P. v. Bledsoe
Filed 3/22/13 P. v. Bledsoe CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
JAMES ERNEST BLEDSOE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
G046411
(Super. Ct.
No. 08WF0033)
O P I N I O
N
Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of Orange County,
John Conley, Judge. Affirmed.
Catherine White, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael T. Murphy and Donald W. Ostertag,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
James
Ernest Bledsoe appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of numerous
sexual offenses. Bledsoe argues the
trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
December 2007, Bledsoe and Tasha went on a date and then back to Bledsoe’s
apartment. Bledsoe attempted to have
sexual intercourse with Tasha, but she said, “[S]top†and “[N]o.†Bledsoe pinned her down and put his penis
inside her vagina. After Bledsoe raped
her, Tasha yelled at Bledsoe, which upset him, and he threw her down and
punched her in the stomach. Tasha
eventually escaped and her parents called the police. The results of a sexual assault examination
were consistent with Tasha having been raped, and semen taken from her vagina
matched Bledsoe’s DNA.
October 2007, Bledsoe went on a date with Sara.
The next thing Sara remembered, she woke up in her apartment wearing a
man’s boxer shorts and a T-shirt. Sara
called Bledsoe and asked him whether they had sexual intercourse, and Bledsoe
said they did not. Law enforcement
officers subsequently showed Sara a videotape where Bledsoe was engaged in
sexual acts with her. Sara did not
remember any of what occurred on the video, and she did not consent to having
sex with Bledsoe.
July 2007, Bledsoe and Lana went on a number of dates together. During a few of those dates, Lana would not
remember what had happened and she would wake up without any clothes on. Lana asked but Bledsoe denied they had sexual
intercourse. Law enforcement officers
subsequently showed Lana videotapes where Bledsoe engaged in sexual acts with
her and on her. Lana did not remember
the sexual acts she observed on the videotape, and she did not consent to
having sex with Bledsoe.
Holly
H.
In June 2007, Holly was
at a bar when things started to get “really fuzzy†and she collapsed on the
dance floor. The next thing she remembered,
she was lying on a couch at the bar and Bledsoe, a man she had never met
before, said he would give her a ride to a friend’s house. Instead, Bledsoe took her to his apartment
and made her a drink. Holly remembered
she and Bledsoe were naked and Bledsoe was on top of her. Holly told Bledsoe she did not want to have
sex with him because she was a virgin.
She then felt pain in her vagina, and despite saying “‘stop’†and “‘no,’â€
Bledsoe continued. After Bledsoe had
finished, Holly had a lot of blood coming from her vagina. She took a shower and left. Law enforcement officers subsequently showed
Holly a videotape where Bledsoe was engaged in sexual acts with her and on her. Holly did not consent to having sex with
Bledsoe.
The day after Bledsoe
raped his last victim, law enforcement officers arrested him a stone’s throw
from the Mexican border with $2,000 in cash.
A second amended
information charged Bledsoe with the following offenses: (1) Tasha S.-assault with intent to commit
sexual offense (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a))
(count 1), forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2), forcible oral
copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)) (count 3), misdemeanor secretly filming
another with intent to arouse (§ 647, subd. (k)(2)) (count 4), resisting
and obstructing an officer (§ 148,
subd.
(a)(1)) (count 5); (2) Sara R.-misdemeanor secretly filming another with intent
to arouse (§ 647, subd. (k)(2)) (count 6), rape of intoxicated woman
(§ 261, subd. (a)(3)) (count 7), rape of an unconscious woman (§ 261,
subd. (a)(4)) (count 8); (3) Lana N.-rape of an intoxicated woman (§ 261,
subd. (a)(3)) (count 9), rape of an unconscious woman (§ 261, subd.
(a)(4)) (count 10), oral copulation of an unconscious person (§ 288a,
subd.
(f)) (count 11), oral copulation of intoxicated person (§ 288a, subd. (i))
(count 12), sexual penetration by foreign object of unconscious person
(§ 289, subd. (d)) (count 13), sexual penetration by foreign object of
intoxicated person (§ 289, subd. (e)) (count 14), misdemeanor secretly
filming another with intent to arouse (§ 647, subd. (k)(2))
(count
15); (4) Holly H.-forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) (count 16), sexual
penetration by foreign object by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)) (count 17),
misdemeanor secretly filming another with intent to arouse (§ 647, subd.
