P. v. Epps
Filed 7/11/12 P. v. Epps CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FRANCHUNE DYUEL EPPS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D059021
(Super. Ct.
No. RIF132260)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Helios J. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.
Defendant
Franchune Dyuel Epps and her codefendants, Brooke Rottiers and Omar Hutchinson,
charged in an information with two counts of
§ 187, subd. (a) (undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal
Code)) for the murders of Milton Chavez and Marvin Gabriel, who were
asphyxiated by Rottiers. The information
also alleged the special circumstances that Epps, Rottiers, and Hutchinson (1)
committed multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(3); and (2) committed the murders during the commission of a robbery in
violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
As Epps and
Hutchinson made extrajudicial statements that implicated each other in the
crimes, the court ordered three separate juries pursuant to
rested, the court granted the prosecution's motion for an order that, if any of
the defendants testified, all three juries would hear the testimony.
After the
People rested, the court denied Epps's motion
for acquittal under section 1118.1.
Epps and Rottiers rested, and Hutchinson
thereafter testified before all three juries after Epps's counsel made a
request, which the court did not rule upon and Epps's counsel did not renew,
for additional time to prepare his cross-examination of Hutchinson.
Epps's jury
convicted her of both counts of first
degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegations that she
committed multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(3), and committed the murders during the commission of a robbery in
violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The court sentenced Epps to two consecutive
terms of life without the possibility of parole.
Epps
appeals, contending (1) the court erred when it denied her motion for judgment
of acquittal under section 1118.1; (2) she was denied the effective assistance
of counsel when the court allowed the prosecution to reopen its case-in-chief
after both sides rested in order to present incriminating evidence from
Hutchinson and refused to give Epps's counsel time to prepare to meet this
previously excluded evidence; and (3) the court erred by requiring her to wear
leg shackles during the trial. We affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
A.
1.
The
victims, Gabriel and Chavez, worked in construction. Gabriel weighed between 175 and 200 pounds
and was five feet eight inches tall.
Chavez weighed between 104 and 120 pounds and was five feet five inches
tall.
In the
afternoon on August 29, 2006, a car was discovered next to the road in an
isolated area near Lake Matthews. When
investigators from the Riverside County Sheriff's Department's Central Homicide
Unit arrived at the scene, they discovered the bodies of two men, who were
later identified as Gabriel and Chavez.
A washcloth was found stuffed in Gabriel's mouth, duct tape covered his
mouth, a belt had been wrapped around his face, and plastic bags also had been
wrapped around his face and neck. A
telephone cord had been wrapped around both his wrists, and a black bra had
been wrapped around that telephone cord.
Gabriel had been hogtied; an electrical cord was found around the wrist
bindings and between the wrists and the ankles.
Electrical
cords had been wrapped around Chavez's ankles, and a leather belt had been
wrapped around his chin and the back of his neck. Over that, another leather belt, a pair of
panties, and two pieces of telephone cord also had been wrapped around Chavez's
neck.
Mark
McCormick, M.D., a forensic pathologist for the Riverside County coroner's
office, testified that Gabriel and Chavez both died from asphyxiation.
2.
Investigators
learned from the manager of the National Inn in Corona that he had recently
evicted two people, Rottiers and Hutchinson, from room 114 after the cleaning
crew informed him that blankets and sheets were missing and the power cords had
been removed from two motel vacuum cleaners.
The manager testified that on August 28, 2006, between 8:00 and 8:30
a.m., Rottiers borrowed the motel dolly to move some items out of room 114, and
a car had been backed into the garage.
Scott
Williams testified that on August 29, 2006, he was released from prison on
parole and was picked up by Christy Day, the mother of his son and a recovering
methamphetamine and heroin addict. Day
took Williams to the National Inn where she lived. Williams indicated at trial that the National
Inn was a "[k]ind of rough motel" where other parolees stayed and
prostitution and drug use occurred.
Williams also indicated he knew Rottiers and Hutchinson. The manager showed Williams room 114. The room had been stripped of bed
linens. Two homicide detectives came to
the door while Williams was in the room.
Detective
Jesse Martinez, a homicide investigator at the Riverside County Sheriff's
Department, testified that on August 29, 2006, he was assigned to assist Senior
Investigator Robert Masson (Detective Masson) and Investigator John Powers in
investigating this case. Detective
Martinez testified that when he, Detective Masson, and another investigator
arrived at the National Inn that day, the manager told them he was in the
process of renting room 114 to Williams and Day. When the investigators entered room 114, they
encountered Williams.
Day
testified and identified Rottiers in the courtroom, indicating she had met
Rottiers at the National Inn. Rottiers
lived in room 114 in August 2006 and was in a romantic relationship with
Hutchinson. Day also identified
Hutchinson in the courtroom, stating she had purchased methamphetamine from
him. Day denied knowing that Hutchinson
was Rottiers's pimp, but, when asked about Rottiers's role as a prostitute, Day
testified that Rottiers told her she would rob her customers instead of
"doing the date."
Day
testified that on August 27, 2006, at around 10:00 p.m., she went to Rottiers's
room to look for Day's daughter. When
Rottiers answered the door, Day saw two Hispanic men in the room with
Rottiers. One of the men was taller than
Day, who is five feet seven inches tall.
Day also
testified that in the early morning hours of August 29, 2006, Rottiers came to
her room, woke her up, and told her she did something she was not proud
of. Rottiers said she had picked up two
men in Riverside and had brought them back to her room to "do a
date," and Hutchinson came into the room and caught her having sex with
one of them. Rottiers told Day that Hutchinson
said something like, "You say you're so bad, let's see what you got"
or "Let's see what you're going to do now." Rottiers also told Day she ended up
strangling the two men with her hands, bras, and panties, and that she
"kind of liked it." Rottiers
told Day that she hit the men with her knuckles when they started to smell, and
she showed Day her bruised and swollen knuckles. Rottiers also told Day she put the men's
bodies in a car along with all the bedding from the room, drove out to Lake
Matthews, and tried to light the car on fire, but a second car got stuck and
"they"
title="">[3]
had to leave before she was able to burn the car.
