P. v. Cummings








Filed 11/8/10 P. v. Cummings CA2/4






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDREW CUMMINGS, Defendant and Appellant.

B218633 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA079327)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Richard R. Romero, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Pamela J. Voich and Pamela J. Voich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.




Andrew Cummings appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on three narcotics counts. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officer from the City of Torrance lacked jurisdiction to conduct a traffic stop in the City of Long Beach. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In August 2008, Dustin Dasner, a narcotics detective with the Torrance police department, received a tip from a confidential informant. Based on the tip, Detective Dasner and other Torrance police officers began conducting narcotics surveillance on appellant and other defendants at a Marriott hotel in Torrance. Appellant engaged in activities the officers believed were narcotics-related, such as countersurveillance driving, meeting with people in parking lots, following them to other parking lots and getting into their cars briefly, entering a building and emerging driving a different car, unloading boxes at a residence and a warehouse, loading boxes into cars, and switching cars again. The officers followed appellant as he drove to locations in Los Angeles and Long Beach. On the second day of surveillance, Detective Dasner asked Torrance police officer Richard Gabel to stop appellant’s vehicle at an address in Long Beach, where Detective Dasner knew appellant to be. Detective Dasner wanted Officer Gabel to conduct the stop because Officer Gabel had a canine unit that could search the vehicle. Appellant was the passenger and Hope Shoto was the driver of the vehicle, a grey minivan.
As Officer Gabel drove to the location, Long Beach police officers stopped him to ask what he was doing, and he asked them to come with him because he was outside of Torrance. Officer Gabel parked his patrol car in an alley, and the Long Beach police officers parked their vehicle behind his in the alley. A second Long Beach police unit arrived later.
Officer Gabel saw appellant’s vehicle make a left turn without using a turn signal, in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107, so he stopped the vehicle. When Officer Gabel pulled out of the parking spot to stop appellant’s vehicle, the Long Beach police car followed him and parked behind Officer Gabel’s car.
When Officer Gabel approached appellant’s vehicle, Shoto said that she forgot to signal at the stop sign, and Officer Gabel told her that was the reason for the stop. Shoto gave Officer Gabel her license, but said she did not have any paperwork for the car registration or proof of insurance. Officer Gabel asked her to step out of the vehicle, and she was patted down for weapons by a Long Beach police officer. Appellant also was asked to get out of the vehicle, and he was searched for weapons.
Officer Gabel’s narcotics dog searched the vehicle and indicated that there were narcotics in the rear of the vehicle. After the dog indicated the presence of narcotics, Officer Gabel had Paul Kranke, a narcotics detective with the Torrance police department, take possession of the vehicle, and appellant and Shoto were transported to the Torrance police department. Detective Kranke took several boxes out of the rear of the vehicle and found marijuana inside.
Appellant was charged by information with three counts: transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), conspiracy to transport marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359).[1]
Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, challenging the constitutionality of the stop and the search, and arguing that Officer Gabel did not have jurisdiction to stop and arrest appellant. The court denied the motion following a hearing. In finding that the Torrance police officers had jurisdiction to stop appellant’s vehicle, the court reasoned that the stop involved “the passive participation of the Long Beach police department” and that there was “an agency relationship because of the presence of Long Beach.” The court concluded that “the Torrance officers therefore had jurisdiction in Long Beach to make a traffic stop for a mere infraction.”
The jury found appellant guilty on all three counts. The court sentenced appellant to the mid term of three years on the count of transportation of marijuana and stayed sentencing on the other two counts pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The court imposed the requisite fines and fees and gave appellant credit for 36 days of actual custody and 18 days of good time/work time credit for a total of 54 days. Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Gabel did not have jurisdiction to conduct the traffic stop and arrest in the City of Long Beach, pursuant to Penal Code section 830.1, which governs the extent of a police officer’s authority.
“When considering a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion, ‘we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 528-529.) “We exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.]” (People v. Strider (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398.)
Penal Code section 830.1 provides that a police officer’s authority extends to three situations: “(1) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed within the political subdivision that employs the peace officer or in which the peace officer serves. [¶] (2) Where the peace officer has the prior consent of the chief of police or chief, director, or chief executive officer of a consolidated municipal public safety agency, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a city, or of the sheriff, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a county. [¶] (3) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the peace officer’s presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense.” (Pen. Code, § 830.1, subd. (a).) “The words ‘public offense’ include misdemeanors and infractions as well as felonies. [Citation.]” (People v. Tennessee (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 788, 791.) The third category applies only in emergency situations. (People v. Bush (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 952, 955, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357.)
The record indicates that Officer Gabel engaged the assistance of the Long Beach police because he was cognizant of the need for them to be involved, and that the stop was made in tandem with the Long Beach police. Because the Long Beach police participated in the stop, the limitations of Penal Code section 830.1 do not apply. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence and the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS




MANELLA, J.
We concur:



EPSTEIN, P. J.



SUZUKAWA, J.






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