(k)(2)) (count 18); and (5) failure to register (§§ 290, subd. (b),
290.018, subd. (b)) (count 19). As to
counts 2, 3, 16, and 17, the information alleged Bledsoe was a habitual sexual
offender (§ 667.71, subd. (a)), he committed an offense against more than
one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(5)), and he was not eligible for
probation (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(1)).
The information also alleged Bledsoe suffered a prior strike conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)), and a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subds. (a)(1)).
On September 15, 2011, the trial court denied
Bledsoe’s first motion to substitute his conflict counsel pursuant to
ineffective because in part Bledsoe had not been shown any of the nearly 2,500
pages of discovery. Defense counsel
indicated he was ready for trial, and the master calendar judge indicated the
matter would be sent to a courtroom on Tuesday, September 20. Bledsoe stated he would be retaining private
counsel. The judge indicated any private
counsel needed to be present on September 20, and warned Bledsoe about
requesting additional time because “this case is long in the tooth.â€
On September 20, private
counsel appeared and explained he was requesting a short continuance to review
the discovery and provide a retainer agreement to Bledsoe’s mother, who he
spoke with and wished to retain him. Bledsoe’s
conflict counsel stated he spoke with Bledsoe’s mother the previous night and
she did not intend to retain private counsel; she asked him to review the
case. The master calendar judge denied
the request for a continuance and assigned the case to Judge John Conley.
That afternoon, Judge Conley
indicated it was day five of 10. After
discussing some scheduling issues, Bledsoe became very emotional. Bledsoe stated he did not want conflict
counsel representing him and, “I would like to do it, if I have to go forward
here.†The trial court cleared the
courtroom. After Bledsoe again expressed
his displeasure with conflict counsel, conflict counsel advised the court of
the case’s procedural history and indicated he was “100 percent ready†to
proceed. Bledsoe again expressed his
concerns with conflict counsel, including that he had not been able to review
the discovery, and stated, “If I have to go pro per and represent myself I feel
more comfortable[.]†The court denied
Bledsoe’s second Marsden motion as
untimely because it was so close to trial.
Back on the record, Bledsoe’s emotions overcame him, and the court
continued the matter to the next day.
The next day, a
Wednesday, and day two of trial, private counsel appeared and indicated Bledsoe
had retained him. After the court
indicated there were 2,700 pages of discovery to review, private counsel
requested a three-month continuance. The
prosecutor objected because it was a four-year-old case and it was day six of
10. The court denied Bledsoe’s motion to
substitute private counsel for his conflict counsel because the request was
untimely.
Bledsoe moved to
represent himself and indicated he could be ready for trial on Monday. The trial court inquired whether Bledsoe had
reviewed the 2,700 pages of discovery.
Bledsoe said he could. The court
noted that the day before Bledsoe complained conflict counsel had not shared
the discovery with him. Bledsoe assured
the court he could review the information as he is “very good at reading[]†and
his “vocabulary is excellent.†When the
court reminded Bledsoe this was a “life†case, Bledsoe replied, “And I think I
would be open to that to save the court the time, save the people the pain.â€
Relying on the factors
articulated in People v. Windham
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham),
the trial court denied Bledsoe’s motion.
The court reasoned that based on the court’s experience conflict counsel
was an excellent lawyer. The record
reflects Bledsoe shook his head in the affirmative. The court noted Bledsoe did not have a
proclivity for substituting counsel.
When the court stated the reason for the request appeared to be Bledsoe
believed he could do a better job than conflict counsel, Bledsoe replied he
could “do an honest job[.]†The court
stated not getting along with an attorney or not having confidence in an
attorney was not sufficient grounds. The
court stated the age of the case and the stage of the proceedings weighed
against granting Bledsoe’s request. And
as to the disruption that would reasonably be expected to follow, the court did
not believe Bledsoe would be prepared to proceed in five days considering the
seriousness of the charges and the amount of discovery to review. Finally, citing People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268 (Powell), the court explained the right of
self-representation
is not a license to abuse the judicial process and the court should rarely
grant such a request on the day set for trial.
Bledsoe proceeded to trial with counsel.
At trial, Bledsoe
testified he had consensual sex with Tasha, Sara, and Lana. Bledsoe remembered Holly, but he had no
recollection of that evening. The jury
convicted Bledsoe on all the counts and found true all the allegations. The trial court sentenced Bledsoe to prison
for a very, very long time: 100 years to
life plus a 29-year determinate term for good measure.
DISCUSSION
Bledsoe argues the trial
court erred when it denied his request to represent himself pursuant to
806 (Faretta). We disagree.
