P. v. Johnson
Filed 12/4/13 P. v. Johnson CA3
Reposted to provide correct document
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PETER JESSE JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
C072646
(Super. Ct. No. 11F05748)
Officers executed a search warrant
at defendant Peter Jesse Johnson’s home, conducted an analysis of his computer,
and located more than 30 videos depicting minors (some under 10 years old)
committing acts of sexual intercourse
with adults.
Defendant pleaded no contest to
trial court granted defendant’s motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor (§
17, subd. (b)), denied his equal protection challenge to the imposition of sex
offender registration, and placed defendant on formal probation for three years
with various terms and conditions, including 360 days in jail and the
requirement that defendant register as a sex offender.
On appeal, defendant reasserts his claim
that it violates equal protection to impose mandatory lifetime sex offender
registration on his misdemeanor conviction for possession of child pornography.
We conclude the holding in
211 Cal.App.4th 132 (Gonzalez)
is on point. A person convicted of
possessing child pornography, an offense requiring mandatory registration, is
not similarly situated to a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse
with a minor, an offense for which registration is at the discretion of the
trial court, and hence defendant’s equal protection claim lacks merit. We will affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Sex offender registration is mandatory for the
sex offenses specified in section 290, subdivision (c). (§ 290, subd. (c).) The offense involved in this case, a
violation of section 311.11, is included in section 290, subdivision (c). All other sex offenses are subject to
registration at the sentencing court’s discretion “if the court finds at the
time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a
result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. The court shall state on the record the
reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring registration.†(§ 290.006.)
Defendant claims it violates equal
protection to impose mandatory registration on his misdemeanor section 311.11
violation, when similarly situated offenders who commit unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor in violation of section 261.5 are only subject to
discretionary registration. Defendant cites
People v. Hofsheier (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier) in
support of his contention. That case
involved a 22–year–old man who engaged in nonforcible oral copulation with a
16–year–old girl. (Id. at pp. 1192–1193.) The
California Supreme Court explained that the first prerequisite to a meritorious
equal protection claim is a showing that the state has adopted a classification
that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (Id.
at p. 1199.) The Supreme Court observed
that “section 288a(b)(1) [oral copulation] and section 261.5 [sexual
intercourse] both concern sexual conduct with minors. The only difference between the two offenses
is the nature of the sexual act. Thus,
persons convicted of oral copulation with minors and persons convicted of
sexual intercourse with minors ‘are sufficiently similar to merit application
of some level of scrutiny to determine whether distinctions between the two
groups justify the unequal treatment.’ [Citation.]†(Hofsheier,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1200.) The Supreme Court concluded there was no
rational basis for the disparate treatment (Hofsheier,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1206–1207), and thus the defendant in
that case established a violation of equal protection. (Id.
at pp. 1201, 1207.)
Here, defendant argues he is
similarly situated to offenders convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor because sections 261.5 [sexual intercourse] and 311.11 [child
pornography] both concern a person under the age of 18 years personally who engaged
in or simulated sexual conduct. He
claims the only difference is the nature of the sexual act: the person who violated section 261.5 was actively
engaged in sexual misconduct with another person, while the person who violated
section 311.11 was not; both, however, involved the victimization of the minor.
But in Gonzalez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 132, the Court of Appeal held
that offenders convicted of section 311.11 are not similarly situated to
offenders convicted of section 261.5. (
explained that child pornography is capable of duplication and thus offenders
contribute to revictimization; possession of child pornography can involve
child victims of any age, and especially those under 14, while statutory rape
is the primary offense only when the victim is 14 or older; it is often
impracticable to locate the victim of child pornography to establish the actual
age of the child; and the production of child pornography often involves force,
fear, or duress. (Id. at pp. 136-139.)
Defendant criticizes the holding in
rape can also be revictimized. But the
court in Gonzalez explained that
although an offender can be prosecuted on multiple counts of statutory rape, it
is often difficult to prosecute everyone involved in child pornography. (Gonzalez,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 137.) Defendant nonetheless argues that the degree
of revictimization in child pornography cases “is a far cry from
revictimization through multiple physical acts.†We decline to minimize the level of
victimization involved in child pornography.
The voters passed Proposition 83 (Initiative Measure, Prop. 83,
§ 8, approved Nov. 7, 2006, eff. Nov. 8, 2006), and section 2 of that measure
provides in part: “(c) Child pornography
exploits children and robs them of their innocence. FBI studies have shown that pornography is
very influential in the actions of sex offenders. Statistics show that 90% of the predators who
molest children have had some type of involvement with pornography. Predators often use child pornography to aid
in their molestation. [¶] (d)
The universal use of the Internet has also ushered in an era of
increased risk to our children by predators using this technology as a tool to lure
children away from their homes and into dangerous situations. Therefore, to reflect society’s disapproval
of this type of activity, adequate penalties must be enacted to ensure
predators cannot escape prosecution.â€
(See Historical and Statutory Notes, 48 West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2008 ed.)
foll. § 311.11, p. 536.)
Defendant further questions the
court’s suggestion in Gonzalez that
unlike child pornography, statutory rape is characteristically “voluntary.†(Gonzalez,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 139.)
But the court in Gonzalez was simply noting the distinction articulated in
conduct.
Sections 261.5 and 288a make
distinctions based on the age of the perpetrator and the age of the victim,
recognizing that a voluntary sexual act between a 19 year old and his
17-year-old girlfriend should be treated differently than a sexual act between
a 35 year old and a 13 year old. But
there are no such distinctions based on age or use of force included in section
311.11. (See also §§ 311.1, 311.2,
subds. (b), (c), (d), 311.3, 311.4, 311.10.) There is no lesser penalty or alternative statute
that would apply when the minor is under 18 but over 14, or when force is not
used. This indicates that the
Legislature does not view pornography involving older children to be any less
serious than pornography involving younger children. In fact, section 311.11 previously applied
only to the possession of child pornography depicting children under the age of
14 but the Legislature increased the age to 18 in 1994. (Stats. 1994, ch. 55, § 4, pp. 436-437.)
We conclude that persons convicted
of section 311.11, subdivision (a) are not similarly situated to those
convicted of section 261.5. Accordingly,
it is not necessary for us to apply a level of scrutiny. Defendant’s equal protection claim lacks merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MAURO , J.
We concur:
RAYE , P. J.
NICHOLSON , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