According
to Day, Rottiers came back to Day's room at National Inn a few days later and
was talking loudly with Hutchinson on a Nextel phone. Day overheard Rottiers say something about
DNA, that Hutchinson was being "weak," and that she would do the same
thing to him as she did to "those two mother fuckers" she had killed. At that point, the manager came to the room
and told Rottiers to leave.
Richard
Stornetta testified that he and Williams were released from prison at the same
time, and Day picked them up and took them to the National Inn. Stornetta went with Williams to look at room
114, which Stornetta described as torn up and "stripped." A woman nicknamed "Crazy," whom
Williams identified at trial as Rottiers, came to Day's room. Stornetta heard Rottiers talking on the phone
with someone, yelling at that person and calling that person a "weak piece
of shit" who could not even help her "pick up one of 'em." Rottiers talked about her DNA being all over
the room and said something about a dolly cart.
At that point Williams asked Rottiers to leave.
Yvette
Meek, a recovering drug addict, testified she knew Rottiers and Hutchinson in
2006. Meek stated that Rottiers told her
she would pick up guys pretending to be a prostitute, and then she would rob
them without going through with the sexual act.
3.
Megan
Mannion-Gray, a criminalist at the California Department of Justice's Jan
Banshinski Laboratory and Bureau of Forensic Services, testified about DNA
testing on evidence taken from the victims.
Epps, who is an African-American, was excluded as a DNA donor on 15
items compared by the lab. Regarding a
swab taken from one item of evidence as to which Epps could not be excluded as
a DNA donor, there was a 33 percent chance that a randomly selected
African-American could have been the donor.
Regarding another swab as to which Epps could not be excluded as a DNA
donor, there was more than a 50 percent chance that a randomly selected
African-American could have been the donor.
Rottiers could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA discovered on an
electrical cord, but Epps could be excluded.
Rottiers could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA found in
fingernail clippings taken from Gabriel, but Epps could be excluded. Rottiers also could not be excluded as a
contributor of DNA discovered on a belt, but Epps could be excluded.
4.
A radio
frequency engineer working for Ericsson under contract for Sprint Nextel,
provided expert testimony regarding phone records obtained from Sprint in this
case. He indicated that the timing,
duration, and locations of cell phone calls can be determined from phone
records and cell tower locations.
Authenticated
Sprint Nextel cell phone records for Epps, Rottiers, and Hutchinson were
presented to the jury. The phone records
showed direct connect communications made on August 27, 2006, from Epps's phone
to one belonging to Rottiers that carried the billing of "Krazie
Hutchinson." A total of four such
phone connections were recorded between 9:46 p.m. and 10:18 p.m. on August 27. A fifth connection between those two phones
was recorded early the next morning, August 28, at 2:22 a.m.
The phone
records also showed a direct connect communication made from Rottiers' phone to
Epps's phone at 10:15 p.m. on August 27, 2006.
Later that night, at 11:23 p.m., a direct connect communication was made
between Epps's phone and Hutchinson's phone.
The next day, August 28 at 12:15 p.m., a connection was also made from
Epps's phone to Hutchinson's phone.
5.
Masson and Martinez
On May 15,
2007, Epps gave a statement to Detectives Masson and Martinez, a transcript of
which was admitted into evidence. Epps
indicated she knew Rottiers through a mutual boyfriend, Brandon Evans, who had
been Epps's boyfriend two or three years earlier. Epps knew that Rottiers's nickname was
"Crazy" and Rottiers's current boyfriend, Hutchinson, was Rottiers's
pimp. She claimed she went to the
National Inn in Corona at around 2:00 a.m. to buy drugs from Hutchinson, and
she was high on drugs at the time. She
stated that when she arrived at the motel room, she saw Rottiers, Hutchinson,
and Rottiers's twin daughters. She
described the room as "junky," with phone cords ripped from the wall,
vacuum cleaners with cords ripped out, and a phone on the bed with no
cord.
Epps stated
that Rottiers and Hutchinson were arguing when she entered the room. Rottiers told Hutchinson he was stupid and
careless, and Hutchinson called Rottiers a "stupid bitch." Epps told the detectives Hutchinson said,
"Oh, shit, the blanket," and Rottiers threw a blanket on the floor as
if she were hiding something. Epps said
she did not know what was under the blanket, but it was something "kind of
lumpy," and an investigator later told her the "lumps" were
bodies.
Epps asked,
"Am I being recorded?" When
Detective Masson assured her that she was not being recorded, but that
Detective Martinez was taking notes for a report, Epps provided additional
details about the homicides. She stated
that she saw Rottiers and Hutchinson wrapping up the bodies in blankets, and
she helped them move one the bodies to the trunk of the car Rottiers was
driving. Epps said that to get the body
into the trunk, she lifted one side of the blanket and Rottiers lifted the
other. Rottiers and Hutchinson moved the
second body to the trunk of the car after Rottiers asked the motel manager for
a dolly. Hutchinson left after the
second body was put in the car. Epps
stated she helped Rottiers vacate the motel room and move to the Flaming Arrow
motel.
Epps told
the detectives she left Rottiers at the Flaming Arrow, but later saw her
driving around town as Epps was driving down the street with the bodies in the
trunk. Rottiers told her she needed to
drop the car off, and Epps led her to the Lake Matthews area where she showed
Rottiers an open space where she could leave the car. Rottiers pulled off the road, left the engine
running as if the car had been abandoned, and then hopped out of the car and
let it roll. Epps said she got out of
her car and cursed at Rottiers for leaving the engine running, and then they
got into Epps's car. Epps started
driving Rottiers back to her motel room.
However, following Rottiers's directions, Epps drove the car into sand
and she had to call for a tow truck to pull it out. Epps left Rottiers by the side of the road
and drove home.
