P. v. Jasso

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 12/6/13 
P. v. Jasso CA2/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,               Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   JESUS JAVIER JASSO,               Defendant and Appellant.

B242229         (Los Angeles County       Super. Ct. No. BA350171)        ORDER MODIFYING OPINION      AND DENYING REHEARING      [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

 

 

 

THE COURT:

            It is ordered that the opinion filed
herein on November 18, 2013,
be modified as follows:

            1. 
On page 2, the last line of the third paragraph, the word “appellant” is
changed to “Carrillo” so the sentence reads:

            Her way of handling the situation
was to keep Carrillo away from Art T. and hope Carrillo would give up.

            2. 
On page 3, the third sentence of the fourth paragraph, in two locations,
the word “appellant” is changed to “Carrillo” so the sentence reads: 

            At some point, Art T. tried to speak
to Carrillo man-to-man about the situation, but Carrillo continued to make
annoying telephone calls to Art T.’s residence where he lived with his parents.

            3. 
On page 10, the fourth sentence of the second full paragraph, the word
“appellant” is changed to “Carrillo” so the sentence reads:

            He urged the complaint to the police
and even Art T.’s man-to-man visit with Carrillo had not stopped Carrillo’s
obsessive efforts to continue his relationship with H.A.

            4.  On page 10, the last sentence of the second
full paragraph, the word “appellant’s” is changed to the word “the” so the
sentence reads:

            Fortunately for Art T., Carrillo ran
out of ammunition or the gun jammed at a critical point during the shooting,
and that spared Art T.’s life.

            5. 
On page 10, the third sentence of the third full paragraph, the words
“the defendants” is changed to “appellant and Carrillo” so the sentence reads:

            Essentially, in the final phase of
the argument, the prosecutor again summarized the evidence against appellant
and Carrillo and replied to several points made by trial counsel.

            6. 
On page 10, the fourth sentence of the third full paragraph, in one
location, the word “appellant” is changed to “Carrillo” so the sentence reads:

            The prosecutor pointed out appellant
apparently had arrived and given Carrillo a gun, and his sign to Ryan B. to be
quiet indicated appellant was well aware of the entire situation between
Carrillo and H.A.

            There is no change in the judgment.

            Respondent’s petition for rehearing
is denied. .

Filed 11/18/13  P. v. Jasso CA2/3 (unmodfied version)

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 


 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,               Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   JESUS JAVIER JASSO,               Defendant and Appellant.

B242229         (Los Angeles County       Super. Ct. No. BA350171)

 

 

 

            APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Craig E. Veals, Judge. 
Affirmed.

            David
Arredondo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

            Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback
II and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

 

>_________________________

 

 

            Jesus Javier Jasso appeals from the judgment entered
after a jury trial in which he was found guilty of attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder with a finding a principal was armed with a
handgun.  (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187,
subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)(1).)href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]  At sentencing, the trial court imposed an
aggregate term in state prison of one year to life, consisting of a base term
of life enhanced by one year for the finding a principal was armed with a
firearm. 

BACKGROUND

            Appellant
argues the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Hence, we set out the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment.  (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)

            In
September 2008, H.A. was living with her parents.  She had a boyfriend named Art T.  In July 2008, she started seeing Art T. after
she broke up with her former boyfriend, codefendant Mario Carrillo (Carrillo).href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
 Carrillo would not accept the
breakup.  Carrillo persisted in texting
her, calling her and showing up at her residence at all hours of the day and
night to see what she was doing.  She
changed her telephone number, but nothing discouraged him.  He continued to harass her.  She had not wanted to get the authorities
involved.  She pretended to be friendly
with him, but refused to date him.  Her way
of handling the situation was to keep Carrillo away from Art T. and hope
appellant would give up. 

            Carrillo
was not friendly with Art T., and when Carrillo discovered Art T. was seeing H.A.,
Carrillo harassed Art T., as well.

            According
to H.A., appellant was a friend of Carrillo’s and the boyfriend of H.A.’s
friend, Mercedes.  The parties stipulated
appellant and Carrillo were friends.

            At
3:00 a.m., on September 6, 2008, Carrillo kidnapped H.A. in her own car when
she returned home from a date with Art T.  During the kidnapping, Carrillo pointed his
semiautomatic pistol at her to coerce her cooperation.  Carrillo had her drive him to his family’s
apartment, held her there in the one bedroom, forcibly raped her and engaged in
forcible sexual penetration.  When he
permitted her to leave, she drove home.  She told her father about the kidnapping.  Several hours later, she reported the
kidnapping and the forcible sexual misconduct to the police. 

