P. v. Aguirre
Filed 8/15/12 P. v. Aguirre CA2/7
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE LUIS AGUIRRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
B231368
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA087280)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
Charles D. Sheldon, Judge. Affirmed.
Kari E.
Hong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Baine
P. Kerr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________
>
Jose Luis
Aguirre appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury for
battery with serious bodily injury
(Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), contending the court committed instructional
error and abused its discretion in denying a defense request for a continuance
to allow Aguirre to locate and recall one of the People’s witnesses.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to Eddie Ortega’s
testimony at trial, on the morning of November 7, 2010 Ortega was playing
in an adult soccer match in Long Beach. Aguirre
was on the opposing team. The two men
were unacquainted. As Ortega was running
with the ball toward the goal, Aguirre ran into him from behind. Ortega fell to the ground. The referee called a foul on Aguirre,
momentarily stopping the match. As
Ortega picked up the ball, ready to resume play, Aguirre approached him,
angrily yelling, “What What” and then struck Ortega in the face with his
forehead. Ortega lost consciousness and
fell to the ground. He was later
transported to the hospital and treated for a broken nose.
Irvin Cruz, one of Ortega’s
teammates, testified through a court interpreter that, after being fouled by
Aguirre, Ortega pushed himself up on one knee and slammed his closed fists on
the ground. Aguirre was standing about
six feet behind him. Ortega got to his
feet and picked up the ball to resume play.
Aguirre approached, said something to Ortega and then head-butted him. Cruz corroborated Ortega’s testimony that
Ortega did not speak, move his arms or advance on Aguirre before Aguirre struck
him with his head.
After Cruz
testified, Aguirre’s counsel requested he be subject to recall. The trial court admonished Cruz not to leave
town. Cruz said he worked in the area
and was not going anywhere.
After the People rested, Aguirre
presented evidence he had acted in self-defense. Luis Martinez, the referee, testified Ortega
fell after being fouled but then quickly stood up and said something. Ortega had his hand in a fist and made a
downward motion from his elbow as if he were throwing something. However, Martinez did not see Ortega throw
anything. After Ortega made the throwing
motion, he turned to face Aguirre and said, “Don’t be a pig.” The two men walked toward each other, and
Aguirre struck Ortega with his head.
Aguirre fled when two players from Ortega’s team went after him. In Martinez’s opinion Aguirre’s foul was not
“abnormal,” and Ortega’s behavior was “unsportsmanlike.”
When the trial resumed the next
morning, defense counsel advised the
court an error had occurred the day before during Cruz’s testimony. Court interpreter Marina Cardonatto, who was
assisting Aguirre during the proceedings, explained she had heard Cruz testify,
“[Ortega] grabbed some dirt” after being fouled. However, court interpreter Juan Escobar, who
was translating questions and answers for Cruz, a Spanish speaker, failed to
translate that statement; and it had not become part of the record. Cardonatto reported she had talked to Escobar
after Cruz testified and Escobar said he had not heard Cruz make the
statement. A third interpreter who was
in the courtroom at the time, on the other hand, said he also heard Cruz
testify that Ortega had grabbed some dirt after he fell to the ground.
Aguirre’s counsel candidly told the
court the apparent omission had been brought to his attention while Cruz was
still on the witness stand, “but I really didn’t understand because shortly you
[(the court)] asked who was interpreting what, and there was a witness on the
stand and I was kind of confused.” He
subsequently added, “I don’t know Spanish.
I didn’t understand what the interpreters were telling me.”
Defense counsel requested the jury
be instructed there was an omission in the translation of Cruz’s testimony and
Cruz had testified Ortega “grabbed some dirt.”
The court declined to give the instruction.
The defense then called Alejandro
Gutierrez, one of Aguirre’s teammates, who testified, after being fouled,
Ortega stood up and threw “something” toward Aguirre before slowly approaching
him. When Ortega reached Aguirre,
Aguirre head-butted him; and Ortega fell.
