P. v. Jessee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 11/25/13  P. v. Jessee CA4/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,         Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   SANDRA MARIE JESSEE,         Defendant and Appellant.

G046881            (Super. Ct. No. 07ZF0009)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, James A. Stotler, Judge.  Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

                        Eric R. Larson, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

                        Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and Raquel M. Gonzalez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

                        A
jury convicted Sandra Marie Jessee of conspiracy to commit murder and special
circumstance first degree murder for
financial gain, all in connection with the slaying of her husband, Jack Jessee.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]  Sandra was sentenced to life in prison
without parole and ordered to pay a total of $521,414 in victim restitution.

                        Sandra does not contest
her conviction or sentence.  She merely challenges
four of the five restitution orders and the related abstract of judgment.  We reverse one of the challenged restitution
orders, order the abstract of judgment corrected, and affirm the judgment in
all other respects.

FACTS

                        After trial, the
prosecution requested victim restitution (Pen. Code, § 1202.4 (section
1202.4)) as follows:  (1) $311,858 to
Provident Life Insurance Company, as repayment of the life insurance proceeds which
Sandra received as a result of Jack’s death; (2) $131,291 to Jack’s estate, as
repayment of one-half of the 401k plan Sandra received from Jack’s employer,
Fujitsu Corporation; (3) $45,335 to Jack’s estate as repayment of one-half of
the proceeds Sandra received from the sale of the family home; (4) $29,648 to
the Allstate Insurance Company, for a related fraudulent automobile theft claim
perpetrated by Sandra and others; and (5) $3,282 to Jack’s daughter, Chere Conrad-Williams,
for costs associated with attending the hearings and trials.

                        On May 4, 2012, a restitution hearing was held.  The prosecution relied upon the documents and
testimony presented at trial, as the basis for “proving up” the dollar amounts
of the restitution requested in items 1 through 5 above.  The defense stipulated Chere Conrad-Williams
was entitled to restitution in the amount of $3,282 as requested.  The defense also agreed the other dollar
amounts requested were accurate, but argued Jack’s estate and the insurance
companies were not entitled any restitution at all.

                        The trial court did not
issue a ruling that day, but instead continued the hearing and ordered the
parties to file written briefs on the issues.

                        The prosecution filed a
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the restitution requested.  The prosecution argued Jack’s estate and both
of the insurance companies were “victims” within the meaning of section 1202.4,
subdivision (k).  These arguments were
based in large part on the now superseded Court of Appeal opinion (>People v. Runyan (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1010, review granted Jan. 12, 2011, S187804) in the case later decided by the Supreme
Court as People v. Runyan (2012) 54
Cal.4th 849 (Runyan).

                        The defense filed a href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">memorandum of points and authorities in
opposition to the restitution requested.  Among other things, the defense argued (a) neither
Jack’s estate nor the insurance companies were “victims” under section 1202.4, subdivision
(k), Sandra was the sole beneficiary of all of Jack’s assets, including the
life insurance policy, (c) there was no evidence Jack’s estate even existed, (d)
Provident Life Insurance Company suffered no loss, and (e) Sandra was not
convicted of any crime which resulted in a loss to Allstate Insurance Company.

                        On June 22, 2012, another restitution hearing was
held.  The prosecution argued “the
purpose the restitution statute is to make sure the defendant isn’t unjustly
enriched by her criminal conduct.”  The
prosecution analogized to a theft case, and noted “when you steal from
somebody, you have to pay it back.” 
Finally, the prosecution contended:  â€œSo the only issue then becomes, since Jack
Jessee was killed for financial gain, does his estate have the ability to
recoup those losses?  And I think that he
does and the estate does.”

                        The defense argued, “The
purpose of restitution is to compensate victims for direct economic loss.”  The defense noted the life insurance was a
policy Sandra and Jack had on each other, with the surviving spouse named as
the direct beneficiary.  â€œSo had Mr.
Jessee died of his colon cancer three months later, Mrs. Jessee would have
gotten every dime of that insurance policy, and no one would have ever been
entitled to it.  Had she predeceased him,
he would have been entitled to the value of her insurance policy
. . . .  So this is not a direct economic loss to any
victim. . . .  [¶] 
I would make the same exact argument with respect to the 401-K money, as
well as the community property shares of the marital home.”

