P. v. Gatlin
Filed 6/28/12 P. v. Gatlin CA1/4
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TROY JOSEPH
GATLIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
A134474
(San Mateo
County
Super. Ct.
No. SC073974)
Appellant
Troy Joseph Gatlin pled guilty to possession
of methamphetamine. (Former Health
& Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a) [Stats. 2008, ch. 292,
§ 3].) He was sentenced to two
years eight months in state prison. On appeal, he contends that the trial court
erred by (1) denying his suppression motion and (2) awarding him insufficient
presentence conduct credits. We affirm
the judgment, including the award of sentencing credits.
FACTS
About
6:20 p.m. on July 8, 2011,
San Mateo
County Deputy Sheriff Chad
Buck was on duty in San Bruno. He saw appellant Troy Joseph Gatlin riding a
bicycle northbound on San Mateo Avenue
approaching Huntington Avenue. The deputy’s unmarked car was moving behind
him, also going northbound. Gatlin
veered from the right side of the roadway into the middle of it at the
intersection, then went back to the side of the road, crossed Huntington
Avenue and rode up onto the sidewalk. Deputy Buck and the three local police
officers with him
title="">[3]—all
in full uniform—were in an unmarked car.
They pulled up to the corner and made a traffic stop. Deputy Buck explained the reason for the stop
to Gatlin, who was cooperative. When the
deputy asked if he could conduct a search; the bicyclist agreed. Gatlin had a plastic baggie in his hand
containing 0.41 grams of methamphetamine—a usable quantity.
Gatlin
was arrested. In August 2011, he was
charged by information with possession of
methamphetamine. The information
also alleged nine prior convictions including a 1983 assault. (Former Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a);
Pen. Code,
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)-(2); former §§ 667.5, subd. (b) [Initiative
Measure Prop. 83, § 9], 1203, subd. (e)(4) [Stats. 2009, ch. 582,
§ 5].) At his arraignment, Gatlin
pled not guilty to the charge and these allegations.
On
November 1, Gatlin moved to suppress evidence, arguing that his July 8
detention was improper because he did not commit any criminal offense
warranting a traffic stop, rendering the search unreasonable. (§ 1538.5.) The People opposed the motion. At the hearing on the suppression motion,
Deputy Buck and Gatlin both testified.
Gatlin testified that he pulled up onto the sidewalk after the police
car stopped, swerving to avoid hitting the car or the officers. Deputy Buck testified that Gatlin veered into
the roadway and rode the bicycle up onto the sidewalk before he conducted the
traffic stop. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress, finding that Deputy Buck—whom it found to be a credible
witness—had an objective legal basis to stop Gatlin because the bicyclist
veered into the vehicular traffic on the roadway and because he rode his
bicycle onto the sidewalk.
On
November 17, pursuant to a negotiated
agreement, Gatlin withdrew his not guilty plea and pled no contest to the
possession of methamphetamine charge. He
also admitted that he was ineligible for probation and that he had a prior
conviction for assault that constituted a strike. He was to be sentenced to no more than 32
months in prison. The trial court
accepted the plea and found Gatlin guilty of the possession of methamphetamine
offense. The remainder of the information—including
a second strike—was dismissed.
Gatlin
moved to strike his assault strike, without success. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to a total term of two years
eight months in state prison—the lower
term of 16 months for possession of methamphetamine, doubled because of the
strike.
subd. (a); § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1); former § 18 [Stats. 1976, ch.
1139, § 98, p. 5089].) He was given
284 days of presentence credit against his prison term—190 days of custody
credit and 94 days of conduct credit.
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
First,
Gatlin challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. He raises two grounds, but we need only
address one of them. He argues that the
traffic stop was initiated before he had reached the corner of the intersection
at which he was said to have begun riding his bicycle on the sidewalk. Thus, he reasons, Deputy Buck had no
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop at the time of the stop. (See § 1538.5.)
The
Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop—a form of investigatory
detention—is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the
detaining official can point to specific articulable facts that, in the
totality of the circumstances, provide an objective manifestation that the
detained person is suspected of having committed a crime. (People
v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299.)
If the traffic stop of Gatlin was made without a reasonable suspicion,
then the evidence of the methamphetamine found during the later search may be
suppressed. (See § 1538.5; see also
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S.
429, 433-434.)
When
resolving a suppression motion, the trial court must first find the historical
facts. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23
Cal.4th 225, 255.) Gatlin’s claim of
error on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding the facts on which it
relied to uphold the validity of the traffic stop. In essence, he contends that the facts that
the trial court relied on were not
credible. Our standard of review
of the trial court’s findings of fact is well settled. We defer to those findings of fact if they
are supported by substantial evidence. (
The power to judge the credibility of witnesses, to resolve conflicts in
the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. (People v. Leyba (1981)
29 Cal.3d 591, 596.) When we construe
the record, we view it in the light most favorable to those findings. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th
668, 673-674.)