“‘Criminal defendants
have the right both to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the
prosecution and the right, based on the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
represent themselves. [Citation.] However, this right of self-representation is
not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom or disrupt the
proceedings. [Citation.] Faretta
motions must be both timely and unequivocal.
[Citations.] Equivocation of the
right of self-representation may occur where the defendant tries to manipulate
the proceedings by switching between requests for counsel and for
self-representation, or where such actions are the product of whim or
frustration.’ [Citation.] Moreover, a trial court rarely should grant
such a motion on the day set for trial.
Our Supreme Court has ‘held on numerous occasions that
are untimely.’ [Citation.] A motion made that close to the day set for
trial is ‘extreme’ [citation] and now is disfavored [citations].†(Powell,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1277-1278.)
“Once the trial against
a defendant has commenced, a Faretta
motion for self-representation ‘is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which should consider such factors as the quality of counsel’s
representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute
counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings,
and the disruption or delay that might reasonably be expected to follow the
granting of such a motion.’ (
799, 827, . . . , relying on Windham,
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128 . . . .)â€
(People v. Barnett (1998) 17
Cal.4th 1044, 1104-1105.)
Here, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Bledsoe’s Faretta motion. Indeed, it
was certainly within the court’s discretion to deny the motion, subject to it
analyzing the request under the Windham
factors, as it was made on day two of trial.
(People v. Clark (1992) 3
Cal.4th 41, 99-100 [trial court discretion to deny motion for self-representation
because it was made when trial date was being continued on day-to-day basis in
effect on eve of trial].)
With respect to the
factors articulated in Windham, we
are convinced the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying
Bledsoe’s belated request to represent himself.
The court opined that based on his experience, conflict counsel was “a
very competent lawyer.†The record
reflects Bledsoe agreed with the court’s assessment of conflict counsel’s
skills as Bledsoe shook his head in agreement.
Although the court noted Bledsoe did not have a proclivity for
substituting counsel, his reasons for now wanting to represent himself were not
a valid basis. (People v. Berryman (1993)
6
Cal.4th 1048, 1070, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 [defendant’s
claimed lacked confidence in or inability to get along with insufficient basis
to substitute counsel].) Thus, the
record supports the conclusion Bledsoe had experienced trial counsel who planned
to offer the best defense possible under the circumstances.
The court was
particularly concerned with the age of the case as it was September 2011. The charged offenses occurred in 2007. The prosecutor filed the complaint in January
2008 and the original information in March 2009. The court’s concern with the length and stage
of the proceedings was proper as allowing Bledsoe to now represent himself on
the eve of trial would have likely delayed the case further.
Finally, we address the
last factor—the disruption or delay that might reasonably be expected to follow
the granting of such a motion. This is
the only factor Bledsoe discusses on appeal.
He claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to represent
himself because his request was not accompanied by a motion for a
continuance. We disagree. First, Bledsoe did in fact request a
continuance, although not as long as the three-month continuance private counsel
requested. On the morning of Wednesday,
September 21, Bledsoe moved to represent himself and indicated he could be
ready to proceed on Monday. Thus,
Bledsoe did request a short continuance to prepare for trial, and his reliance
on cases where the defendant did not request a continuance is misplaced. (In re
Justin L. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1068, 1076-1077 [no request for
continuance]; People v. Herrera
(1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 167, 173-175 [same]; People
v. Tyner (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 352, 355 [same]; but see People v. Perez (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 893, 903-904 [continuance necessary for defendant to prepare
defense].)
Second, it was certainly
reasonable for the trial court to be suspicious Bledsoe would be ready to
proceed with trial on Monday. Bledsoe
had previously complained conflict counsel had not shared any of the discovery
with him. Despite Bledsoe’s
extraordinary reading skills, it would be difficult for a trained lawyer to
review, organize, and synthesize 2,700 pages of discovery, some of it
scientific discovery, and prepare a plausible defense strategy in less than five
days. Although the court did not state
it on the record, the court’s obvious concern was that Monday morning Bledsoe
would request additional time to review the discovery and prepare a defense. Considering the age of the case, allowing
Bledsoe to represent himself would have likely resulted in further delays.
Bledsoe’s reliance on
federal authority holding any request to represent oneself before a jury is
impaneled is timely is misplaced. The
California Supreme Court rejected the federal rule, describing it as “too rigid
in circumscribing the discretion of the trial court.†(People
v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854.)
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Bledsoe’s motion to represent
himself made on the eve of trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
O’LEARY,
P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
FYBEL, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