Long Beach Police Officer Eric
Fernandez testified out of order as a rebuttal witness for the People. Several days after the incident, Fernandez, a
certified Spanish speaker for the Long Beach Police Department, spoke with
referee Martinez. At that time Martinez
said Aguirre had fouled Ortega with “a leg sweep,” an “aggressive and
unnecessary” maneuver. Martinez did not
tell Officer Fernandez that Ortega had made a swinging motion or had thrown
dirt or anything else at Aguirre after the foul. According to Martinez, Aguirre “leaned his
head back and drove his forehead into [Ortega’s] face, causing [Ortega] to be
knocked unconscious.”
Officer Fernandez also testified he
interviewed Aguirre’s teammate Gutierrez, who said Aguirre tried to take the
ball from Ortega with “a leg sweep” and both men fell to the ground. They immediately stood up and faced each
other. Ortega said something, and
Aguirre “drove his forehead into Ortega’s face.”
Just before the noon recess, the
trial court asked if defense counsel intended to call another witness. Counsel said, “not at this time” but, when
proceedings resumed, he stated he would recall Cruz, who was supposed to be in
the courtroom at 1:30 p.m. After
the jury had been excused, counsel informed the court he had telephoned Cruz
and was unable to reach him, but the person who answered the phone would try to
contact Cruz. The court stated, “Well,
let’s hope he shows up at 1:30.”
When trial reconvened at 1:35 p.m.,
defense counsel told the trial court he had been unable to contact Cruz, but
the prosecutor had relayed a message to Cruz that he was to come to court. Defense counsel said he could not proceed
without Cruz and requested a body attachment.
The court agreed to issue a body attachment, but also stated the trial
would continue.
title="">[2]
The trial resumed, and Aguirre
testified in his own defense. According
to Aguirre, Ortega was the aggressor.
The two men fell after Aguirre accidentally tripped Ortega as they were
both going for the ball. When Aguirre
heard the whistle, he stood up, turned away from Ortega and approached the
referee to complain he had not committed a foul. Ortega, who was upset, followed Aguirre,
calling him a “pig” and threatening him with harm. Ortega stopped five or six feet away from
Aguirre, picked up some dirt and threw it at Aguirre’s back. When Aguirre felt the dirt, he turned and took
a step toward Ortega. Fearing Ortega was
going to hit him, Aguirre moved his head forward a couple of inches and looked
down. Ortega then fell to the ground. Aguirre insisted he did not lean his head
back before lowering it or otherwise make an aggressive move with his head.
On cross-examination Aguirre
conceded Ortega made no attempt to hit or kick him, but said he feared Ortega
would. Aguirre admitted he struck Ortega
in the face with his forehead and acknowledged in soccer a player occasionally
“heads” a ball—that is, uses the forehead to hit the ball by leaning the head
back and then thrusting it forward against the ball to achieve maximum
force.
After Aguirre completed his
testimony, the court inquired whether there were any other defense witnesses. Defense counsel said, “just Irvin Cruz,” who
had been “placed on call.” The court
then asked whether the defense intended to call any additional witnesses who
were currently available in the courtroom.
Defense counsel answered, “No your Honor.” The court then advised the jury, “We have all
the testimony in then, ladies and gentlemen.”
After the trial court and counsel
discussed jury instructions, counsel argued to the jury; and the court
instructed the jury with modified versions of the CALJIC instructions. Following two hours of deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty.
DISCUSSION
1.
Interpreter Error
In criminal proceedings, court
interpreters perform three distinct but interrelated roles: (1) to facilitate the questioning of
non-English-speaking witnesses by counsel (as a “witness interpreter”
; (2) toenable non-English-speaking defendants to understand what is occurring during
the proceedings (as a “proceedings interpreter”
; and (3) to enable anon-English-speaking defendant to communicate with his or her
English-only-speaking attorney (as a “defense interpreter”
. (Peoplev. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.)
