P. v. Collier

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 7/11/13  P. v. Collier CA6

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SIXTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,   Plaintiff and Respondent,       v.   BRENT MELTON COLLIER,   Defendant and Appellant.

H038124      (Santa Clara County       Super. Ct. No. 162764)

 

Defendant Brent Melton Collier
appeals from a trial court order extending his involuntary commitment as a href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">mentally disordered offender
(MDO).  He argues the order must be
reversed because an expert witness testified regarding the content of
inadmissible hearsay documents when opining that defendant was unsuitable for
release from Patton State
Hospital (Patton).  Defendant alternatively argues the trial
court erred in refusing placement in an outpatient
treatment program.  We will
affirm. 

Factual and Procedural History

            In 1992,
defendant threw a rock at a bus driver, causing her bodily injury.  As a result of this incident, he was
convicted of violating Penal Code section 245.2href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">>[1]
and sentenced to four years in prison. 

            In 1995,
defendant was deemed an MDO and civilly committed.  He was released on outpatient status, under
the supervision of the South Bay Conditional Release Program (CONREP), in
1997.  That same year, he stole a CONREP
van, and his outpatient status was revoked. 
He was accordingly committed to Atascadero
State Hospital. 

            Defendant
was administratively transferred to Patton in 1999.  Over the next 12 years, the trial court
periodically extended defendant’s commitment to Patton. 

            On October 12, 2011, the Santa Clara
County District Attorney filed a petition, pursuant to section 2970, seeking to
extend defendant’s commitment for an additional year.  A court trial on the petition commenced on March 20, 2012. 

            Dr. Gregory
Leong provided expert testimony at the trial. 
Dr. Leong was a Patton psychiatrist, and he interviewed defendant for 45
minutes on August 16, 2011.  During the interview, defendant admitted that
he experienced delusions and heard voices. 
He explained that he had suffered from a mental disorder in the past,
but he claimed that he no longer suffered from any sort of mental
disorder. 

            During the
interview with Dr. Leong, defendant talked about the 1992 assault on the bus
driver.  Defendant stated that the bus
driver, who was female, reminded him of his father.  He explained that the bus driver deserved to
be assaulted because she had not treated him with adequate respect.  Based on defendant’s statements, Dr. Leong
determined that defendant experienced a delusional misidentification when he
committed the assault on the bus driver.  


            Later in
the interview, defendant told Dr. Leong that other people and entities were
responsible for all his failings in life. 
Defendant stated that CONREP was one of the entities that had wronged
him.  He complained that, when he
participated in CONREP in 1997, he was forced to submit to frequent drug
testing.  He also complained that CONREP
prohibited him from having any money.  He
explained that the conditions imposed by CONREP were unduly restrictive, and
that he was therefore justified in fleeing from CONREP. 

            Near the
end of the interview, defendant began speaking about a fellow patient who had
been accepted into CONREP.  Defendant
explained that the patient was a murderer, and that it would therefore be
unfair if defendant were not also accepted into CONREP.  Defendant explained that he needed to go to
CONREP because individuals at Patton were out to get him.  He believed he was in danger at Patton.  He refused to answer a hypothetical question
regarding CONREP, explaining that answering the question would further endanger
him.  Defendant was upset, and he
terminated the interview.  Dr. Leong
testified that defendant’s fearful statements and behavior showed that he was
delusional and hearing voices. 

            Before
trial, Dr. Leong reviewed defendant’s Patton file.  The records in the file showed that defendant
had recently experienced illogical thinking, paranoia, irritability, and mood
disturbance.  Notes made by defendant’s
treating psychologist stated that defendant’s symptoms were in partial
remission, but that defendant was still experiencing thought distortion and
internal preoccupation that were indicative of delusions or
hallucinations.  The records showed that
defendant had recently experienced a delusion that caused him to believe that
Patton staff members were imposters. 

            Based on
his interview with defendant, as well as the symptoms and behaviors documented
in defendant’s Patton file, Dr. Leong opined at trial that defendant was
currently suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.  Dr. Leong also opined that defendant would
pose a substantial risk of harm to others if released into the community.  Dr. Leong believed that defendant posed a
substantial risk of harm because defendant was currently exhibiting symptoms of
a severe mental illness and defendant’s failure to recognize the existence of
his mental illness rendered him unlikely to comply with a treatment
program. 

            Defendant
testified at the trial.  He explained
that he was currently suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.  He testified that his disease caused him to
experience “[t]hought disorders, delusions, believing people are out to get
you, inferiority complexes, worries about things that aren’t real.”  He explained that he currently experienced
delusions involving the devil, hell, and heaven.  He currently believed that Patton staff
members were out to get him. 

