P. v. Baca

















Filed 6/29/12
P. v. Baca CA4/3











NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS







California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.











IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
THREE




>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CAMERON JOSEPH BACA, Defendant and Appellant.

G044535 (Super. Ct. No. 08HF2452) O P I N I O N

Appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, David A. Thompson, Judge.
Affirmed.

Allen
G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and Lynne
G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

A jury convicted Cameron Joseph Baca of eight counts of
committing lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted), one
count of attempting to commit a lewd act (§§ 288, subd. (a); 664),
three counts of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)),
and possession of child pornography
(§ 311.11, subd. (a)). Baca
contends insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction for an
attempted lewd act (count 14), the trial court should have stayed punishment
(§ 654) for two counts of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (counts 9
and 10), and his aggregate sentence of 51 years and four months to life in
prison constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the federal and state Constitutions. For the reasons expressed below, we
affirm.

I

Factual and Procedural History

In 2004, Peter P. and his
wife, Margaret, lived in San Juan Capistrano with their three children, Kyle,
Grant, and Peter, Jr. Peter met Baca at a youth football game
Baca was refereeing. Baca approached
Peter and his youngest son, Peter, Jr., at the game and surprised Peter by
stating, “This must be Grant’s brother.”
Baca explained he remembered Grant from a prior youth basketball
program.
Peter later invited Baca to watch a college football game at Peter’s
house.

Baca became a close
family friend. Peter, a certified public
accountant, owned his own company. He offered Baca employment in 2005 and
Baca worked at Peter’s firm for just over two years. Baca also worked as an
assistant basketball coach with Peter, and coached Peter’s sons in flag
football. Baca sometimes drove Peter’s sons to
practices. He often showed up at Peter’s
home uninvited.

Baca began spending more time alone with Grant. When Margaret and Peter
refused to let Baca babysit the children while they took a vacation, Baca
became upset. Peter’s niece watched the
children, and Baca called her complaining, “I should be doing this.”

In July 2007, the P.’s
terminated their relationship with Baca, concluding it had become
“unhealthy.” Margaret asked her sons if
Baca ever acted inappropriately towards them, but they denied it.>

Grant’s behavior became erratic.
In December 2008, he disclosed to his parents “something terrible” had
happened, and said Baca had touched him.
The following day, the P.’s informed the police.

Grant, 15 years old at
the time of trial, testified Baca took
him to trading card shops and bought him cards.
Grant visited Baca’s San Clemente apartment and helped cook the
food. During these visits, Baca showed
Grant pornographic videos. They also
watched regular television shows, including the Simpsons.

No sexual contact occurred the
first time Baca showed Grant pornography.
Later, Baca touched Grant’s penis over his clothes. More than once, he touched
Grant’s penis with his hand. On five to
six occasions, Baca orally copulated Grant. He also asked Grant to orally copulate
him, but Grant refused. Baca tried to
get Grant to comply by telling the boy, “Don’t be immature” and “I’m just
trying to make you feel better.” On one
occasion, Baca told Grant he wanted to try something new, but Grant
declined. Nevertheless, Baca inserted
his finger into Grant’s rear end. Before this incident occurred, Grant and
Baca watched pornographic videos, and Baca told him not to tell anyone or he
could get into a lot of trouble.

The last incident
occurred at Baca’s mother’s home. Grant
told Baca he “[didn’t] want to do this anymore.” Baca orally copulated Grant that day and then
drove him home.

After informing the police, an investigator asked Grant to make a
recorded phone call. During the first
call, Grant asked Baca why he touched him, stating it made him feel
uncomfortable. Baca responded, “I’m
sorry.”
During a second call, Baca expressed concern someone might be
listening to their conversation. He told
Grant if anyone found out, he would go to jail forever. Grant asked Baca if “that [was his] finger .
. . you put in my butt.” Baca stated he wanted to discuss it in
person, and again expressed concern someone might be listening to their
conversation. He apologized to Grant,
stating he “screwed up,” and wanted to “kill” himself for what happened.

Gerald and Karin G. met
Baca around 2006. Baca and Gerald coached youth sports
together. Over time, Baca began spending more time
with the G.’s two children, 12-year-old Garrett and his younger brother
Griffin. (The G.’s considered Baca’s behavior odd.