“The right to an interpreter has
its underpinnings in a number of state and federal constitutional rights. These include a defendant’s rights to due
process, to confrontation, to effective assistance of counsel, and to be
present at trial. [Citation.] The California Constitution provides that a
criminal defendant who does not understand English ‘has a right to an
interpreter throughout the proceedings.’
(Cal. Const. art. I, § 14.) In
addition, . . . an interpreter must interpret accurately, without embellishing,
omitting, or editing, and when ‘interpreting for a witness, the interpreter
must interpret everything that is said during the witness’s testimony.’” (Romero,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
Aguirre contends his trial was
refused to instruct the jury the witness interpreter failed to translate Cruz’s
testimony that Ortega had “grabbed some dirt” after being fouled—testimony he
argues would have reinforced his claim of self-defense and invited the jury to
question Ortega’s assertion he was not the aggressor. This argument has been forfeited because not
raised in a timely fashion in the trial court.
To preserve an issue for review on
appeal, a defendant must interpose a specific and timely objection in the trial
court on the same ground that he asserts on appeal. (People
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.)
This “requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a ‘contrary
rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial
and would “permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure
in the knowledge that a convictions would be reversed on appeal.”’” (Ibid.) In People
v. Romero, supra, 44 Cal.4th 386, where the defendant claimed unreported
discussions between interpreters and witnesses at trial violated his federal
and state constitutional rights, the Supreme Court held the defendant had
forfeited that argument by failing to raise it at trial: “‘“[A]s a general rule, ‘the failure to
object to errors committed at trial relieves the reviewing court of the
obligation to consider those errors on appeal.’
[Citations.] This applies to
claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of
fundamental constitutional rights.
[Citations.]”’ [Citation.] The reason for this rule is to allow errors
to be corrected by the trial court and to prevent gamesmanship by the
defense. [Citations.] We see no reason why the general rule of
forfeiture should not be applied to violations of rules of court or to claims
of error relating to interpreters for the witnesses.” (Id.
at p. 411; see People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [party may forfeit right to present claim of error if
the party did not do enough to prevent or to correct the claimed error in the
trial court].)
Here, although the purported error
in translation of the witness’s testimony was raised in the trial court, it was
not presented in a timely fashion.
Aguirre’s trial counsel acknowledged he was told of the omission from
the translation of Cruz’s testimony while Cruz was still on the witness stand
and his testimony could have been clarified and the translation error, if any,
remedied. Notwithstanding counsel’s
claimed confusion about what the proceedings interpreter was telling him, it
was counsel’s responsibility to promptly raise the matter with the court so any
error could be cured.
2. The Trial Court Properly Declined To Instruct the Jury About the
Alleged Interpreter Error
Even were the issue of the alleged
translation error not forfeited (or, alternatively, if we were to consider it
under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel
rejected the defense proposal the jury be instructed that Cruz had testified
Ortega “grabbed some dirt” after Aguirre had tripped him. As the court observed at the time, all three
interpreters involved in the trial were qualified. The record reflects the witness interpreter
did not hear Cruz make the statement subsequently attributed to him and,
accordingly, did not include it in his translation of his testimony. The trial court was justified in relying on
the competence of the witness interpreter and correctly concluded it could not
“change the testimony from the interpreter’s standpoint.” (See People
v. Mendes (1950) 35 Cal.2d 537, 543 [“[t]he competence of the interpreter
is ordinarily for the trial court to determine”]; People v. DeLarco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 306-307 [same].)
On appeal Aguirre argues, as an
alternative to instructing the jury that Cruz had testified Ortega grabbed some
dirt, the court should have at least advised the jury there was disagreement
among the court interpreters as to what Cruz had said on this point. However, Aguirre’s counsel did not ask the
court for any such instruction and did not proffer the testimony of the proceedings
interpreter to impeach the witness interpreter’s translation. (See People
v. Johnson (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [recognizing defendant’s right to
present evidence to impeach translation of victim’s preliminary hearing
testimony].) Counsel’s and the
interpreter’s unsworn descriptions of the disagreement were not themselves
relevant evidence. (Cf. Evid. Code,
§ 210.)