            Defendant
testified that his act of stealing the van and fleeing from CONREP in 1997 was
“[n]ot that big of a deal.”  He explained
that his actions were justified because CONREP had violated his constitutional
rights.  Despite his belief that CONREP
had violated his constitutional rights, defendant testified that he would like
the court to send him to CONREP if outright release were denied. 

            At the
conclusion of the trial, the court found that defendant suffered from a severe
mental disorder that was not in remission, and that defendant would pose a
substantial danger of physical harm to others if he were released into the
community.  The court accordingly granted
the petition to extend defendant’s involuntary commitment for an additional
year.  The court denied defendant’s
request to be placed with CONREP, finding that defendant had failed to satisfy
the burden of proof required for an outpatient placement. 

            On March
29, 2012, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.  This appeal followed.

Discussion

            Defendant
argues the order extending his involuntary commitment must be reversed because
Dr. Leong testified regarding the content of several inadmissible hearsay
documents included in defendant’s Patton file. 
We conclude that Dr. Leong properly relied on the hearsay in forming his
opinion regarding defendant’s mental disorder and dangerousness, and that Dr.
Leong properly testified regarding facts contained in the Patton file at the
court trial.  We accordingly find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the hearsay. 

            In the
alternative, defendant argues the trial court’s denial of CONREP placement
should be reversed because defendant’s trial testimony established his
suitability for treatment at CONREP.  We
conclude that defendant’s testimony, which evinced a hostility toward CONREP
and its policies, constituted substantial evidence that defendant could not be
safely and effectively treated at CONREP. 
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to
place defendant with CONREP. 

I.  Admission of the Hearsay was Not an Abuse of
Discretion

            Section
2972, subdivision (c) describes the elements that must be established to extend
an MDO’s involuntary commitment:  “If the
court or jury finds that the patient has a severe mental disorder, that the
patient’s severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in
remission without treatment, and that by reason of his or her severe mental disorder,
the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the
court shall order the patient recommitted . . . .”  A qualified expert witness “is entitled to
render an opinion on the criteria necessary for an MDO commitment.”  (People
v. Dodd (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569.) 

            Matter that
is ordinarily inadmissible “can form the proper basis for an expert’s opinion
testimony.”  (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618; see also Evid.
Code, § 801, subd. (b) [an expert’s opinion may be based on matters known to
the expert  “whether or not
admissible”].)  Thus, an expert may
generally base his or her opinion on reliable hearsay “not otherwise admissible.”  (People
v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 918.) 
“[A]n expert witness whose opinion is based on
such inadmissible matter can, when testifying, describe the material that forms
the basis of the opinion.”  (>Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.
618.)  

            An expert
witness’s ability to testify regarding inadmissible hearsay, however, is not
unlimited.  People v. Coleman explained: 
“While an expert may state on direct examination the matters on which he
relied in forming his opinion, he may not testify as to the details of such
matters if they are otherwise inadmissible.” 
(People v. Coleman (1985)
38 Cal.3d 69, 92 (Coleman),
disapproved on another point in People v.
Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 824, fn. 32, internal quotation mark
removed.)  “The rule rests on the
rationale that while an expert may give reasons on direct examination for his
opinions, including the matters he considered in forming them, he may not under
the guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.”  (Ibid.) 

            A trial
court must therefore balance competing interests when determining the extent to
which an expert witness may testify regarding hearsay documents.  The desirability of permitting an expert to
explain the basis for an opinion must be balanced against the need to prevent
the trier of fact from
considering inadmissible matter for an impropername="SDU_180">
purpose.  (See People v. Martin (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 970, 977 (>Martin), disapproved on another point in
People v. Achrem (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 153, 156.)  “Because an
expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury’s need for information
sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion, may conflict with an accused’s
interest in avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay, disputes in this
area must generally be left to the trial court’s sound judgment.”  (Montiel,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 919.)  A
trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of this hearsay is accordingly
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People
v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 511; see also People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 723 [“an appellate court
applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial
court on the admissibility of evidence”].) 


            The
following principles must guide a reviewing court’s abuse of discretion
analysis:  “ ‘The discretion of a trial
judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is
subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its
action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is
shown.’  (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th
ed. 2008) Appeal, § 364, p. 420; see Westside
Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348,
355.)  ‘The scope of discretion always
resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the “legal principles
governing the subject of [the] action . . . .”  Action that transgresses the confines of the
applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call
such action an “abuse” of discretion. 
[Citation.]  . . .  [¶] 
The legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action
vary greatly with context. 
[Citation.]  They are derived from
the common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred.’  (City
of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1297-1298.)  To determine if a court abused its discretion,
we must thus consider ‘the legal principles and policies that should have
guided the court’s actions.’  (>People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
377.)”  (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773).)

