P. v. Herrera
Filed 5/30/06 P. v. Herrera CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANK DIAZ HERRERA, Defendant and Appellant. | B186275 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA087442) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Michael A. Cowell, Judge. Affirmed.
Charlotte E. Costan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Dawn S. Mortazavi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Frank Diaz Herrera appeals from a judgment of conviction for failing to register as a sex offender as required by Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A).[1] He challenges his conviction on three bases. First, he contends that evidence he spent approximately three nights per week at his girlfriend's house was insufficient to show both that he had established a second residence and that he was aware such an arrangement warranted additional registration. Second, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after his parole officer remarked that this was the second time he had failed to register. Third, he contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give CALJIC No. 2.02 regarding circumstantial evidence of the requisite mental state.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Under applicable standards of appellate review, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction, and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact which the jury could reasonably find from the evidence. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; People v. Neufer (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 244, 247.)
When appellant was paroled, he signed a form that outlined the sex offender registration requirements. Typically, a parole officer will go through the form with a parolee to confirm that he understands the requirements. The form does not define the term â€