P. v Lynch
Filed 2/7/12 P. v Lynch CA4/1
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LEE ROY LYNCH,
Defendant and Appellant.
D058719
(Super. Ct.
No. SCD194246)
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
Lee Roy Lynch shot his
girlfriend in the chest. When the
girlfriend recovered, they moved to Arizona
and married. About five years and four
months after the shooting, Lynch was arrested and charged with
other felonies arising from the shooting (counts 2 through 6). A jury convicted Lynch of the charged crimes,
and the court sentenced Lynch to prison for 17 years.
This is Lynch's second appeal. In his first appeal, Lynch challenged his
conviction on numerous grounds, including that the trial court erred in denying
his posttrial motion to dismiss counts
2 through 6 as barred by the three-year limitations period. (People
v. Lynch (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1262 (Lynch
I).) We rejected each of these
contentions, except that we remanded the case "to the trial court for the
limited purpose of holding a hearing to determine whether Lynch's prosecution
on counts 2 through 6 was time-barred."
(Id. at p. 1265.) On remand, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing and found Lynch's prosecution on these counts was timely
because the statute of limitations was tolled while Lynch lived in Arizona. The court then reinstated the judgment as to
counts 2 through 6.
In this appeal Lynch
challenges the trial court's factual finding that he was outside California
for a sufficient time to toll the limitations period. We conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court's factual finding and affirm the order reinstating Lynch's
conviction.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. Background
On December 8, 2001, Lynch shot his girlfriend,
Latoya Younger, in the chest. Younger
sustained life-threatening injuries,
but survived the shooting. (
1265-1266.) After she was released from the hospital,
Lynch and Younger moved to Arizona
and married. (Id. at pp. 1267, 1268.)
About four years and five
months after the shooting, on May 8, 2006, the district attorney filed an
information alleging Lynch committed attempted murder (count 1), assault with a
firearm (count 2), corporal injury to a cohabitant (count 3), negligent
discharge of a firearm (count 4), being a felon in possession of a firearm
(count 5), and being a felon in possession of ammunition (count 6). (Lynch
I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1268-1269.) All of the counts were allegedly committed on
December 8, 2001. (Id. at
p. 1269.)
Although counts 2 through
6 are governed by a three-year limitations period (Pen. Code,
information did not include tolling or other allegations explaining the delay
in filing the charges. (
1269-1270, 1271.) Additionally, neither
the prosecutor nor defense counsel raised the limitations issue at trial. (Id.
at pp. 1269-1271.) Lynch testified at
trial that he and Younger lived in Winslow, Arizona
for about "a year and a half" after the shooting, but the record was
unclear as to the actual dates that Lynch lived outside of California. (Id.
at pp. 1268, 1270.) The jury convicted
Lynch as charged. (Id. at p. 1269.)
At the hearing on his new
trial motion, Lynch raised the issue for the first time that charges 2 through
6 were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, and requested that the
court dismiss these counts. (
at p. 1271.)
Lynch appealed his
conviction on various grounds, including that the prosecution of counts 2
through 6 was untimely. (
must be reversed because the information was untimely on its face and the
prosecutor did not present evidence at trial supporting a tolling theory. (Id. at
pp. 1269-1277.) In response, the
Attorney General conceded that the charging document, on its face, showed
counts 2 through 6 were outside the limitations period and that the timeliness
issue can be raised at any time. (
the evidence at trial was unclear as to whether the limitations period was
tolled. (Id. at pp. 1269, 1272.) The
Attorney General, however, disagreed with Lynch's requested reversal
remedy. The Attorney General instead
urged this court to remand for a determination as to whether the statute was
tolled for the period Lynch was out of the state. (Id.
at pp. 1265, 1269.)
We agreed with the Attorney
General's position. (
the defendant had pled guilty, but on appeal argued for the first time that the
information filed against him was untimely on its face. (Id. at
p. 338.) The Court of Appeal found it
was unable to determine from the record whether the prosecution was timely and
remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to make that determination. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that if "the court cannot determine from the available record
whether the action is barred, it should hold a hearing or, if it is an
appellate court, it should remand for a hearing." (Id.
at p. 341.)