            >People v. Campos (1995)> 32 Cal.App.4th 304 (>Campos) found such an abuse of
discretion in a trial court’s admission of the hearsay basis of an expert’s
opinion.  In Campos, a jury determined the appellant qualified as an MDO.  (Id. at
p. 306.)  Campos held that the trial court erred in permitting a psychiatrist
to testify that nontestifying experts concurred in the psychiatrist’s opinion
regarding the appellant’s MDO status.  (>Id. at pp. 306-307.)  Campos reasoned:  “[D]octors can testify as to the basis for
their opinion [citation], but this is not intended to be a channel by which
testifying doctors can place the opinion of innumerable out-of-court doctors
before the jury.”  (Id. at p. 308, internal quotation marks omitted.) 

            In
contrast, Martin, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th
970 found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the hearsay basis of
expert opinion.  In Martin, the appellant’s MDO status was determined at a court
trial.  (Id. at p. 973.)  At the court
trial, three doctors testified that specific facts in the probation report
established the appellant’s status as an MDO. 
(Id. at p. 976.)  On appeal, the appellant argued the experts
“should not have been allowed to testify to the details of the report.”  (Id. at
p. 977.)  Martin held that “there was no
error in allowing the experts to describe the probation report in stating the
basis for their opinions.”  (>Ibid.) 
Martin reasoned that a
probation report is a reliable hearsay document upon which an expert may base
an opinion.  (Ibid.)  Martin also reasoned that the Coleman
rule, which proscribes an expert’s testimony regarding the details included
in hearsay documents, is inapplicable in a court trial.  (Ibid.)  Martin explained:  “The court in Coleman was attempting
to balance the desirability of allowing an expert to explain the basis for an
opinion and the need to prevent the jury from considering inadmissible
matter for an improper purpose.  In this
case, however, appellant was tried before the court.  A judge is presumed to know and follow the
law.  [Citations.]  We must assume that the court in this case
considered the testimony about the probation report’s contents solely for the
proper purpose of assessing the experts’ credibility, and not as independent
proof of the facts contained therein.”  (>Ibid., italics in original.)  

            At
defendant’s court trial, Dr. Leong’s opinion regarding defendant’s mental
disorder and unsuitability for release from Patton was based, in part, on
medical records in defendant’s Patton file. 
Specifically, Dr. Leong utilized the following hearsay in defendant’s
Patton file:  the treating psychiatrist’s
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, polysubstance dependence, and water
intoxication; the facts of the 1992 assault on the bus driver; defendant’s
symptoms as described by Patton staff members; Patton staff members’
descriptions of defendant’s participation in group treatment; Patton staff
members’ statements regarding the viability of defendant’s release plan; notes
indicating that defendant’s substance abuse problem was in institutional
remission; Patton staff members’ statements that defendant denied having a href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">substance abuse problem; and Patton
staff members’ notes regarding defendant’s recent delusions. 

            Defendant’s
case is analogous to Martin.  The medical records in defendant’s Patton
file, like the probation report at issue in Martin,
constituted reliable hearsay upon which Dr. Leong was permitted to base his
opinion.  (Garibay v. Hemmat (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 735, 743  [“although hospital records are hearsay, they
can be used as a basis for an expert medical opinion”]; see also >People v. Nelson (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 698, 707 [mental health experts “routinely rely on interview
reports and observations of nontestifying experts”].)  Also like Martin,
defendant’s MDO status was determined by the trial court, not by a jury.  Thus, just as the Martin court did, we must presume that the trial court did not
improperly consider the Patton medical records for their truth.  (See Martin,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 977.) 
Indeed, the trial court specifically stated that it considered the
hearsay in defendant’s Patton file only for the purpose of assessing the
credibility of Dr. Leong’s opinion.  The >Martin holding therefore authorized Dr. Leong’s
testimony regarding the content of the hearsay documents in defendant’s Patton
file.  Accordingly, because the admission
of the hearsay in defendant’s case comports with the legal principles and
policies articulated in Martin, we
find no abuse of discretion. 