When
pressed, Epps told the detectives that Rottiers killed the two men by
smothering them by stepping on their faces with her bare feet after they were
tied up. Epps stated she was sitting in
the room when it happened, and Rottiers killed the larger man first. She claimed she did not know how the other
man died; she looked over and he was not moving or breathing. Epps then said Rottiers smothered the smaller
man first. She claimed she went there
because Rottiers "chirped" her that Hutchinson had
"chronic" (drugs) for her.
Contrary to
her earlier version of the facts, Epps then told the detectives that the two
men were still dressed when she arrived at the motel room, and both undressed
when Rottiers told them to do so. The
men thought they were about to have sex.
Rottiers began hitting them with Hutchinson's belt. Rottiers punched the smaller man and knocked
him out. The larger man was covering his
private parts with his hands when Hutchinson hit him and knocked him to the
floor. Rottiers then tied up both men
using cords from the phone and vacuum cleaners.
Rottiers then killed both men, the smaller man first, with Rottiers's
daughters still in the room. Epps again
stated that Rottiers killed the larger man by stepping on his face and
smothering him, but also stated she did not know how the smaller man died.
Epps told
the detectives she pulled her car into the motel just as Rottiers and the two
men were getting out of their car.
Rottiers and the two men entered the motel room about 30 seconds before
Epps entered the room. Hutchinson was
already in the room with Rottiers's daughters.
Epps stated
she "might have handed [Rottiers] the phone cord." She said she knew the cord was not hooked up
to the wall phone because the cord was by her leg and she grabbed it. Epps said she "probably tried to give
[the cord] to her and it didn't go, so she snatched [it]." Epps admitted she pulled the cord from the
wall. She then said Rottiers
"ripped it out of the wall." She
said she watched Rottiers rip the cord out of the vacuum cleaner. Epps denied handing Rottiers any duct
tape.
6.
district attorney
On June 14,
2007, Epps was interviewed by District Attorney Senior Investigator Tom Dove
and Deputy District Attorney John Molloy.
A transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence.
Epps stated
she met Hutchinson a month or two before August 2006. She bought drugs from him. Epps had known Rottiers since about
2003. She met Rottiers through Epps's
former boyfriend, Evans.
According
to Epps, she went to the National Inn on the day of the incident to buy drugs
from Hutchinson. When she arrived, six
people were in the room: Rottiers,
Rottiers's two daughters, who were asleep on the bed, Hutchinson, and "two
Mexican guys," who were lying naked on the floor. Epps stated that Rottiers and Hutchinson were
arguing about something, and she (Epps) was "so high" on drugs at the
time she could not remember what they were arguing about and she could not
remember whether the two men were tied up.
She recalled that Rottiers, who was barefooted, walked over to the
smaller man, who was praying, and stepped on his nose and mouth. Hutchinson was standing over the man, who
started kicking, and told him not to move.
The man's face turned purple and he urinated on himself. The larger man, who was crying, stood
up.
Epps stated
that one of Rottiers's girls woke up and Hutchinson was going to take her out,
but Rottiers told him not to leave and, pointing to the larger man, said,
"This one has to go, too."
Rottiers started punching and spitting on the larger man, who fell to
his knees and begged her to stop, saying "please, please." Rottiers hit him again and then Hutchinson
punched him. When Hutchinson hit him,
the man fell and hit his head on the edge of the door. Rottiers then stepped on his nose and mouth
with both feet and leaned against the wall to keep her balance. The man was kicking and Rottiers stood on his
face for 10 to 15 minutes. Epps claimed
she sat on the bed during the entire incident.
According to Epps, when Rottiers finished she asked Epps to help her
move her things to another motel. Epps
helped put her things into the victims' car and took them to the other motel
while Hutchinson took the girls to a fast-food restaurant.
Epps
admitted she helped Rottiers put the smaller man into the car. They carried him on a blanket. Epps said she grabbed one end of the blanket,
Rottiers grabbed the other end, and they walked up to the car and put him in
the trunk. When Rottiers and Hutchinson
were unable to lift the heavier man's body, which was wrapped in a blanket,
Rottiers asked the manager for a dolly and brought it back to the room. Epps said she was holding the girls as
Rottiers and Hutchinson put the "big guy" on the dolly, pulled him
out to the car, and put him in the trunk on top of the "little
guy." Epps also admitted she drove
her borrowed car and led Rottiers to a place near Lake Matthews in the
mountains to dispose of the victims' car and the bodies. On the way back, Epps's car got stuck in sand
and she called for a tow truck. To help
pay for the tow service, Rottiers got into "some other dude's" car
and was paid $150 to do a "quickie."
Rottiers used Epps's cell phone to call for a cab and left on her own,
but Epps said she did not know how she returned to Corona.
When
questioned about DNA evidence, Epps admitted she might have touched a vacuum
cleaner or a vacuum cleaner cord or a telephone cord. She stated it was possible the two men were
tied up when she arrived at the motel.
Epps denied
that she participated in killing the victims.
She denied seeing duct tape on the face of one of the men. Epps claimed she did not see Rottiers kill
the man who was lying unconscious on the floor when Epps arrived; she only
watched Rottiers kill the "big guy."
However, she then stated she saw Rottiers stand on both men. Epps denied the men were hogtied.
Epps
claimed a phone cord was on her foot, she grabbed it, and then she dropped it
without giving it to Rottiers. She
claimed that when she grabbed for the phone cord, Rottiers told Epps to give
her the vacuum cleaner cord, Epps said, "I ain't giving you shit,"
and Rottiers then ripped the cord out of a vacuum cleaner.
Epps admitted she watched as Rottiers tied up one of the men
with a cord she ripped out of a vacuum cleaner.
The People
rested on June 9, 2010, in the presence of all three juries.
B.
1.