On one occasion, Baca asked Garrett to assist him with a catering
job.
Garrett enjoyed cooking and visited Baca’s apartment to help cook
their food. The first time he visited,
they watched the Simpsons. On the second visit, Baca showed Garrett
pornographic videos. One video depicted two children around
Garrett’s age. Baca told Garrett, “if you ever want to
show me your penis, it’s okay.” He asked Garrett personal questions and
informed Garrett he could grab a condom from his bathroom at anytime. Baca sat uncomfortably close to Garrett on
the couch. Garrett scooted away and Baca
told him to “stop being so immature.”
Baca stated he gave really good massages and wanted to give Garrett
one. Garrett responded, “no, it’s all
right.” Baca said “don’t be so
immature,” and Garrett put his face on a pillow. The massage began at
Garrett’s back and proceeded lower until Baca touched Garrett’s bottom, which he rubbed for approximately 30
seconds.
Baca told Garrett not to tell anyone or he could get in a lot of
trouble.
After the massage, Baca and Garrett watched pornography, and Baca
asked Garrett if he liked it. He never touched Garrett’s skin,> or attempted to touch his penis.>

On another occasion, Baca showed Garrett a movie entitled “Kids,”
which depicted an 18-year-old boy and a 13-year-old girl involved in sexual
activities. On another visit, Baca showed Garrett pornography from his laptop computer at
Garrett’s home. Baca asked Garrett to crack his back in
the presence of Garrett’s friends Luke and Matt, and Griffin. After Garrett’s friends left, Baca and
Garrett watched pornography. Baca whispered to Garrett he had to come
to Baca’s place if he wanted to see more.

Baca hugged Garrett frequently, and teammates teased Garrett, asking
whether it made him feel uncomfortable. Garrett’s father confronted Baca and told
him never to hug his child again. After this conversation, Baca visited
Garrett’s house less often, but continued to hug Garrett out of sight of his
parents.
One time Garrett told Baca he did not want to hug him.> Baca
responded, “stop being so immature and give me a hug.” Baca took Garrett and his
friends to sports card shops. He gave
Garrett between 1,000 and 2,000 sports trading cards, including a Brett Favre
rookie card.

Baca also coached 11-year-old Tanner L. in flag football. Baca befriended Tanner’s family and came over
to watch football games. He and Tanner
watched television, threw a football, and played video games. At some point, Baca began visiting without an
invitation. Baca became upset when
Tanner’s father told Baca he could not spend time with Tanner.>

On one occasion, Baca received permission from Tanner’s mother to
drive Tanner to a sports card shop after telling her falsely another boy would
be coming. On the drive home, Tanner
rested his hand on the passenger seat. Baca placed his hand on top of Tanner’s.> Tanner
moved his hand away and Baca responded “stop being immature,” and “you can
still put your hand there. I just like
putting my hand there when I drive.” Tanner responded, “that’s okay,” and kept
his hand in his lap. Baca asked Tanner if his parents talked
with him about sex yet, and said something like “what we talk about in the car
stays in the car.” Tanner notified his mother what happened
when he arrived home.

Baca testified and admitted he orally copulated Grant several times
and touched the boy’s penis. He also
showed him pornography. He claimed he
experienced no sexual arousal from these interactions. He loved Grant’s family and
knew his actions were wrong and illegal.
Baca considered himself bisexual and realized at the age of 12 or 13 he
liked boys. Baca also admitted he hugged
Garrett several times and massaged him when he complained of soreness from
playing lacrosse. He touched Garrett’s bottom during a
massage.
He once pulled Garrett into a bathroom because of disrespectful
behavior at a supermarket. After the
conversation ended, Baca offered to
hug him, but Garrett declined because he did not “like them anymore.”

Baca did not recall conversing with Tanner about sex. He testified a tear in the passenger seat of
his car resulted from him pushing his hand down there for many years. According to Baca, the statement “what we
talk about in the car stays in the car” occurred toward the end of the drive
and was not made in conjunction with touching Tanner’s hand.>

Investigators found thousands of photographs of children being
raped, sodomized, and orally copulated by men on Baca’s computer. A forensic examiner recovered more than 500
videos depicting adults raping and sodomizing children, as well as 40 short
stories about male sexual fantasies with
young boys.

