v. Hoffman
Filed
7/5/12 P. v. Hoffman CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KYLE HOFFMAN
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
F061127
(Super. Ct. No. BF125737A & BF125737B)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
. John S. Somers, Judge.
Deborah
L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Kyle Hoffman.
Heather
J. MacKay, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Luis William Palafox.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, William K. Kim and
Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
>
Kyle Hoffman and Luis William Palafox (Hoffman and Palafox;
collectively, defendants) stand convicted, following a jury trial, of two
counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
multiple-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), robbery-murder (
burglary-murder (id., subd.
(a)(17)(G)) special circumstances. Each
defendant, 16 years of age or older when the offenses were committed (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(1)), was sentenced to two consecutive
terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and ordered to
pay various fees, fines, and restitution.
Hoffman now raises claims of trial error and insufficiency of the
evidence, while both contend a sentence of LWOP is unconstitutional when
imposed on a juvenile offender. We
strike the parole revocation restitution fines, but otherwise affirm.
Juries
Early
on the morning of August 6, 2008,
Woessner was investigating an abandoned stolen vehicle when he heard a car
alarm coming from the 4400 block of Belle Terrace. He saw Palafox walking away from the vehicle
that was emitting the alarm; when Woessner identified himself and asked him to
stop, Palafox ran. Woessner caught and
detained Palafox. Palafox had a dagger
with a four-inch-long, double-sided blade in his sock. Palafox was arrested for having the knife,
which was seized and booked into the police department’s property room.
Later
that morning, Richard Parrott, the son of Joseph and Dorothy Parrott, received
a telephone call from his cousin saying Dorothy had not shown up as scheduled
to take Richard’s aunt to an appointment.
telephonic contact with his parents, whom he had last seen on the morning of
August 4. As a result, he went to their
Bakersfield home. As he approached, he
saw that a window had been dislodged from the door on the side of the
house. Richard yelled inside the house
but, getting no response, went back out front and called his cousin, Gerald
Goodell, and asked him to come over.
Goodell
arrived a short time later and went to the back of the house, where he found
the sliding door open. He and Richard
telephoned again and heard the phone ringing inside, but there was no answer
despite the fact both cars were in the garage.
At that point, Richard called 911.
Officer
Knutson and his partner arrived at about 1:45 p.m. After contacting Richard outside, the
officers entered through the open rear sliding glass door and conducted a
protective sweep of the residence.
Knutson observed a small wooden box in the middle of the hallway, with
jewelry on the floor next to it. There
was nobody in the first bedroom off the hallway. In the second bedroom, he found an elderly
male, subsequently identified as Joseph, lying dead on the bed. There was dry blood on his face, the
blankets, and the pillow. The pillow was
covering his face, and it appeared someone had pushed it down in that
position. There were also what appeared
to be lacerations to his neck. In the
master bedroom, Knutson found an elderly female, subsequently identified as
Dorothy, lying dead on the bed. A pillow
with dried blood on it was covering her face.
Her skull was partially crushed in.
There
was extensive blood spatter in the rooms in which the bodies were found,
especially the one in which Dorothy was located. The cast-off blood stains and arch patterns
in both rooms indicated a striking of multiple blows. There was also impact spatter on and above
the headboard in the room in which Dorothy was found. Impact spatter results from an object
striking a source of exposed blood.
There was no trail of blood between the two bedrooms or out of the room
in which Dorothy was found. There was no
drip trail from the implement used.
Shoe
tracks were found in the tile hallway that connected the kitchen, laundry room,
garage, and living room area on one end, with the bedrooms and office on the
other end. It appeared someone had gone
through dressers, nightstands, a file cabinet, jewelry boxes, and a jewelry
armoire in various rooms.
Joseph’s
autopsy revealed that he had eight
along the left side of his neck, ranging in depth from one and a half to three
and a quarter inches. Although the stab
wounds appeared to have been made by a single-edged implement, this could not
be determined with certainty, because the body was going through the stages of
decomposition and so the wounds were somewhat dried. Dried edges can make what was caused by a
double-edged blade appear to have been made by a single-edged blade. Joseph also had possible defensive wounds on
his left hand. The left side of his jaw
was fractured, and he suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage (bleeding between the
brain and the skull). Bruising on his
left shoulder was linear, suggesting he was struck with a linear object. Death, which was caused by sharp and
blunt-force injuries, was not instantaneous.
Dorothy’s
autopsy revealed that she had trauma to her face and both sides of her
head. The left side of her face showed
blunt force trauma with linear bruising.
The entire right side of her face basically was crushed. She had a large laceration, and her right eye
was pushed backwards into her cranial vault.
She had numerous skull fractures, two of which were in a circular
pattern, meaning there was an actual impact by an object. That sort of fracture could be consistent
with being struck by a linear object such as a baseball bat. Because of the skull fractures, there was
tearing of the brain itself. Such
crushing of the skull required a significant amount of force. Dorothy also had linear contusions from blunt
force trauma to her abdomen,
left flank to left shoulder, and right shoulder. The linear bruising observed on Dorothy was
similar to that noted on Joseph, and the blunt force injuries to both could be
consistent with being caused by the same or a similar type of weapon. Because all of the bruises corresponded to
extensive hemorrhaging into the soft tissues of the fat of Dorothy’s back, it
meant her heart was still beating when she received those injuries. In addition, Dorothy had multiple contusions
to the upper left arm, just below the shoulder.
Some were linear abrasions, but two were in the shape of an inverted
C. They could be consistent with the
knob end of a baseball bat. The cause of
death was blunt force head trauma.
