P. v. Barraza









Filed 11/15/10 P. v. Barraza CA2/5






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GILDARDO BARRAZA, Defendant and Appellant.

B221793 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA087185)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charles Horan, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Shira B. Seigle, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.



INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Gildardo Barraza (defendant) pleaded no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant also requests that we review the sealed transcripts of an in camera hearing regarding a privilege claim asserted by the Pomona City Police Department to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in upholding the privilege claim. We affirm the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and its decision upholding the privilege claim.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant with possession for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code, section 11378, and transportation of a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code, section 11379, subdivision (a). The District Attorney also alleged that defendant had a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code, sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i),[1] had served two prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had a drug-related conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code, section 11370.2, subdivision (c). Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, contending the search was improper. The trial court heard and denied the motion. During the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the trial court held an in camera hearing regarding the arresting officer's assertion that certain information was privileged under Evidence Code sections 1040 and 1041. The trial court ruled that the information was privileged.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admitted all of the allegations regarding his prior convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison. The trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his admissions to the prior prison term allegations and the prior drug-related conviction, and ordered them stricken. The charge for transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd (a)) was dismissed.

DISCUSSION

I. The Motion to Suppress
Defendant contends the scope of the arresting officer's search of the car exceeded the scope of defendant's consent to search. We hold that the scope of the search was objectively reasonable.

A. Standard of Review
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