On June 9,
2010, after the People rested, Rottiers and Epps presented no witnesses and
rested in the presence of all three juries based upon "the sufficiency of
the prosecution case."
2.
The next
day, June 10, Hutchinson's counsel informed the court and counsel for the other
parties that Hutchinson had decided to testify on his own behalf.
In the
presence of all three juries, Markson first presented the testimony of Virgal
Cooper, who stated that he used methamphetamine in the summer of 2006, he lived
at the National Inn motel in Corona at that time, and Hutchinson was his
methamphetamine supplier. Cooper
indicated that in late August 2006, he used his cell phone to call Hutchinson
to buy some methamphetamine. Although
Cooper initially stated he called Hutchinson after midnight, he then
acknowledged his cell phone records showed he made the call at 10:26 p.m. Cooper met with Hutchinson at the bottom of
the stairs outside Cooper's motel room about 20 or 30 minutes later and bought
some methamphetamine from Hutchinson. As
they were sitting on the stairs, Cooper saw a small car pull into the motel
parking lot. According to Cooper, four
people were in the car: Rottiers, two
"Hispanic guys," and an African-American woman. When asked by Hutchinson's counsel whether he
saw any of those four people in the courtroom, Cooper testified he saw
one: Rottiers.
On
cross-examination by Epps's counsel, Cooper stated he did not know Epps, but he
had met her twice through "other people." When counsel said, "You told Officer
Gibson, 'I never met Franchune Epps at all and cannot recall ever having met
her,'" Cooper responded he had "[n]ever met her formally." Counsel then asked Cooper, "You don't
recognize her in the courtroom today?"
Cooper replied, "No, I don't." He then testified he met Epps at a motel
"[d]own the street─I forget the name of it─by the pool
hall." When asked, Cooper could not
remember the name of the pool hall, but indicated it was next door to a CVS
pharmacy.
a. Hutchinson's
testimony before all three juries
Also on
June 10, 2010, following Cooper's testimony, Hutchinson testified on his own
behalf in the presence of all three juries.
He indicated that he and Rottiers started living together in June or
July of 2006. He noticed that she put
the name "Krazie Hutchinson" on one of the phone bills that was in
her name. On August 11, 2006, he moved
his belongings into room 114 at the National Inn, but did not always stay
there.
Hutchinson
stated that on Sunday morning, August 27, he woke up at the Motel 6 and went
over to the National Inn to check on Rottiers's twin daughters. When he arrived, he found Rottiers vacuuming
the room. He and Rottiers got into an
intense argument. Rottiers tried to
bully him, and he told her he was no longer going to pay for the room and she
needed to find somewhere to go. After 20
minutes, he left. He testified he had no
plans to get back with Rottiers that evening or to watch her daughters or to
commit a robbery that night.
Hutchinson
stated he next saw Rottiers at around 2:30 the next morning (August 28). He was sitting on a chair behind a wall in
the carport and putting some "dope" in a sack for Cooper, who had
called him at 10:30 p.m., when two cars came in and parked in the carport. Rottiers was driving one of the cars and
Chavez and Gabriel were with her.
Hutchinson identified Epps in the courtroom as the driver of the other
car. He testified that Epps was carrying
a stick in her hand that looked like half of a mop handle.
Hutchinson
indicated that he confronted Rottiers about the two men as they were walking
towards room 114, and she told him she was about to rob the men and asked
whether he wanted to help. Hutchinson
said he told Rottiers he had $900 in his pocket and did not need to rob anyone. Rottiers went to the room and he went back to
talk to Cooper. Shortly thereafter, out
of curiosity, Hutchinson went to the room.
He stated he knocked on the door, and, when Rottiers opened it, he saw
the two men were dressed and money and wallets were on the bed. He saw Epps sitting in a chair by the kitchen
playing with a cell phone. Rottiers, who
had been speaking to the two men in Spanish, told Hutchinson that one of them
said he was going to do something to her girls.
Hutchinson testified he immediately jumped on the "big guy"
(Gabriel) and they both fell on the bed.
Hutchinson
testified his statement to Detective Masson that he hit the man after the man
lunged at Rottiers was a "pure ass lie." Hutchinson also testified that his statement
to Detective Masson that Epps had a gun was false, and he made that false
statement because Rottiers asked him to do so.
According
to Hutchinson, he sat down on the bed and read a magazine after he hit
Gabriel. He said that Rottiers and Epps
left the room to check the car, and he stayed in the room. The door was open and the men did not
leave. Rottiers and Epps quickly
returned. Hutchinson testified that
Rottiers looked at him and Epps with a "mean" look, and then hit the
"big dude," Gabriel, on the back of his head with the telephone that
was in the room. According to
Hutchinson, Epps then hit the other man (Chavez) with the stick she was
carrying, and Hutchinson left the room after telling Rottiers and Epps they
were crazy.
Hutchinson
testified he returned to room 114 later that morning at around 4:00 a.m. He indicated he did not expect Gabriel and
Chavez to be there because "pretty much the robbery's done." He saw that Chavez was naked and hogtied with
his hands behind his back and his wrists tied to his ankles. He had a belt around his neck. Hutchinson acknowledged that, at Rottiers's
request, he told Detective Masson that Rottiers had told him that "[Epps]
made me do it," but he testified that statement was not true. Hutchinson stated that Rottiers "had
asked me to blame [Epps] for that."
According
to Hutchinson, Chavez started choking when Rottiers tried to loosen the belt
around his neck. Hutchinson said he saw
Gabriel lying naked and unresponsive on the floor, moaning and groaning. Rottiers started asking for cords to tie up
the men, and Hutchinson suggested she use a vacuum cleaner cord. Hutchinson tugged weakly on the cord, and
Rottiers snatched it and ripped it out of the vacuum cleaner. He stated that Epps threw a phone cord near
Rottiers, and he was in the room for only about 10 to 15 minutes and then
left.
Hutchinson
said he returned to the National Inn and walked back to room 114 a third time
at around 6:00 a.m. after Rottiers called him.