We rejected Lynch's
arguments that his case was distinguishable from Williams and that the People had forfeited the opportunity to
litigate the factual issues related to the statute of limitations. (Lynch
I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1273-1277.) We thus remanded the case to the trial court
for a hearing to determine whether counts 2 through 6 were prosecuted within
the statute of limitations. (
right to a jury trial on the statute of limitations question because he did not
raise the issue until after he was convicted of the offense. (Id.
at pp. 1275-1277.)
In our Disposition
section, we stated: "Lynch's
conviction for attempted murder is affirmed.
The judgment with respect to counts 2 through 6 is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for a determination as to whether the prosecution of counts
2 through 6 was time-barred. Following
such determination, the court shall reinstate the judgment of conviction as to
each timely count." (
1278.)
B. Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary
hearing on remand, the prosecutor argued that the charges on counts 2 through 6
were timely because: (1) Lynch committed
the crimes on December 8, 2001; (2) on May 8, 2006, Lynch was arraigned on an
information alleging these felony counts; (3) the governing limitations period
required the prosecution to commence the case within three years from the date
the crimes were committed; (4) although the time between the commission of the
crimes and the arraignment was about four years and five months (17 months
beyond the three-year statutory period), the limitations period was tolled for
22 months because Lynch lived in Arizona for this time period.
To support its argument
that Lynch lived in Arizona for 22 months after committing the crimes, the
prosecutor presented facts showing that Lynch lived in Winslow, Arizona from
March 15, 2002 until June 30, 2003 (about 15 and one-half months) and he lived
in Glendale, Arizona from June 30, 2003 through January 22, 2004 (about six and
one-half months). This evidence was as
follows.
First, the prosecutor
presented a portion of Lynch's trial testimony in which Lynch said that after
Younger was released from the hospital from her gunshot wound, the two moved in
together behind her "granddaddy['s] house." Lynch said they then moved to Winslow,
Arizona and stayed with Lynch's father for
a few months. Lynch testified the two
were then "able to get a place out there [in Arizona]
of our own." Lynch said that they
moved back to San Diego
"[a]bout a year and a half" later as Younger did not like Arizona
because "Everybody out there is my kinfolk. Small, little town. So she didn't have no freedom."
Second, the prosecutor
called witness Clifford Renfro, who testified that in March 2002 he rented an
apartment to Lynch and Younger in Winslow, Arizona. Renfro personally collected the rent each
month and would generally see Lynch at those times. Lynch told Renfro he had a job in a nearby
town, and Renfro sometimes saw Lynch coming home dressed in a manner consistent
with having been at work. Renfro said
that he knew that Lynch's father also lived in Winslow. On June 30, 2003, Renfro saw Lynch leaving
the apartment in a U-Haul truck and Lynch told him he was moving out. Renfro checked the apartment and found
several employment pay check stubs in Lynch's name.
Third, the prosecutor
presented the testimony of a financial manager (Veronica Jimenez) of a large
apartment complex in Glendale, Arizona.
The financial manager authenticated a computer-generated document
entitled "Resident Ledger," showing that Lynch (along with Younger
and Younger's mother (Yvonne Pradd)) were the named tenants of an apartment
unit at the Glendale apartment complex.
The ledger shows that the "Move In" date was June 30, 2003 and
the "Move Out" date was January 22, 2004. The ledger also shows the payment history for
the unit, including that the rent was paid on Lynch's apartment unit for five
months from June 30, 2003 through November 2003, and the account was sent to
collections on January 27, 2004.
During
no personal knowledge of when Lynch moved in or out of the apartment unit, and
there was no information on the ledger as to who made the rental payments. She also stated it was possible that Lynch
had moved out of the apartment and left his wife living there, but there was no
indication in the records that this had occurred.
