P. v. Delgado



















Filed 12/14/12 P. v. Delgado CA4/3















NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION THREE




>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TEMOTEO VALLADARES DELGADO, Defendant and Appellant.

G046495 (Super. Ct. No. 03WF2871) O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Stephanie George, Judge. Affirmed.

Temoteo Valladares
Delgado, in pro. per.; and Sylvia Whatley Beckman, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *



We
appointed counsel to represent
defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a
brief which set forth the facts of the case.
Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no
issues were found to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given 30 days to file href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">written argument in defendant’s own
behalf, which he did. (>People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436.) Defendant pleaded guilty to
committing several robberies. The
handwritten statement of facts offered to the court as the basis for his plea
states: “In Orange County, California,
on the following dates; 6-30-03, 11-2-03, 10-26-03, 11-8-03, 10-27-03, 7-7-03
& on 10 separate occasions I used force and fear to take money from [10
named individuals].”

The plea agreement
states that he is sentenced to state prison for a term of 14 years, that he
already served 697 days in actual custody and that he accumulated 104 days of
good time/work time for a total credit of 801 days. In his plea agreement, he waived his right to
appeal from decisions and orders of the superior court.

Pursuant to >Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738, counsel listed four possible issues:
(1) Did the terms of the plea agreement preclude modification of the
judgment to correct presentence custody credit?
(2) Did the court correctly calculate
the number of days actually served as 697?
(3) Was defendant’s proof of service attached to his second ex parte
motion for correction of presentence credit invalid? (4) Was defendant entitled to additional
conduct credit?

A
defendant’s plea admits all matters essential to the conviction. The issues cognizable on appeal are those
based on “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to
the legality of the proceedings” resulting in the plea. But review of these issues requires a
certificate of probable cause, which defendant failed to obtain. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B), (b)(5).)
“Section 1237.5 [is designed] ‘to promote judicial economy’ [citation]
‘by screening out wholly frivolous guilty’. . . plea appeals
before time and money are spent’ on such matters as preparation of the record
on appeal [citation], the appointment of appellate counsel [citation], and, of
course, consideration and decision of the appeal itself.” (People
v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Appealable
issues cognizable without a certificate of
probable cause include the sentence on other matters occurring “after entry
of the plea,” and the denial of a suppression motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B).) But in the case of a negotiated plea with
specification of penalty, a certificate is required because the defendant’s
challenge to the sentence implicates the plea.
(People v. Panizzon (1996) 13
Cal.4th 68, 79.) Moreover, here
defendant expressly waived his right to appeal in conjunction with his guilty
plea as to any “legally authorized sentence the court imposes which is within
the terms and limits of [the] plea agreement.”
He reached an agreement, and part of that agreement was the number of
conduct credits he would be given. Even
had he agreed to waive his right to any conduct credits at all, his right to
appeal such a waiver would not have survived his agreement. (See People
v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173, 175.)
The trial court’s imposition of credits was legally authorized.

The
judgment is affirmed.







MOORE,
J.



WE CONCUR:







RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.







BEDSWORTH, J.