P. v. Edwards
Filed 5/7/13 P. v. Edwards CA4/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN ALLEN EDWARDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
G046756
(Super. Ct. No. 11WF2032)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a
postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of
County, Vickie L. Hix, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Meredith S. White,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
*
* *
Introduction
As
of October 1, 2011, the
rate at which a criminal defendant may accrue presentence
October 1, 2011, may accrue
two good conduct credit days for every two actual custody days. A defendant who committed a crime before October 1, 2011, accrues good conduct
credit at the former rate of two days for every four days of actual custody.
Defendant
Stephen Allen Edwards committed burglary and other crimes in August 2011. He pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. In March 2012, after
admitting to a violation of his probation, defendant’s probation was
reinstated, and he was awarded presentence custody credit at the rate in effect
before the October 1, 2011
statutory amendment. Defendant
challenges the trial court’s refusal to calculate his good conduct custody
credit at the higher accrual rate. We
affirm.
The
statutory language clearly states that the higher accrual rate applies
prospectively only. We reject defendant’s
contention that the language of the statute is ambiguous. Further, we reject defendant’s claim that a
prospective-only application of the higher accrual rate violates equal
protection. Although criminal defendants
who committed the same crime before and after October 1, 2011, are similarly situated, a rational basis
exists for treating them differently in terms of the accrual of their good
conduct credit.
Procedural History
Defendant
was charged in an amended felony complaint with second degree commercial
burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)); possession of burglary
tools (id., § 466); possession
of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350,
subd. (a)); and possession of a designated substance (id., § 11375, subd. (b)(2)). The crimes were alleged to have occurred on August 24, 2011. The amended felony complaint also alleged a
prison prior sentencing enhancement.
(Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant
pleaded guilty to all counts and admitted the prison prior. The trial court suspended imposition of
sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation.
On
March 5, 2012, defendant
admitted a violation of his probation.
The trial court reinstated his probation on the condition he serve 90
days in county jail. The court awarded
defendant 33 days of presentence custody credit—23 days of actual custody
credit, and 10 days of good conduct credit.
Defendant filed a motion requesting that he be awarded 23 days of good
conduct credit, for a total of 46 days of presentence custody credit. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant timely appealed.
Discussion
Before
October 2011, defendants in local custody were eligible to earn good conduct
credit at a rate of two days for every four days of actual custody. (Pen. Code, former § 4019,
subd. (f).) Pursuant to an
amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which was operative on October 1,
2011, the accrual rate for good conduct credit changed to two days for every
two days of actual custody. (
§ 4019, subd. (f).) The unambiguous
language of the statute makes it clear that the Legislature did not intend it
to apply retrospectively: “The changes
to this section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall apply
prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail,
city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after
October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a
prisoner prior to October 1, 2011,
shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law.†(Id., § 4019, subd. (h).)
Defendant
argues the language of Penal Code section 4019, subdivision (h) is
ambiguous. The first sentence of
subdivision (h) clearly states that the increased accrual rate applies
prospectively only. The second sentence
of subdivision (h) provides: “Any
days earned by a prisoner prior to October
1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior
law.†(Pen. Code, § 4019,
subd. (h).) Defendant argues the
two sentences of section 4019, subdivision (h), when read together, require
that “all persons serving time after October 1,
2011, without regard to the date the offense was committed, are
entitled to earn day-for-day credits.â€
We disagree. As explained in
prior opinions, the two sentences can be read together without creating an ambiguity.
As
this court explained in People v.
Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 51, “to read the second sentence†of
Penal Code section 4019, subdivision (h) as stating that a defendant earns
day-for-day credit after October 1, 2011, no matter when the crime was
committed, “renders meaningless the first sentence. This we cannot do.†Rather, this court concluded: “[S]ubdivision
(h)’s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduct
credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes
on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision
(h)’s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to
any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before October
1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)’s second sentence
attempts to clarify that those defendants who committed an offense before October
1, 2011, are to earn
credit under the prior law. However
inartful the language of subdivision (h), we read the second sentence as
reaffirming that defendants who committed their crimes before October 1, 2011,
still have the opportunity to earn conduct credits, just under prior law. [Citation.]
To imply the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to defendants who
committed their crimes before the effective date but served time in local
custody after the effective date reads too much into the statute and ignores
the Legislature’s clear intent in subdivision (h)’s first sentence. [¶] We recognize the Legislature in drafting
subdivision (h)’s second sentence used the word ‘earned.’ And it is impossible to earn presentence
credits for an offense that has not yet been committed. But reading the first and second sentences
together, the implication is the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to
defendants who committed crimes before October 1, 2011, but who served time in
local custody after that date. To
isolate the verbiage of the second sentence would defy the Legislature’s clear
intent in subdivision (h)’s first sentence and contradict well-settled
principles of statutory construction. In
conclusion, we find the enhanced conduct credit provision
applies only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after
October 1, 2011.†(People v. Rajanayagam, supra,
at p. 52, fn. omitted.)
Similarly, the court in People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1553, held: “In our view, the Legislature’s clear intent
was to have the enhanced rate apply only
to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1,
2011. [Citation.] The second sentence does not extend the
enhanced rate to any other group, but merely specifies the rate at which all
others are to earn conduct credits. So
read, the sentence is not meaningless, especially in light of the fact the
October 1, 2011, amendment to [Penal Code] section 4019, although part of the
so-called realignment legislation, applies based on the date a defendant’s
crime is committed, whereas [Penal Code] section 1170, subdivision (h),
which sets out the basic sentencing scheme under realignment, applies based on
the date a defendant is sentenced.â€
We agree with People v. Rajanayagam and People
v. Ellis that the second sentence of Penal Code section 4019,
subdivision (h) reiterates that defendants who committed their crimes
before October 1, 2011 will accrue good conduct credit at the rate specified
under the earlier version of the statute.
The second sentence of subdivision (h) does not create an ambiguity
when read in conjunction with the first sentence of that subdivision.
Defendant
also argues a prospective-only application of Penal Code section 4019,
subdivision (f) would violate equal protection. To prevail on an equal protection claim,
defendant must show the state has adopted a classification affecting two
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner, and no rational basis exists
for doing so. (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199-1200.) Defendant has made the requisite showing as
to the first prong of the equal protection analysis. “Defendants who committed offenses and earned
conduct credit before the operative date of the statute are treated more
harshly than those who committed the same crimes and earned conduct credit on or
after October 1, 2011. The two groups
are similarly situated in the sense that they committed the same offenses but
are treated differently in terms of earning conduct credit based solely on the
dates their crimes were committed. For
purposes of receiving conduct credit, nothing distinguishes the status of a
prisoner whose crime was committed after October 1, 2011, from one whose crime
was committed before that date.†(
Cal.App.4th 991, 995-996; see also People
v. Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-54.)
However,
a rational basis exists for making the increased accrual rate for good conduct
credit apply only to those crimes committed after a date certain. The classification created by the October 1,
2011, amendment to Penal Code section 4019 bears a rational relationship to
cost savings, balanced against public safety, by increasing the accrual rate
for good conduct credit, and thereby decreasing the time certain defendants
will spend in custody, while ensuring that defendants are punished according to
the sanction in effect as of the date their crime was committed. (See People
v. Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 55; People v.
Verba, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 996-997.)
Disposition
The postjudgment order is
affirmed.
FYBEL,
ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IKOLA, J.
THOMPSON, J.
need not discuss the facts underlying defendant’s crimes.
