P. v. Benson
Filed 5/13/13 P. v. Benson CA2/8
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
>
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERTA BENSON, Defendant and Appellant. | B240319 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA384041) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Stephen A.
Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
Pamela J. Voich, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and William N. Frank, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
A
jury convicted Roberta Benson of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) On appeal, Benson contends the evidence is
insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred in
excluding relevant character evidence of the victim, denying her
FACTS
Benson and Oliver Ramillate lived in
the same condominium complex for many years and participated on the homeowner’s
association board together. Since 2007,
Ramillate also served as the complex’s manager.
Benson often complained about his performance to the board.
One day in May 2011, at around 3:00
a.m.,
Ramillate awoke to sounds from the lobby.
He got up to investigate, and found cut roses and spilled coffee by his
door. When he walked into the lobby of
the third level where his unit was, the chairs had been turned over and
magazines strewn over the floor.
Ramillate continued his investigation onto the first floor where he
found Benson, alone in the courtyard area, cutting roses with an eight-inch
kitchen knife.
Ramillate told Benson to stop
cutting the roses he had planted. He was
about six to nine feet from Benson when she told him, “Don’t say anything
to me, bad boy. Did you see this knife?â€
and raised the knife up to head level.
Ramillate began to retreat after the exchange because he felt
worried. He grabbed a chair to create a
buffer between himself and Benson.
Benson stood up and moved toward the building’s interior while making a
jabbing motion with the knife towards Ramillate. With only a foot between Benson and the chair
Ramillate was holding to defend himself, she continued to jab at him. Benson then began to push the chair with her
left hand, while jabbing at Ramillate with her right. The altercation ended when Benson walked into
the building.
Ramillate immediately returned to
his unit and called the police. Ten
minutes later, police arrived and retrieved two knives from Benson’s unit. Ramillate identified an eight-inch kitchen
knife that smelled like cut roses as the weapon she jabbed at him.
Benson sought to impeach Ramillate’s
character for truthfulness at trial by the testimony of Helga Gordon. Before trial, Benson’s counsel offered a
typed statement from Gordon that included this statement: “[Ramillate] does not make things up, but he
exaggerates wildly.†The court deferred
a ruling on whether Gordon would be allowed to testify. During trial, the court held an Evidence Code
section 402 hearing. Gordon testified
she lived at the complex with Benson and Ramillate for 14 years, but did
not know Ramillate personally. Gordon
said that Ramillate once accepted money from Gordon for keys but never
delivered the keys. Gordon similarly
testified that Ramillate mistreated a particular employee of the building. As consolation, Gordon gave the employee a
job, alleging that it saved the homeowners’ association about $4,000. Gordon testified that when Ramillate found
out, he accused her of diverting funds.
Gordon also testified that Ramillate asked her to make requests at board
meetings but then told a previous manager that the requests were
unnecessary.
The trial court stopped Gordon’s
testimony and ruled the evidence would be excluded under Evidence Code section
352. The court found her testimony
largely irrelevant, and that the confusing effect of Gordon’s testimony
outweighed its probative value. The jury
convicted Benson of assault with a deadly weapon.
Benson filed appeal.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Benson contends the evidence was insufficient to support
her conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
Our role in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence is limited. We review
“ ‘the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and or
solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citations.]†(
170.) We do not reweigh the evidence or
redetermine the credibility of the witnesses (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), and “[w]e draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the judgment†(People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640). “If the circumstances reasonably justify the
[trier of fact’s] findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the
circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citations.]
The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support
the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not whether guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt.†(
755.)
Assault with a deadly weapon is an
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on
the person of another with a deadly weapon.
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, subd. (a)(1).)
The mens rea for assault requires “actual knowledge of the facts
sufficient to establish that the defendant’s act by its nature will probably
and directly result in injury to another.â€
(People v. Williams (2001) 26
Cal.4th 779, 782.) It is a general
intent crime without a requisite specific intent to injure the victim. (Id. at
p. 784.) Indeed, “ ‘[t]here need not be
even a direct attempt at violence; but any indirect preparation towards it, under
the circumstances mentioned, such as drawing a sword or bayonet, or even laying
one’s hand upon his sword, would be sufficient.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Chance (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1164, 1172.)
Benson contends that at “no timeâ€
during her “brief encounter†with Ramillate did she commit a willful and
intentional act that was “likely to result in any physical force on him.†Benson argues there was never any likelihood
of any resulting force being applied to Ramillate. We disagree.
The evidence shows that Benson brought Ramillate’s attention to the
knife when he first approached her in the courtyard. Next, she made repeated jabs with the knife
in his direction while trying to push the chair he used to defend himself out
of the way. This evidence was sufficient
to establish the offense of assault with a deadly weapon.
Benson further contends that the
distance between Ramillate and herself during the incident defeats the “present
ability†element of the assault statute.
Not so. Ramillate was only three
feet away from Benson as she jabbed an eight-inch kitchen knife in his
direction. Benson certainly had the
present ability to commit a violent injury on Ramillate. Three feet is a mere step and an arm’s length
away from contact with a person, especially with a weapon such as a long
kitchen knife.
Benson argues unpersuasively that
the testimony submitted at trial should be given less weight because Ramillate
was the only witness and he had a contentious relationship with Benson. However, the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction unless it is physically impossible or
inherently improbable. (
1181.) There is no indication
Ramillate’s testimony fits either category.
Further, long-standing precedent dictates that a reviewing court
resolves neither credibility nor evidentiary conflicts, as these issues are for
the trier of fact. (Ibid.)
II. Exclusion of Character
Evidence
Benson next contends the trial court
erred in excluding Gordon’s testimony about Ramillate, resulting in a denial of
due process. We find no error and no due
process violation.
We first note that Benson waived any
federal due process claim because she did argue that exclusion would deny her
v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892; People
v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7.) Moreover, as a general rule, evidentiary
rulings do not create constitutional issues.
(People v. Lawley (2002) 27
Cal.4th 102, 155.)
We do not find any error in
excluding the evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. That section provides a trial court “may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury.†A trial
court is given broad discretion in weighing the probative value of particular
evidence with the concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of
time. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1125.) Here, the trial court was well within its
discretion to find that Gordon’s testimony was less probative than confusing
and time consuming. The trial court
noted:
“[S]he will bring in the
whole politics of this board, the issue of whether or not she was properly
raising the opinions of [Ramillate]. . . .
“I further think that it
would ‑‑ and I should look at 352 ‑‑ but basically it
would extend the trial, and it would confuse the jury. It would require the other side to have a
chance to counteract this, and it would bring up all of these minor
disagreements and tiffs and whatever you want to call them in this little
housing complex to the floor, and it has nothing to do with this caseâ€
In essence, the trial court found
that admission of Gordon’s testimony would result in a minitrial on issues that
were tangential at best. Further, that
the prosecution would have to investigate the issues and find
if the testimony were admitted. These
reasons demonstrate the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, any error in excluding the
evidence was harmless. (
836.) Benson was allowed to bring in
evidence that she made numerous complaints about Ramillate’s work performance
as manager of the complex. She used this
evidence to attempt to persuade the jury that Ramillate had a motive to falsely
accuse her of the assault. We find no
reasonable probability that the evidence of Gordon’s testimony would have
changed the result.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J.
We concur:
RUBIN, J.
FLIER, J.