Dr.
Wallis-Butler, the forensic pathologist who performed both autopsies, could not
give an exact time of death because so many factors came into play. She estimated though that, depending on the
environment and based on the bodies’ degree of decomposition, death occurred 12
to 36 hours earlier.
On
November 23, a search warrant was executed at an apartment in the 4400 block of
Belle Terrace in which Hoffman resided.
Joseph’s state quarter collection was found in one of the bedrooms. Seized from a closet in the same bedroom were
a pair of shoes that, although they could not be positively identified as the
ones that made the tracks in the Parrotts’ hallway, were the same size, had the
same or a very similar tread pattern, and had a similar wear pattern.
Also
on November 23, a search warrant was
executed at the Moreno Valley residence of Palafox’s mother. Some of Joseph’s rings were found in two of
the bedrooms. Palafox was located in
Whittier and arrested. The knife seized
from him on August 6 (the morning the bodies were discovered) was
examined. DNA analysis showed that a
15-loci genetic profile developed from blood found where the blade met the hilt
matched Joseph’s genetic profile. The
probability of selecting the DNA profile from a population of random unrelated
individuals was estimated to be one in 670 quadrillion Caucasians, one in 2.1
quintillion African-Americans, and one in 7.3 quintillion Hispanics.
Hoffman’s Jury
As
of November, Reginald Cotton and Hoffman had been next door neighbors for about
two years. Hoffman had attended church
with Cotton on a number of occasions, and Cotton had developed a relationship
with Hoffman as his neighbor and spiritual advisor. One day that month, Hoffman asked Cotton if
God would forgive him for anything.
Cotton asked what Hoffman had done, and if he had murdered someone. Hoffman said he was a part of it. When Cotton asked what he meant by that,
Hoffman asked if Cotton knew the old people who were killed, and said he and
his cousin had done it.
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] Hoffman said they went to a
house to break in to get money for drugs.
He stayed outside in some bushes while his cousin went inside. Hoffman heard some noises, then his cousin
said the coast was clear and Hoffman went inside. Once he walked in, he saw blood and sheets
over someone. He was “just numb.†Hoffman said he did not know anyone was
present in the house until he went in and saw the blood.
Cotton
prayed with Hoffman, and told him that he needed to do the right thing, which
was to tell the police. Hoffman said
okay and asked Cotton to go with him to tell his mother. Cotton then went next door and told Hoffman’s
mother what Hoffman had said. She said
she needed to think about what to do.
Later that month, Cotton contacted the police because Hoffman had not
done so. Cotton recounted to Detective
Murphy, the lead detective on the case, what Hoffman had told him.
Murphy
subsequently interviewed Hoffman at the police department. Detective Findley was also present.
rights, Hoffman related that on August 4, he and his cousin, Palafox (whose
nickname was Junior and who was actually Hoffman’s nephew) were getting high on
marijuana and watching movies at Hoffman’s apartment. Palafox then convinced Hoffman to go with him
into a house later that night. At first,
Hoffman did not want to go, but he wanted to be “cool†around Palafox since
they were the only older boys in the family.
Hoffman
related that he and Palafox went to a house.
Hoffman thought Palafox was kidding when he said that, if there were any
people, he would take care of them.
Hoffman never really believed Palafox.
Hoffman went with Palafox to look for an opening into the house, because
there was no car parked outside. When
Palafox suggested they break a window, Hoffman agreed. Palafox told Hoffman to open the gate and put
something there to hold it open, and Hoffman complied without thinking, using a
trash can to prop it open.
Hoffman
stated that Palafox used a wooden Dodgers baseball bat, which he had brought
with him, to push out a window in the kitchen or laundry room door. Because he was too big to fit through the
window, he had the smaller Hoffman go inside with instructions to open the
sliding glass door in back. When Hoffman
did not hear any loud voices or noises inside, he opened the sliding door for
Palafox, who told him to stay there.
Hoffman waited while Palafox went to take a look. A few minutes later, Hoffman thought he heard
a basketball being dribbled, a child crying, and someone talking. Although nervous and scared, Hoffman stayed
where he was. Palafox then returned with
blood on his face and on the “bat.â€
whatever happened, Hoffman was not to look at the body or tell anybody about
this. Palafox told Hoffman to hold the
backpack, to look through two certain rooms, and not to come into two other
rooms.
Hoffman
related that he did as he was told and found some jewelry and cash, which Palafox
told him to put in the backpack. Palafox
told Hoffman to wait there, then went into another room. After about five minutes, Hoffman also went
into the room, and saw a body with the covers over her head and blood. Palafox was in the bathroom; he had found a
lot of jewelry that he put in the backpack.
Palafox said that since Hoffman had seen the one body, they should just
go in the other room. He had Hoffman
wait at the door, however, while he covered the body. Then Hoffman went in and they both started
looking through drawers.
Hoffman
said that after they left, they went to a nearby church to split what was in
the backpack. There was more than $200
in cash and quarters in a map of the United States. Hoffman related that although the cash had
been “wasted,†he still had the quarters in their cardboard display in his
room. Hoffman said that if he had known
beforehand what was going to happen, he never would have gone inside or even
agreed. The day Palafox left, Hoffman
threw everything away but the quarter collection. He went for a drive with a friend and tossed
stuff out of the car window every mile or so.
He kept the quarters, however, because his mother had said a complete
set could be turned in and would be worth a lot.