As he was walking back to the room, he saw the manager standing by the
office. As he approached the room, he
saw Rottiers coming out of the room and rolling one of the bodies out on a
dolly. When Rottiers rolled the dolly up
to the trunk of the car, she asked Hutchinson, who was standing next to the
trunk, to help her hoist the body into the trunk. Chavez's body was already in the trunk, and
Epps was also standing by the car. He
did not hear Chavez making any noises and he did not see any movement in the
blanket covering his body.
Hutchinson
claimed he did not help Rottiers put Gabriel's body in the trunk, but admitted
that when Rottiers asked him where she should dump the bodies, he told her to
dump them in a field in the Lake Matthews area.
He stated that he and Rottiers later went to Orange County and Rottiers
complained he did not help her dispose of the bodies.
On June 15,
after he completed his testimony, Hutchinson rested.
2.
Also on
June 15, after Hutchinson completed his testimony and rested, Rottiers and Epps
rested without presenting any witnesses.
DISCUSSION
I
Epps first
contends the court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal
under section 1118.1. We reject this
contention.
A.
On June 9,
2010, after the prosecution concluded its case-in-chief and rested, Epps
brought a motion under section 1118.1 for dismissal of both first degree murder
charges. In opposition to the motion,
the prosecutor relied principally on Epps's statements to Detective Masson,
which, he argued, showed she participated in planning the murders and assisted
Rottiers when she killed the two victims.
1.
The court
denied Epps's acquittal motion. Noting
it was "more than coincidental" that Epps showed up at the motel
"at the time the [victims were] getting robbed and murdered," and
also noting that Epps stayed in the motel room "the whole entire
time," the court stated it "could see how [Epps's] jury could draw the
conclusion she was a helper, part of the muscle." The court also found that the fact that Epps
helped Rottiers dispose of the bodies could lead the jury to believe Epps
"was an aider and abett[o]r and a helper in these murders."
B.
1.
In
1212-1213, the California Supreme Court explained that "[i]n ruling on a
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, a trial court
applies the same standard an appellate court applies in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction."
When
assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review, under which
we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People
v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "The same standard of review applies to
cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial
evidence." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
We do not
reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the
v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
"Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact." (People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
On appeal,
we independently review the trial court's ruling under section 1118.1 that the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction.
(People v. Cole,
2.
A person
incurs criminal liability as an aider and abettor when he or she (1) by act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime;
(2) with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose; and (3) with the
intent or purpose either to commit, or to facilitate or encourage commission
of, the crime. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164, citing
561.)
"'Whether
[a] defendant aided and abetted [a] crime is a question of fact, and on appeal
all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences must be resolved in
favor of the judgment.'" (
402, 409.) While a defendant's mere
presence at the scene of an offense is not sufficient in itself to sustain a
conviction of aiding and abetting its commission, it is a circumstance that will
tend to support a finding that the accused was an aider and abettor. (Ibid.;
People v. Miranda (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 398, 407.)
"'"[C]ompanionship, and conduct before and after the
offense,"'" are also relevant factors the trier of fact may consider
in determining whether the accused aided and abetted the commission of a
crime. (People v. Miranda, p. 407; People
v. Campbell, p. 409.)
C.
Epps
acknowledges "there was evidence that two homicides occurred during a
robbery and that [she] was present when it happened," She asserts that
"no substantial evidence established any active participation by
[her]" in the commission of those crimes.
She also asserts that "none of [her] actions provided sufficient
evidence that [she] shared Rottiers's intent to rob or kill the two men or
otherwise act as an aider and abettor in the crimes." Thus, she maintains, the court erred in
denying her motion for acquittal under section 1118.1. These assertions are unavailing.
After
reviewing the record, we conclude the prosecution presented substantial
evidence apart from Hutchinson's testimony (discussed further,
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Epps aided and abetted the commission
of those crimes, and, thus, the court properly denied her motion for
acquittal. It is undisputed Rottiers
murdered Chavez and Gabriel in room 114 of the National Inn in the early
morning hours of August 28, 2006. The
prosecution's phone records evidence showed that four direct connect communications
were made the night before the murders, between 9:46 p.m. and 10:18 p.m. on
August 27, from Epps's phone to Rottiers's phone. A fifth connection between those two phones
was recorded early the next morning, August 28, at 2:22 a.m. The phone records also showed a direct
connect communication made from Rottiers's phone to Epps's phone at 10:15 p.m.
on August 27.
Pursuant to
these phone conversation, Epps agreed to drive to the motel and meet Rottiers
there in the early morning hours of August 28 at the same time that Rottiers
arrived there in a separate car with the victims in order to provide what the
court referred to as "part of the muscle" that Rottiers needed to rob
and murder the victims. Specifically,
the prosecution presented evidence that during her interview Epps told
Detectives Masson and Martinez that she drove to the National Inn at around
2:00 a.m., she pulled her car into the motel just as Rottiers and the two men
were getting out of their car, and Rottiers and the two men entered the motel
room about 30 seconds before Epps entered the room. A rational jury could reasonably infer that,
as the court found, it was "more than coincidental" that Epps showed
up at the time the victims were about to be robbed and murdered, and that she
stayed in the motel room "the whole entire time" Rottiers was
perpetrating the crimes. Epps admitted
to the detectives she was in the room when Rottiers smothered the men by
stepping on their faces after they were tied up. Epps also admitted to the detectives that she
"might have handed [Rottiers] the phone cord" she used to tie up one
of the victims. Referring to the phone
cord, Epps stated, "I probably tried to give it to her."
The
prosecution also presented evidence that during Epps's recorded June 2007
interview, she told a deputy district attorney and an investigator that after
Rottiers smothered the smaller man with her bare feet, Rottiers pointed to the
larger man (Gabriel) and said, "This one has to go, too," and then
smothered him with both of her bare feet.