            On
September 8, 2008, in a recorded interview, the police interrogated Carrillo
about the kidnapping, rape and sexual penetration.  He admitted the offenses but denied the use
of a firearm.  Carrillo claimed he loved H.A.
and simply wanted her to continue to be his girlfriend.

            The
report to the police did not deter Carrillo. 
He continued to come by H.A.’s residence where she lived with her family
frequently and knocked on her window at 2:00 a.m.  At some point, Art T. tried to speak to
appellant man-to-man about the situation, but appellant continued to make
annoying telephone calls to Art T.’s residence where he lived with his
parents.  Carrillo threatened to shoot
Art T. 

            At
about 6:30 a.m., on December 8, 2008, Carrillo showed up at H.A.’s
residence.  They argued.  Carrillo was upset because H.A. refused to
marry him.  At about 8:30 a.m., H.A. and
Art T. had arranged to meet that morning to jog or to take a walk.  At one point, H.A. did not answer her
cellular telephone, and Art T. became concerned and drove to her residence.

            On the way
there, Art T. saw Carrillo two blocks from H.A.’s residence, and Art T. tried
again to talk with Carrillo man-to-man. 
Carrillo said to leave him alone and ran away in the direction of  H.A.’s residence.  Art T. drove to the residence.  He spoke to H.A. outside and then waited
for her to get ready.  While they were
conversing, H.A. saw a silver truck that looked like appellant’s drive by at
the south end of the block.  H.A.
testified there were other similar trucks in the neighborhood, but appellant’s
truck was distinctive as it had black rims. 
H.A. commented to Art T., “There goes Vision,” referring to appellant by
his nickname.  On two prior
occasions, Art T. had seen appellant previously as appellant drove by H.A.’s
residence.   H.A. had  identified appellant as “Vision,” Carillo’s
friend and Mercedes’s boyfriend.

            As
Art T. was waiting outside, the same truck pulled up to the corner north
of  the residence.  Art T. could see appellant sitting in the
driver’s seat of the truck.  Carrillo was
in the truck’s passenger seat.  For two
minutes, the men looked in Art T.’s direction and conversed.  Then the truck turned and pulled up in front
of Art T.  Carrillo and appellant made
eye contact with Art T.  Appellant
hunched over, and then Carrillo got out of the car wearing a black glove,
walked toward Art T., pulled a handgun from his waistband and pointed the
handgun at Art T.  Art T. jumped a fence
and ran.  Art T. turned and saw
Carrillo chasing him.  Appellant remained
in the truck driving slowly after Carrillo as Carrillo chased Art T. 

            On
a residential driveway, Carrillo shot at Art T., and Art T. fell and could not
get up.  Art T. was wounded during the
gunfire.  Carrillo stood over him
pointing the gun at him, and Art T. closed his eyes.  He heard a click.  Art T. opened his eyes and saw Carrillo run
to the truck.  The truck backed up the
street, then drove off. 

            Art T. telephoned
H.A. and told her Carrillo had shot him.  H.A. telephoned 9-1-1.  H.A. found Art T. two doors away bleeding profusely.  The police and an ambulance
responded.  Near Art T., the officers
found 9 expended shell casings and two spent bullets. 

            On
December 8, 2008, H.A. identified Carrillo and appellant in two different
six-pack photographic identification procedures.

            Three
days later, in the hospital’s intensive care unit, in two six-pack photographic
displays, Art T. identified Carrillo as the gunman and appellant as the truck’s
driver.  He added that the rims on
appellant’s truck were black. 

            Art
T. suffered 10 gunshot wounds and almost died. 
Art T.’s ambition was to be a deputy sheriff, and he now had permanent
nerve damage in his legs that prevented him from running, making him ineligible
for the police academy.  He had had
six surgeries and possibly needed more, and at the time of trial, he was still
involved with physical therapy.  He
walked with a cane.

            At
trial, Art T. identified Carrillo as the gunman and appellant as the driver of
the truck.  At trial,  H.A. identified Carrillo as her former
boyfriend and appellant as Carrillo’s friend, the owner of the silver truck she
saw shortly before the shooting.

