P. v. Arteaga

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 8/26/13  P. v. Arteaga CA6

 

 

 

 

 

>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

> 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SIXTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,   Plaintiff and Respondent,   v.   LORENZO ARTEAGA,   Defendant and Appellant.

H038236      (Santa Clara County       Super. Ct. No. CC815385)

 

            Defendant
Lorenzo Arteaga appeals from an order finding him incompetent to stand trial
and committing him to the Department of
Mental Health pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(2).href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]  On appeal, defendant contends the trial court
erred by refusing to hold a hearing on his Marsden
motion.  (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).)  We will reverse
the commitment order and remand for a Marsden
hearing.

Background

            On August 19, 2008, the District
Attorney filed a complaint alleging that defendant failed to register as a sex
offender (§ 290.015, subd. (a)) and had 11 prior convictions that qualified as
strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).

            Defendant
was committed to Atascadero State
Hospital (Atascadero)
on June 10, 2009 after
being found incompetent to stand trial.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]  (See § 1370.) 
On February 14, 2011,
the medical director of Atascadero filed a report
certifying that defendant’s competency had been restored.  (See § 1372.)

            Criminal
proceedings were reinstated on March
21, 2011.  Defendant was
granted the right to represent himself on March 23, 2011. 
(See Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806.)  Defendant continued to
represent himself over the next several months.

            On December 9, 2011, the trial court
declared a doubt as to defendant’s competency to stand trial and suspended
criminal proceedings.  (See § 1368.)  On December
14, 2011, the trial court revoked defendant’s pro per status and
appointed the Public Defender’s Office to represent him.  After the appointment, Deputy
Public Defender Mallory Street noted that
defendant objected “to a doubt being declared,” and she requested that two
doctors be appointed to evaluate defendant. 
The trial court appointed Brent Hughey, Ph.D. for one of the
evaluations.

            Dr. Hughey
filed his report on January 10, 2012.  He had evaluated defendant for one hour, 30
minutes.  Defendant initially made a
“considerable effort to present himself in a favorable and ‘normal’
manner.”  However, his “mental health
symptomatology” began to show; it included “increasing pressured speech,
considerable rambling and tangential train of thought with frequent references
to various legal matters or letters, . . . regardless of the topic or specific
question being posed.”  Towards the end
of the evaluation, defendant “began exhibiting paranoid delusional beliefs.”

            Dr. Hughey
concluded that defendant had a “significantly impaired ability to rationally
cooperate with counsel as a result of a decompensated mental state as a result
of schizophrenia of the paranoid type.” 
Dr. Hughey recommended that he be restarted on psychotropic medications,
which defendant had stopped taking after his release from Atascadero.

            On January 11, 2012, defendant filed a
written Marsden motion.  In the motion, he checked boxes listing a
number of general grounds for the motion, such as trial counsel’s failure to
confer with him, failure to perform investigation, and failure to file motions
on his behalf.  He asserted that
“[attorney] Mallory Street, P.D. and the entire [Santa Clara County] Public
Defender’s office has a serious and sustained conflict of interest in this
case” and that there was an “on-going conspiracy” to delay the criminal
proceedings and destroy evidence of his innocence.  He indicated that he was represented by
attorney Lori Silva Stuart in habeas proceedings, but that she was on maternity
leave and “unavailable.”

            At a
hearing on January 11, 2012,
defendant was represented by Deputy Public Defender Jennifer Bedolla.  Defendant stated, “There’s a >Marsden pending current.”  The trial court responded, “Yes.  I understand that, but I also have a
competing doctor’s report from Dr. Hughey. 
And based on that report, I am going to decline to entertain any kind of
Marsden motion because proceedings
are suspended, and I am prepared to follow the recommendation of Dr.
Hughey.”  Defendant pointed out that two
doctors had been appointed, and attorney Bedolla made a formal request for a
second evaluation.  The trial court then
appointed Steven Barron, Ph.D. for a second evaluation.

            Dr. Barron
issued a report on February 7, 2012.  His
report was based on “a review of available records” because defendant had
declined to participate in an evaluation. 
The report reflected that defendant had been delusional upon his
admission to Atascadero but that his condition improved with medication, which
he was currently refusing to take.  Dr.
Barron concluded that defendant was “presently unable to understand the nature
of the criminal proceedings and assist
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner,” and that involuntary
psychiatric medications should be administered.

            At a
hearing on February 8, 2012, defendant was still represented by attorney
Bedolla, but a different judge presided. 
Defendant referred to his “pending Marsden
motion” and indicated that it pertained to attorney Stuart.  Defendant also asserted that there was “no
problem” with his competency.  Attorney
Bedolla informed the court that defendant was “in disagreement” with Dr.
Barron’s finding and requested that defendant be given another opportunity to
participate in an interview with Dr. Barron. 
The trial court agreed to re-refer the matter to Dr. Barron.  The court did not make any comments about the
Marsden motion.

            Dr. Barron
issued a second report on February 27, 2012. 
He had attempted to evaluate defendant again, but defendant had again
declined to participate.  Dr. Barron
again concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.

