P. v. Benedict

 

 

 

 

Filed 8/29/14  P. v. Benedict CA3

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD
APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

 

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,                           Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   KAREN ANN BENEDICT,                           Defendant and Appellant.

C074198   (Super. Ct. No. 12F04318)

            Defendant
Karen Ann Benedict appeals her judgment following the trial court’s denial of
her motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of a warrantless blood draw.  She contends the blood draw was illegal
because it was not obtained incident to an arrest, it was obtained without
probable cause, and there was no exigent circumstance to excuse not obtaining a
warrant.  We reject defendant’s
contentions because (1) the lack of an actual arrest does not render
the warrantless blood draw illegal if there was href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">probable cause to believe defendant was
driving under the influence of alcohol, (2) the record supports the officer’s
probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol
at the time the blood sample was taken, and (3) the totality of the
circumstances supports a finding of exigent circumstance.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2012, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Adam
Gonzalez was dispatched pursuant to a reported “wrong-way driver” and “head-on
collision” on Iron Point in Folsom.  Iron
Point has two lanes in each direction with a 12- to 14-foot-wide center divider
with raised concrete curbs.  When he
arrived on scene, Gonzalez saw two vehicles -- a white Toyota Camry in a
westbound lane facing south and a white Nissan Sentra on the center divider
facing north with its front wheels in a westbound lane.  Both vehicles had sustained major front end
damage. 

The three
individuals from the Toyota Camry were lying on the sidewalk being attended to
by witnesses.  Gonzalez found defendant
in the Nissan Sentra driver’s seat with her head “slumped backwards,” eyes
closed, and “a significant amount of blood around her nose and mouth
area.”  Defendant was initially
unresponsive but she began to “come to” when Gonzalez attempted to obtain
defendant’s pulse after cutting the deployed curtain side air bag.  When she began to respond, Gonzalez climbed
into the seat behind defendant to support her neck and prevent her from moving.  At the time, Gonzalez was unable to note any
objective symptoms of intoxication because the air bag explosive and powders
overpowered any other odor in the car, and Gonzalez was more focused on
preventing and assessing defendant’s injuries than on “check[ing] her
pupils.”  But defendant admitted to
Gonzalez she had been drinking “earlier.” 


Defendant was
removed from the vehicle by other personnel and transported to the
hospital.  Gonzalez coordinated with
officers at the accident scene and followed the ambulances (one each for
defendant and for the driver and passengers of the Toyota Camry) to the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">University of California at Davis Medical Center.  At the hospital, Gonzalez attempted to speak
with defendant, but she was being treated, so he spoke with the victims.  The driver of the Toyota Camry reported he
was driving westbound on Iron Point “when he saw headlights in his lane [and
before] he could react, he was struck by another vehicle.”  The female passenger of the Toyota Camry
confirmed defendant hit them head-on, traveling in the wrong direction. 

Gonzalez spoke
with defendant, who confirmed she had a “glass of wine” and had been heading
home but “couldn’t remember what had happened.” 
Defendant appeared “to be out of it” and “was not fully cognizant,”
either because of the accident or intoxication -- Gonzalez was “not totally
sure.”  Defendant appeared to be
“noticeably impaired,” though Gonzalez was unsure if that was due to the
medication she was receiving, “alcohol, or the accident itself.”  Based on “all of the observations from
multiple phone calls of a wrong way driver,” his “training and experience,”
defendant’s statement she had been “drinking wine earlier in the night and her
actions,” Gonzalez suspected she might have been driving under the influence
and arranged for a nurse to perform a href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">blood draw.  The result of defendant’s blood alcohol
analysis, drawn at 10:48 p.m., was 0.18 percent. 

Defendant was
charged in count one with causing href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">injury to another while
driving in the wrong direction and under the influence of alcohol and a
drug (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (a), 21651, subd. (b)) along with
special allegations of causing great bodily injury to multiple victims (Veh.
Code, § 23558; Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)), and, in count
two, with causing injury to another while driving with a blood alcohol level above
the legal limit and above 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (b),
23578), along with bodily injury special allegations (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). 

