target="H037141_files/props0002.xml">
P. v. Manson
Filed 6/29/12 P. v. Manson CA6
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SHAWN W.
MANSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
H037141
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. C1082547)
Defendant
Shawn W. Manson was convicted after jury trial of two counts of lewd acts on a
child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),
and one count of forcible lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). The jury further found that defendant
committed a sexual offense against more than one victim within the meaning of
section 667.61. The jury was unable
to reach a verdict on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under
14 (§ 269) and one count of forcible lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1)), and the court later dismissed those counts upon the People’s
motion. The jury found defendant not
guilty of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and one
count of lewd acts on a child under 14.
The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of 15
years to life.
On
appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction on count 4, the forcible-lewd-acts count involving the victim
Stephanie Doe. He further contends that
the court prejudicially erred in admitting testimony regarding Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). We
disagree with defendant’s contentions, and will therefore affirm the judgment.
Defendant
was charged by first amended information with three counts of
14 (§ 269; counts 1 - 3), three counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 (§
288, subd. (a); counts 6 - 8) and two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 4 & 5).
The information further alleged that defendant committed sexual offenses
against more than one victim within the meaning of section 667.61. The alleged victim of counts 1 through 6 was
Stephanie Doe, and the alleged victim of counts 7 and 8 was Sabrina Doe.
Prior
to trial, the People moved in limine for admission of
“for any purpose either in the People’s case-in-chief or on rebuttal.†Defendant also moved for leave to present “a
counter-expert†if the court denied his motion to exclude CSAAS evidence. The court denied defendant’s motion to
exclude expert testimony regarding CSAAS.
However, the court granted defendant’s motion for leave to call “a
‘counter witness,’ †and the court stated that the CALCRIM instruction relating
to CSAAS evidence would be given to the jury.
At
the time of defendant’s May 2011 trial, Stephanie Doe was 15 years old and
Sabrina Doe, who is Stephanie’s half-sister, was 24 years old. Their mother was 44 years old and defendant,
who was a friend of their mother’s, and who had a key to their family home, was
about eight years younger. Stephanie has
known defendant all of her life, and Sabrina has known him since she was about
10 years old. Defendant often babysat
Sabrina, Stephanie, and their brother who is three years older than
Stephanie. Stephanie testified that “for
the most part,†she had “a good relationship with†defendant. “He was always nice to me.â€
Stephanie
testified that when she was about five years old, she went on a trip to
Legoland and Knott’s Berry Farm with her mother, father, brother, Sabrina, and
defendant. Defendant had “his own roomâ€
and her family had “our own room†at their hotel. At some point on the trip, after a day at
Legoland, Stephanie told her mother that she had to go to the bathroom. Defendant said that he would take her. When she came out of the bathroom in the
hotel room, defendant came close to her, put one hand down her pants, and
touched her vagina and her buttocks for about 30 seconds to a minute. She tried to move away from him but he held
her back with his other hand; she felt like she could not get away. When they heard what sounded like Stephanie’s
mother’s voice, defendant stopped what he was doing and they left the hotel
room, but nobody was there. They
returned to Legoland and had been gone for approximately 10 minutes.
Stephanie
further testified that she was six when her family stopped seeing defendant
regularly, but her mother did not tell her why.
She first “recall[ed]†defendant’s molestations of her when she was 10
years old while she was in bible class at school. However, she did not tell anybody about the
molestations at that time.
When
Stephanie was 14, while she was attending a church camp, she told her group
leader that she had been molested by a family friend when she was younger. Stephanie did not disclose any details of the
molestations or name the molester, but she said that the group leader was the
first person to know about it. The group
leader told Stephanie that she should let her parents know. When Stephanie returned home, another camp
leader accompanied her and was present when Stephanie disclosed to her mother
that defendant had molested her.
Stephanie’s mother was shocked and started crying; she did not ask
Stephanie for any details. The next day,
Stephanie’s mother took her to file a police report and they were later
separately interviewed by Detective Mark Natividad. The detective told Stephanie’s mother that he
wanted to talk to Sabrina and to Stephanie’s brother about defendant, and the
detective said that she should not discuss any details about Stephanie’s
disclosure with them before his interviews.