                        Similarly, the defense
noted Jack’s daughters testified they were not economically dependent upon him,
and there was no evidence as to what Jack might have provided for them if
Sandra was written out of his will.  â€œThe
reality is, not to be crass or disrespectful, but they – in other words, it
would be unjust enrichment of the asserters now to get money that they never
would have gotten in the first place. . . .  They suffered no losses economically.”  Finally, the defense argued the types of
restitution at issue in this case were not the same as in Runyan.

                        The prosecution responded:
 â€œThe problem is that under the law, once
she’s convicted of that crime, she is removed from the equation.  She cannot be the beneficiary of the life
insurance or the sale of the home or his 401-K if she caused the death in order
to financially benefit from it.”

                        The prosecution reasoned,
“Once you remove her from the equation, which you have to do for the analysis,
the beneficiary is the estate.  If the
People came in and said please award X number of dollars to Chere
Conrad-Williams and Cheryl Deanda [Jack’s daughters], that would be totally
inappropriate.  However, the fact that –
that they would benefit if the money goes to the estate is not the relevant
question.  It’s not whether they get
unjustly enriched or whether they get money that they wouldn’t have gotten if
Jack Jessee had died of natural causes.  That’s
not the analysis at all.  It’s the fact
that the defendant killed him and she killed him to get to his life insurance
and his 401-K.  She can’t benefit.  You pull her out of the equation.  It goes to the estate, and the estate distributes
it as is determined under the law of the state of California or based on, you
know, any contingencies he may have had in a will or a trust.”

                        A short time later, the trial
court stated:  â€œWell, the fact is the
money was paid, and all I am simply saying is the money is out there.  It was based on the trial evidence paid to
the defendant.  And let’s just assume
that $311,000 is still in existence. 
Let’s assume just for the sake of argument that the defendant is not
entitled to it.  In light of the
conviction here of murder for financial gain, that money has to go
somewhere.  And the real question
is . . . .  [¶]  . . . does the money go back to Provident or
does it go to where?  The question of
where, it would seem that it would go to the estate.”

                        Ultimately, the trial court
ordered Sandra to pay restitution as follows: 
(1) $311,858 to Jack’s estate as repayment of the life insurance
proceeds; (2) $131,291 to Jack’s estate as repayment of one-half of the 401k plan;
(3) $45,335 to Jack’s estate as repayment of one-half of the proceeds from the
sale of the family home; (4) $29,748 to the Allstate Insurance Company for the fraudulent
automobile theft claim; and (5) $3,282 to Chere Conrad-Williams for the costs of
attending the hearings and trials.  Each
item was set out in a separate restitution order.

                        With respect to the
restitution ordered in favor of Allstate Insurance Company, the trial court declared:
 â€œI am going to make a finding . . . there
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a perpetrator of
insurance fraud regarding the false report of . . . the theft of
the Ford Explorer.  [¶]  Allstate, according to the evidence, paid
$27,748.29.  My finding is that there was
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant defrauded Allstate Insurance out
of that money.”

                        With respect to all
restitution ordered, the trial court stated:  â€œThe restitution that I am going to order will
be a joint and several liability; that is, the restitution obligation will not
be totally the defendant’s obligation. 
There are three convicted people in this case so far [Sandra, her son
Thomas Aehlert, and Brett Schrauben], and Mr. [Thomas] Garrick is out there pending
somewhere.  If he’s convicted, I’m
thinking that he’s going to be responsible for restitution, so it’s joint and
several.”

>DISCUSSION

A.  General
Principles and Standard of Review

                        “The
burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide an adequate factual basis
for the claim.”  (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 664.)  “The standard of proof at a restitution
hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt.”  (People
v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319.)  Once the prosecution has made a prima facie showing
of the victim’s loss, “the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that
the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim.” (>People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
682, 691.)

                        On appeal, we review a
restitution award for abuse of discretion. 
(People v. Giordano,> supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663; People
v. Hudson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 924, 927.) 
The award must be supported by sufficient evidence under the substantial
evidence standard of review.  (>People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
7, 26; People v. Thygesen (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 988, 993.)  “We do not
reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.”  (People
v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.)