Asked
if he knew what happened to the baseball bat, Hoffman related that Palafox said
he had “went on Parkwood and broke it against the wall and burned it[] with his
lighter.†Palafox said the police had
the knife he used because they had caught him with it. As to why they chose that particular house,
Hoffman surmised it was because they did not see any car and, when Palafox went
to go knock on the front door and ran, no one answered. Hoffman agreed with Murphy that they were just
walking through the neighborhood and happened to see that house without any
cars in the driveway.
Murphy
inquired why, if Hoffman did not think “this was gonna go this way,†he thought
Palafox brought a baseball bat and a knife with him. Hoffman responded that he (Hoffman) lived in
a bad neighborhood. There were a lot of
gang members around, most of whom tried to “gang bang†on Hoffman. Hoffman explained that he was not from
anywhere, but just shaved his head sometimes to fit in with his friends, who
were all “gang-bangers.†Hoffman related
that he had never gone into a house before, although he had heard stories about
Palafox and his friends “stalk[ing]†houses where Palafox lived. Hoffman maintained he did not know at first
that Palafox had a baseball bat; Palafox was wearing jeans and a shirt, and
Hoffman guessed he had the bat in one of the sides. Hoffman was wearing jeans and a black
shirt. He threw away the shirt because
Palafox said to. Hoffman was also
wearing a jacket; it was still in his room.
He was not about to throw it away because his mother got it for
him. Palafox put gloves and a beanie in
the backpack. Hoffman did not see the
gloves until they were about to enter the house. They put on the gloves then because Palafox
said to.
Hoffman
admitted that when he and Palafox first left Hoffman’s residence, Hoffman knew
they were going to see if some cars were unlocked. Palafox said they were also going to go into
a house. Hoffman had a recollection of
talking about going into a house, but thought he disagreed. He did not remember much when he smoked
marijuana. When he and Palafox left the
apartment around midnight, however, he knew they were going to be up to no
good.
Asked
if they ever discussed what they would do if somebody was in the house or
chased them or anything, Hoffman related that Palafox told him, “‘You just run,
I’ll take care of ‘em.’†Palafox had
told him stories many times before about what he did, but it was all a
lie. For instance, Palafox had said he
killed a guy on the street in front of a crowd.
He then said he was just kidding and would not do that. Palafox always denied being a gang member,
but he told Hoffman “he back[ed] up the south the whole way.â€
Hoffman
was adamant that he did not see Palafox hurt either of the victims. However, Palafox described what he did and
how it felt. Palafox said the old man
was sleeping. Palafox went into his room
first and hit him or stabbed him in the throat.
Palafox made it sort of like a joke and told Hoffman, “‘Man, you don’t
know how hard it is to hit a throat.’â€
Palafox described how he hit the man and then stabbed him and then
stabbed him again in the throat and twisted and pulled. He said he then went into the woman’s
room. He started swinging down with the
baseball bat, and the old woman got up and sort of started screaming. Palafox said he was not sure if he was
hitting her, so he flashed a light, saw her start twitching, and kept on
hitting her. Palafox said he wanted them
to feel no pain at all. Palafox told
Hoffman this while they were in the house.
Hoffman estimated they were in there for 15 to 20 minutes at the most,
and that it probably happened between midnight and 2:00 a.m. Palafox told Hoffman not to snitch on him,
and he (Palafox) would not snitch on Hoffman, and that if only one got caught,
that person should take the whole rap.
Hoffman anticipated that if the detectives told Palafox what Hoffman had
told them, Palafox would probably make something up such as saying that Hoffman
killed one of the victims. Hoffman
acknowledged it would make more sense if each had killed one, but he almost
vomited when he saw the blood. He
insisted he did not kill anyone.
Hoffman
related that he had told his mother and Cotton about what happened, and that he
told his sister about it before that. He
told his mother because he could not take it anymore. He had wanted badly to turn himself in, but
he was scared. He intended to turn
himself in after Christmas. Asked how he
felt about what he was telling the detectives, Hoffman replied that he was glad
he had gotten it off his chest.
Asked
about knives found in his room, Hoffman replied that he liked collecting them,
especially how sharp they were and how crafted.
of the best weapons there were, but did not know why he thought that. He just loved them. He had never used one to hurt somebody.
Palafox’s Jury
K.M.,
Hoffman’s sister, testified under a grant of immunity. During August through November, Palafox lived
in Moreno Valley. In August, Palafox
stayed with her family, including Hoffman, in an apartment on Belle
Terrace. At the time, K.M. had a
full-sized Dodgers baseball bat.
At
some point, K.M. was around defendants when the two were talking about going
into someone’s house and stealing. On
August 4, the two left the apartment around 11:00 p.m. or midnight and did
not return until 3:00 a.m. or later.
They took the bat with them and returned with it. Around that same time frame, K.M. was in her
room with defendants and she touched the bat.
Defendants both reacted, and Palafox told her not to touch it. After that, Palafox took the bat away and she
never saw it again. At some point at the
beginning of August, K.M. looked into Hoffman’s backpack. In it, she saw jewelry and a couple hundred
dollars. Palafox said they had gotten
the money and jewelry when they were out breaking into cars.
In
September or October, K.M. spoke to Palafox by telephone and asked him if he
was involved in a murder that occurred during a break-in at a house. Palafox said something like she should not be
talking about it with him over the phone.
Murphy
interviewed K.M., who was not in custody, at the Bakersfield Police Department
in November. K.M. volunteered that she
had called Palafox and asked him about his involvement in the murders. Palafox denied, more than once, knowing what
she was talking about. When K.M. became
more “blunt,†basically telling him, “like murder, retard,†Palafox paused,
then replied “yeah.†Palafox directed
her not to talk about it on the phone.
