P. v. Hawkins
Filed 6/5/13 P.
v. Hawkins CA5
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
MARCUS ANDRE HAWKINS,
Defendant and
Appellant.
F064216
(Super.
Ct. Nos. 1420849, 1422553)
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus
County. Scott T. Steffen, Judge.
Elisa A.
Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N.
Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant challenges the rate at
which he was awarded conduct credits for time spent in county jail prior to
commencement of his prison sentence. We
find no error and affirm.
Defendant
was charged by information with two counts of
occurred on September 16, 2009, and June 25, 2010.
arrested in July 2010, and remained in custody while the criminal proceedings
were pending. He was convicted of both
counts after a jury trial, and was sentenced to state prison in December 2011. Pursuant to Penal Code section 4019,
actual confinement. He appeals,
contending the current version of section 4019, properly interpreted, entitles
him to two days of presentence conduct credits for every two-day period of
confinement and to interpret it otherwise would violate
DISCUSSION
of Review
“‘The
interpretation of a statute and the determination of its constitutionality are
questions of law. In such cases, appellate
courts apply a de novo standard of review.’
[Citations.]†(
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.)
Construction
Section
4019 governs credit to be given to a defendant convicted of a felony for time
spent in county jail “from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving
of the sentence commences.†(§ 4019,
subd. (a)(1).) Prior to January 25,
2010, presentence conduct credits under section 4019 accrued at a rate of two
days for every four days of actual time served in presentence custody. (People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 395 (
4554.) An amendment effective from January
25, 2010 to September 28, 2010, increased the rate, so that custody credits
accrued at a rate of two days of credit for every two days actually
served. (Kennedy, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 327; Stats. 2009, 3d Ex.
Sess. 2009–2010, ch. 28, § 50.) For those
defendants required to register as sex offenders, those committed for serious
felonies (as defined in § 1192.7), and those who had prior convictions for
violent or serious felonies, however, two days of conduct credit were earned
for every four days spent in actual custody.
(Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009–2010, ch. 28, § 50.) By
amendments that became operative on October 1, 2011, the Legislature enacted the
current version of the statute, under which two days of conduct credit may be
earned for each two days of actual custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c);
991, 993 (Verba).)
The current
version of the statute provides that it applies prospectively, “to prisoners
who are confined to a county jail … for a crime committed on or after October
1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner
prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior
law.†(§ 4019, subd. (h).) The former sentence expressly makes the
amended statute applicable when the crime was committed on or after October 1,
2011. Although the latter sentence is
less clearly expressed, we interpret it to mean that conduct credit for other
prisoners is governed by prior law. As
stated in People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 (Rajanayagam): “‘“A statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.â€â€™ [Citations.] Therefore, we cannot read the second sentence
to imply any days earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, shall be
calculated at the enhanced conduct credit rate for an offense committed before
October 1, 2011, because that would render the first sentence
superfluous.†(Id. at p. 51.) Defendant’s
offenses were committed before October 1, 2011. By the terms of section 4019, he was not
entitled to the benefit of the October 1, 2011, version of that section. Consequently, the trial court properly
calculated his conduct credits in accordance with prior law.
Protection
“The
States Constitution and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California
Constitution both prohibit the denial of equal protection of the laws.†(People
v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 674.)
“The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are
similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated
equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘“[t]he first prerequisite to a
meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state
has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner.â€â€™
[Citation.] ‘This initial inquiry
is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether
they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.â€â€™ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Brown (2012)
54 Cal.4th 314, 328.) Prisoners who were
in jail on or after October 1, 2011, and who committed an offense on or after
that date are similarly situated to prisoners who were in jail on or after
October 1, 2011, and who committed the same offense before October 1, 2011, for
purposes of earning conduct credits under section 4019. (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53–54.)
Both classes were presumably aware of the conduct credit provisions and
those provisions acted as an incentive to perform assigned work and comply with
applicable rules and regulations during the time period beginning October 1,
2011. (Ibid.)
Defendant’s
offenses were committed prior to October 1, 2011. He was arrested and placed in custody prior
to that date, but he remained in presentence custody both before and after
October 1, 2011. The statutory
classification results in less favorable treatment for defendant than for those
who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011, although defendant
served part of his presentence custody time along with those defendants.
“Both classifications of prisoners, pre- and
post-October 1, 2011, offense defendants, are aware of the conduct credit
provision and have an incentive to perform assigned work and comply with rules
and regulations because both classifications have the opportunity to earn
conduct credit, just at different rates. To argue that a defendant who committed an
offense before October 1, 2011, but was in local custody on or after that date
was not aware of the conduct credit provision and did not have an incentive to
work and behave is unpersuasive. Both
classes have an incentive to work and behave but a defendant who committed a
crime before the effective date is rewarded less. Thus, based on the facts before us, the
current version of section 4019 creates a classification that affects two
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.
[Citations.]†(
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 53–54.)
Consistent with
similarly situated to prisoners whose offenses were committed on or after
October 1, 2011, for purposes of application of section 4019 conduct credits.
If the
persons differently affected by the statute are similarly situated, we must determine
whether the statute’s classifications violate equal protection. A statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
the rational basis test. (
1185, 1200–1201.) Under this test, which
applies to conduct credits, we inquire whether the “classifications between
those to whom the state accords and withholds substantial benefits [are]
reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.†(In re
Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, 545–546; In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800, 805.) The statutory classification “must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.†(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
While “the purpose of section 4019’s
conduct credits generally is to affect inmates’ behavior by providing them with
incentives to work and behave, [the purpose of the October 1, 2011, amendment
of section 4019 was] ‘to reduce recidivism and improve public safety, while at
the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spending.’ [Citation.]â€
(Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at pp. 54–55.) Rational
basis review of an equal protection challenge is deferential; we may not
intrude on the Legislature’s policy judgments, or “second-guess the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of the law.†(
74, 77.) “When conducting rational basis
review, we must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that
the Legislature seems to have made.†(
We agree with the
classification bears a rational relationship to its stated purposes.
“Preliminarily, we note the
California Supreme Court has stated equal protection of
the laws does not forbid statutes and statutory amendments to have a beginning
and to discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time.…
“More importantly, in choosing
October 1, 2011, as the effective date of Assembly Bill No. 109, the
Legislature took a measured approach and balanced the goal of cost savings
against public safety. The effective
date was a legislative determination that its stated goal of reducing
corrections costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those
defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits
to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost
savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who
commit an offense on or after the amendment’s effective date. But that is not the approach the Legislature
chose in balancing public safety against cost savings. [Citation.]
Under the very deferential rational relationship test, we will not
second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated purpose is better served
by increasing the group of defendants who are entitled to enhanced conduct
credits when the Legislature has determined the fiscal crisis is best
ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only those defendants who
committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011.†(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 55–56; accord,
The
Legislature is also permitted to make incremental changes, as it tries to
determine the best means to achieve its purposes. (Kennedy, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) Because the classifications used by the
Legislature bear a rational relationship to the purposes of the statutory
amendment, we find no violation of the constitutional right to equal
protection.
The
judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before Hill, P. J., Wiseman, J. and
Levy, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1] Because the facts of the offenses and
the exact nature of the charges are not pertinent to the issues raised in
defendant’s appeal, we will not discuss them in any detail.