>B. 
Section 1202.4

                        Section 1202.4,
subdivision (a)(1), declares “the intent of the Legislature that a victim of
crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime
shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime.”  Accordingly, “in every case in which a victim
has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court
shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims. . .
.”  (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)  Restitution “shall be of a dollar amount that
is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined
economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct”  (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)), and must include,
but is not limited to, such costs as “the value of stolen or damaged property”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A)).

                        For purposes of section
1202.4, subdivision (k)(1), a “victim” is defined to include, among others, the
actual victim’s immediate surviving family, as well as specified relatives of
the actual victim, and present and certain former members of the victim’s
household, who sustained economic loss as a result of the crime (§ 1202.4,
subd. (k)(3)(A)-(D)).  A “victim”
also includes “[a] corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government,
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or
commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime.”  (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(2), italics added.)

>C. 
Sandra Cannot Benefit From
Murdering Jack

                        As a preliminary matter,
we note the trial correctly concluded Sandra is not entitled to the life
insurance proceeds or any other property, interest, or benefit she might
otherwise have obtained as a result of Jack’s death.  The defense arguments to the contrary have no
merit.  Probate Code section 250 et seq. expressly
provides a person convicted of murdering a decedent cannot succeed to any
portion of the decedent’s estate.  (See
generally 14 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Wills and Probate, § 293,
p. 380.)  Specifically, as relevant here,
these statutes cover:  (a) property under
a will or by intestate succession (Prob. Code, § 250); (b) joint tenancy
property (Prob. Code, § 251); and (c) the proceeds of life insurance and
similar contracts (Prob. Code, § 252).  For
all of these purposes Sandra is deemed to have predeceased Jack.  (14 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, >supra, Wills and Probate, § 294, p.
381.)

>D. 
Restitution Awarded to Jack’s
Estate

                        Sandra challenges the
three restitution orders in favor of Jack’s estate representing the life
insurance proceeds, one-half of the 401k plan, and one-half of the proceeds
from the sale of the family home.  She
contends all three of these restitution awards were unauthorized and must be
reversed based upon the Supreme Court decision in Runyan.  Among other things, Sandra
argues Jack’s estate is not entitled to restitution because it was not a direct
victim of her crimes.  We disagree.

                        Less than a month after
the trial court issued the challenged restitution orders in this case, the Supreme
Court decided Runyan.  In that case, the defendant, driving while
intoxicated, killed another driver instantly in a freeway collision.  The defendant was convicted of href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">gross vehicular manslaughter with intoxication
and sentenced to prison.  In addition, the
defendant was ordered to pay substantial restitution to the decedent’s
estate.  The restitution award
represented post-death loss in value of the decedent’s business and property, together
with probate, estate administration, and funeral expenses.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the award by the
trial court.

                        The Supreme Court granted
review “to decide if and when one convicted of a felony is required by the California
Constitution and statutes to pay restitution to the estate or personal
representative of a victim of the crime who has died.”  (Runyan,> supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 853.)  The
Supreme Court held that, for purposes of restitution, the estate itself was not
a “‘direct victim’” of the crime that caused the decedent’s death.  (Id.
at p. 857.)  This was true because:  “The case law has ascribed a precise meaning
to the phrase ‘direct victim,’ as that phrase has appeared in several
restitution statutes.  Thus, it is
established that a statute ‘permitting restitution to entities that are “direct”
victims of crime [limits] restitution to “entities against which the [defendant’s] crimes had been committed”—that is,
entities that are the “immediate objects of the [defendant’s] offenses.”  [Citation.]’  [Citations.]” 
(Id. at p. 856.)

                        As the Supreme Court
explained the victim’s estate in Runyan
was not a “direct victim” of the fatal collision, because the estate was not an
entity against which defendant committed his offenses, and “it was not the
immediate object of those offenses.”  (>Runyan, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.
857.)  Indeed, “the estate did not even
exist at the time the crimes were committed; it came into being only as a
result of those offenses.  Hence, the
estate is not entitled to restitution, on its own behalf, as an entity itself
directly targeted and victimized by defendant’s crimes.”  (Ibid.)