3.
There Was No Abuse of Discretion
in Denying a Continuance of the Trial
A continuance of a criminal trial
may be granted only upon a showing of good cause. (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (e);
352.) Although no express request for a
continuance of the trial was made by Aguirre’s counsel when Cruz failed to
appear for further examination, the trial court made it plain it would not
delay the proceedings to permit additional time for the defense team to locate
him. This implicit denial of a
continuance was not an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1171 [granting or
denying a continuance during trial “rests within the sound discretion of the
trial judge”]; People v. Gonzalez
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548.)
“To establish good cause for a
continuance, defendant had the burden of showing that he had exercised due
diligence to secure the witness’s attendance, that the witness’s expected
testimony was material and not cumulative, that the testimony could be obtained
within a reasonable time, and that the facts to which the witness would testify
could not otherwise be proven.” (People
v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at
p. 1171.) In weighing the request
for a mid-trial continuance, as here, the trial court must consider “‘“‘not
only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood
that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the
court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or
defeated by a granting of the motion.’”’”
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 450.)
We do not fault defense counsel’s
diligence in seeking to recall Cruz or to ensure his presence in court. In fact, the court facilitated the defense
effort to some extent by ordering a body attachment and having the People
proceed with a rebuttal witness without first requiring the defense to rest. Nonetheless, after that rebuttal witness,
Officer Fernandez, and then Aguirre himself had testified, neither side had any
additional witnesses; and there was no indication where Cruz was or when (if
ever) he could be located and brought to court.
Balanced against the burden of a continuance on the court and the
jurors, Cruz’s proposed additional testimony—that he may have seen Ortega grab
a handful of dirt while on the ground—had only minimal value.
To be sure, Aguirre and his
teammate Gutierrez had both testified Ortega threw dirt at Aguirre’s back
before Aguirre turned around and head-butted Ortega; but referee Martinez,
another defense witness, testified Ortega had not thrown anything, and Cruz had
expressly denied Ortega had moved his arms or approached Aguirre before the
attack. Ortega, as well, denied he had
acted toward Aguirre in an aggressive manner following the foul. Moreover, even if Ortega had tossed some dirt
at Aguirre’s back, taunting him, that is not the type of conduct that would justify
Aguirre’s head-butt to Ortega’s face.
Finally, Aguirre’s claim of self-defense was seriously undermined by his
highly implausible testimony that, although he felt threatened by Ortega’s
words and actions, all he did was bend his head forward a few inches and that
limited action somehow caused Ortega to break his nose and fall to the ground
unconscious. The jury’s evaluation of
the likelihood of that scenario and of the comparative credibility of Ortega’s
and Aguirre’s version of events would not have been materially assisted by any
further testimony from Cruz.
Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded the burden of delaying
the proceedings outweighed any potential benefit to Aguirre. (See People
v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920.)
4.
Aguirre contends the trial court improperly failed to
instruct the jury not to decide the case by chance in its modified version of
CALJIC No. 17.40, incorrectly advised the jury about the consequences of the
People’s and the defendant’s discovery violations in its modified version of
CALJIC No. 2.28 and omitted entirely to tell the jury it had the right to
receive and review a written form of the instructions during deliberations (as
specified in CALJIC No. 17.45).