During the interview, Epps admitted she helped Rottiers put Chavez's
body in the trunk of the victims' car, she watched as Rottiers used a dolly to
take Gabriel's body to the car and then put the body in the trunk; and, driving
separately, she led Rottiers to a place near Lake Matthews to dispose of the
victims' car and the bodies.
From the foregoing substantial evidence and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, a rational jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Epps aided and abetted the commission of the
crimes with knowledge of Rottiers's unlawful purpose and with the intent to
facilitate or encourage Rottiers's perpetration of the crimes. (See People
v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.
1164.) Accordingly, we conclude the
court properly denied Epps's section 1118.1 motion for acquittal.
II
ADMISSION OF
HUTCHINSON'S TESTIMONY, DENIAL OF EPPS'S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE,
Epps next
contends she was "denied the effective assistance of counsel when the
trial court allowed the prosecution to reopen its case in chief after both
sides rested in order to present incriminating evidence from co-defendant
Hutchinson and refused to give [Epps's] counsel time to prepare to meet this previously
excluded evidence." This series of
contentions is unavailing.
A.
On April
14, 2010, during pretrial proceedings, the court granted an unopposed defense
motion for three separate juries pursuant to Aranda-Bruton (discussed, post;
see also fn. 2, ante) because the
defendants had made recorded out-of-court statements incriminating one
another. The prosecution presented its
first witness on May 6, in the presence of Epps's jury, Rottiers' jury, and
Hutchinson's jury.
1.
June 1, 2010: Recordings of Hutchinson's out-of court
statements played for his jury only
On June 1,
in the presence of Hutchinson's jury only, the prosecutor called to the stand
Detective Masson, who testified that he interviewed Hutchinson several times on
September 5, 6, and 7, 2006. Detective
Masson testified the interviews were recorded and transcribed. After Detective Masson authenticated the
recordings and the transcripts, the seven recordings were played for
Hutchinson's jury only.
2.
The prosecution's June 4 motion to
have all juries hear the testimony of any testifying defendant was opposed by
defendants
On Friday,
June 4, outside the presence of the juries and before the prosecution rested on
June 9, the prosecutor brought a motion requesting that if any of the
defendants testified before his or her jury, all three juries should hear that
testimony. The prosecution's theory was
that, if a defendant elected to testify, Aranda-Bruton
principles would no longer apply and the nontestifying defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation would not be violated because the testifying
defendant would be subject to cross-examination.
In
response, the court noted that Aranda-Bruton
would not apply, and there would have been only one jury in this case, if, at
the beginning of the trial, each of the three defendants had indicated an
intention to testify. The court stated,
"It's the statement, the recorded statement coming in without [the]
ability to cross-examine the person who made the statement which creates the
Hutchinson's
counsel asked for time to prepare a response to the prosecution's motion, and
the court gave defense counsel the weekend to prepare their arguments on this
issue.
3.
prosecution's motion
On Monday,
June 7, the court again heard arguments on this issue outside the presence of
the juries. Both Epps and Rottiers
opposed the prosecution's motion, indicating they intended to rest after the
prosecution rested and arguing this would preclude the presentation of any
additional evidence to their respective juries.
Addressing
the prosecutor, the court stated, "There is no authority for what you want
to do.
[¶] . . . What you're trying to do is piggyback on
the defense case." Citing
"[W]e have three separate jury trials.
It's not one jury trial. [¶] Each
[defendant] gets to make [his or her] decision independently. And if [Rottiers's] jury wants to rest,
that's the end of it. . . .
[T]here's nothing for you to reopen with. . . . So after you've rested,
. . . if they want to rest, they can
rest. . . . [T]he case is
closed, period. Closing arguments. Jury goes off to deliberate."
Hutchinson's
counsel argued that if Hutchinson elected to testify after Epps and Rottiers
rested, Hutchinson would testify only in front of his jury.
At the
conclusion of the arguments, the court denied the prosecution's motion,
stating:
"[T]he [prosecutor] is not seeking to present
evidence on his own. He's just hoping to
use somebody else's evidence. . . . There is no authority supporting the
[prosecutor], plus I don't think it's fair.
It's a due process fundamental fairness issue. You can't bootstrap your way into using
evidence that you can't present against the other defendant. So the [prosecutor's] motion is
denied."
4.
June 9: Ruling granting the
prosecution's motion before the
People rested; denial of Hutchinson's severance motion
a. Ruling granting
the prosecution's motion
On June 9,
before the prosecution rested later that day, the court revisited the issue
outside the presence of the juries and, after reviewing the
decision and ruled that if one defendant testified, all three juries would hear
the testimony. The court explained its
reasoning for granting the prosecution's motion:
"[T]he reason we have three juries is because
there's out-of-court statements being introduced against various defendants
which carry within them implications of wrongdoing by other codefendants. And since it's an out-of-court statement
brought in through a tape the person making the statement is not subject to
cross-examination. That's the whole
reason for having multiple juries. [¶]
If there was no such statement or if the
defendants . . . said in advance they were going to testify
we'd have only one jury. There would be
no reason to have multiple juries. [¶] . . . [I]f . . . one
or more of the defendants wants to testify, all the juries hear it because but
for Aranda-Bruton there would only be
one jury and they'd be hearing that same thing."
Epps's
counsel objected, stating there was no case law on point. Counsel also objected under Evidence Code
section 352, arguing that Hutchinson had "given numerous interviews,"
the defense would have the right to impeach him if he testified, and such
impeachment would consume about a day and a half of court time.
The court
affirmed its ruling, explaining that "the underlying rationale of
separate juries is because the person whose statement is relevant isn't going
to take the stand and can't be cross-examined, and that's totally undermined
when the person does take the stand and can be cross-examined." The court concluded that "[i]f any of
the codefendants testif[ies,] all the juries hear it."
b. Denial of
Hutchinson's severance motion
Hutchinson's
counsel then moved to sever Hutchinson's trial from those of Epps and Rottiers,
arguing Hutchinson had a right to testify only before his own jury and "give any version of events
that he wants that he thinks is exonerating, and only to them because they are
the only people that are deciding his guilt." Counsel informed the court that Hutchinson
wanted to testify, but he would not do so if he was required to testify before
all three juries.