DISCUSSION
I
Hoffman
contends the statements he made to Reginald Cotton should have been excluded
based on clergy-penitent privilege. We
disagree.
A. Background
Hoffman
moved, in limine, to exclude Cotton’s testimony pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1030 et seq. At a hearing
on the motion, Cotton testified he worked for a local professional basketball
team, and also “minister[ed] the gospel.â€
He was not licensed, but would go out “on the streets†and talk to
people and “share what Jesus has done for us.â€
He regularly attended Church of Christ Ministries, but did not hold any
position or have any official capacity with the church, nor had he ever held
such a position with any church.
However, he also had his own ministry, called “Livenit Ministries.†He had a card he would hand out in
conjunction with his ministry; it gave a telephone number and website, and
invited people to call if they “[n]eed[ed] to hear testimony, receive prayer or
encouragement.†Livenit Ministries was
not affiliated with Church of Christ Ministries or any other group. It was Cotton’s street ministry; Cotton did
not have any licenses or certificates as a minister.
Cotton
was someone Hoffman came to for spiritual advice. With respect to their conversation in
November, Cotton was told by a friend they had in common that Hoffman appeared
to be somewhat depressed. Their initial
contact concerned whether God could forgive Hoffman for something in which he
had been involved. At the end of the
conversation, Cotton and Hoffman prayed together. Cotton said he did that as a Christian in
ministering the word of God.
When
Hoffman spoke to Cotton about this case, Cotton encouraged Hoffman to go to the
police. Cotton told Hoffman they had to
follow “the laws of the land.†Cotton
never told Hoffman that he (Cotton) would go to the police or that Cotton could
not tell other people about what Hoffman had told him. Cotton and Hoffman were neighbors. Hoffman was one of the neighborhood youths to
whom Cotton ministered. Cotton would
encourage Hoffman to go to church.
Hoffman would attend church services with Cotton. When that happened, Cotton was not the one
conducting the services.
As
a member of the Church of Christ Ministries congregation, Cotton was not
obligated to listen to confessions.
While he would try to help someone who came to him to talk about a
problem, it was not his job or assignment as a member of the congregation. If someone came to him with a problem and
asked him to keep their conversations confidential, he would do so. Asked why, he replied, “Just so -- don’t
gossip.†With respect to the conversation
he had with Hoffman in this case, Cotton did not say anything one way or the
other about whether he would speak to anyone else about what had been
said. Although Cotton could not recall
with any certainty, he did not believe Hoffman requested that Cotton keep the
information confidential.
At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that, although Cotton
was performing as a religious counselor and advisor to Hoffman, he was not
performing as a member of the clergy who had the right to conduct penitential
communications. The court further found
the conversation did not qualify as a penitential communication, and that
Cotton did not have a duty to keep communications secret. Accordingly, it overruled the claim of
privilege.
Cotton’s
trial testimony is summarized in the statement of facts, ante. Hoffman’s renewed
objection to admission of his conversation with Cotton was overruled.
B. Analysis
“Subject
to [Evidence Code] Section 912, a penitent … has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication
if he or she claims the privilege.â€
(Evid. Code, § 1033.)
who has made a penitential communication to a member of the clergy.†(Id.,
§ 1031.) A “‘member of the clergy’â€
is “a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a
church or of a religious denomination or religious organization.†(Id.,
§ 1030.) A “‘penitential
communication’†is “a communication made in confidence … to a member of the
clergy who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member’s
church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear
those communications and, under the discipline or tenets of his or her church,
denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret.†(Id.,
§ 1032.)
“As
a general matter, the claimant of the [clergy-penitent] privilege has the
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to
sustain the claim. [Citation.] He is aided by a presumption that a
[clergy-penitent] communication was made in confidence. (Evid. Code, § 917[, subd. (a)].) The opponent has the burden to prove
otherwise [citation] by a preponderance of the evidence [citation].†(People
v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 655; see also Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 417, 441-442 (Archbishop).)
“‘We
defer to the [trial] court’s factual findings concerning privilege if they are
supported by substantial evidence.’
[Citation.] Where the facts are
undisputed, the privilege claim is one of law which is reviewed de novo. [Citation.]â€
(Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1515; accord, Archbishop,
supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at
p. 442.) “‘“When the facts, or
reasonable inferences from the facts, shown in support of or in opposition to
the claim of privilege are in conflict, the determination of whether the
evidence supports one conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and a
reviewing court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial evidence
to support it [citations].â€â€™
[Citations.] Accordingly, unless
a claimed privilege appears as a matter of law from the undisputed facts, an
appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s decision to reject that
claim.†(HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54,
60.) When reviewing a ruling on a claim
of clergy-penitent privilege, we must keep in mind that while “‘member of the
clergy’†is broadly defined in Evidence Code section 1030 (Cal. Law Revision
Com. com., 29B Pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 1030,
p. 54), “[b]ecause privileges ‘prevent the admission of relevant and
otherwise admissible evidence,’ they ‘should be narrowly construed.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Sinohui (2002) 28
Cal.4th 205, 212; accord, Trammel v.
United States (1980) 445 U.S. 40, 50.)
We
assume, for purposes of our analysis, that Cotton was a “‘member of the
clergy,’†as defined by Evidence Code section 1030, because he was a
“religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a … religious organizationâ€
(ibid.) by virtue of his street
ministry. Hoffman need not have been a
member of Cotton’s church or faith, or a subscriber to the tenets of Cotton’s
ministry, to constitute a “‘penitent’†within the meaning of Evidence Code
section 1031. (Doe 2 v. Superior Court, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1517.)