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] The People concede the instructions as read
to the jury were incorrect, and we agree:
Deviations from the approved form of standard instructions, other than
to conform to the facts of the case being tried, are risky and should be
avoided. (See People v. Briscoe (20010 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 589.) Nonetheless, we also argee with the People’s
contention any error was harmless. “In
assessing a claim of instructional error, ‘we must view a challenged portion
“in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” to
determine “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied
the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.”’” (People
v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774,
831; see People v. Mower (2002) 28
Cal.4th 457, 484 [if trial court’s instructional error violates California law,
appellate court applies harmless error standard stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 677 [“‘[w]hen an
appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the
instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with
other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible
manner’”].)
a. The
failure to give CALJIC No. 17.45 Penal Code section 1093, subdivision (f),
requires the trial court to advise the jury of the availability of a written
copy of the instructions for its use during deliberations. Although both counsel during closing argument
referred to specific instructions by number and told the jurors they would be
able to review the written instructions, the court itself did not read CALJIC
No. 17.45 or otherwise inform the jurors they could request a copy of the
instructions. Nonetheless, the record
contains a file-stamped set of the written instructions, initialed by the trial
judge. It is reasonable to infer these
written instructions were, in fact, provided to the jury even though no minute
order memorializes that action. (See
Evid. Code, § 664 [“[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed”]; People v.
549-550 [in the absence of any affirmative showing to the contrary, it is
presumed the court regularly performed its lawful duty]; see also
1133.) As a consequence, any failure to
inform the jury they could review the instructions was necessarily harmless.
Even if the court did not actually
provide the written form of instructions to the jury during its deliberations,
however, any error in failing to advise the jurors they could review the
instructions was harmless. In its oral
instructions the court explained the jury could ask questions or request a
read-back of portions of the trial proceedings.
The jury did not do either, and there is no suggestion in the record
that there was any confusion as to the meaning of the court’s instructions or
that the absence of a written copy of the instructions in any way prejudiced
Aguirre.
b. The omission from CALJIC No. 17.40
The trial court combined and modified
CALJIC Nos. 17.40 and 17.41, orally instructing, “[The] People and the
Defendant are entitled to your individual opinion. So each of you should consider the evidence
for the purpose of reaching decisions, verdicts, if you can do so. Decide the case for yourself, but do so only
after discussing, talking about the case with your fellow jurors. Don’t let pride enter in. Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you
go out with one opinion and you talk about it and you change your mind. Pride is not what’s involved here. What’s involved here is that you do the right
thing based upon how you see it after you’re done with the discussing with your
fellow jurors. When you go into the jury
room, don’t have somebody say ‘I’m guilty,’ ‘I’m not guilty,’ and before you
know it, there’s pride. We don’t want
pride. We want you just to discuss the
case. If you do that, you know, people
don’t want to back off from an opinion sometimes. You have to be willing to listen to one
another and see what you can do with that.
You’re impartial judges of the facts.
Impartial judges of the facts.”
As read, the instruction omitted the final sentence of CALJIC No. 17.40,
which states, “Do not decide any issue in this case by the flip of the coin, or
by any other chance determination.”
Even if the jury was not provided
with the file-stamped, full written version of CALJIC No. 17.40 in the record,
which contained the missing language, the court’s omission, if error at all,
was harmless.
title="">[5] Although the court did not specifically
advise the jurors not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs or not to
decide the case by some form of chance determination, as Aguirre argues, the
instruction as given did direct the jurors that each of them must consider the
evidence in attempting to reach a verdict and decide the case for themselves
and that they should do so only after discussing the evidence and instructions
with their fellow jurors. Other
instructions informed the jurors the People had the burden of proving Aguirre
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90); they must base a decision
on the facts and the law (CALJIC No. 1.00); and the jurors had to determine what
facts have been proved from the evidence received in the trial and not from any
other source. (CALJIC
No. 1.00.) The trial court also
instructed that both the People and the defendant have a right to expect them
to conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence, apply the law and reach a
just verdict. (CALJIC
No. 1.00.) Jurors were also
admonished not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number
of witnesses who testified on each side.
