P. v. Alexis C.
Filed 1/15/13 P.
v. Alexis C. CA4/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALEXIS C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D061747
(Super. Ct. No. J221581)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
Alexis
C. (Minor) was charged by an amended petition filed in the juvenile court with
one count of forcible rape in concert
(Pen. Code,
title="">[1] §§ 261, subd. (a)(2)
& 264.1) and one count of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) with the
allegation that each crime was committed to benefit a
subd. (b)). The juvenile court made a
true finding on both counts and found the enhancements to be true. The Minor was committed to the California
Division of Juvenile Justice for a maximum commitment period of 12 years.
The
Minor appeals contending the court erred in permitting the introduction of his
interview with police in violation of Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
(Miranda). We find the juvenile court properly found
that the Minor was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was interviewed by police. Accordingly, we will find the Minor's
statements were properly admitted into evidence and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The
Minor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to either count or
the enhancements. He only challenges the
admissibility of his statement to police.
Therefore it is sufficient to simply note he was found to have
participated in a gang rape of a teenage girl, along with members of the Posole street
gang. It is not necessary to recite the
unfortunate details of the offenses.
DISCUSSION
The
Minor, who was 14 years old at the time, was interviewed by an Oceanside Police
detective regarding the events surrounding the rape of the victim. At the time, the Minor was confined at
Breaking Cycles, a juvenile camp facility.
He was advised he did not have to talk with the detective and that he
was free to leave the interview, however, the Minor was not advised of his
rights under the Miranda rule.
The
Minor contends he was in custody at the time of the interview and that the
detective was required to inform him of his Miranda
rights. After reviewing the record and
the briefs, we requested that the parties file
___ U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 1181] (Fields). The parties complied with the court's request
and filed supplemental briefs discussing both cases.
After
reviewing the record in light of the new authorities, we conclude that the
juvenile court correctly found the minor was not in custody for
interview. Thus, the court correctly
overruled the Minor's objection.
When
we review the denial of a motion to suppress a statement obtained in alleged
violation of Miranda, we review the
court's factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence
standard. Once we determine there is
sufficient substantial evidence to support the trial court's factual findings,
we review the legal significance of those facts de novo, using our independent
judgment. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.)
An
Oceanside Police detective interviewed the Minor at a Breaking Cycles camp
facility where the Minor was being housed for an unrelated offense. A staff person brought the Minor to an
administrative office where the detective was waiting. The detective was not in uniform. The Minor was informed of the purpose of the
interview and was told he was free to leave.
The Minor was also informed he was being interviewed as a witness and
that he was not going to be arrested.
The detective asked if it was okay to talk and the Minor agreed. Toward the end of the interview the Minor
was asked if he felt he was forced to talk and the Minor said
"no." When the Minor did ask
if he was free to leave the detective reminded him he had always been free to
leave and that the Minor had said he was willing to stay and talk.
When
a person is in custody and subject to a process of interrogation, the person
must first be warned of the rights identified in Miranda. (
Cal.3d 612, 648.) However, if the
person is not in custody, as that term is defined in Miranda, the warning is not required. (People
v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401; People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088.)
Persons
who are in jail, or prison, are not "per se" in custody for purposes
of Miranda. (People
v. Macklem (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 674, 693.) Rather, the question of custody must be
determined from the totality of circumstances and whether the manner of the
interview would cause a reasonable person to believe he or she is so restricted
that the interview has become a custodial interrogation.
"Although
no one factor is controlling, the following circumstances should be
considered: '(1) [W]hether the suspect
has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the
detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the
demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.' [Citation.]
Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and
was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed
the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were
restrictions on the suspect's freedom of movement during the interview, and
whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were
'aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,' whether they pressured the
suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the
interview. [Citation.]" (People
v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404.)
We
turn next to the setting of the interview and the case law regarding interviews
of persons in jail or prison.
The
U.S. Supreme Court in Fields, supra,
132 S.Ct. 1181, addressed the question of whether a prisoner serving time in a
jail or prison was automatically in custody for purposes of
The court held that prisoner status alone was not enough to turn an
interview into a custodial interrogation under Miranda. As in the present
case, Fields was in jail for an offense unrelated to the subject of the
interview. In that case, Fields was
involved in an interview that lasted at least five hours. He had been told he was free to leave and go
back to his cell whenever he wanted to do so.
Fields was not physically restrained nor was he threatened by the
officers. The court, in finding Fields
was not in "custody" noted that persons in jail are usually
restricted in their movements around the facility, thus being brought to the
interview by a jail staff person did not create custody. The court concluded that where the prisoner
was informed he was free to leave, not threatened or restrained, the person was
not in custody for purposes of Miranda. (Fields,
supra, at pp. 1192-1193.)
In
addition to the fact the Minor was housed in a juvenile facility, we must
consider the fact that he was 14 years old at the time of his interview. The U.S. Supreme Court in
a court addressing whether a minor was in custody for Miranda purposes must consider the minor's age, at least where it
is known or objectively apparent to a reasonable officer at the time of
questioning. (Id. at pp. 2404-2406.)
In
the present case, the trial court did not specifically address the Minor's age,
nor did counsel specifically focus on age as an indication of custody. However, the officer was clearly aware that
the Minor was a juvenile. Indeed, the
interview took place at a juvenile camp facility. Further, the adjudication in this case took
place in the juvenile court where the Minor's age was contained in the court
records.
Here,
the trial court believed the testimony of the interviewing detective and
listened to the taped interview of the Minor.
The court found that interview took place at a juvenile camp facility in
a dorm-like setting. The Minor was not
restrained, was told he was free to leave, that he did not have to talk to the
officer, that he was not going to be arrested, and that the interview was
conducted in a "low key" nonthreatening manner. Finally, the court found the Minor was
fully aware of the purpose of the interview.
Based
upon the trial court's factual findings, which are supported by substantial
evidence in the record, the trial court correctly concluded the Minor was not
in custody for Miranda purposes at
the time of the interview. Thus, the
detective was not required to give the Miranda
warning before talking to the Minor.
Dealing
then with the question of the Minor's age, it is clear the officer and the
court were aware of the Minor's youth. Although
the issue was not specifically addressed in the discussions between court and
counsel, the court did make a significant finding about the Minor's mental
state. Specifically, the court found the
Minor was fully aware of the purpose and nature of the interview. We take that as an implied finding that the
Minor's youth did not create a circumstance akin to custody, as may have been
the case in J.D.B, supra, 131 S.Ct.
2394. The record supports a conclusion
the Minor was fully aware he was free to terminate the interview, but that he
made a decision to stay and talk. There
is no basis in the record to support any inference that he was intimidated or
failed to understand his circumstances at the time he decided to speak to the
detective.
Accordingly,
we find the trial court properly overruled the Minor's objection to the
introduction of his statement to the detective.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE,
Acting P. J.
HALLER,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