“‘The
priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed
acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation … in return.’ [Citation.]â€
(Archbishop,
p. 443.) Under the current
definition, which centers on a “communication†and not on a “confession,†there
is no requirement that, in order to be privileged, a communication have as its
purpose the confession of such an act or thought to receive religious
consolation and guidance. (
Cal.App.4th at p. 1518; Archbishop,
supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at
p. 443.) “Therefore, ‘[a]s long as
the discipline or practice of a church authorizes a member of the clergy to
hear particular communications and
imposes a duty of secrecy on the clergy member for such communications, a
communication is privileged from disclosure even though it is not a confession.’ [Citation.]â€
(Doe 2 v. Superior Court, supra, 132
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1518-1519, italics added.) Not every statement made to a member of the
clergy is privileged; rather, the statement “‘must satisfy all of the conceptual requirements of a penitential
communication .… [Citations.]’ [Citation.]â€
(Archbishop,
pp. 443-444, italics added.)
In
the present case, there was no evidence to show Cotton was authorized or
accustomed to hear confidential communications, or that he had a duty to keep
any such communications secret under the discipline, practice, or tenets of his
church or ministry. (See
204, 208; compare People v. Edwards (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1363-1365.) Even
assuming his self-imposed duty was sufficient to fulfill this requirement, it
only existed if Cotton were asked to keep the conversation confidential. Insofar as the evidence showed, Hoffman never
made such a request and, indeed, Cotton ultimately did not keep the communication
secret.
In
light of the foregoing, Hoffman’s conversation with Cotton did not constitute a
penitential communication within the meaning of Evidence Code
section 1032, and so was not privileged under section 1033 or section 1034
of the Evidence Code. It follows that
the trial court properly permitted the People to present Cotton’s testimony
concerning the contents of that conversation.
II
Hoffman
next contends his statement to detectives should have been suppressed under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conclude the statement was properly
admitted.
A. Background
As
part of his written motions in limine, Hoffman sought to exclude his statement
to police “as being taken in violation of†Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda),
and he requested an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. At the outset of that hearing, the prosecutor
asked for clarification whether the motion was being made only pursuant to
voluntariness of the statement itself.
Defense counsel responded, “One is as to advisal of rights and also with
regards to the voluntariness of any waiver.â€
The
prosecutor then called Detective Murphy to the stand. Murphy testified that in November, he
interviewed Hoffman after speaking to Reginald Cotton. The interview of Hoffman took place at the
Bakersfield Police Department, in the interview and interrogation room commonly
referred to as “the Blue room.†Detective
Findley was also present. Both
detectives were dressed in street clothes.
Hoffman, who was being detained at that point, was in handcuffs
throughout the interview. Murphy knew
Hoffman was 17 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history or
contact with law enforcement. Murphy did
not inform Hoffman that he had been arrested for murder; other officers
actually placed him under arrest on Belle Terrace, pursuant to an arrest
warrant, and Murphy did not know what they told him. The interview was conducted approximately an
hour to an hour and 15 minutes after Hoffman was taken into custody. During that time, Hoffman was held in a
detention cell at the police department.
To Murphy’s knowledge, he was not allowed to speak to his family. As he was being watched by uniformed patrol
personnel, however, he was not completely isolated.
Murphy
began by asking Hoffman if he wanted something to drink. Hoffman asked for some water and it was
provided. Murphy noted that Hoffman
probably had a pretty good idea why he was there, and Hoffman responded,
“yeah.†Murphy went on to say it was a
“golden opportunity†for Hoffman to “explain some stuff and get it out and
explain away some other stuff.†Less
than a minute into the interview, Murphy advised Hoffman of his
card. After reading each right, Murphy
elicited from Hoffman that Hoffman understood that right. Murphy then asked Hoffman if he understood
all of his rights and, when Hoffman answered yes, began his questioning. He did not ask Hoffman whether, having the
rights in mind, he was willing to talk to Murphy. He told Hoffman that they “desperatelyâ€
needed to find out some things, and that this could very well be Hoffman’s only
opportunity to talk to Murphy. Murphy
already had information that Hoffman had admitted to Cotton that he had been
involved in a burglary at the victims’ residence. Murphy did not tell Hoffman that legally, if
he was involved in the burglary, he would be charged with murder. Murphy also did not inform Hoffman that he
could be charged as an adult.
At
no time did Murphy threaten Hoffman if he did not cooperate. The only questions Murphy remembered Hoffman
asking were for clarification of a question Murphy asked. Murphy did his best to answer any questions
Hoffman asked, had a patrol officer take Hoffman to the men’s room when Hoffman
indicated a need in that regard, provided Hoffman with water, offered him soda,
and, near the end of the interview, asked him if he wanted anything to eat and
then obtained the chips he requested. At
no time did Murphy make any promises of leniency to Hoffman in return for
Hoffman’s cooperation.
While
Murphy was interviewing Hoffman, Hoffman’s mother and sister were in a break
room across the hallway. During the
interview, Hoffman indicated that he knew his mother, sister, and mother’s
boyfriend were at the police station. At
one point, he indicated he had heard their voices. At no time did Hoffman indicate that he
wanted to stop talking to Murphy, that he felt he needed to talk to an
attorney, or that he did not understand his rights. During the interview, which was
conversational, Hoffman seemed to understand the questions and gave appropriate
responses.
At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated the issues before it as
whether there was a proper advisal of rights and waiver under
waiver, whether it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court found sufficient evidence to
establish a proper advisement of rights, an implicit waiver of those rights,
and a waiver that was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, notwithstanding
Hoffman’s age, lack of sophistication, and lack of experience with law
enforcement. Accordingly, it found the
statement admissible against Hoffman.