At the evidentiary
hearing, Lynch did not present any affirmative evidence other than requesting
the court take judicial notice of the probation report, but argued the
prosecution did not meet its burden of
proof.
After allowing the
parties to submit written briefs and present oral argument, the court found the
prosecution proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lynch lived in
Arizona from March 15, 2002 until January 22, 2004. The court thus ruled that the statute of
limitations was tolled for the 22-month period that Lynch was living in Arizona
and thus counts 2 through 6 had been timely filed.
The court stated: "Four years and five months [after the
crimes were committed], the defendant was arraigned on the information charging
the defendant with attempted murder and various other crimes which occurred on
December [8], 2001. [¶] This court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant left the state of California and resided in the
state of Arizona from March 15, 2002, through January 22nd, 2004, a period of
22 months. [¶] During those 22 months, the defendant was
outside of the State of California.
Therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled for those 22
months. And the court finds that the
charges in counts 2 through 6 were not time barred by the statute of
limitations."
DISCUSSION
Lynch contends the evidence is insufficient to support
the trial court's finding that counts 2 through 6 were filed within the
I. Legal
Principles
Under section 801, a
three-year limitations period applies to the charges filed under counts 2
through 6 in this case. Under this
statute, the case must be "commenced within three years" after the
crime was committed, unless the time period is tolled. (§§ 801, 803.)
For purposes of this case, the parties agree the case was
"commenced" on the date the information was filed, May 8, 2006. (See § 804, subd. (a).) Under section 803, subdivision (d), the
limitations period is tolled while "the defendant is out of the state when
or after the offense is committed . . . ."
The
prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the criminal action was commenced
within the applicable limitations period and/or that a statutory tolling period
applies. (People v. Castillo (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 364, 369.) On appeal, we review the court's factual
findings under the substantial evidence review standard. (Ibid.) Under this standard, we
examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the finding below
" ' "to determine whether it discloses
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier
of fact could [make the finding]."
[Citation.]' [Citations.] 'Substantial
evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] We ' " 'presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
[Citation.]" (People v.
Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942-943.)
II.
On the record before it,
the trial court had a reasonable basis to conclude the matter was timely filed
because the evidence showed Lynch lived outside of California for at least 20
months between the time he committed the offenses and the time he was arraigned
on the charges.
The testimony of Lynch's
landlord (Renfro) in Winslow, Arizona supported that Lynch lived in Winslow
from March 15, 2002 until June 30, 2003, approximately 15 and one-half
months. Renfro testified he had personal
knowledge that Lynch moved into the apartment on March 15, 2002, and he would
see Lynch every month when rent was collected.
Renfro saw Lynch move out on June 30, 2003, leaving in a U-Haul
truck. Additionally, Renfro occasionally
saw Lynch in work clothes while he was living in Winslow and he found copies of
Lynch's pay stubs shortly after Lynch moved out of the apartment.
The
record also shows that on the same day they left Winslow, Arizona (June 30,
2003), Lynch and his wife rented an apartment about 200 miles away in Glendale,
Arizona. The record shows rent was paid
for this apartment through November 2003, and the official move-out date was
January 22, 2004. Although there was no
evidence that anyone saw Lynch actually living in this apartment, the fact that
he rented the apartment on the same day he moved out of the Winslow apartment
and that rent was paid on this apartment through November 2003 creates a
reasonable inference that Lynch was in fact living in this apartment at that
time.
In
reaching this conclusion, we are aware that although the official move-out date
was January 22, 2004, the financial manager acknowledged this date merely
reflected the date that the landlord retook possession of the property. Thus, because rent was paid through November
2003, it is reasonable to conclude only that Lynch lived in the Glendale,
Arizona apartment complex until November 2003.
However, even with this finding, the record shows that Lynch lived in
Glendale, Arizona for five months.