The court
denied Hutchinson's severance motion, stating there was a "strong
preference for joint trials," and whether one jury or all three juries
heard Hutchinson's testimony would have "no effect" on Hutchinson
because only his jury was "going to be voting on his guilt."
c. The People rest
Later that
same day, June 9, the prosecutor presented his last witness in the presence of
all three juries, and then rested, stating he had "[n]o additional
witnesses" and adding he had "evidence items to
discuss . . . with the Court." After the jurors left the courtroom, the
court discussed the exhibits with counsel and the prosecutor and then stated,
"[W]e've gone over the exhibits, and that doesn't seem to be a
problem."
Still
outside the presence of the jurors, the court next heard and denied the
defendants' section 1118.1 motions for acquittal. The court then stated, "The DA has
rested."
Epps's and
Rottiers's attorneys advised the court outside the presence of the jurors that
they did not want to present any evidence.
Hutchinson's counsel indicated he intended to call three witnesses the
following day, June 10. Apparently
referring to the court's denial of Hutchinson's severance motion, his counsel
also informed the court and the other counsel that Hutchinson would not testify
on his own behalf "unless the Court changes its ruling."
After
further discussions, all three juries returned to the courtroom. Addressing the prosecutor, the court asked,
"[A]nything else from the People?"
The prosecutor replied, "Subject to the admission of evidence that
I am now moving at this time to introduce into evidence, Your Honor, the People
would rest." The court observed
that "the items of evidence are all submitted except for those one or two
but, in general, everybody is in agreement on those."
d. Epps and
Rottiers rest based upon "the
sufficiency of the prosecution's case"
Immediately
thereafter, both Rottiers and Epps rested based upon "the sufficiency of
the prosecution's case."
Hutchinson's counsel stated, "I will be presenting some witnesses
tomorrow as we discussed."
5.
June 10: Hutchinson's counsel informs the court and
the other counsel Hutchinson will testify, Epps's request for a continuance,
Hutchinson's testimony begins
The next
day, June 10, Hutchinson's counsel informed the court and counsel for the other
parties that Hutchinson had decided to testify in his own defense. Epps's counsel requested a continuance in
order to prepare for his cross-examination of Hutchinson. The prosecutor opposed Epps's request for a
continuance, arguing that all counsel were on notice that prior to closing
arguments any of the defendants could decide to testify in his or her own
defense, and each counsel was "well-armed for
cross-examination." The prosecutor
suggested that Epps's counsel could "go last in order, if that will help
the situation a little." The court
did not expressly deny Epps's request for a continuance, and Epps's counsel did
not renew the request before the court ordered a recess after asking,
"Anything else?"
Epps's
counsel did not renew his request for a continuance after Cooper completed his
testimony and before Hutchinson took the stand.
6.
June 14-15: Hutchinson completes his testimony and rests;
Epps, Rottiers, and the People again rest
Hutchinson's
testimony before all three juries continued on June 14 and ended on June
15. Hutchinson had been cross-examined
repeatedly by Epps's counsel, Rottiers's counsel and the prosecutor.
During a
sidebar discussion after Hutchinson completed his testimony, Epps's counsel
stated he might call a witness who interviewed Cooper. Shortly thereafter the court excused the
jurors for the lunch break.
B.
1.
of confrontation
"The
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that '[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.' The right of confrontation
includes the right of cross-examination."
(People v. Fletcher (1996) 13
Cal.4th 451, 455 (Fletcher).)
A recurring
problem in the application of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
concerns an out-of-court statement by one defendant that incriminates both that
defendant and a jointly charged codefendant.
(Fletcher,
will be admissible in evidence against the defendant who made it (the
declarant)." (Ibid., citing Evid. Code, § 1220 [hearsay exception for party
admissions].) However, if the declarant
does not submit to cross-examination by the codefendant (the nondeclarant),
"admission of the [out-of-court statement] against the nondeclarant is
generally barred both by the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1200) and by the
confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)." (Fletcher,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 455.)
In
Supreme Court has held that, because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one
defendant's confession that is 'powerfully incriminating' as to a [codefendant]
when determining the latter's guilt, admission of such a confession at a joint
trial generally violates the confrontation
rights of the nondeclarant." (
In Aranda,
California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion on nonconstitutional
grounds. (Fletcher, at p. 455.)
Thus,
trial, of a nontestifying defendant's out-of-court statement that incriminates
a codefendant, even if the court instructs the jury to consider the statement
in determining the guilt only of the declarant, because admission of the
statement violates the codefendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. (Bruton,
supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 126, 135-137;
Cal. Criminal Law, supra,
§§ 375-379, pp. 541-545.)
per se, but is scrutinized under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). (People
v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232.)
Under the Chapman harmless
error standard, "an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if
the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Delaware
v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681; see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S.
at p. 24.) In determining whether
evidence improperly admitted in violation of Aranda-Bruton so prejudiced a defendant that reversal of the
judgment of conviction is required, the error will be deemed harmless "'if
the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating
extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct
evidence.'" (People v. Burney, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
2.
of counsel
"Under
both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right
to the assistance of counsel." (
215.) The ultimate purpose of the right
to the assistance of counsel is "to protect the defendant's fundamental right
to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its
result." (Ibid.) This right entitles a
criminal defendant "not to some bare assistance but rather to
"'reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his [or her]
diligent and conscientious advocate.'"
(Ibid.)
In
279, 306, the United States Supreme Court recognized that in
the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require
reversal of a conviction. The
determining the effect of "most constitutional errors," appellate
courts may properly apply a Chapman harmless
error analysis. (Fulminante, at p. 306.) In
contrast, "structural" errors involve "'basic protections,
[without which] a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may
be regarded as fundamentally fair.'"