            At a
hearing on April 2, 2012, defendant was represented by Deputy Public Defender
Mairead O’Keefe.  The parties submitted
the competency determination on the doctors’ reports, and the trial court found
that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. 
By order filed on April 19, 2012, defendant was committed to the Department
of Mental Health for a maximum of three years.

Discussion

            Defendant
contends the trial court erred by refusing to hold a hearing on his >Marsden motion.

            “When a
defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is
providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden
motion [citation]—the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the
basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate
performance.  A defendant is entitled to
relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing
adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in
such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.”  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.)

            A trial
court must conduct a Marsden hearing even when the defendant’s
complaints about counsel arise during competency proceedings.  (See People v. Solorzano (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069-1070 (Solorzano); accord, People v. Taylor
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 600-601 (Taylor)
[trial court erred when it “brushed aside” defendant’s requests for
substitution of counsel in the belief that the question of defendant’s
competence had to be resolved first]; People
v. Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57, 61 (Govea).)  Thus, in this case, even though the criminal
proceedings were suspended, the trial court should have addressed defendant’s >Marsden motion.

            However, “Marsden
does not establish a rule of per se reversible error.  [Citation.]” 
(People v. Washington (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 940, 944.)  Reversal is
not required if the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing.  (See >People v. Reed (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1148 (Reed); see also >Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126; >Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 601; >Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p.
1071.)

            The trial
court’s failure to hold a Marsden
hearing was prejudicial in Solorzano,
where the defendant indicated he wanted a new attorney on the day of his
competency hearing.  The defendant
complained that his attorney had not obtained certain records that would
establish his incompetency.  (Solorzano,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.) 
The trial court refused to hold a Marsden
hearing, and it found the defendant competent to stand trial.  The defendant was then convicted and
sentenced to state prison.  (Id.
at p. 1068.)  On appeal, the >Solorzano court explained that it could
not determine whether the outcome of the competency proceeding might have been
different had the defendant been given an opportunity to explain the basis for
his claims about counsel.  (>Id. at p. 1071.)  Since “[a]
criminal trial of a defendant incompetent to stand trial violates due process,”
and it was possible that the competency trial could have had a different result
if the trial court had heard and granted the defendant’s Marsden motion, the error was not harmless.  (Ibid.)

            Failure to
hold a Marsden hearing was held to be
harmless in both Govea and >Taylor. 
In Govea, the defendant’s
attorney declared a doubt as to his competency. 
While criminal proceedings were suspended, the defendant requested a >Marsden hearing, but the trial court
refused to conduct such a hearing.  (>Govea, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 60.)  After finding the defendant
competent to stand trial, the trial court heard and denied the >Marsden motion, but it ultimately
appointed another attorney to represent the defendant at trial.  (Id.
at p. 61.)  The appellate court held that
while the trial court “should have conducted a Marsden hearing, notwithstanding the pending issue regarding
defendant’s competency,” the error did not require reversal.  (Ibid.)  The error was harmless because the defendant
eventually got a Marsden hearing, was
found competent, and obtained a new attorney: 
“the trial court gave defendant everything he sought.”  (Id.
at p. 62.)

            In >Taylor, the California Supreme Court
followed Govea and found the failure
to hold a Marsden hearing was harmless.  There, the defendant requested another
attorney after counsel declared a doubt as to his competency.  The trial court initially refused to hold a >Marsden hearing “ ‘[b]ecause of the
mental competence problem,’ ” but it ultimately held two Marsden hearings – one before finding defendant competent to stand
trial, and one afterwards – and it granted the defendant’s request for a new
attorney before the criminal trial began. 
(Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 597.)  Since, as in >Govea, “the ‘trial court gave defendant
everything he sought,’ â€ the error was harmless.  (Id.
at p. 601.)

            In this
case, defendant filed a Marsden motion
while criminal proceedings were suspended and requested a Marsden hearing twice during the competency proceedings.  The trial court did not hold a >Marsden hearing before determining
defendant’s competency.  Unlike in >Govea and Taylor, the trial court here found defendant incompetent, against
his wishes.  Although defendant was
represented by different attorneys from the Public Defender’s Office,
defendant’s motion had alleged that the “entire [Santa Clara County] Public
Defender’s office” had a conflict, and attorney O’Keefe submitted the
competency determination on the psychologists’ evaluations.  On this record, we cannot say that
defendant got “everything he sought”  (>Govea, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 62)
and thus we cannot say that the trial court’s failure to hold a >Marsden hearing was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  (See >Reed, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148;
Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126; >Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 601; >Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p.
1071.)

Disposition

            The April
19, 2012 order committing defendant to the Department of Mental Health is
reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to
conduct a Marsden hearing.  If the
court grants the Marsden motion,
substitute counsel shall be appointed, and a new trial shall be held on the
issue of defendant’s competency.  If the
court denies the Marsden motion, it
shall reinstate the order of commitment.

 

 

                                                            ___________________________________________

                                                            Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

__________________________

ELIA,
ACTING P.J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________________

Márquez, J.