B. Analysis
In
the title of the argument contained in his opening brief on appeal, Hoffman
frames his claim as being that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver
of his Miranda rights. He then expands his argument to include a
claim his statement was the involuntary product of intimidation, coercion, and
deception. The Attorney General says
this challenge to the voluntariness of the statement is not the same objection
made in the trial court, and so should be deemed forfeited. Hoffman disagrees, apparently viewing the
issues as one and the same.
The
Attorney General has the better argument.
Involuntariness due to a Miranda
waiver that was not knowing and intelligent, is a distinct claim from an
assertion that the ensuing statement was the product of intimidation,
deception, and coercion and therefore involuntary. (See Fare
v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 727; Edwards
v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 483-484.)
Hence, Hoffman’s failure to assert in the trial court that basis for
suppressing his statement forfeits the claim for purposes of appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; see, e.g.,
666; People v. Mayfield (1993) 5
Cal.4th 142, 172; People v. Hill (1992)
3 Cal.4th 959, 982, overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) Nevertheless, since the issues factually and
legally overlap in the circumstances of this case, and we are able to
independently review the recording of the interview which was played for the
jury and which the Attorney General has caused to be transmitted to us, and
Hoffman has raised (albeit somewhat perfunctorily) an alternative claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we will address Hoffman’s challenge to the
voluntariness of his statement on the merits.
We
turn first to the issue of waiver. The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that a suspect in
a criminal case “may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any
respect.†(Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 574.) “To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, a person undergoing a custodial interrogation must
first be advised of his right to remain silent, to the presence of counsel, and
to appointed counsel, if indigent.
[Citation.] As long as the
suspect knowingly and intelligently waives these rights, the police are free to
interrogate him. [Citation.]†(People
v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535.)
The waiver inquiry has two aspects.
“First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived. [Citations.]â€
(Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475
U.S. 412, 421.)
“In
considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it
was obtained in violation of a defendant’s rights under Miranda …, we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts
and inferences, and its evaluation of credibility, if supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] Although we independently determine whether,
from the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, the
challenged statements were illegally obtained [citation], we ‘“give great
weight to the considered conclusions†of a lower court that has previously
reviewed the same evidence.’
[Citations.]†(
235-236.) The prosecution bears the
burden of establishing the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver by a
preponderance of the evidence. (
1194-1195, disapproved on another ground in People
v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10; see Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 168.)
The
foregoing principles apply equally when the suspect is a minor. (People
v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 383.)
As the California Supreme Court has acknowledged, “a court faces special
problems in determining whether a minor who purports to waive the Fifth
Amendment rights to silence and the assistance of counsel in the context of
custodial interrogation does so knowingly and voluntarily. The [United States Supreme Court], in holding
that these constitutional protections apply to minors, ‘emphasized that
admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution’ [citation] and
that courts must use ‘special care in scrutinizing the record’ to determine
whether a minor’s custodial confession is voluntary [citation].… Nevertheless, … federal law requires us to
apply … the totality-of-the-circumstances rule .…†(People
v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1166-1167.) In examining the totality of the
circumstances when a minor is concerned, the court must take into
consideration, among other factors, the minor’s “age, intelligence, education,
experience, and capacity to understand the meaning and consequences of the
given statement. [Citations.]†(People
v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 383.) However, “‘“[n]either a low I.Q. nor any
particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack of understanding,
incompetency, or other inability to voluntarily waive the right to remain
silent under some presumption that the Miranda
explanation was not understood.â€â€™
[Citation.]†(
In
the present case, the record clearly shows Murphy took care to ensure Hoffman
understood each of his rights. There is
no indication Hoffman failed to understand, or was confused by, anything Murphy
advised him in that regard. (See
p. 726.) Further, there is no
suggestion Hoffman “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights
he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be. He was not worn down by improper
interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.†(Id.
at pp. 726-727.) While Murphy never
expressly asked him if he was willing to waive his rights, the record shows no
unwillingness or hesitation to answer questions on Hoffman’s part. At no time did Hoffman request the presence
of an attorney or indicate he wanted to terminate the questioning. “Although the police officers did not obtain
an express waiver of defendant’s
States Supreme Court and of [the California Supreme Court] have held that such
an express waiver is not required where a defendant’s actions make clear that a
waiver is intended. [Citations.]†(People
v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 250; accord, North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 & fn. 6.)
It
is true Hoffman was not allowed to see his family. However, there is no evidence he made any
request to speak with them, despite his awareness they were present at the
police department. (See
446.) It is also true Murphy never
informed Hoffman that if he confessed to burglary, he could be charged with
murder, or that he could be charged as an adult. Nevertheless, “[o]nce it is determined that a
suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all
times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of
the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis
is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.†(Moran
v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 422-423, fn. omitted.) There is no requirement that a suspect be
informed of the possible charges against him or her, the possible punishment
for those charges, or, by parity of reasoning, whether he or she may be charged
as an adult. (People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 982; see also
pp. 576-577; People v. Tate (2010)
49 Cal.4th 635, 682-685; People v. Neely (1979)
95 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1017.) “The
Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every
possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.†(Colorado
v. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 574.)
In
light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court correctly found that
Hoffman validly waived his Miranda
rights. Accordingly, we turn to the
voluntariness of his ensuing statement, which is assessed in much the same way
as the waiver.
