P. v. Jones
Filed 10/9/13 P. v. Jones CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
JONALA ABRISHA JONES,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E056161
(Super.Ct.No.
RIF1101090)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of
County. Charles J.
Koosed, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice
R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and
Elizabeth M. Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A
jury found defendant and appellant Jonala Abrisha Jones and codefendant Sada
Corneil
produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)
codefendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant thereafter waived her
she had suffered one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(1)).
years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike her prior strike
conviction or the great bodily injury enhancement. We reject this contention and affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Defendant
and the victim used to be “best†friends until defendant suspected the victim
of starting a relationship with the father of defendant’s baby. Codefendant Corneil was also acquainted with
the victim, but they were never friends.
On
October 18, 2010, the
victim and her mother were outside of a friend’s apartment in Riverside
smoking a cigarette when they saw defendant and her friends walk by. Defendant was glaring at the victim. The victim asked defendant if she had a
problem. Defendant did not say anything
and continued to walk down the sidewalk.
Approximately
30 to 45 minutes later, someone came to the friend’s apartment door and told
the victim to come outside and fight defendant.
One of the girls with defendant said, “‘You better open up the door or
we going to kick this bitch in.’â€
The
victim’s mother went outside and spoke with defendant, trying to calm her
down. She stated they were all friends
and asked, “‘Why you letting somebody come between you all?’†After a few minutes, the victim came outside
and stood next to her mother. Defendant
then began calling the victim a whore and accused her of sleeping around. An argument ensued between the victim and
defendant. After the two stopped
arguing, everyone began walking away as if the confrontation was over. However, as the victim was walking away,
defendant punched the victim on the side of her head and the two began fighting.
Defendant
and the victim were taking swings at each other until they both fell to the
ground. Defendant jumped on top of the
victim and began punching her in the face.
other girls, including codefendant Corneil, jumped in and began punching and
kicking her. The victim’s mother
attempted to get the girls off her daughter, saying it was no longer a fair
fight, but got punched in the jaw by codefendant Corneil instead. The fight eventually stopped and everyone
left the area.
The
victim was taken to the hospital by paramedics.
She had a light depression on her left cheek, bruising on her face, and
swelling in her nose. She suffered a
fracture in her maxillary sinus that was caused by a hard punch to the face,
and her doctor had to pop her nose back into place. The victim was in pain for about three to
four months after the assault; her nose and the left side of her face were numb
for about four months; and she had to see a doctor three or four times after her
initial hospital visit.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to strike her
prior strike conviction or the great bodily
allegation pursuant to section 1385.
Essentially, she claims that under the totality of the circumstances a
12-year sentence was not warranted in this case. We disagree.
Under section
1385, subdivision (a), the trial court has discretion to strike a prior felony
conviction allegation in furtherance of justice. (People
v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) In order to do
so, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances
of his [or her] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his [or her] background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he [or she] had not previously
been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.†(People
v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) A trial court must enter a statement of
reasons in the minutes of the court when dismissing a prior conviction;
however, it is not required to “‘explain its decision not to exercise its power
to dismiss or strike.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376 (Carmony).)
We review the
trial court’s refusal to strike a prior felony conviction under section 1385
for abuse of discretion. (
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that the trial court’s
decision was unreasonable or arbitrary.
(People v. Superior Court (
[presumption that trial court acts to achieve lawful sentencing
objectives].) “Where the record
demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an
impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the
trial court’s ruling. . . .†(
305, 310.) “‘[I]t is not enough to show
that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’
prior conviction allegations.†(
“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.†(Id.
at p. 377.)
Defendant
filed a written motion to dismiss her prior 2009 strike conviction for residential
burglary, claiming she fell outside the spirit of the three strikes law based
on her personal background and the circumstances surrounding her prior and
present offenses. In regard to her
personal background, defendant asserts that she was born to a teen mother who
was in and out of prison during her childhood.
As a result, she was placed in foster care many times and was unable to
graduate high school. She also states that
she was sexually molested as a child; that she had been diagnosed with bipolar
manic disorder; that she became pregnant with her first child at 17 years old;
and that she gave birth to her second child while in custody in the instant
matter. She further claims that despite
her challenges, she had been employed at a McDonald’s and other fast food
restaurants; that she was involved in school sports and modeling; that she had
participated in the Junior Olympics in 2005; and that she suffered no juvenile
adjudications. Defendant also states that
while in custody she had obtained her GED, completed anger management classes,
and planned to complete her sentence, reenter society, obtain employment, and
raise her two children.