            Two
neighbors witnessed the shooting.  Teresa
C. heard the shots and saw the gunman apparently pointing a gun and
shooting.  The gunman then ran and  jumped into the rear window of a truck
waiting in the middle of the street.  The
truck drove off.  The truck was a newer
model, charcoal gray, with a “futuristic look.” 
Ryan B. heard the shots and went outside.  He then saw a newer model silver pickup
truck, a Toyota Tacoma or Tundra, backing up in the middle of the street.  The truck was not “stock” as it was modified
with what he recalled as unique aftermarket raised wheels and perhaps
distinctive chrome rims.  Ryan B. got a
partial license plate, 7YR4, from the vehicle.

            Ryan B.
said he got a good look at the truck’s driver, who looked directly at Ryan B.
and put his finger to his lips, instructing Ryan B. with that sign to “Be quiet.”  At trial, and during an extrajudicial
six-pack photographic identification procedure, Ryan B. identified
appellant as the truck’s driver.  Ryan B.
had never seen appellant before the shooting.

            California
Department of Motor Vehicle records disclosed the license plate for appellant’s
Toyota truck was 7Y43053.

            After
the shooting, neither Art T. nor H.A. heard from, or saw, Carrillo again until
the preliminary hearing.

CONTENTIONS

1.  The
sufficiency of the evidence

            Appellant contends the identification evidence is
insufficient to support the judgment. 

                  a. 
Standard of review

Recently, in >People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th
174, the California Supreme Court summarized the well-established standard
of review.     “ â€˜In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves.  Rather, we “examine the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
[Citations.]  We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. 
[Citation.]  [¶]  The same standard of review applies to cases
in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence . . .
.  [Citation.]  “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify
the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.”  [Citation.]  We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a
witness’s credibility.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]” 
(Id. at p. 200.)

“ ‘ “Although an appellate
court will not uphold a judgment or verdict based upon evidence inherently
improbable, testimony which merely discloses unusual circumstances does not
come within that category.  [Citation.]  To warrant the rejection of the statements
given by a witness who has been believed by the [trier of fact], there must
exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must
be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.  [Citations.] 
Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion
do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of
the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth
or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.  [Citation.]”. . . .’  [Citation.]” 
(People v. Barnes (1986)
42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304, 306.) 

The uncorroborated testimony of
a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction unless it is physically
impossible or inherently improbable.  (>People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149,
1181.)  Indeed, “ ‘[t]he testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment even if it is contradicted by
other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions.  [Citations.]’ ”  (In re
Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 815, 821.) 

                  b. 
The analysis

            Appellant’s
contention in part misstates the evidence and misapprehends the nature of an
appellate court’s review for sufficiency of the evidence.  Art T. had seen appellant before on two prior
occasions.  On the day of the shooting,
Art T. had an adequate opportunity to observe the driver of the Toyota
truck.  He positively identified
appellant as the truck’s driver in the extrajudicial post-shooting six-pack
identification procedure and in court as Carrillo’s accomplice, the driver of
the getaway vehicle.

            H.A. had seen appellant’s truck drive
by minutes before the shooting.  The truck
was unique in appearance due to its newness and aftermarket modifications. 

            Two
neighbors who did not know appellant or his truck saw the shooting or its
immediate aftermath.  Teresa C. described
appellant’s truck.  Ryan B.
positively identified appellant by his facial appearance and his truck and got
a partial license plate number that was highly similar to appellant’s actual
California license plate number. 

            The
parties stipulated appellant and Carrillo were friends, and H.A. testified
appellant was one of Carrillo’s friends, making it likely appellant was well
aware of Carrillo’s obsessive attempts to reclaim H.A. as his girlfriend.  Her testimony also made it probative that
appellant was the driver assisting Carrillo by supplying the firearm to commit
the shooting and in assisting Carrillo during the shooting and the escape.

            Multiple
witnesses identified appellant as the truck’s driver.  The identifications were neither physically
impossible nor inherently incredible. 
Discrepancies in the testimony and issues of reliability were for the
jury to resolve.  (People v. Elliot (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.)  Even an identification by one of these
witnesses would be sufficient to support a conclusion appellant assisted
Carrillo during the shooting.  (>People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th
680, 703-704 [identification testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
support the judgment]; People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 248 [the court uses the general test for sufficiency of
the evidence to determine the sufficiency of an out-of-court identification in
supporting a judgment].)  The
identification evidence amply supports the judgment. 

2.  Prosecutorial
misconduct

            Appellant
contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during the final comments he made
to the jury.  The complained-of comments
are  italicized below.

                  a. 
Background

            The
prosecutor initiated his final comments to the jury by saying the very reason
they were all there was because Carrillo could not accept H.A.’s “No.”  Carrillo’s inability to accept reality had
landed them all here in court three years later.  He urged the jury it did not have to rely on H.A.’s
claim of what had occurred alone concerning the September 2008 kidnapping and
forcible rape and sexual penetration. 
Appellant had admitted these crimes during the subsequent videotaped
police interview, although he did not admit he had committed the offenses with
a firearm.

