P. v. Guzman
Filed 8/21/12 P. v. Guzman CA4/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE JOAQUIN GUZMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
G045649
(Super. Ct. No. 08NF1578)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of
County, William R. Froeberg, Judge. Affirmed.
Barbara A. Smith, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven
T. Oetting and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Jose Joaquin
Guzman argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
FACTS
One evening around 10 o’clock, appellant rode his bike to a Del
Taco in Anaheim and entered the
restaurant through the rear entrance.
There were no customers inside at the time, but manager Edith Gonzalez
was cleaning tables in the back of the restaurant. She recognized appellant as a frequent
customer, exchanged greetings with him and then went about her cleaning. However, appellant wasn’t there to eat. Instead, he approached Gonzalez from behind,
restrained her with his left arm and began stabbing her with a small folding
knife. Gonzalez struggled to escape, but
appellant stabbed her twice each in the chest and shoulder, thrice in the back
and once in the forearm before finally letting her go. Bleeding profusely, Gonzalez hobbled to her
office and summoned help.
Appellant proceeded to
the front of the restaurant and hopped over the front counter. There, he encountered two cashiers, neither
of whom was aware of what had just happened to Gonzalez. Holding the knife at his side, appellant told
the first cashier, “Give me the money and I won’t hurt you.†He then opened her cash register and took the
money. At that point, the second cashier
opened her register, but appellant jumped back over the counter, ran out the
rear exit and fled on his bicycle.
Gonzalez was transported
to the hospital, where she received stitches for her wounds. She remained in the hospital for observation
overnight and was released the following day.
In the wake of the
stabbing, Anaheim Police Sergeant Dennis Briggs searched the surrounding area
but was unable to find appellant. He
then went to the restaurant to assist in the investigation. While he was interviewing witnesses in the
parking lot, appellant suddenly appeared on his bicycle. Briggs told him to stop, and he
complied. He then got off his bike and
began walking towards Briggs with his hands tucked inside his pockets. Briggs drew his gun and ordered appellant to
put his hands in the air. When he did,
Briggs noticed he was holding cash in one hand and a pair of pocketknives in
the other. Briggs handcuffed appellant
and took him into custody. He found a
third knife on appellant when he searched him incident to arrest.
About
an hour later, appellant was interviewed by Sergeant James Rodriquez at the
Anaheim Police Station. Appellant
admitted stabbing Gonzalez and robbing the restaurant. He even asked for a pen and paper and
diagramed where inside the restaurant he committed his crimes. When Rodriguez asked him if he was sorry,
appellant replied, “Yeah, for supposedly what I did.†Although Rodriguez asked him several times,
appellant never explained why he stabbed Gonzalez. However, he did say he was not surprised
about what he had done. He said he
returned to the scene afterwards because the stabbing involved a woman and all
he got in the robbery was “chump change.â€
Appellant was charged
with attempted premeditated murder and second degree robbery. It was also alleged he personally used a
deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. During deliberations, the jury asked to
review Rodriguez’s testimony and requested a more detailed definition of the
term “intent.†The court provided the
jurors with a transcript of Rodriguez’s testimony and instructed them to use
the ordinary definition of intent.
However, the jurors subsequently reported they were deadlocked at 8-4
and asked if they could find appellant guilty of a lesser offense than
attempted murder. The judge told them
no, and a short time later they returned their verdict. They found appellant guilty as charged,
except that they found he did not act with premeditation. Thereupon, the court sentenced appellant to
11 years and 4 months in prison.
DISCUSSION
Appellant
contends there is insufficient evidence
to support the jury’s finding he specifically intended to kill Gonzalez. We disagree.
In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
review the entire record “‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value —
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Stuedemann (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
In so doing, we presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People
v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
“The
same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial
evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a
defendant if it finds the circumstantial
evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which
suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court
that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the
judgment. [Citation.]â€â€™ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Kraft, supra, 23
Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054.)
To
support a conviction for attempted murder, the prosecution must prove the
defendant specifically intended to kill the victim. (People
v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) Because “[o]ne who intentionally attempts to
kill another does not often declare his state of mind either before, at, or
after the moment he†attacks, his intent must usually be derived from the
circumstances surrounding the attack. (
the attack strongly suggest appellant possessed the requisite intent to
kill.
Upon
entering the restaurant, appellant forcibly restrained Gonzalez and stabbed her
eight times with a knife. Although the
knife was not very big (one of the cashiers described it as being “about the
size of a hand lengthâ€), repeatedly striking an unarmed and defenseless victim
with a deadly weapon is strong evidence of murderous intent. (People
v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701-702; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [appellant’s intent to kill “was established by the
evidence of his unprovoked attack that rendered the unarmed victim prone and
defenseless as appellant repeatedly stabbed him.â€].)
Moreover, during the course of the attack,
appellant stabbed Gonzalez twice in the chest and three times in the back. Because appellant’s knife penetrated areas of
Gonzalez’s body where her vital organs are located, the jury could reasonably
infer he intended to kill, as opposed to merely wound, her. (People
v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561 [stabbing victim in the chest was
indicative of intent to kill]; People v.
Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114 [stabbing victim in the abdomen was
indicative of intent to kill].)
It is true that appellant never told the
police why he stabbed Gonzalez. However, the prosecution was not required to
establish appellant’s motive to obtain a conviction. (CALCRIM No. 370.) And it seems rather revealing that
immediately after stabbing Gonzalez, appellant went to the front of the
restaurant and robbed one of the cashiers.
This suggests he planned to rob the restaurant, and he tried to kill
Gonzalez because he viewed her as an impediment to that plan. While other explanations are possible, we
must remember the intent to kill may properly be inferred from the purposeful
“use of a lethal weapon with lethal force . . . even if the act was done
without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or
annoyance.†(People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.)
Appellant admits the court was correct in
instructing the jury it could not convict him of a lesser offense than
attempted murder. Nonetheless, because
this effectively forced the jurors into an “all or nothing†choice between
attempted murder and acquittal, appellant fears the jurors may have chosen to
convict him, even if they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his
guilt. This is sheer speculation. And since, as appellant concedes, no instructional
error occurred, our sole task is to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
For the reasons explained above, we believe there is. We are, therefore, powerless to disturb the
judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
BEDSWORTH,
J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
FYBEL, J.