In regard to her
prior offense, defendant claims that she was 18 years old and five months
pregnant at the time she committed the burglary with the father of her
baby. She also asserts that no one was
inside the residence at the time of the offense; that no one was physically
injured; and that she took responsibility for her role in the burglary. In regard to her current offense, defendant
claims that she did not display criminal sophistication or planning in carrying
out the crime; that the fight was an impulsive act; that she did not use any
weapons; and that the fight was mutual.
She also asserts that participation in the instant offense “is
understandable given the all-consuming fight culture†she inhabits “where
physical altercations are a normal, everyday occurrence, a routine, seemingly
unavoidable means to settle differences, even between friends, and then
forgotten.â€
The People filed a
written opposition to defendant’s motion to strike, claiming that defendant was
on probation for her first strike offense when she committed the instant
offense. The People also assert that
defendant’s prior strike was very recent and that the instant crime was a
serious, violent crime, showing defendant’s criminal conduct had
escalated.
At the sentencing
hearing, the trial court noted that it had read defendant’s motion to dismiss
her prior strike conviction as well as the People’s opposition. After defense counsel submitted on the
written motion and hearing the prosecutor’s brief remarks, the trial court
explained that it “had looked at this long and hard†and concluded that defendant
fell within the spirit of the three strikes law. The court explained,
“. . . unfortunately for [defendant], I don’t see how her
situation really falls under the full spirit of what Romero I think is all about.
She’s actually the opposite, which is she seems to fall under the spirit
of three strikes in that she has a residential burglary which is a strike,
which isn’t that old, and then gets herself involved in a second strike. I mean I fear for [defendant]. I fear that she will spend the rest of her
life in prison if things don’t get turned around. [¶]
You know, you have a strike offense committed while on probation for a
first strike offense. It would be an
extreme stretch I think and an abuse of my discretion of that authority vested
by Romero for me to grant such a
motion.â€
The trial court
thereafter denied defendant’s motion to strike her prior conviction, and
proceeded to sentence defendant to a total term of 12 years in state prison as
follows: the low term of two years for
the current aggravated assault
conviction, doubled to four years due to the prior strike conviction, five
years for the prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision
(a), plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court refused to stay the punishment for
the great bodily injury enhancement, noting that the jury found the allegation
to be true and the facts were consistent with that finding.
Defendant argues
that based on the totality of the circumstances as set out ante, the trial court’s imposition of an additional two years for
the prior strike constituted an abuse of discretion.
Based on
defendant’s entire record, including her background, the nature and
circumstances of her current and past convictions, and her prospects, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike defendant’s prior 2009
burglary conviction. As the trial court said, defendant had engaged in violent
criminal conduct while on probation for her prior strike conviction. She reoffended less than two years after her
first strike conviction by committing a violent assault causing great bodily
injury and thereby showing an escalation of criminal conduct. There is nothing in the record to show that
the trial court declined to exercise its discretion on improper reasons or that
it failed to consider the relevant factors, including defendant’s personal and
criminal background and the circumstances of the past and present
offenses. In fact, the record clearly
shows the court was aware of its discretion, aware of the applicable factors a
court must consider in dismissing a prior strike, and appropriately applied the
factors as outlined in Williams. Thus, the trial court reasonably concluded
that defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the three strikes law.
Alternatively,
defendant claims the trial court should have stricken the additional punishment
for the great bodily injury enhancement.
We disagree.
Under section
1385, a trial court has the discretion to strike a great bodily injury enhancement
upon a statement of reasons in the furtherance of justice. (People
v. Thomas (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 396, 403-405.) And, as previously mentioned, a trial court’s
decision not to exercise its section 1385 discretion to dismiss is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (
The trial court
here properly declined to strike the great bodily injury enhancement, and
thoughtfully rendered its decision after balancing the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The record shows,
as pointed out by the trial court, that defendant returned to the apartment to
engage in a fight with the victim and waited until the victim was off guard to
punch her in the side of the head. As a
result of the assault, the victim suffered severe injuries, including a broken
nose. There is nothing in the record to
demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or irrational. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to strike the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement.
III
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
KING
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] Codefendant Corneil is not a party to this
appeal.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] All future statutory references are to the
Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