Stephanie’s
mother called a family meeting at her home.
At the meeting were Stephanie, Sabrina, Sabrina’s husband, Stephanie’s
and Sabrina’s mother, their mother’s husband (Stephanie’s father and Sabrina’s
stepfather), their brother, and two of Stephanie’s church youth leaders. Sabrina and her brother thought it unusual
that people other than family members were at the meeting, but they had no idea
what the meeting was about. Stephanie’s
mother said Stephanie had something to say.
Stephanie asked if everyone remembered defendant and, before she said
anything else, Sabrina ran out of the room saying “no, no, no.†After Sabrina left the room, Stephanie said
that defendant had molested her, but she did not go into detail.
Sabrina’s
mother and husband followed Sabrina.
Sabrina locked herself in the bathroom and cried. She said, “it’s my fault, it’s my
fault.†She continued crying after she
came out of the bathroom and her mother asked her if she needed to talk to a
detective. Sabrina answered yes, but she
did not say anything further. The next
day, Sabrina’s mother called Detective Natividad.
Sabrina
testified that when she was about 10 or 11 years old, while she was still in
grammar school, and while her mother and stepfather were having marital
problems, she sometimes went with her mother to visit defendant and stay at his
parents’ house. There, Sabrina slept in
a sleeping bag on the floor in an upstairs bedroom in her jeans and a
T-shirt. She remembers waking up in the
sleeping bag, which was unzipped, being rocked back and forth, and feeling
defendant behind her with an erection and with his hand on her stomach. She knew it was defendant because of the way
his hand felt. He did not say anything
and neither did she; she pretended that she was still asleep. She could not tell if defendant had clothes
on. The rocking occurred “for a little
while[,] it wasn’t just real quick.†She
did not tell anybody about it, and it happened again each of the “handful†of,
or less than five, times she spent the night at defendant’s parents’ house.
Sabrina
also testified that there was a mattress in the living room of her mother’s
house, and she used to watch television while on it. Sometimes, when defendant later came to the
house to babysit when Sabrina’s mother and stepfather were gone, defendant
wrestled with her on the mattress, during which time he would pin her down on
her back, straddle her legs, and press their private parts against each other
while he had an erection. Each time he
did this, she tried to move away, but he held her down. Sometimes he put his hand over or under her
shirt but over her bra and quickly grabbed her breast, or he tried to put his
hand on her buttocks as she “squirm[ed]†and tried to push him away. The wrestling incidents occurred at least two
to three times a week over a couple years.
Sabrina
testified that she did not tell her mother about any of these incidents because
she did not know what to say or do, so she kept them to herself. The first person she told about the incidents
was Detective Natividad.
Sabrina
further testified that she spent a lot of time with defendant when she was
between the ages of 10 and 12. Often,
just the two of them went to the mall, out to eat, to the store, or to the
movies, but there was nothing sexual about their relationship. Defendant did put his arm around her waist or
hold her by her hip when they walked around the mall. When she was 13 or 14, her mother “shut[]
down the family’s relationship with†defendant without telling her why. However, the family continued to see him on
occasion, such as when defendant and his then girlfriend, now wife, visited
Sabrina in the hospital after she had her first child. Sabrina testified that she did not tell
defendant on that occasion that she felt that she had been abandoned or
deserted by him.
Stephanie’s
and Sabrina’s mother testified that she and Sabrina often spent the night at
defendant’s parents’ house during a three-year stretch when Sabrina was between
nine and 11 years old. She remembers
that on occasion, defendant would wrestle with her children on the mattress she
had in her living room and that he would pin them down on the floor. She testified that the trip to Legoland
occurred when Stephanie was five years old.
During the trip, they all shared a two-bedroom suite at a Residence Inn
that was near Knott’s Berry Farm and about an hour away from Legoland, and
defendant had one of the bedrooms. There
were times when defendant was alone with Stephanie on the trip. In the morning while the family ate breakfast
outside the suite, defendant would often take one or more of the children back
to the suite before everyone else was finished eating. She remembers that one time defendant took
only Stephanie back to the suite while everyone else was still eating
breakfast.