The jury found Baca guilty as charged, and found true special
allegations of substantial sexual conduct and multiple victims. The trial court sentenced Baca to three
consecutive terms of 15 years to life for committing lewd acts on a child under
14 years of age (counts 1, 2, and 10). The court imposed concurrent terms of 15
years to life for convictions on the seven other lewd acts alleged (counts 3
through 9). On the two remaining lewd
act convictions, the court imposed a determinate term of six years and four
months (count 14) and an eight month
sentence (count 15) served consecutively with the sentences previously imposed.> The
aggregate term was 51 years and four months to life. Baca received credit for 792 days in custody
(690 actual days and 102 days conduct credits) and the court ordered him to pay
various costs, make restitution, and provide fingerprints and DNA samples per
section 296.

II

Discussion



A. Substantial
Evidence Supports Baca’s Conviction for Attempted Lewd Acts Charged in Count 14

Baca challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
conviction for attempted commission of a lewd act against Tanner (count
14). He argues no evidence showed he intended
to obtain immediate sexual gratification when he attempted to hold Tanner’s
hand while driving. Substantial
evidence, however, supports the jury’s contrary conclusion.

We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment
below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence, defined as
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37
Cal.4th 453, 466; People
v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576–578; Jackson
v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) The test is whether substantial evidence
supports the verdict, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. (People v. Crittenden (1994)
9 Cal.4th 83, 139.) Thus, the court must
affirm the judgment below unless “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d
745, 755.) It is the jury’s exclusive
province to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and weigh the evidence. (People
v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.) The fact that circumstances can be reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d
919, 932–933.) Accordingly, a defendant
“bears an enormous burden” when challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence. (Sanchez, at p.
330.)

Section 288, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “[A]ny person who willfully and lewdly
commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or
member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
that person or the child, is guilty of a felony . . . .” The statute is violated by touching >any part of a child’s body with the
intent to arouse sexual desires of either the child or the perpetrator. (People
v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442; People
v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 907 [touching of a sexual organ not required].) The touching must be for the “present and
immediate purpose” of sexual gratification.
(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1161, 1171.) An attempt to
commit a crime requires a specific intent to commit it and a direct but
ineffectual act done towards its commission that is beyond mere
preparation. (See People v. Imler (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181 [sufficient
evidence of attempted lewd act where the defendant phoned minor and told him to
disrobe and touch himself].) To
determine sexual intent, the court considers the manner of touching and
surrounding circumstances. (>People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 445.)
Relevant factors include the defendant’s statements, other acts charged
or admitted in the case, the parties’ relationship, and any coercion, bribery,
or deceit used by the defendant to obtain the victim’s cooperation. (Ibid.)

Baca insinuated himself into Tanner’s family to gain access to the
boy. On the date of the charged
incident, he lied to Tanner’s mother to drive with Tanner alone to a sports
card store. En route home from the
store, Baca asked Tanner if he knew how babies were made. He put his hand on top of Tanner’s hand. Tanner yanked his hand away and Baca
responded he “forgot” to tell Tanner where his “hand goes. You can put yours on top of mine, but that’s
where my hand belongs.” He also told
Tanner, “What is said in this car stays in this car” and warned “don’t tell
your parents.”

Baca admits he touched Tanner’s hand in the car but contends the
“prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Baca] attempted to
commit a lewd act by having the requisite present intent to receive or give
immediate sexual gratification.” We
disagree.

The issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conviction,
not whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as Baca
contends. Baca views the act of touching
Tanner’s hand as, at most, an overture toward future acts. But an overt act beyond mere preparation may
appear as “innocent behavior.” (>People v. Reed (1996) 53 Cal.App.4th
389, 398, quoting People v. Dillon
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455) Given Baca’s
proclivity to take advantage of every opportunity to hug and touch young boys,
his deceit in arranging circumstances so he would be alone with Tanner, and the
evidence he would immediately take advantage of his young victims if they did
not adamantly reject his advances, the jury reasonably could conclude Baca’s
actions went beyond mere preparation.

Indeed, the crime of committing a lewd act on a minor may be based
on conduct having “‘the outward
appearance of innocence.’” (>Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 444, original italics.) The controlling factor is the defendant’s
intent when touching the minor, not the type of touching. (Ibid.) “[A]ny touching” of any part of the victim’s
body is sufficient if done with the required intent to sexually arouse the
defendant or the child. (>Id. at pp. 442, 444.)