“The
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15, of
the state Constitution bar the prosecution from using a defendant’s involuntary
confession. [Citation.]†(People
v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576; accord, Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 376.) When a defendant challenges his or her
statements as involuntary, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. (Lego
v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489; People
v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71.)
“A
statement is involuntary if it is ‘not “‘the product of a rational intellect
and a free will.’â€â€™ [Citation.]†(People
v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114, disapproved on another ground in
p. 421, fn. 22.) “Voluntariness
does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather
on the ‘totality of [the] circumstances.’
[Citations.]†(
79.) Thus, “‘[t]he due process
[voluntariness] test takes into consideration “the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.â€â€™
[Citations.]†(
1093, disapproved on another ground in People
v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 151.) “Relevant are ‘the crucial element of police
coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location
[citation]; its continuity’ as well as ‘the defendant’s maturity [citation];
education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Williams (1997) 16
Cal.4th 635, 660.) Other characteristics
of the defendant to be considered are his or her age, sophistication, prior
experience with the criminal justice system, and emotional state. (In re
Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 209.)
An
appellate court reviews independently a trial court’s determinations as to
whether coercive police activity was present and whether a defendant’s
statements were voluntary. (
p. 1093.) A trial court’s findings
concerning the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation are
generally reviewed for substantial evidence.
(Ibid.) Here, the interview was tape-recorded so the
facts surrounding the giving of the statement are undisputed (
404; People v. Anderson (1990) 52
Cal.3d 453, 470; People v. Vasila (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873).
Hoffman’s
challenge to the voluntariness of his statement rests on the assertions the
police misled him and gave him the impression that talking to them would create
a more favorable outcome. Hoffman points
out he was never told he could be charged as an adult or that, if he were
involved in the burglary, he could be charged with murder even if he did not
kill anyone; Murphy told him it was his “golden opportunity†to explain some
things and explain away other things, and suggested this was Hoffman’s only opportunity
to exonerate himself; and Hoffman was in a very vulnerable position when Murphy
“confronted†him in the interrogation room because he had been alone in a
holding cell for over an hour, he had not been allowed to speak to his family,
he was only 17 years old and had no prior experience with law enforcement, and
he was emotionally upset and feeling “great grief and remorse,†as shown by his
conversation with Reginald Cotton.
“The
test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant’s ‘will was overborne at the time he confessed.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Maury, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 404.) “In evaluating
a claim of psychological coercion, the ‘question posed … is whether the
influences brought to bear upon the accused were “such as to overbear [his or
her] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely
self-determined.â€â€™ [Citations.]†(People
v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 952.)
“A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or
violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of
improper influence. [Citation.] Although coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it ‘does not itself
compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.’ [Citation.]
The statement and the inducement must be causally linked. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Maury, supra, 30
Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) This
“requisite causal connection between promise and confession must be more than
‘but for’: causation-in-fact is insufficient.
[Citation.] ‘If the test was
whether a statement would have been made but for the law enforcement conduct,
virtually no statement would be deemed voluntary because few people give
incriminating statements in the absence of some kind of official action.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Benson (1990) 52
Cal.3d 754, 778-779.) Rather, “[t]he
statement is involuntary only if the threat [or promise] actually induces
defendant to make the statement.
[Citation.]†(
442.)
We
have viewed the recording of the interview and find it no more “coercive†than
any interview conducted by police at a police station. It was conducted in a comfortable-appearing
interview room that had plants, cushioned chairs, reading materials on the
tables, and pictures on the walls, and that looked more like a doctor’s waiting
room than the stereotypical police interrogation room. Hoffman was offered his choice of water or
soda and, before the interview began, he was asked if he was all right. Hoffman acknowledged that he had a good idea
why he was there. Although he teared up
at various times, the recording shows he was not so emotional that his will was
overborne. He was able to calmly relate
what occurred on the night of the murders, even when it obviously was difficult
for him to recount the noises he had heard and the seeing of the blood and
bodies. He was even able to smile
occasionally and chuckle at small jokes made by the detectives. The detectives did not yell at or become
stern with Hoffman. They did not treat
him in any way that might be termed aggressive or confrontational, and they
gave him food, water, and a comfort break.
They did not badger him to talk.
Although Hoffman was only 17 and had no prior experience with the
criminal justice system, nothing in his manner suggested he had mental problems
or low intelligence.
We
are hard-pressed to see the requisite causal connection between police conduct
and Hoffman’s statement. Hoffman had
already confessed to his sister, Cotton, and to his mother. He said he talked to his mother because he
could not take it anymore; he badly wanted to turn himself in, but was
scared. That he may have been feeling
grief and remorse is laudable, but did not result from any form of pressure
placed on him by the police.
We
also have no problem with Murphy’s “golden opportunity†remark or his comment
during the interview that the only way they could try to help Hoffman at all
was if he were completely honest. “‘The
courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, under all the
circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is
both involuntary and unreliable.’
[Citation.]†(
297-298.) Thus, “‘mere advice or
exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the
truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a
subsequent confession involuntary.’
[Citation.] … [T]he distinction
between permissible and impermissible police conduct ‘does not depend upon the
bare language of inducement but rather upon the nature of the benefit to be
derived by the defendant if he speaks the truth as represented by the
police.’ [Citation.] In terms of assessing inducements assertedly
offered to a suspect, ‘“[w]hen the benefit pointed out by the police … is
merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of
conduct,†the subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily made
[citation].’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 773.) The police did not cross the line in the
present case. (See, e.g.,
p. 727 [police indication that cooperative attitude would be to minor’s
benefit was “far from threatening or coerciveâ€]; People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 171 [detective’s
suggestion killing might have been accident, self-defense, or product of fear
not coercive but offered defendant an opportunity to provide details of crime;
any benefit to defendant that reasonably could be inferred was merely that
flowing naturally from truthful course of conduct]; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 113-116 [investigators did
not cross the line from proper exhortations to tell truth into impermissible
threats of punishment or promises of leniency when they: told defendant they were talking about a
death penalty case, that truth could not hurt him, but the longer he said
nothing, he was gone, and that if killings were accidental or resulted from
uncontrollable rage during drunken blackout, such circumstances could make a
lot of difference].)