Considering
all of the evidence presented at the hearing together with Lynch's testimony at
trial that he lived in Arizona for about one year and a half after Younger was
shot, the trial court had a reasonable basis to find that (1) Lynch lived in
Winslow, Arizona for at least 15 months (March 15, 2002 through June 30, 2003);
and (2) Lynch lived in Glendale, Arizona for at least five months (June 30,
2003 through November 30, 2003). The 15
months in Winslow, Arizona and five months in Glendale, Arizona equals 20
months in Arizona between the time Lynch committed the crimes and the time he
was arraigned. The information was filed
17 months beyond the three-year statutory period. On this record, the court had a sufficient
basis to conclude the limitations period was tolled for at least 20 months and
thus the matter was timely.
Lynch's
arguments challenging this conclusion are unpersuasive. First, Lynch argues that "[m]aintaining
a residency in another state" does not necessarily establish that Lynch
was not in California during the time period.
We agree with this general proposition, but it does not undermine the
court's factual finding in this case.
The record supports that Lynch moved to Arizona with his girlfriend
(later his wife) soon after his girlfriend was released from the hospital after
being treated for gunshot injuries caused by Lynch shooting her in the
chest. The record also shows that Lynch
and Younger lived with Lynch's father for a couple of months in Arizona and
later rented two places in Arizona. The
prosecution presented evidence showing Lynch was working in Arizona while he
lived in the Winslow apartment. The
evidence also shows that he (or someone on his behalf) was paying rent on the
Glendale apartment until November 2003.
Lynch did not testify at the hearing or present any evidence disputing
the facts that he lived in Arizona during this time period, nor did he present
any evidence that he returned to California during this time.
Based
on the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that Lynch was
in Arizona during at least a 20-month period and did not return to
California. Although this may not have
been the only inference, it was one reasonable inference based on the
evidence. The prosecution was required
to prove the tolling facts by a preponderance of the evidence. The court did not err in concluding that the
prosecution met its burden in this case.
Lynch
also argues the evidence does not support that he was a named tenant on the
Glendale apartment lease. However, we
have examined the submitted documents and find they support that he was a named
tenant of the apartment unit. The
computer generated "Resident Ledger" document identifies the tenants
as: "Yvonne Pradd Lee R. Lynch Jr.,
Latoya Younger, &." Viewing
this document in the light most favorable to the court's findings, the court
had a reasonable basis to conclude that three names were listed on the
lease: Yvonne Pradd (Younger's mother),
Lee R. Lynch, Jr. (the defendant here), and Latoya Younger. Although there was no comma between Yvonne
Pradd's name and Lynch's name, it is reasonable to infer this was simply a
clerical error occurring when the apartment staff inputted these names into the
computer. The fact that Pradd's name is
also on the lease (along with Lynch and Younger) appears to show that she was a
cosigner on the lease for her daughter and son-in-law.
In
arguing the evidence did not show his name was on the lease, Lynch directs us
to the testimony of the Glendale apartment's financial manager wherein the
prosecutor asked the manager to "tell us the name of the tenant that this
resident ledger applies to," and the financial manager (looking at the
Resident Ledger document) responded:
"That would be [Y]vonne Pradd Lynch, Jr., and Latoya Younger." The fact that the financial manager
inadvertently read the ledger as if there were two names rather than three does
not show the court erred in finding Lynch's name was on the lease. The name "Yvonne Pradd Lynch, Jr."
was an obvious misreading of the document because it merged Lynch's name with
his mother-in-law's name: Pradd is
Younger's mother's name and Lee Lynch is the defendant's name.
The record supports a
finding that the statute of limitations was tolled for at least 20 months while
Lynch was living in Arizona. Because the
statute was tolled for the amount of time Lynch was living in Arizona, counts 2
through 6 were brought within the statute of limitations. Thus, the court did not err in reinstating
the conviction on these counts.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE,
J.
IRION,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
The underlying facts are detailed
in Lynch I. (Lynch
I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1262.) In
this opinion, we discuss only those facts relevant to the limitations issue.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
All further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
