P. v. Frias
Filed 6/25/08 P. v. Frias CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL FRIAS II, Defendant and Appellant. | G038263 (Super. Ct. No. 05NF0427) O P I N I O N |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Manuel Frias II was convicted of three robberies and a carjacking, all with gun enhancements. His appeal concerns only the carjacking conviction. The sole evidence linking Frias to the crime was the identification of Frias in a photographic lineup by the victim, Ye Yuan, and Frias contends this evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Frias asks this court to hold all nighttime, stressful, and
cross-racial eyewitness identifications made by a victim are insufficient to support a conviction. While we recognize there can be inaccuracies and complications associated with eyewitness testimony, we find no basis to hold as a matter of law all such eyewitness identifications are insufficient. The jury had the opportunity to weigh and consider the many factors affecting Yuans identification and reasonably chose to believe his testimony. The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS
On January 16, 2005, Yuan was sitting in his car parked in the Fullerton Target parking lot. While Yuan was talking on his cell phone, two men parked their car, exited, approached Yuan, and pulled out their guns. The taller, bigger man asked for Yuans cell phone and car keys while pointing his gun at Yuans head. Yuan handed over his cell phone and his keys. The two men got into Yuans car and drove away.
Detective Roy Ellison showed Yuan seven six-pack photographic lineups over the next month. Yuan did not identify any of the photographs in the three six-pack lineups on January 26, 2005, or in the two six-pack lineups on February 16, 2005. On February 8, 2005, Yuan identified Frias from one of the two six-pack lineups as the man who look[ed] like the guy that pointed the gun at him, but he was not positive.
At trial, Frias was also charged with committing three robberies. On January 21, 22, and 29, 2005, he entered three different businesses, approached the cash registers, demanded the register cash at gunpoint, and absconded with the money. Frias
conceded he committed all three robberies at trial, but he disputed the gun enhancement allegation by claiming the gun he used was not a real firearm. On appeal, Frias does not challenge the gun enhancement convictions.
DISCUSSION
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must review the entire record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and decide whether there exists substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 316-320; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562.) For evidence to be substantial, it must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. [Citation.] (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 139, cited in People v. Aispuro (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1511.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the jurys finding, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
An out-of-court identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness, which Yuans identification was, can be sufficient evidence to prove the defendants identity as the perpetrator of the crime. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480.) Such an out-of-court identification is generally of greater probative value than in-court identifications because the circumstances of a trial may affect the witnesss recognition. (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 265.) Yuan looked through 42 different
pictures, in seven separate six-pack photographic lineups, during the month following the incident. He identified only one person, Frias, as one of the carjackers. Although Yuan was not positive, a cautious identification is not proof of unreliability. (Brayboy v. Scully (2d Cir. 1982) 695 F.2d 62, 65-66.)
Frias questions the validity of Yuans identification by relying on evidence of Yuans fear, the darkness of the night, and that a gun was pointed directly at Yuans head. The credibility of convictions solely based on eyewitness identification where the defendant is previously unknown to the witness has been a problem in our justice system for many years. (See Jackson v. Fogg (2d Cir. 1978) 589 F.2d 108, 112; see also United States v. Russell (6th Cir. 1976) 532 F.2d 1063, 1066.) However, the testimony of a single witness remains sufficient to prove identity. (See Evid. Code, 411.)
The dangers of eyewitness identifications have led courts to allow expert witnesses to discuss the many factors that can play a role in affecting an individuals perception. (See People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 375-376 (McDonald), overruled on other grounds in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914.) Some of these factors. such as stress, the focus on the gun, and a difference in race of the observer and the observed, are especially pertinent to the instant case. (McDonald, supra,
37 Cal.3d. at p. 361.) Although Frias did not present any expert testimony, he had the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine Yuan suggesting these weaknesses of eyewitness identification to the jury.
The jury chose to believe Yuan, and where reasonably based we must defer to its conclusion. We have independently reviewed the relevant exhibits and found no suspicious characteristics of the photographic lineups. Yuan neither retracted his identification nor identified anyone besides Frias. While there was some circumstantial evidence suggesting Frias may not have been the carjacker (i.e., the carjacking did not fit Friass modus operandi from the robberies because he had an accomplice, he did not take money, and he may have used his opposite hand to hold the gun), the jury was not persuaded. Based on the record before us, we conclude the jury could reasonably believe Yuans identification of Frias as the carjacker.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
OLEARY, J.
WE CONCUR:
SILLS, P. J.
RYLAARSDAM, J.
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