Hoffman
says that “[s]ilence can be as misleading as a false statement,†and suggests
detectives employed deception by withholding from him that he could be charged
with murder even if he did not kill anyone and that it was possible he could be
charged as an adult. “‘While the use of
deception or communication of false information to a suspect does not alone render
a resulting statement involuntary [citation], such deception is a factor which
weighs against a finding of voluntariness [citation].’ [Citation.]â€
(In re Shawn D., supra, 20
Cal.App.4th at p. 209.) Hoffman
cites no case in which this type of omission has been found to constitute
deception, and we conclude it did not render Hoffman’s statement
involuntary. (Compare, e.g.,
838-843 [confession involuntary where investigators made promises of leniency,
engaged in psychological coercion, and falsely told defendant he had been seen
committing offenses], disapproved on another ground in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836; People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 610-612 [same; investigator
told defendant he could get death penalty if he did not confess, but a
codefendant — the actual killer — probably would not get death penalty],
overruled on another ground in People v.
Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510, fn. 17; People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 229-230 [same;
investigators repeatedly called 16-year-old suspect a liar, advised her that
she would face death penalty unless she changed statement and admitted true
extent of complicity, suggested she might be charged only as accessory if she
changed story, and ignored her repeated requests for assistance of counsel],
overruled on another ground in People v.
Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 509-510, fn. 17; People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 314-317 [same;
investigator deceptively omitted felony-murder doctrine, making his account of
law “materially misleading,†and he understated seriousness of defendant’s
position by implying that if defendant admitted his role in killing but had not
premeditated, defendant might avoid trial and conviction of first degree
murder]; In re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 213-216 [same; investigator repeatedly told minor, falsely, that
witnesses would identify him, truthful statement would benefit minor’s
girlfriend, and minor would not be tried as adult if he confessed].)
After
considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude the
statement made by Hoffman to detectives was voluntary. Accordingly, there was no due process
violation or state law error in introducing that statement at Hoffman’s trial. (See People
v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 660.)
III
Hoffman
says reversal is required because CALCRIM No. 400, as given in his trial,
misinstructed the jury on the mens rea required for an aider and abettor. We conclude the error was harmless.
A. Background
The
prosecutor argued both premeditation and felony murder to the jury as bases
upon which to find Hoffman guilty of first degree murder. He asserted premeditation was shown because,
when defendants moved through the house and came upon the victims in separate
rooms, they had a choice — kill or get out — and they had to think about that
choice. The prosecutor also suggested
the use of two weapons, coupled with the absence of a blood trail from one
bedroom to the other, led to the inference one defendant killed Joseph at the
same time the other defendant was killing Dorothy. The prosecutor further argued that the
evidence showed a robbery and a burglary, and that, based on Hoffman’s
statement, there was no doubt defendants intended to commit those crimes; accordingly,
Hoffman was guilty of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory. The prosecutor told jurors that even if they
were not sure whether Hoffman directly took action to kill Joseph and Dorothy,
he was guilty because he was an accomplice to the act and was aware of what was
going on.
Hoffman’s
jury was instructed that he could be guilty if he directly committed the crime
or if he aided and abetted the perpetrator.
The trial court instructed on the general principles of aiding and
abetting in accordance with CALCRIM No. 400, as it read at that time, as
follows: “A person may be guilty of a
crime in two ways: [¶] One, he or she may have directly committed
the crime.… [¶] Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a
perpetrator who directly committed the crime.
[¶] A person is
or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who
committed it. [¶] Under some specific circumstances, if the
evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be
found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first
crime.â€
title="">[12] (Italics added.)
The
trial court further told jurors that Hoffman was being prosecuted for first
degree murder under theories of premeditation and felony murder, and it
instructed on both. It also instructed
on unpremeditated, second degree murder.
The court further instructed on the requirement of proof of the union or
joint operation of act and specific intent and/or mental state, and on
voluntary intoxication. The court told
jurors that if they concluded Hoffman was intoxicated at the time of the
alleged crime, they could consider such evidence in deciding whether he
(1) knew Palafox intended to commit murder, robbery, and/or burglary
(robbery and burglary being the felonies underlying the felony-murder theory);
(2) intended to aid and abet Palafox in committing murder, robbery, and/or
burglary; (3) acted with an intent to kill or with deliberation and
premeditation; and (4) had the specific intent required for robbery and/or
burglary.
B. Analysis
Hoffman
voiced no objection to the italicized portion of CALC
| Description | Kyle Hoffman and Luis William Palafox (Hoffman and Palafox; collectively, defendants) stand convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)), with multiple-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), robbery-murder (id., subd. (a)(17)(A)), and burglary-murder (id., subd. (a)(17)(G)) special circumstances. Each defendant, 16 years of age or older when the offenses were committed (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(1)), was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and restitution. Hoffman now raises claims of trial error and insufficiency of the evidence, while both contend a sentence of LWOP is unconstitutional when imposed on a juvenile offender. We strike the parole revocation restitution fines, but otherwise affirm. |
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