Because there was substantial evidence to show Baca committed a lewd
act, he cannot complain because the jury chose to find him guilty of the lesser
offense of attempt. (See People v.
Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
785, 796 [substantial evidence of grand theft; the defendant cannot complain
the jury chose to find him guilty of attempted grand theft]; >People v. Lowen (1895) 109 Cal. 381, 384
[attempted burglary].)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Section 654 By Imposing Consecutive
Sentences on Counts 9 and 11

The jury convicted Baca of four counts of exhibiting harmful matter
to a minor. (§ 288.2, subd. (a).)href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Baca challenges the sentences concerning two
of the counts. Count 9 alleged Baca
showed Grant harmful matter “on or about and between January 1, 2006 and July
4, 2007.” As recounted above, Grant
testified Baca played pornographic videos on several occasions when Baca
molested him. Count 11 alleged Baca
showed Garrett harmful material in Baca’s apartment “on or about and between
December 1, 2007 and December 18, 2008,” which the parties agree involved the
same incident described in count 10, when Baca touched Garrett’s bottom during
a massage in Baca’s apartment. Garrett
testified Baca played the video before and after he gave Garrett the massage.

Although Baca committed two “acts” on each occasion (showing harmful
matter and lewd touching), he nevertheless argues “there was a course of
conduct which violated more than one statute” constituting “an indivisible
transaction” triggering section 654 and precluding the court from sentencing
him on the lesser charge of exhibiting harmful matter. He argues the crimes were incidental to a
single intent and objective “to engage in the lewd acts which occurred close in
time to the exhibiting of the harmful material.”

Section 654 provides in relevant part, “An act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the
provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in
no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” Section 654 “‘“precludes multiple punishment
for a single act or . . . course of conduct comprising indivisible acts. ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is
divisible . . . depends on the intent and objective of the actor.’ [Citations.]
‘[I]f all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means
of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have
harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]
However, if the defendant harbored ‘multiple or simultaneous objectives,
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be
punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though
the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible
course of conduct. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)

In People v. Powell (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 1268, the jury convicted the defendant of unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)) and
exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed separate punishment
for each conviction. The appellate court
upheld the trial court’s implicit finding the defendant harbored separate
intents. “Defendant played the movies in
an unavailing effort to arouse the victim sexually, an act and an intent
punishable under section 288.2, subdivision (a). Conversely, defendant raped the victim to
gratify himself, an act and an intent punishable under section 288.7,
subdivision (a). As the People comment, ‘[defendant] intended
to arouse [the victim], but also intended to have sex with her regardless of
whether she actually became aroused.
Therefore, the two crimes had separate objectives because they were
intended to arouse different people; and [defendant] had multiple intents,
i.e., to arouse [the victim] for sex and to have sex with [the victim] even if
she were not aroused.’” (>Powell at p. 1296, fn. omitted; see
People v. Hairston (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 231.)

The reasoning applies here.
Before committing his lewd acts, Baca showed the boys pornographic
videos and asked his victims if they liked them. The trial court could have found that Baca
exhibited the videos to groom the boys for sexual activity. Here, however, the court implicitly found
Baca intended to molest the boys for his own gratification regardless of
whether the boys became interested or aroused.
Thus, the court concluded Baca harbored multiple criminal intents, the
intent to seduce and the intent to gratify himself. Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings Baca possessed independent objectives when he showed Grant and
Garrett pornographic videos and molested them on the same occasions. Baca’s contention therefore fails.

C. Baca’s
Sentence of 51 Years to Life Does Not Constitute Cruel and/or Unusual
Punishment

Finally, Baca contends his aggregate sentence of 51 years and four
months to life in prison constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment. The trial court imposed consecutive
15-year-to-life terms under section 667.61 for the lewd act convictions charged
in counts 1 (Grant), 2 (Grant), and 10 (Garrett).href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] The court also imposed a consecutive
three-year term for the attempted lewd act conviction (count 14; Tanner), four
consecutive eight-month terms for four counts of exhibiting harmful matter
(counts 9, 11, 12 and 13), and a consecutive eight-month term for possession of
child pornography (count 15).

The court imposed consecutive sentences because the crimes and their
objectives were predominantly independent of each other (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.425(a)(1))href="#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3], the
crimes were committed at different times and places (rule 4.425(a)(3)),
and the crimes were committed against separate victims. The court also found the crimes involved a
high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness because they occurred over
a significant period of time and Baca had a reasonable opportunity to reflect
on his actions (rule 4.421(a)(3)), the victims were particularly
vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(8)), the crimes involved planning and
sophistication (rule 4.421(a)(11)), Baca took advantage of a position of
trust (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and his conduct indicated a serious danger to
society. The aggregate term was 51 years
and four months to life in prison.