Defendant moved
to suppress evidence of her blood analysis on the basis that the warrantless
blood draw was illegal because Gonzalez lacked href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">probable cause and there were not exigent
circumstances.  The trial court found
there was probable cause to arrest defendant “based on the defendant’s
seriously dangerous driving pattern including going the wrong way for a significant
enough period of time that people were calling 911; the fact that she hit
head-on a vehicle going the wrong way, [and] that she admitted that she had
been drinking at the scene and admitted at least to consuming one glass of
wine.”  The court also found an exigency
in that defendant had already been admitted to the hospital and was receiving
medical intervention, “including the introduction of intravenous fluid or other
medical prescriptions” that might have affected the ability to obtain an
accurate analysis of her blood alcohol level. 
Additionally, the court found the officer was acting “in good faith”
based on the law in California at the time of the incident. 
Finally, the court concluded that “the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant would . . . have caused the loss of relevant
evidence.”  Therefore, the trial court
denied defendant’s suppression motion. 

Defendant
ultimately pled no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol and a
drug, admitted one allegation of great bodily injury, and admitted two multiple
victim enhancements.  The court dismissed
count two in the interest of justice and in view of the plea, and sentenced
defendant to serve an aggregate term of 6 years 4 months:  16 months for count one, 3 years for the
great bodily injury enhancement, and 2 one-year multiple victim
enhancements. 

DISCUSSION

Challenges to the
admissibility of evidence obtained by a search or seizure are evaluated under
federal constitutional standards.  (>People v. Schmitz (2012)
55 Cal.4th 909, 916.)  The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to
be secure in his or her person against unreasonable searches and seizures.  (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; >Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1,
8-9 [20 L.Ed.2d 898].)  The central
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all of the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a defendant’s personal
security.  (Terry, supra, at p. 19.) 
A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained as the result of an
unreasonable search or seizure.  (Pen.
Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

In reviewing the
trial court’s denial of a suppression motion, we consider the record in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, if supported by substantial evidence.  (People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) 
Any conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the trial court’s
order.  (People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 529.)  If “ â€˜ â€œthe evidence is uncontradicted,
we do not engage in a substantial evidence review, but face pure questions of
law.”  [Citation.]’ â€  (Ibid.)  We exercise our independent judgment to
determine whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.  (>Tully, supra, at p. 979.)  And we will affirm the trial court’s ruling
if correct on any theory of applicable law, even if for reasons different than
those given by the trial court.  (>People v. Evans (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742; People v.
Hua (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033.)

>A.

>Lack of Arrest

Defendant first
contends her warrantless blood draw was illegal because Schmerber v. California> (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [16 L.Ed.2d 908] (Schmerber)
only applies incident to an arrest and defendant had not been formally arrested
at the time of the blood draw.  We
disagree.

California courts
have routinely applied Schmerber, supra,
834 U.S. 747 to permit a warrantless compulsory blood draw where “the
procedure (1) is done in a reasonable medically approved manner,[href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]] (2) is incident to a lawful
arrest, and (3) is based upon reasonable belief the arrestee is
intoxicated.  [Citations.]”  (People v.
Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36.)

Two California
appellate court cases, People v.
Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430 (Trotman)
and People v. Deltoro (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 1417 (Deltoro),
have found that a blood sample may be obtained from a driver even in the
absence of an actual arrest.  (Accord, >United States v. Chapel (9th Cir.
1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419.)  >Trotman further holds that “[t]he
rationale of both Schmerber and >Cupp makes it clear that probable cause
to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for
the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.”  (Trotman,
supra, at pp. 437-438.)  Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition
to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exists to
believe that the defendant was driving under the influence and that an analysis
of the sample will yield evidence of that crime.”  (Id. at
pp. 436-437.) 

Therefore, the
lack of an actual arrest does not render the warrantless blood draw illegal if
there was probable cause to believe defendant was driving under the influence
of alcohol. 

>B.