(Id. at p. 310.) A structural error requires reversal without
regard to the strength of the evidence or other circumstances. (Ibid.) One example of a structural error in the
criminal context is the total deprivation of the right to counsel at
trial. (Id. at pp. 309-310.)
C.
Epps claims
that "[b]y effectively rejoining the trials" by allowing Hutchinson
to testify in front of her jury after she rested on June 9, and by
"refusing counsel adequate time to prepare," the court violated her
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel as well as her Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial. She asserts the court's "summary
denial" of her request for a continuance to prepare for cross-examination
of Hutchinson after Hutchinson's counsel announced on June 10 that Hutchinson
would testify, "was an absolute deprivation of [her] Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel," and, thus, the court's
constitutional error is reversible per se.
Assuming,
without deciding, that the court committed constitutional error by permitting
Hutchinson to testify in front of Epps's jury after Epps rested and after the
court denied her counsel's request for additional time to prepare for his
cross-examination of Hutchinson, we conclude the error was not structural and
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent Epps suggests the court committed Aranda-Bruton error, such error is not reversible per se, but is
scrutinized under the Chapman
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
(People v. Burney,
diligent advocate who cross-examined Hutchinson twice on June 15, 2010, the
last day of Hutchinson's testimony.
Hutchinson began his testimony on Thursday, June 10. The next day, Friday, June 11, the court and
defense counsel discussed jury instructions and scheduling, and the court
adjourned the trial proceedings until Monday, June 14. Epps's counsel, Clark, cross-examined
Hutchinson on Tuesday, June 15, five days after the court denied Epps's request
for a continuance. The record does not
support Epps's claim that the court's refusal to grant her counsel additional
time to prepare his cross-examination resulted in what Epps claims was an
"absolute deprivation of [her] Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel." In his
cross-examination of Hutchinson, Epps's counsel demonstrated the thoroughness
of his preparation and knowledge of the case.
We also
conclude any constitutional errors in this matter were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under the applicable Chapman
standard. In affirming the court's
denial of Epps's section 1118.1 motion for acquittal, we have already concluded
that the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence apart from Hutchinson's
testimony from which any rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Epps aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.
III
Last, Epps
contends the court erred by requiring her to wear leg shackles during the
trial. This contention is unavailing.
A. Background
The
prosecution presented its first witness on May 6, 2010, in the presence of all
three juries. On May 26, during the
prosecution's case-in-chief, Lieutenant Perri Feinstein of the Riverside County
Sheriff's Department advised the court outside the presence of the juries and
the defendants, that the sheriff's department wanted all three defendants to
wear leg restraints or electronic arm bands during the course of the trial because
it was "inherently dangerous" to have multiple unrestrained
defendants in a double-murder case with only two officers in the
courtroom. Lieutenant Feinstein asserted
that "[t]he possibility of escape, or attempt of escape, or assault to the
staff of the courtroom is heightened without any types of restraints on these
defendants."
The court
asked Lieutenant Feinstein, "Do you have any information? Has anything come up?" Lieutenant Feinstein replied she had no
information that anything had come up.
Epps's counsel, joined by Rottiers's counsel, but not by Hutchinson's
counsel who was not scheduled to be present that day, observed that all three
defendants had been model defendants in the courtroom, there had been no
security issues during the trial proceedings, and it would be prejudicial to
the defendants if the juries saw some type of leg restraints. Lieutenant Feinstein informed the court that
the restraints would be "underneath the clothing, underneath their
pants," and neither a leg brace nor an electronic arm band, which is like
a "stun belt" or Taser, would be visible.
Noting it
had ordered that at least two deputies be present in the courtroom during the
trial proceedings, the court indicated it would make no order regarding
restraints at that time, observing that only two of the three defendants were
present in the courtroom, two deputies and an armed policeman were present, and
the court needed input from Hutchinson's counsel, who was not present. The court continued the matter to the following
day.
The next
day, May 27, the court again considered the issue of restraints outside the
presence of the juries and (over objections by all three defense counsel) the
defendants. Lieutenant Feinstein
informed the court that two of the defendants, Hutchinson and "one of the
females," were classified as "ad seg" inmates, which means the
sheriff's department does not move the defendant without the presence of two
deputies. Regarding Hutchinson,
Lieutenant Feinstein informed the court that in April 2010 Hutchinson was found
in possession of a five-inch piece of plastic that "was starting to be
formed in the form of a shank" and was "found in his legal paperwork
that he was trying to bring to court."
Regarding
Rottiers, Lieutenant Feinstein informed the court that Rottiers had been
disciplined for "bullying other inmates," being "disrespectful
towards staff," and "intimidat[ing] other inmates on a regular
basis." In addition, while in
custody Rottiers had been rehoused twice for aggressiveness towards staff and
inmates, she had thrown her property box down onto the floor from the top tier
of the detention facility, she had thrown water on other inmates, she had
stolen shoes from other inmates and threatened to harm them if they told anyone
about it, and she had become intoxicated with methamphetamine she had managed
to smuggle into her cell.
Regarding
Epps, Lieutenant Feinstein informed the court that in April Epps became
involved in an argument and threw water on another inmate from the top tier of
the detention facility. Epps had
attempted to pass a letter to an inmate who was being released so it could be
mailed without proper screening, she had been found making "pruno"
(jailhouse wine), a nail file had been found in her possession, she
| Description | Defendant Franchune Dyuel Epps and her codefendants, Brooke Rottiers and Omar Hutchinson,[1] were all charged in an information with two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) (undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal Code)) for the murders of Milton Chavez and Marvin Gabriel, who were asphyxiated by Rottiers. The information also alleged the special circumstances that Epps, Rottiers, and Hutchinson (1) committed multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3); and (2) committed the murders during the commission of a robbery in violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). |
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