                        The Supreme Court also
held:  â€œ[W]e are persuaded that a
deceased victim’s estate may, in appropriate cases, receive restitution in a
different capacity, and for a different reason. When the actual victim of a
crime has died, the estate, acting in the decedent’s stead, steps into the
decedent’s shoes to collect restitution owed to the decedent, but which the decedent cannot personally receive
because of his or her death.”  (>Runyan, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.
857.)  “Thus, a decedent’s estate . . . is
a proper recipient, on the decedent’s behalf, of restitution owed >to the decedent, as an actual and
immediate crime victim, for economic losses the decedent incurred as a result
of the defendant’s offenses against the decedent.”  (Ibid.)

                        Applying these principles
to the case at bar reveals restitution was properly awarded to Jack’s estate
either on its own behalf, or in its capacity as Jack’s personal representative.  The logic is quite simple.  Sandra was convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder and special circumstance first degree murder for financial gain.  There is no doubt one immediate object of
those crimes was the life insurance and other assets which were owned by Jack,
and which became part of Jack’s estate as a result of his death.  So in this sense, Jack’s estate itself is an
entity against which those crimes were committed.  Under these circumstances, we conclude Jack’s
estate is entitled to restitution, on its own behalf, as an entity itself
directly targeted and victimized by Sandra’s crimes.

                        There is one problem
with this conclusion.  Jack’s estate itself
did not exist at the time those crimes were committed and only came into being as
a result of those crimes.  However, we also
conclude this is an appropriate case for the estate to receive restitution under
the alternative rationale discussed in Runyan.  When Jack died, the estate stepped into his shoes
to collect restitution owed to him, but which he could not personally receive.  Thus, Jack’s estate is a proper recipient of any
restitution owed to Jack, for economic losses he incurred as a result Sandra’s
crimes.  These losses include the life
insurance proceeds, and at least one-half of the 401k plan and the proceeds
from the sale of the family home, all of which were incurred upon Jack’s death,
not after.

E.  Restitution
Awarded to Allstate Insurance Company

                        Sandra
also asserts that because she was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and
murder, but not insurance fraud, the restitution order in favor of Allstate
Insurance Company was also unauthorized and should also be reversed.  We agree. 
By its own terms, section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1), only authorizes a crime
victim to receive restitution “from a defendant convicted of that crime.”  Likewise, section 1202.4, subdivisions (a)(2)
and (a)(3)(B) provide, “(2) Upon a 
person being convicted of a crime . . . the court
shall order the defendant to pay. . . .  [¶] . . .
[¶]  (B) Restitution to the
victim or victims . . . .” 
Based upon the plain language of these statutes, we conclude restitution
may only be awarded for crimes the defendant is charged with and convicted of,
even if the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court finds the
defendant committed an uncharged crime. 
Therefore, the restitution order in favor of Allstate Insurance Company
constitutes and abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

>F. 
Abstract of Judgment

                        Finally, Sandra argues
the abstract of judgment is erroneous and should be amended.  She notes the abstract makes no mention of the
trial court’s oral pronouncement that the restitution orders are to be joint
and several obligations of Sandra and her coconspirators, and the abstract
incorrectly includes “Provident Life Insurance, Allstate Insurance, and Fujitsu”
as parties awarded restitution.  The
Attorney General agrees as do we.

                        Therefore, the abstract shall
be amended to reflect the written restitution orders in favor of the estate of
Jack Jessee and Chere Conrad-Williams filed on June 26, 2012, and to delete any
reference to Provident Life Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company and Fujitsu.  Furthermore, the abstract shall be amended to
state the restitution orders are joint and several obligations of Sandra,
Thomas Aehlert, and Brett Schrauben, the coconspirators convicted thus far,
together with Thomas Garrick, if and when he is ever convicted of these same
crimes.

>DISPOSITION

                        All
of the restitution orders in favor of the estate of Jack Jessee and Chere
Conrad-Williams are affirmed.  The
restitution order in favor of Allstate Insurance Company is reversed.  The clerk of the Orange County Superior Court
is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to (a) delete any reference to
Provident Life Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company and Fujitsu, and
(b) state the restitution orders are joint and several obligations of Sandra
Jessee, Thomas Aehlert, and Brett Schrauben, together with Thomas Garrick, if
and when he is ever convicted of these same crimes.  The clerk of the Orange County Superior Court
is further directed to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.  The judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.

 

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    THOMPSON,
J.

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

FYBEL, ACTING
P. J.

 

 

 

IKOLA, J.