P. v. Fletcher
Filed 4/23/13 P. v. Fletcher CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM DOUG FLETCHER,
Defendant and
Appellant.
F063786
(Super.
Ct. No. CF03901007)
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County. Wayne R.
Ellison, Judge.
Paul
Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Melissa
Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant
William Doug Fletcher was recommitted to Coalinga State Hospital (CSH) as a
mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2962
to support his commitment as an MDO. The
term of commitment under the order appealed from expired on December 14, 2012, thereby rendering
it impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief to Fletcher. He does not raise any legal issues that have
evaded appellate review; therefore, we exercise our discretion to dismiss this appeal
as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 1995,
when Fletcher was 21 years old, he was convicted of misdemeanor
his following a 15-year-old girl for approximately two years in order to be
“close†to the girl.
In 1996 Fletcher tried to kiss a
12-year-old girl in the laundry room of his apartment complex. He told the girl he wanted “to do her.†Also in 1996, Fletcher asked a neighbor’s
five-year-old daughter to come to his apartment, where he asked the child to
lie down on the bed. Fletcher then
kissed the child and afterwards pulled down his pants and exposed his penis to
the child. The conduct with the
five-year-old constituted the basis of Fletcher’s second conviction for
annoying or molesting a child.
Fletcher
committed the qualifying offense for MDO commitment when he was 29 years old
followed a 13-year-old girl as she walked home from school. On one occasion, he positioned himself across
the street from her home and waited for her.
After his arrest, Fletcher told officers he wanted to make the girl “his
friend†so he could touch her. Fletcher
repeatedly told officers he did not intend to rape the teenager; he wanted to
“touch her.†In 2003 Fletcher pled no
contest to one count of an attempted
lewd act upon a child. He was sentenced
to serve 18 months in a prison facility and thereafter was committed as an MDO.
In 2007,
after a jury trial, Fletcher’s commitment as an MDO was extended to December 14, 2008. His commitment thereafter was extended again
until December 14, 2010. After a bench trial, Fletcher’s commitment
once again was extended through December
14, 2011.
On September 12, 2011, a new petition
for continued involuntary treatment was filed pursuant to section 2970 et
seq. A jury trial commenced on November 10, 2011. Dr. Robert Wagner, a forensic psychologist
employed at CSH, testified for the People.
Prior to
testifying, Wagner reviewed Fletcher’s mental health records, including prior
evaluations, police and probation reports related to Fletcher’s offenses, and
the daily interdisciplinary notes completed by all hospital staff treating or
interacting with Fletcher at CSH. Wagner
also conducted an interview of Fletcher and discussed the case with Fletcher’s
current treating psychiatrist and psychologist.
Wagner diagnosed Fletcher as suffering from two qualifying severe mental
disorders: pedophilia and schizophrenia
disorganized type. Based upon all
available information, Wagner opined that if released, Fletcher posed a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to others.
Pedophilia
is a chronic, lifelong condition.
Pedophilia is a diagnosis that requires that over a period of six months
an individual have recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual
urges, or sexual behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child
and the person has acted on these feelings or the feelings have caused personal
distress or difficulties. The goal for
treatment is to use cognitive behavior therapy to assist the pedophile to learn
skills to manage the sexual urges and to conform to society’s rules in this
regard.
Fletcher
twice had started sex offender treatment but failed to complete phase one of
the treatment. Fletcher refused to
participate in group sessions because he felt his attraction to children was
“behind him†and he did not want to be stigmatized. The treating psychiatrist felt Fletcher had
very little, if any, insight into his pedophilia diagnosis.
The diagnosis
of schizophrenia disorganized type was based on Fletcher’s history of positive
symptoms, including hallucinations and delusions, as well as the negative
symptoms of lack of motivation and failure to groom himself. Fletcher was taking prescribed medications
for schizophrenia while at CSH and Wagner opined that this mental condition was
in partial remission because of the medications.