Sabrina’s
mother further testified that some time after the Legoland trip, when Sabrina
was 13 or 14, she received a call from a friend whose daughter saw defendant
and Sabrina at the mall. The friend told
Sabrina’s mother that her daughter felt that defendant’s and Sabrina’s behavior
there “was not appropriate.†Because
Sabrina’s mother trusted her friend’s judgment, she confronted defendant, but
he said that nothing was going on.
Defendant stopped coming around as often about that same time. Sabrina’s mother had the locks changed on her
family home and she no longer let defendant babysit her children, but she did
not confront Sabrina with what she had heard.
Stephanie’s
and Sabrina’s brother testified that he looked to defendant as his older
brother, and that defendant never molested him.
He also testified that he never saw defendant wrestling with Sabrina or
anyone else in his parent’s home.
Carl
Lewis, a licensed private investigator and consultant on child sexual abuse
issues, testified as an expert in CSAAS.
He testified that CSAAS is not a diagnosis. “It is background information based on
observations and experience that provides alternative explanations for the
often unexpected and often counterintuitive conditions that often appear†in
reported child sexual abuse cases. Lewis
had not done any investigation in or interviewed any of the people involved in
this case because CSAAS “is not something that can be applied to a particular
child or a particular set of facts.†Nor
can it be used to discern between true and false allegations.
CSAAS
explains “that people delay in disclosing and there are some explanations for
why they do delay.†CSAAS has five basic
categories: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed,
conflicted, unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. Each of the categories provides an
alternative explanation for why children do not immediately come forward with
information about a molestation, and not all of the categories may be present
in every case.
Marlaina
Manson, defendant’s wife, testified that she met Sabrina in 2004, at which time
Sabrina seemed “kind of standoffish†and “almost like jealous.†Defendant had not seen Sabrina in the two
years before he and Marlaina saw her in the hospital after she had a baby in
2007. At that time Sabrina said to defendant,
“So you, basically what, you come around after two years and now you are just
going to abandon us again?†Marlaina
encouraged defendant to see Sabrina and her family more often. Just prior to defendant’s arrest, Sabrina
left a couple voicemails for defendant asking him to do some electrical work
for her.
Annette
Ermshar, a neuropsychologist
and board certified forensic psychologist, testified as an expert in CSAAS and
human memory. She testified that infants
and children have “a very poor ability to make memories or to remember
things.†Scientific literature suggests
that memories of things that occurred between the ages of three years and six
years are unlikely to be reliable memories.
However, the consensus is that memories tend to be better for traumatic
events than neutral or positive events.
Dr.
Ermshar further testified that CSAAS has been “rejected†by the American
Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association. It is not a diagnostic tool for forensic
purposes; it does not tell us whether a reported molestation actually
occurred. CSAAS was created to advocate
for the treatment of children “who have known unquestioned, uncontested
histories of child sexual abuse.†It
does not consider alternate explanations for a child’s behavior. There are other explanations for secrets;
helplessness; entrapment; delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and
retractions, that may have nothing to do with actual sexual abuse.
On May 13, 2011, the jury found defendant guilty of counts 4 (§ 288,
subd. (b)(1); forcible lewd acts on Stephanie) and 7 and 8 (§ 288, subd. (a);
lewd acts on Sabrina), and found true the allegation that defendant committed
sexual assaults against more than one victim within the meaning of section
667.61. The jury found defendant not
guilty of counts 3 (§ 269; aggravated sexual assault of Stephanie) and 6 (§
288, subd. (a); lewd acts on Stephanie).
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 1 and 2 (§ 269;
aggravated sexual assault of Stephanie) and count 5 (forcible lewd acts on
Stephanie). On June 30, 2011, the court
sentenced defendant to prison for three consecutive terms of 15 years to
life. The court also granted the
People’s motion to dismiss the counts on which the jury had been unable to
reach a verdict.
Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction on count 4
for forcible lewd acts on Stephanie. He
contends that “her testimony on its face as to the Legoland incident falls into
the category of inherently improbable and thus insufficient to sustain the
conviction for this count. Her account
was demonstrably false in the context of other known aspects about the trip, as
described [by] her mother and as established by independent evidence.†Defendant requests that a judgment of
acquittal be entered on count 4.
The
People contend that, “[a]lthough Stephanie and [her mother] offered conflicting
testimony as to the exact timing of the incident, a reasonable jury could have
found that the sexual abuse occurred.â€
“Resolving conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding that [defendant] committed a lewd act on
Stephanie during the 2001 trip to Southern California.â€
“The
standard of appellate review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is
settled. On appeal, ‘ “we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.†[Citation.]’
[Citation.] In conducting such a
review, we ‘ “presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.†[Citation.]’
[Citations.] ‘Conflicts and even
testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal
of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Lee (2011) 51
Cal.4th 620, 632.)
“An
appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn
from the circumstantial evidence.†(
396.) “ ‘It is blackletter law that any
conflict or contradiction in the evidence, or any inconsistency in the
testimony of witnesses must be resolved by the trier of fact who is the sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
It is well settled in California that one witness, if believed by the
jury, is sufficient to sustain a verdict.’ â€
(People v. Watts (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258-1259; see also People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608-609.) Reversal is warranted only if it appears “
‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].’ †(
297, 331.)
In
this case, defendant points to numerous conflicts between Stephanie’s testimony
and her mother’s testimony and the other evidence presented about the family’s
trip to visit Legoland in order to support his contention that Stephanie’s
claim that defendant molested her on that trip is demonstrably false. For instance, he points to conflicts in the
evidence regarding who proposed the trip, what time of day the family left on
the trip, and where the inn the family stayed at was located in relation to
Legoland. However, we find that, even with
the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence that defendant points to,
there is ample evidence to support defendant’s conviction on count 4.
Stephanie’s mother testified that while
on that trip, her family and defendant ate breakfast outside their suite. Often, defendant would take one or more of
the children back to the suite before their parents were through eating. And, Stephanie’s mother recalled one instance
where defendant took only Stephanie back to the suite while everybody else was
still eating. Stephanie testified that
on one occasion while on that trip, defendant took her back to the suite alone,
and that after she left the bathroom in the suite, defendant put his hand down
her pants and touched her vagina and buttocks.
He stopped when they heard what they thought was Stephanie’s mother’s
voice outside the suite. That Stephanie
thought that the lewd acts occurred after she and defendant walked to the suite
directly from Legoland, yet there was other evidence demonstrating that this was
impossible, does not warrant reversal of the judgment. Stephanie’s testimony regarding where (in the
hotel suite during the family trip to Legoland), when (after defendant had
taken her back to the suite alone), and how the actual lewd acts occurred (defendant
put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina and buttocks), which was
believed by the jury, is not inherently improbable and is sufficient to sustain
the jury’s verdict. (
Cal.4th at p. 632.)
Defendant argues that his case is “akinâ€
to People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d
134 (Lang). We disagree.
In that case, nine-year-old twin sisters both claimed that, in separate
incidents in almost identical circumstances at a birthday party for the
defendant, he placed them on his lap “in full view of various party-goers,†and
put his hand in their vaginas for three to five minutes. (Id.
at pp. 136-137.) The Supreme Court
concluded that an argument that the sexual molestation described by
twin sisters was “physically impossible†and that their testimony was
“demonstrably false†had arguable merit.
(Id. at p. 139.) “[A] strong argument could have been made
that the twins’ testimony was inherently improbable and insubstantial†because
“[e]ach child, using almost identical words, told of unsuccessfully resisting
separate but identical assaults by [the] defendant in the presence of from six
to twelve persons, none of whom saw either assault.†(Ibid.) Accordingly, the court found that the
defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his former
appellate counsel refused to raise an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on
appeal even though the defendant clearly wanted him to. (Id.
at pp. 136, 138-139.)
in this case did not have any of the indicia of inherent improbability present
in Lang. Her testimony regarding the assault was not
almost identical to any other reported assault and did not occur in the
presence of other persons who did not see it.
