P. v.
Coulter
Filed 5/1/13
P. v. Coulter CA3
NOT TO
BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
SANDRA LEE COULTER,
Defendant
and Appellant.
C069813
(Super. Ct. No. NCR79256)
Defendant Sandra Lee Coulter pled
guilty to two counts of first degree
burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 -- counts 1, 10)
dismissal of eight other criminal counts and was sentenced to serve concurrent
terms of four years for each conviction in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion in finding her ineligible for probation. We reject the contention and affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
On May 12,
2010,
the victim and her son left their residence in the morning. When they returned that evening, their home
had been broken into and several items had been stolen.
The following day, defendant and her
codefendant, Chase Reifert, attempted to sell three of the victim’s video games
to a store in Red Bluff, but the clerk suspected they were stolen and refused
to purchase them. The store’s
surveillance video showed Reifert trying to make the sale while defendant
waited outside. Defendant later admitted
having taken part in the burglary with Reifert.
On May 14,
2010,
about 6:00 a.m., the victim was in his
residence when he was awakened by a loud noise.
He saw a pickup leaving and called the sheriff’s department. Investigation revealed a broken garage window
and the odor of gasoline in the garage.
A deputy saw a pickup matching the victim’s description and stopped
it. The pickup was driven by Reifert and
defendant was the passenger. The pickup
contained property stolen from the victims in counts 1 and 10, along with other
stolen property. Reifert admitted
breaking into the victim’s garage to get gasoline to drive to Corning, California. Defendant admitted going into the victim’s
residence and looking for items while Reifert was stealing gasoline. She also admitted participating in the
burglary charged in count 1.
DISCUSSION
Because defendant was convicted of
first degree burglary, she was statutorily ineligible for probation unless the
court found her case was unusual.
(§ 462, subd. (a).) At
defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded defendant had not
shown her case to be unusual.
Defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to give sufficient weight to her youth, her
drug use since the age of 13, and her minimal criminal record. She also argues that the factors found by the
trial court in granting codefendant Reifert probation applied equally to her
and, therefore, she too should have been granted probation. We reject defendant’s contentions.
A trial court has broad discretion
to determine whether a defendant is suitable for probation. (People
v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233.)
The determination whether a case is unusual is also within the sound
discretion of the trial court. (
831.) An appellant bears a heavy burden
when attempting to show an abuse of such discretion. (People
v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282.) To establish abuse, the defendant must show
that, under all the circumstances, the denial of probation was arbitrary,
capricious, or exceeded the bounds of reason.
(Du, supra, at p. 831.)
California Rules of Court, rule 4.413(b)
and (c),
title="">[2] govern the court’s
consideration of probation where there is a statutory
prohibition against probation “except in unusual cases.†Where such a statutory prohibition exists,
rule 4.413(b) directs the court to evaluate whether the statutory limitation
has been overcome by applying criteria in rule 4.413(c). It is only after a defendant establishes his
or her case is unusual that the court will then consider granting
probation. (Rule 4.413(b).)
According to defendant, there are
three factors that are relevant to determining whether defendant’s case is
unusual: (1) she was youthful;
(2) she committed the crimes because she was addicted to methamphetamine;
minimal record of prior offenses.
Here, the trial court stated it had
read and considered the probation officer’s report and it had read letters
submitted on defendant’s behalf as well as defense counsel’s statement in
mitigation. The court further stated it
had considered her youth, her addiction, and her prior record in making its
determination that an unusual case had not been shown. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding defendant ineligible for probation.
While we agree defendant was young
at the time of sentencing -- 22 years old -- and defendant did not have a
significant prior record,
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] she has a history of
drug and alcohol abuse and a current addiction to methamphetamine. According to defendant, she began using drugs
and alcohol at age 13. She uses
“marijuana daily†and drinks alcohol “all the time,†combining it with
drugs. She has used Vicodin, Seroquel,
Soma, and Norco without prescriptions.
Over the past few years she has used methamphetamine daily, injecting it
into her inner arm. She has sold
methamphetamine for the purpose of obtaining some for herself. Defendant admitted being involved in the
burglaries because “[i]t was all about getting dope. I wanted to continue getting high.†With regard to defendant’s prior conviction
for possession of methamphetamine, she was granted deferred entry of judgment
but did not complete the required class.
She was on probation when she committed the instant burglaries. Finally, when Reifert and defendant were
stopped, they had in their possession not only property from the victims of the
burglaries charged in counts 1 and 10, but also property stolen during other
burglaries.
Defendant’s record of drug abuse and
addiction makes it highly unlikely she would, as required by rule 4.413(c)(2)(B),
“respond favorably†to mental health care and treatment, which would be a
condition of any grant of probation. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant
had not shown her case to be unusual within the meaning of section 462,
subdivision (a).
Defendant next argues that since the
reasons the trial court found her codefendant’s case to be unusual apply
equally to her, the trial court should have made the same finding for her. Specifically, both were youthful, both had
minimal criminal records, and both equally participated in the burglaries in
counts 1 and 10. But, as defendant
recognizes, “each sentencing is individualized, and one cannot say that a
court’s exercise of leniency as to one defendant must be extended to another
defendant.†A codefendant’s sentence is
not relevant to determining whether a defendant’s sentence is an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27 [sentence received by
accomplice is not relevant to reviewing appellant’s sentence].) Rather, the trial court looks at each
defendant individually to determine whether an unusual case is presented to
grant probation. As discussed above, there
was no abuse of discretion in finding defendant ineligible for probation.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
HOCH , J.
We concur:
BLEASE , Acting P. J.
DUARTE , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Undesignated rule references are to the
California Rules of Court.