            The
prosecutor said, as it was, H.A. had to relive this September 2008 incident and
appear in court as a witness for the trial as “no means no.”  He urged, “So she’s been through a lot since 2008 and now its time for no to
mean no.  And you’re the ones that can
make that happen.  You need to tell both
of the defendants that no meant no and find them guilty as charged.”  (Italics added.)

            At
this point, appellant’s trial counsel objected the evidence concerning the
September 2008 kidnapping, rape and sexual penetrations did not relate to
appellant.

            The
trial court admonished the jury: 
“Okay.  Remember, ladies and
gentlemen, as I have mentioned to you before, you must decide each defendant[‘s
guilt] separately and consider the evidence independently as to each
defendant.”

            The
prosecutor explained to the jury his theme applied to both defendants:  “And I
would beg to differ with counsel because when I say no means no, no was Hermila
[A.] telling [Carrillo to] stop coming over to harass[] us.  And the defendant—that defendant [appellant]
got involved as he did that he became part of that.  And no should mean no to him just as well.”  (Italics added.)

            Appellant’s
trial counsel objected again on the same grounds.

            The trial
court admonished the jury:  “Okay.  Understanding that, again, decide the
evidence independently as to each defendant and each defendant must be
determined guilty or not guilty based upon the evidence independently of the
other.”

            The
prosecutor continued arguing:  “>Let’s talk about [appellant] then.  Let’s make it clear we’re talking about [appellant]
here.  And let’s see if the no means no
applies to him.”

            The
prosecutor then described the evidence indicating appellant knowingly acted as
an aider and abettor and the getaway driver during the December 2008
shooting.  The prosecutor urged
appellant’s conduct indicated appellant was well aware of the situation that
existed among Carrillo, H.A. and Art T. 
When Carrillo and appellant arrived in front of H.A.’s residence, the
two of them were “smirking.”  Earlier
Carrillo had run away from Art T.  But
now Carrillo was not running.  Carrillo
now had a handgun and was acting with bravado. 
Appellant’s conduct during the shooting showed he was well aware of what
was going on.  Appellant followed
Carrillo slowly in his truck and drove Carrillo off after the shooting.  And in driving off, appellant directed Ryan
B. by a sign to keep quiet about what Ryan B. had seen regarding the
shooting.  The prosecutor argued that evidence
indicated appellant was fully involved in the shooting and had acted with
knowledge of Carrillo’s purpose.

            He
argued the crimes were “intertwined.”  Appellant’s trial counsel objected the
comment implied appellant was charged in both incidents.  The trial court instructed the prosecutor to
clarify his argument.

            The
prosecutor said, “These crimes are intertwined as . . . they are the result of
that relationship that [Carrillo] had with Hermila [A.] where he wouldn’t take
no for an answer.”  The prosecutor said
he had discussed appellant’s involvement in the shooting and now would
delineate  the evidence supporting
Carrillo’s guilt.  He emphasized his
argument from this point on related only to Carrillo.  He urged the complaint to the police and even
Art T.’s man-to-man visit with appellant had not stopped Carrillo’s
obsessive efforts to continue his relationship with H.A.  After H.A. reported the kidnapping and rape
to the police, events escalated. 
Carrillo’s next move was to ‘take out” the boyfriend.   Fortunately for Art T., Carrillo ran out of
ammunition or appellant’s gun jammed at a critical point during the shooting,
and that spared Art T.’s life.

            Trial
counsel then made their closing comments to the jury.  The prosecutor closed thereafter, twice
arguing with respect to Carillo, “no means no.” 
Essentially, in the final phase of the argument, the prosecutor again
summarized the evidence against the defendants and replied to several points
made by trial counsel.  The prosecutor
pointed out appellant apparently had arrived and given appellant a gun, and his
sign to Ryan B. to be quiet indicated appellant was well aware of the entire
situation between Carrillo and H.A.  The
prosecutor urged appellant was as involved in the shooting as Carrillo was.

                  b. 
The relevant legal principles

            Prosecutors
are given “ ‘ “ ‘wide latitude’ ” ’ ” in trying their cases.  (People v. Hill
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [wide latitude given in closing argument].)  “ â€˜A prosecutor is allowed to make
vigorous arguments and may even use such epithets as are warranted by the
evidence, as long as these arguments are not inflammatory and principally aimed
at arousing the passion or prejudice of the jury.’  [Citations.]” 
(People v. Pearson (2013)
56 Cal.4th 393, 441.)  A prosecutor may
not misstate or mischaracterize the evidence. 
(People v. Caldwell (2013) 212
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1268.)