Fletcher
testified that if released, he would seek out a group home in Fresno. He claimed he was “kicked out†of sex
offender treatment because he did not “pass it.†He acknowledged he might need treatment
“later on,†but claimed he did not need treatment now because he had “learned
his lesson.â€
On November 15, 2011, the jury found
the MDO allegations to be true. The
trial court recommitted Fletcher to CSH for a one-year term, expiring on December 14, 2012.
DISCUSSION
This is an appeal from an order committing
Fletcher as an MDO pursuant to the MDO Act found in section 2970 et
seq. The commitment order from which
this appeal is taken expired on December
14, 2012. In
897-898 and People v. Hurtado (2002)
28 Cal.4th 1179, 1186, the California Supreme Court concluded that a proceeding
in which a sexually violent predator seeks relief from a commitment order is
rendered moot when the commitment term expires during the pendency of the
appeal. The same principle holds true
for appeals of commitment orders under the MDO Act.
It is the function of an appellate
court to decide actual controversies by a judgment that can be carried into
effect. It cannot render opinions on
moot questions or declare principles of law that cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before it. (
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.) When,
during the pendency of an appeal an event occurs that renders it impossible for
an appellate court to grant any effectual relief should it decide the case in
favor of the appellant, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment but
will dismiss the appeal. (
When an
appeal raises an issue that is likely to recur while evading appellate review
and involves a matter of public interest, an appellate court may exercise its
discretion to decide the issue for guidance in future proceedings before
dismissing the appeal as moot. (
Cal.App.4th 306, 321 (Gregerson).) No such issues are present in Fletcher’s
case. With respect to the sufficiency of
the evidence, this issue is not reasonably capable of recurring in that the
evidence presented at recommitment hearings, even successive ones, will
necessarily vary based upon Fletcher’s response to treatment.
Appellate courts have addressed the
merits of an appeal from an expired commitment order in very limited
cases. In People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1381, the commitment
order under the MDO Act had expired, but the appellate court addressed the
legal issue of whether a trial court had a sua sponte duty under section 2972
to consider outpatient treatment. Such
an issue involved a matter of public interest likely to recur. In People
v. Hernandez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 483, 487 and footnote 3, this court
addressed the merits of the appeal after the commitment order appealed from had
expired because the committee had stipulated to a further recommitment order,
this court was notified of the stipulation during the pendency of the appeal,
and thus effective relief could be granted if the appeal was decided in the
appellant’s favor. In
669, 672 and footnote 2, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the
MDO Act violated ex post facto laws in its application, even though the
commitment order appealed from had expired.
We cannot
grant any effectual relief to Fletcher even if the evidence presented during
the hearings that resulted in the recommitment that is the subject of this
appeal was insufficient because of the expiration of the appealed from
commitment order. Moreover, our review
of the record discloses sufficient evidence.
The MDO Act (§ 2960 et seq.) applies to certain offenders about to be
released on parole. An offender is
eligible for commitment under the MDO Act if all of the following are met: (1) He or she has a severe mental disorder
that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment (§
2962, subd. (a)); (2) the disorder must have been “one of the causes of or was
an aggravating factor in the commission of a crime for which the prisoner was
sentenced to prison†(id., subd.
(b)); (3) he or she has been in treatment for the severe mental disorder for 90
days or more within the year prior to the release date (id., subd. (c)); (4) before his or her parole or release, the
treating physician and other specified medical authorities have certified that
each of the noted conditions exist and, because of the disorder, the offender
“represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others†(
for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison was punished by a determinate
sentence under section 1170 (§ 2962, subd. (e)(1)) and is specifically listed
in the MDO Act (§ 2962, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(Q)). Wagner’s testimony provided sufficient
evidence of all the elements required under the MDO Act for commitment.
Therefore, because the term of
commitment under the order appealed from expired on December 14, 2012, thereby
rendering it impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief to
Fletcher, and the issue raised by Fletcher does not involve a matter of public
interest, nor is it likely to recur while evading appellate review, we exercise
our discretion to dismiss this appeal as moot.
(Gregerson, supra, 202
Cal.App.4th at p. 321.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal
is dismissed as moot.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before
Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Poochigian, J.
further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
