P. v. Jaramillo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 6/25/13  P. v. Jaramillo CA4/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
THREE

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,         Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   HECTOR DELIO AGUILAR JARAMILLO,         Defendant and Appellant.

G046632            (Super. Ct. No. 10NF1087)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, John Conley, Judge.  Affirmed.

                        Thomas Owen, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

                        Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Michael Pulos,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*               
*                *

 

Introduction

Defendant
Hector Delio Aguilar Jaramillo was convicted of the murder of Roberto
Martinez.  Defendant challenges his
conviction on appeal.  We affirm.

First,
defendant argues there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. 
We disagree.  There was sufficient
evidence to support the conviction, based on DNA found at the scene, the
testimony of a blood spatter expert, and the similarity between defendant’s
shoe size and the size of bloody shoe prints found at the scene. 

Second,
defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to allow evidence of a third
party’s culpability in the murder.  We
find no abuse of discretion; defendant did not offer any evidence that linked a
third party to the perpetration of the murder.

 

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

On
October 31, 2006, Martinez
was murdered in his home.  He was stabbed
more than 50 times in the head, neck, torso, and extremities.  Martinez
also suffered blunt force trauma to his face and head.

A
black latex glove was found at the scene. 
Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA found on the
inside of the glove; fewer than one in four billion people would have the same
profile as the DNA found on the glove. 
Although the prosecution’s DNA evidence expert was not able to say with
100 percent certainty that the DNA on the glove was defendant’s, she did
testify that, statistically, only one other person in the world besides
defendant could have contributed the DNA. 
The outside of the glove was covered with Martinez’s
blood.  The prosecution’s blood spatter
expert opined the glove was worn during the commission of the murder. 

A
hair found on the black glove was identified as belonging to Martinez.  Additional DNA was found on a wall inside the
home, mixed with Martinez’s blood;
defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of that DNA. 

Two
different sets of bloody shoe prints were found at the scene; neither belonged
to Martinez.  One set of shoe prints was from an athletic
shoe between sizes eight and eight and a half, but which could have been
between sizes seven and a half and nine. 
A dress shoe or boot made the other set of shoe prints, and was a size
seven or eight.  Shoes found at defendant’s
home were consistent in size with the shoes that made the bloody shoe prints.

Defendant
had lived at Martinez’s home for
six or seven months in 2005; he moved out in January or February 2006.  Defendant testified he did not go back to Martinez’s
house after he moved out.  Defendant
further testified that, while living at Martinez’s
house, he had worn gloves while helping in the yard and around the house.

Defendant
testified that he probably went to Mexico,
after getting off work on the night of the murder, to visit his mother’s
grave.  Defendant returned to the United
States on November 7, 2006.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]

At
the time of the murder, Martinez
was in a relationship with the sister of defendant’s then wife.  Defendant, defendant’s ex-wife, and one of
her sisters (though not the sister who had been in a relationship with Martinez)
testified that there were no problems between defendant and Martinez.

Defendant
was charged with a single count of murder.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)  A jury found defendant guilty, and the trial
court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.  Defendant timely appealed.

 

Discussion

I.

>Sufficiency
of the Evidence

Defendant
contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the
murder of Martinez.  “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.] .
. . We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.  [Citation.] 
If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.  [Citation.]  A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence
nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility. 
[Citation.]”  (People v. Lindberg (2008)
45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)

DNA
consistent with that of defendant was identified on the inside of a glove found
at the scene of the murder, while Martinez’s blood was identified on the
outside of that same glove.  A blood
spatter expert who examined the glove testified the amount and pattern of the
blood on the glove were consistent with a direct transfer, rather than a
secondary transfer, of blood; in his opinion, the glove was worn during the commission
of the murder.  Defendant could not be
excluded as the source of additional DNA found on a wall in the room where the
murder took place, which was mixed with Martinez’s blood. 

Shoe
print evidence was found at the scene. 
Two distinct shoe print impressions were found, neither of which matched
Martinez’s shoes.  One shoe print was of
an athletic shoe, sized eight or eight and a half, but which could have been
between sizes seven and a half and nine. 
The other shoe print was from a dress shoe or boot, and was sized
between seven and eight.  None of the
shoes located at defendant’s home matched the shoe prints found at the
scene.  Defendant testified he wore a
size seven shoe; he could not explain why the police found between four and six
pairs of shoes in his home that were sized eight or eight and a half.  Thus, defendant’s shoe size was the same size
as either of the distinct sets of bloody shoe prints found at the scene.