            “The
applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are
well established.”   (>People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795,
841 (Samayoa).)   Under federal constitutional standards, a
prosecutor’s “ â€˜ â€œintemperate behavior” ’ ” constitutes misconduct if
it is so “ ‘ “ ‘egregious’ ” ’ ” as to render the trial “fundamentally unfair”
under due process principles.  (>Ibid.)  
Under state law, a prosecutor commits misconduct by engaging in
deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion.  (Ibid.)  Where a prosecutor has engaged in misconduct,
the reviewing court considers the record as a whole to determine if the alleged
harm resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
(People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d
955, 976-977.)  In considering prejudice
“when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury,
the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable
fashion.  [Citation.]”  (Samayoa,
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.)

                 
c.  The analysis

            Appellant
contends there was prosecutorial misconduct during the final comments to the
jury as the “no means no” argument appealed to the jury’s passion and
prejudice.  He argues there was no proof
appellant was involved in the earlier kidnapping and rape of H.A.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s argument was
likely to have persuaded the jury that appellant had something to do with
Carrillo’s September 2008 misconduct, when appellant had nothing to do with
these earlier crimes.  He claims the
September 2008 crimes were so offensive that the effect of including appellant
in the “no means no” argument had a spill-over effect that improperly
influenced appellant’s conviction as an aider and abettor to the attempted
murder.  He urges the trial court’s
admonitions the evidence against each defendant should be considered and
weighed independently would not have had the effect of curing the possible harm
flowing from the prosecutor’s remarks.

            The
contention lacks merit.  When the
prosecutor made his “no means no” argument 
and urged the charges were intertwined, the comments did not constituted
a reprehensible attempt to persuade the jury that appellant was involved in the
September 2008 kidnapping and rape.   It
was apparent from the charges and the evidence, as well as counsels’ final
comments to the jury, that no juror reasonably would believe appellant was
involved in the September 2008 incident of kidnapping and rape.  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury
that evidence was introduced against Carrillo respecting the September 2008
kidnapping and rape, and such evidence was not admitted against appellant.  The trial court specifically charged the
jury, “Do not consider this evidence against the other defendant,”  meaning appellant.  During closing comments, when trial counsel
objected on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court twice
admonished the jury to consider the defendants’ guilt separately.  On this record there is no reasonable
likelihood the jury would have been misled into believing appellant was
involved in the earlier kidnapping and rape. 
We presume the jury fully understood and applied the court’s
instructions.  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1021.)  

            Trial
counsel attached a post-trial affidavit to the motion for new trial.  Therein, a juror claimed the initial
vote of guilt regarding appellant was 6 to 6. 
She said she and other jurors were confused by the “no means no”
argument and misunderstood and believed appellant was involved in the earlier
incident and those beliefs influenced the jurors’ consideration of appellant’s
guilt of the later shooting.

Evidence Code section 1150
precludes the use of such post-trial juror affidavits concerning the mental
processes of the jury to impeach its verdict. 
The trial court properly refused to consider the juror’s statements
in the affidavit.  And pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1150, this court also cannot consider the juror’s
comments in determining whether the prosecutor’s final comments led to jury
confusion. 

            Furthermore,
we note the trial court denied the motion for new trial insofar as it made the
same claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
As the trial court commented, Evidence Code section 1150 put the death
knell to appellant’s claim of jury confusion arising of prosecutorial
misconduct.  The trial court said in the
circumstances, trial counsel was making too much of the influence the
prosecutor’s comments might have had on the jury.  The jury had been “well educated on the
necessity of deciding the case based on the evidence . . . .”  It was instructed the statements of counsel
were not evidence, and no evidence had been introduced at trial suggesting
appellant was involved in Carrillo’s September 2008 crimes.  The trial court had notes or recalled that it
was explicit with the jurors at the beginning of the trial concerning
appellant’s lack of involvement in the earlier incident.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">>[3]


DISPOSITION

            The judgment is affirmed.

>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

 

 

 

                                                                                    KLEIN,
P. J.

 

 

We
concur:

 

 

 

                        CROSKEY, J.

 

 

 

 

                        ALDRICH, J.