Baca was 29 years old at the time of sentencing and had no prior
record. He notes he will not be eligible
for parole for over 51 years, and contends his sentence is effectively a life
sentence without the possibility of parole.
He argues the sentence “shock[s] the conscience” and is “grossly
disproportionate to his crime[s]” as “reviewed against the backdrop of [his]
prior criminality and relative level of culpability compared to other sex
offenders who receive multiple life sentences.”
We disagree.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution “contains a
‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citations.]” (Ewing v. California
(2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [sentence of 25 years to life for commercial burglary
under California’s “Three Strikes” law was not grossly disproportionate to the
offense].) “A punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment if it involves the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’
or if it is ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230) The United States Supreme Court noted this
principle is “applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’
case. [Citations.]” (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S.
63, 73; Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [life without
parole sentence for possessing 672 grams of cocaine not cruel and unusual]); >People v. Meneses (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
1087, 1092; cf. Solem v. Helm (1983)
463 U.S. 277, 296-297 [sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for uttering a no account check for $100 constituted cruel and unusual
punishment]; People v. Carmony (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1079 [sentence of 25 years to life under California’s
Three Strikes law for failing to register as a sex offender cruel or unusual].)

California’s constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual punishment is found in article
I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
The test under the state Constitution is whether the punishment is “so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410,
424.) The defendant must demonstrate the
punishment is disproportionate in light of (1) the offense and defendant’s
background, (2) more serious offenses, or (3) similar offenses in other
jurisdictions. (Id. at pp.
429-437.)href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] The defendant must overcome a “considerable
burden” to show the sentence is disproportionate to her level of
culpability. (People v. Wingo
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174.) As a result,
“[f]indings of disproportionality have occurred with exquisite rarity in the
case law.” (People v. Weddle
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196.)

name="sp_999_9">Baca’s offenses are not merely passive felonies such as failing to
register as a sex offender or uttering a “no account” check. Rather, he committed 15 criminal offenses,
including multiple lewd acts on children under the age of 14, exhibiting
harmful matter to minors, and possession of child pornography. His offenses spanned several years and
involved multiple victims. Baca, as the
minor victims’ sports coach and family friend, took advantage of the trust
these boys placed in him.

The Legislature designed Section 667.61 to ensure serious sex
offenders receive long prison sentences, even those without a prior href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">criminal record. (People v. Palmore (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1296) The Legislature’s sentencing scheme is
designed not only to deter, but to incapacitate those defendants likely to
reoffend. (See >People v. Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
178, 187.) Pedophiles have a high
recidivism rate and lack amenability to rehabilitation. (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d
984, 994-996 [“A pedophile or fixated offender” is “defined as a man (there are
virtually no female pedophiles) who throughout life is sexually attracted
exclusively to children, usually boys, within a particular age range”]; People
v. Groomes (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 84, 89.)


Moreover, child abuse can have a severe and long lasting effect on a
child. (Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407, 435 [“the victim’s
fright, the sense of betrayal, and the nature of her injuries caused more
prolonged physical and mental suffering than, say, a sudden killing by an
unseen assassin”; “attack was not just on her but on her childhood”; rape “has
a permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes physical impact on the name="SR;11368">child”;
“[w]e cannot dismiss the years of long anguish that must be endured by the
victim of child
rape.”].) Convictions for multiple
sexual offenses exceeding a defendant’s expected lifetime have repeatedly
passed constitutional muster. (See,
e.g., People v. Wallace (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 651, 666 [283-year
sentence for 46 sex crimes against seven victims]; People v. Bestelmeyer
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 532 [129 years for 25 sex crimes against one
victim].)

Here, the record reflects Baca poses a continuing danger to other
young boys. On a test to measure the
risk of recidivism, Baca placed in the “Medium-High Risk Category” for
committing another sexual offense. name=FN6>Baca’s molestations also negatively impacted his
victims. Grant’s mother noted the boy’s
“childhood and innocence was stripped away. . . . He has been filled with fear, unmerited guilt
and anger. . . .” Tanner’s mother
acknowledged her son “has been tainted, especially with regard to his trust of
authority figures.”

Based on the foregoing, we conclude defendant’s sentence does not
constitute cruel
or unusual
punishment under either the United States or California Constitutions.

III

Disposition



The
judgment is affirmed.









ARONSON,
J.





WE CONCUR:







BEDSWORTH, ACTING
P.J.







MOORE, J.