Based
on the evidence before it, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant
was wearing the black glove while killing Martinez; this would be consistent
with the evidence regarding the DNA found inside the glove, Martinez’s blood
being on the outside of the glove, and one of Martinez’s hairs being found on
the glove.  Given the conflicting
evidence regarding the size of defendant’s shoes, the jury could have concluded
defendant left either one of the sets of bloody shoe prints at the scene.  DNA evidence placed defendant inside the room
in which the murder was committed, which further connected defendant to the
murder.  That DNA was mixed with
Martinez’s blood.  Defendant’s trip to
Mexico, combined with his testimony about how often he made such trips (which
was contradicted by the United States Customs and Border Protection records),
was circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt, which the jury could also
consider.  (See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054-1055.) 

Defendant
argues that the evidence of the manner in which the crime was committed was
inconsistent with his participation in it, given the testimony of his ex-wife
and former sister-in-law that defendant and Martinez did not have a problematic
relationship.  Defendant further argues
no explanation was provided by the prosecution why defendant would have killed
Martinez.  Motive, however, is not an
element of murder, and the prosecution had no obligation to provide such
evidence.  (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 218; >People v. Daly (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 47, 59; CALCRIM No. 370.) 
Therefore, the lack of proof of a motive and the lack of any prior
problems between defendant and Martinez do not require reversal of the
judgment.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]

 

II.

>Did
the Trial Court Err in Excluding Testimony About Third Party Culpability?

Before
trial, defendant filed a motion to permit introduction of evidence of a third
party’s culpability in the murder of Martinez. 
In an offer of proof, defendant asserted that four days before the
murder, Martinez was involved in an automobile accident.  Martinez fled the scene.  The driver and three passengers in the car
that Martinez had hit chased Martinez and eventually caught him.  Those individuals cursed at Martinez and took
his wallet.  A police officer called to
the scene made the occupants of the other car return Martinez’s wallet.  One of the passengers in the other car,
Jonathan C., had a history of criminal conduct, including a residential
burglary where he allegedly held a woman down and threatened her with a knife.  Jonathan wore a size eight-and-a-half
shoe.  Defendant sought to introduce this
evidence at trial as proof that Jonathan, not defendant, murdered
Martinez.  The trial court excluded the
evidence.

“A
criminal defendant may introduce evidence of third party culpability if such
evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.”  (People
v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 517.) 
“‘[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party
offered by a defendant to demonstrate . . . a reasonable
doubt . . . must link the third person either directly or
circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime.’”  (People
v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 367.)  “‘“‘[M]ere motive or opportunity to commit
the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt.’”’” 
(People v. Hartsch (2010) 49
Cal.4th 472, 496.)  We review the
trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of third party culpability for abuse
of discretion.  (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 580-581.) 

In
this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the evidence
regarding Jonathan.  That Jonathan had
been involved in a traffic accident with Martinez four days before the murder,
and wore shoes similar in size to a bloody print found at the murder scene, is
not enough to link Jonathan to the actual perpetration of the murder, and
therefore does not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.  Our Supreme Court has found no abuse of
discretion in excluding third party culpability evidence in many cases where
the evidence of a link to the crime was greater than the evidence here.  (See People
v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 35-36 [murder committed while engaged in
commission of lewd act against a child under age 14; trial court properly
excluded evidence that (1) resident of same apartment complex in which the
defendant and the victim lived was frequently in the company of children, would
put his arms around children while teaching them to play tennis, and had asked
11-year-old female apartment complex resident to accompany him to the desert
around the time the victim disappeared, and (2) two days after the victim
disappeared, a man was arrested for exposing himself and masturbating near the
apartment complex]; People v. McWhorter,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 372-373
[trial court correctly excluded evidence that the victims’ ex-husband and
father was a violent man, of whom the victims were afraid, who wanted to end
child support payments, and who regularly wore cowboy boots consistent with a
bloody print found at the scene]; People
v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 684-685 [trial court properly
excluded evidence that the victim and her mother stole money and other property
from Jay-Jay Sheffner, and bragged about it, and that Sheffner, who had a
history of child sexual molestation, had vowed to get even; the 12-year-old
victim had been sexually assaulted and murdered].)

 

Disposition

The
judgment is affirmed.

 

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    FYBEL,
ACTING P. J.

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

IKOLA, J.

 

 

 

THOMPSON, J.