The evidence supporting the conviction for forcible lewd acts on
Stephanie was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction on count 4. Reversal
of the conviction is not warranted. (
Defendant
contends that the court prejudicially erred in admitting CSAAS evidence,
violating his rights to a fair trial
and due process. “CSAAS evidence of the
type admitted here was erroneously admitted inasmuch as it is irrelevant, not
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and does not meet the
requirement of expert testimony that it be beyond the common knowledge of the
jury.†“The fact that in previous years,
reviewing courts have sanctioned the admissibility of CSAAS evidence does not
require that the practice be continued.â€
The
People contend that the trial court properly admitted CSAAS evidence in this
case: “Defense counsel put Stephanie’s
credibility at issue by noting that she delayed reporting the abuse for many
yearsâ€; “[t]he evidence introduced targeted the misconception that a delayed
report of sexual abuse is less credibleâ€; and “[t]he trial court gave the
proper limiting instruction.â€
In
California, when a defendant suggests that an alleged child sexual abuse
victim’s conduct is inconsistent with his or her accusations of that abuse,
expert testimony on CSAAS has been held admissible to disabuse jurors of
commonly held misconceptions about how child sexual abuse victims behave. (See, e.g., People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 406-407;
1210, 1216; People v. Patino (1994)
26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745; People v.
Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-957; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391-394.) Noting that other states limit or exclude
CSAAS evidence (see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Dunkle (Pa. 1992) 602 A.2d 830, 833-834 [CSAAS has not gained general
acceptance in the scientific community]; State
v. Bolin (Tenn. 1996) 922 S.W.2d 870, 873-874 [same]; Sanderson v. Commonwealth (Ky. 2009) 291 S.W.3d 610, 613 [same]),
defendant urges this court to hold that CSAAS testimony is inadmissible as
improper, irrelevant expert opinion which usurps the jury’s function to
determine credibility.
In
People v. Perez (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 231, this court rejected a similar challenge to the admissibility
of CSAAS evidence. We found “no reason
to depart from recent precedent, to wit:
‘CSAAS cases involve expert testimony regarding the responses of a child
molestation victim. Expert testimony on
the common reactions of a child molestation victim is not admissible to prove
the sex crime charged actually occurred.
However, CSAAS testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate [the molestation
victim’s] credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct
after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or
her testimony claiming molestation.
[Citations.]†’ (
Cal.App.4th 994, 1001; see People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300-1301 . . . .) Moreover, it appears that our Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion in People v.
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906, in which case we are bound by its
reasoning (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455).â€
(People v. Perez,
In
this case, Stephanie and Sabrina testified that they delayed reporting
defendant’s molestations of them.
However, they also both testified that they generally had a good
relationship with defendant, that he was always good to them, and that they
enjoyed seeing and spending time with him.
Therefore, expert testimony on CSAAS was admissible “ ‘ “to disabuse
jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain
the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior. . . .†[Citation.]’ †(People
v. Sandoval, supra, 164
Cal.App.4th at p. 1002; People v. Perez,
supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p.
245.) The trial court allowed defendant
to present expert testimony that CSAAS has not attained scientific acceptance
and the court instructed the jury with the pattern instruction on CSAAS
evidence.
Stephanie’s and Sabrina’s testimony, and not consider the CSAAS testimony as
evidence that defendant committed all of the crimes charged against him, is
shown by the fact that the jury found defendant not guilty of two of the
charged counts and was unable to reach a verdict on three other counts. Accordingly, any error in the admission of
the CSAAS evidence in this case did not constitute prejudicial error. (See People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People
v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d
at p. 395; People v. Patino,
p. 1747.) Defendant has not shown a
violation of his rights to a fair trial and due process.
The
judgment is affirmed.
___________________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________
MIHARA, J.
__________________________
DUFFY, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
counts for which defendant was convicted.