One
basis of the trial court’s finding that the traffic stop was proper was that
the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Gatlin violated a San Bruno
ordinance prohibiting an adult from riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. (See San Bruno Mun. Code,
§ 7.48.090.) Noting Deputy Buck’s
testimony that the traffic stop was made at the corner, Gatlin argues that it
was physically impossible for the bicyclist to have ridden onto the sidewalk
beyond this intersection. He reasons
that the police vehicle must have stopped ahead of his bicycle position in
order to prevent him from fleeing. From
this assumption, he further reasons that if the stop was made at the corner, he
could not have ridden beyond the intersection onto the sidewalk.
This
argument is flawed for several reasons.
First, Gatlin’s view of the evidence conflicts with Deputy Buck’s direct
testimony that he saw Gatlin ride up onto the sidewalk at the corner and that
he made a traffic stop after he saw Gatlin do so. Second, Gatlin’s assumption of the relative
location of the vehicle and the bicycle at the time of the traffic stop are
also contradicted by the deputy’s testimony that the police vehicle did
corner—necessarily, behind him. The
trial court expressly found that Deputy Buck’s testimony was credible. It necessarily
rejected Gatlin’s contrary testimony that the traffic stop occurred before he
rode his bicycle onto the sidewalk. On
appeal, we must defer to the trial court on these credibility issues. (In re
Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60,
77; People v. Leyba, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 596.) We are
compelled to draw every reasonable inference in support of those findings.
(See, e.g., People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp.
673-674.) We are not permitted to make
the assumption Gatlin asks us to make that would undermine those findings.
Gatlin’s
other reasoning is also flawed. He
suggests that his view of the relative placement of the vehicle and the bicycle
at the time of the traffic stop bolsters his contention that Deputy Buck could
not have formed a reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop based on his riding
the bicycle on the sidewalk. He argues
that the evidence compels the conclusion that any riding on the sidewalk
occurred after the traffic stop, which cannot constitute justification for the
detention.
The
reasonableness of a traffic stop turns on the circumstances known to the law
enforcement official when the stop was conducted. (See People
v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334.)
Even if we assume arguendo that Deputy Buck decided to
insufficient basis before observing Gatlin ride onto the sidewalk, his
testimony that the sidewalk violation that occurred before the stop was
lawful basis for the stop. Substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s factual findings. The
municipal ordinance violation provided a proper basis for a traffic stop made after
that violation was observed. Based on those findings, the totality of the
circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion that Gatlin had violated the
municipal bicycling ban, making the traffic stop reasonable. (See People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th
224, 231; People v. Mims (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1248.) The trial court properly denied Gatlin’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search conducted during
that traffic stop.
title="">[7]
PRESENTENCE CREDITS
Gatlin
also challenges the presentence credits awarded to him. Statute law provides that a defendant who
commits a crime on or after October 1, 2011, receives two days of presentence
conduct credit for every two days of presentence time served. A less generous calculation of credits
applies to offenses committed before that date.
(§ 4019, subds. (f), (h); see former § 4019, subds. (b)-(c)
[Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2].) As
Gatlin’s offense was committed before the effective date of the new law, the
trial court awarded him 94 days of conduct credit for 190 days of presentence
custody, based on the earlier sentencing scheme.
On
appeal, Gatlin contends that the trial court’s failure to apply the amended
version of section 4019 to him violated his federal and state
inmates whose offenses occurred after October 1, 2011, and that there is no
rational basis for treating him differently from these inmates. (See § 4019 [Stats. 2011-2012 1st
Ex.Sess., ch. 12, § 35]; former § 4019 [Stats. 2010, ch. 426,
§ 2].) He concedes that two Courts
of Appeal have upheld the prospective application of this provision against
equal protection challenges, but argues that these decisions are wrongly
decided. (See People v. Borg (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1535-1539 [First
District, Division One], petn. for review pending, petn. filed May 21, 2012,
S202328; see also People v. Olague (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1136 [Sixth District], petn. for review pending, petn.
filed June 14, 2012, S203298.)
Recently,
the California Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue. In a case involving an earlier version of
section 4019, a unanimous court held that equal protection did not require the
retroactive application of that statute.
The two classes of inmates in that case were not similarly situated for
purposes of the challenged law. The
important correctional goal of a statute creating incentives for good behavior
is not served by rewarding prisoners who served time before those incentives
took effect. These prisoners could not
have modified their behavior in response to the later-created incentive. For this reason, the court held that
prisoners who served time before and after the effective date of the statute
were not similarly situated. (
___ Cal.4th ___, ___ [2012 D.A.R. 8122, 8126].)
The
reasoning of Brown applies with equal
force to the prospective-only application of the current version of section
4019. The trial court properly
calculated Gatlin’s presentence credits.
The
judgment—including the award of sentencing credits—is affirmed.
_________________________
Reardon,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Ruvolo, P.J.
_________________________
Sepulveda, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1]
All subsequent references to dates refer to the 2011 calendar year unless
otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2]
In his written report, Deputy Buck mistakenly reported that Gatlin was riding
on San Bruno Avenue.