>Probable Cause

Here, there was
probable cause to support the warrantless blood draw of defendant.  The record shows Gonzalez was aware multiple
calls had been placed to 911 reporting a driver traveling in the wrong
direction on Iron Point, defendant had collided head-on with the victims while
travelling in the wrong direction on Iron Point, defendant repeatedly admitted
to drinking, and defendant appeared to be significantly impaired.  We conclude substantial evidence supported
the trial court’s finding Gonzalez had probable cause to arrest defendant for
driving under the influence of alcohol at the time the blood sample was taken.

>C.

>Exigent Circumstances

Defendant further
contends Trotman, >supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 430 and >Deltoro, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1417
should not be followed because their analyses depend in part on >Cupp v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S.
291 [36 L.Ed.2d 900] (Cupp), which
holds that ready destruction of evidence, i.e., particle evidence under
fingernails, is an exigent circumstance excusing the warrant requirement even
in the absence of a formal arrest.  >Trotman relies on both >Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. 757> and Cupp,
supra, 412 U.S. 291 for the proposition that “it is the evanescent nature
of the evidence sought . . . that constitutionally justifies the
warrantless, nonconsensual seizure of a blood sample from a defendant suspected
of committing an alcohol-related offense.” 
(Trotman, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 437.) 

Defendant argues
Missouri v. McNeely (2013) __ U.S. __ [133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d
696] (McNeely) distinguished the
“easily disposable” blood and particle evidence under a defendant’s fingernails
in Cupp, supra, 412 U.S. 291> and blood alcohol content, which
“naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively predictable
manner,” and this distinction erodes the precedential viability of >Trotman supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 430
and Deltoro, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d
1417.  (McNeely, supra, at p. 1561.) 
McNeely held that the natural
metabolic elimination of alcohol from the body does not per se constitute
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw.  (Id. at
p. 1568.)  Rather, whether a
warrantless blood draw is reasonable depends on the totality of the
circumstances.  (Id. at p. 1565-1566.)  >McNeely does not address> whether a warrantless search is illegal
in the absence of a formal arrest.  (>Ibid.) 
Therefore, the holdings of Trotman,
supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 430> and Deltoro,
supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, at least for the reasons they are cited
here, remain good law. 

Additionally,
even if McNeely, supra,
133 S.Ct. 1552 did have some
import to the present case, it still would not render the denial of the
suppression motion erroneous because the “totality of circumstances” justify
defendant’s warrantless blood draw. 
Here, the officer who ordered the warrantless blood draw was aware of
defendant’s repeated admissions, the multiple calls of a wrong-way driver,
defendant’s head-on collision while driving the wrong direction, the delay in
assessing defendant’s blood alcohol due to the medical attention defendant and
victims were receiving, and the fact defendant had begun receiving intravenous
fluids and medications as part of her medical treatment.  Thus, the totality of circumstances justified
defendant’s warrantless blood draw.

Even if the
warrantless blood draw was not justified, the denial of the suppression motion
was still not erroneous.  Binding
appellate precedent, Trotman, >supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 430> and Deltoro,
supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1417 specifically authorized Gonzalez’s actions
here because the totality of circumstances gave the officer probable cause to
conduct the blood draw.  Defendant
identifies no California case that suggests her warrantless nonconsensual blood draw was not
permissible based on the law prior to McNeely,
supra, 185 L.Ed. 2d 696.  California courts
have regularly employed the “totality of circumstances” analysis to allow
warrantless blood draws, even before McNeely,
because it engaged in this analysis to determine whether probable cause
exists.  Thus, despite any change in the law
McNeely may have effected, the police
acted reasonably based on existing law at the time of the blood draw because,
as shown above, there was probable cause to believe defendant was driving under
the influence of alcohol.  (See >Davis> v. >United States (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 180 L.Ed.2d 285].)  Because Gonzalez acted reasonably, no
“appreciable deterrence” would result from the application of the exclusionary
rule in this case and the evidence related to the blood draw need not be suppressed.  (Id.
at pp. 2426-2427.)  Consequently,
the police conduct here, contrary to defendant’s assertion otherwise, fell
within the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.  (See United
States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2d 677].)

DISPOSITION

            The
judgment is affirmed.

 

 

 

                                                                                              HOCH          , J.

 

 

 

We concur:

 

 

 

        BLEASE        , Acting P. J.

 

 

 

          HULL          , J.