            Defendant
contends the Campos holding
prohibited Dr. Leong from testifying regarding the content of the hearsay
documents in the Patton file.  >Campos, however, is easily harmonized
with our analysis.  Campos held that the trial court erred in admitting, in a jury
trial, an expert’s testimony regarding the medical opinions of multiple
nontestifying doctors.  (>Campos, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p.
308.)  In defendant’s case, Dr. Leong
described only one nontestifying doctor’s opinion:  the treating psychiatrist’s diagnosis
regarding defendant’s mental disorder. 
The remainder of the hearsay utilized by Dr. Leong largely pertained to
Patton staff members’ direct observations of defendant’s behavior, not the personal
opinions of those Patton staff members. 
Moreover, unlike the jury trial in Campos,
defendant had a court trial.  In light of
the Campos court’s concern with
placing “the opinion of innumerable out-of-court doctors before the jury,”
defendant’s case does not fall within the ambit of the Campos holding.  (>Id. at p. 308, internal quotation
marks omitted; see also People v.
Bordelon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1326 [Campos was “concerned with preventing the introduction of multiple
opinions, insulated from cross-examination, into evidence”].) 

            Accordingly,
we conclude that Dr. Leong’s testimony regarding the hearsay was authorized
under the legal principles and policies articulated in Martin.  We therefore hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
hearsay. 

II.  Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial
Court’s Denial of CONREP Placement

            Defendant
alternatively argues the trial court erred in refusing to place him in the
CONREP outpatient treatment program. 
Defendant’s contention is unpersuasive. 
 

            Section 2972,
subdivision (d) states:  “A person shall
be released on outpatient status if the committing court finds that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the committed person can be safely and
effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” 
Section 2972, subdivision (d) describes “a disposition available to
the trial court atname="citeas((Cite_as:_155_Cal.App.4th_350,_*3"> the conclusion of a
recommitment hearing.”  (>People v. May (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 350, 359; see also People v.
Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1382 
[section 2972, subdivision (d) “describes an alternative disposition
that is available to the court” upon sustaining a section 2970 petition].) 

            The patient “shoulders the
burden of showing his suitability for outpatient treatment.”  (People
v. Gregerson (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 306, 316 (Gregerson).)  The standard of proof is set forth in the
plain language of section 2972, subdivision (d):  the patient must demonstrate reasonable cause
to believe that he or she can be safely and effectively treated on an
outpatient basis.  (Id. at p. 317.)  Under this
reasonable cause standard, “the patient must raise a strong suspicion in a
person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and
effective.”  (Id. at p. 319, fn. omitted.) 


            A trial court’s ruling
regarding placement in an outpatient program must be based on evidence.  (Gregerson,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.) 
“Accordingly, if the court grants outpatient treatment, its order will
be affirmed if substantial evidence shows reasonable cause existed to believe
outpatient treatment would be safe and effective.  If the court denies outpatient treatment, its
order will be affirmed if substantial evidence shows there was no such
reasonable cause.  In any event, if
substantial evidence does not support the court’s order, it must be
reversed.”  (Ibid.) 

            In the
instant case, defendant testified that, during his 1997 CONREP placement, he
stole a CONREP van and fled from the CONREP facility.  He explained that stealing the van was
justified because CONREP’s drug-testing procedures and “flea-bitten” facility
violated his constitutional rights.  He
specifically testified that stealing the CONREP van and fleeing from CONREP was
“[n]ot that big of a deal.”  During his
August 2011 interview with Dr. Leong, defendant expressed his continuing belief
that CONREP had wronged him, and he complained that CONREP’s policies were
unduly restrictive.  At the time of
trial, defendant still believed CONREP had violated his constitutional rights. 

            Given the
evidence of defendant’s negative feelings toward CONREP and the evidence of his
non-compliance with CONREP’s policies, the trial court reasonably concluded
that defendant could not be safely and effectively treated at CONREP.  Although defendant testified that, if placed
with CONREP, he would comply with CONREP’s policies, this testimony was
insufficient to establish reasonable cause for a CONREP placement.  (See Rish,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [patient’s testimony regarding his
willingness to comply with outpatient procedures was insufficient to establish
reasonable cause for an outpatient placement].) 
Indeed, in light of defendant’s testimony regarding his hostility toward
CONREP and its policies, defendant’s assurance that he would comply with CONREP’s
policies was suspect.  Accordingly,
substantial evidence shows there was no reasonable cause to believe that CONREP
treatment would be safe and effective, and the trial court did not err in
refusing to order CONREP placement.  (See
generally ibid. [patient failed to
meet his burden of proof where the “evidence does not come close to addressing
how [the patient] intended to comply with outpatient treatment and how such
treatment would be safe and effective”].) 


Disposition

            The order
granting the petition to extend defendant’s involuntary commitment is
affirmed. 

 

 

                                                                        ______________________________________

                                                                                                RUSHING, P.J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

 

____________________________________

PREMO, J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

____________________________________

ELIA,
J.