(CALJIC No. 2.22.) In light
of the court’s instructions viewed as a whole, no reasonable juror would have
believed it was proper to abandon his or her deliberative role by disregarding
sincerely held beliefs based on the evidence or deciding the case by flipping a
coin or other chance device.
c. The
modified version of CALJIC No. 2.28
i. The
alleged discovery violations
The timely disclosure of the names
of anticipated witnesses with identifying information and copies of relevant
written or recorded statements is one of the reciprocal pretrial discovery
requirements in criminal cases. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1054.1, subds. (a),
(b), 1054.3, subd. (a)(1).) Penal Code
section 1054.5, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to “make any order
necessary to enforce” the mandatory pretrial discovery provisions, including
“prohibiting the testimony of a
witness,” and further provides “the court may advise the jury of . . . any untimely disclosure.”
Both sides in this case claimed
there had been improper, delayed disclosures.
Aguirre objected the People had failed to identify Cruz as a potential
witness until shortly before trial. The
People, in turn, objected to the failure of the defense to produce a copy of a
statement referee Martinez had given to a defense investigator until after
Martinez had testified as a defense witness.
ii. The
court’s modification of CALJIC No. 2.28
After much
discussion the trial court agreed to instruct the jury with a modified version
of CALJIC No. 2.28 to address the mutual pretrial disclosure violations. The court explained its rationale for the
truncated form of instruction it intended to give: “I’ve modified it way down, and I’ve taken
out all this blame, blame, blame, and all that language. What I’ve said is what the evidence is before
the court right now. [The prosecutor]
comes up with a statement late in the game, but I’m not finding that he
intentionally withheld anything until he got it and gave it to [the defense]. [The defense], you have a guy that’s been on direct
examination and we don’t even hear from you about that until the direct
examination is over and that’s when he gets your statement. So, I’m telling them those two things. Whether it means anything to them or not,
it’s up to them.”
The instruction as given stated,
“The prosecution and the defense are required to discuss–disclose to each other‑‑I’m
talking about discovery now. Something I
talked about early in the trial, not knowing whether there would be an issue or
not. They’re required to disclose to
each other evidence each intends to present at trial so as to promote the
ascertainment of truth, save court time, avoid surprise which may result during
trial. Delay in the disclosure of
evidence may deny a person a sufficient opportunity to subpoena necessary
witnesses or produce evidence which may exist to rebut the noncomplying party’s
evidence. Any new evidence, if it’s new
evidence, must be disclosed right away. As
soon as you know it, give it to the other side as soon as you can. In this case there were two things that need
to be talked about along this line.
There were two reports. One
witness had to do with one report. That
was Luis [Martinez]. The other had to do
with a person by the name of Irvin Cruz.
Irvin Cruz was called by the People.
Mr. [Martinez] was called by the defense.” “So one by the People; one by the
defense. The reports came in late in the
game, but the reports were turned over.
One report was turned over before the witness testified, that’s Mr.
Cruz. One report was not turned over
until after the direct testimony was offered by the defense in this case. So you had two things that occurred. And whether that makes any difference to you,
I just tell you because I’m supposed to talk about everything.”
Aguirre challenges three omissions
in this modified instruction: (1) the
court did not caution the jury that untimely disclosure was insufficient by
itself to support a finding of guilt; (2) it did not explain how each party may
have been disadvantaged by the opponent’s delayed disclosure; and (3) it failed
to advise the jury only to consider the delayed disclosure in assessing the
credibility of the underlying evidence if that evidence related to a material
fact not already established by other evidence.
Aguirre argues these errors in the modified instruction impermissibly
allowed the jury to conclude he was guilty merely because he had failed to
comply with pretrial discovery requirements.
Although we have characterized
CALJIC No. 2.28 as “a problematic jury instruction” because it offers
insufficient direction to the jury (People
v. Saucedo (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 937, 942),
nothing in this record suggests the trial court’s version of the
instruction affected the jury’s deliberations.
The instruction was entirely neutral and reciprocal, simply advising
jurors both parties had failed to timely produce a witness report. No reasonable juror could have inferred that
the defense’s delayed disclosure of Martinez’s witness statement was sufficient
to convict Aguirre because the court told them the significance of that delay
was for them to decide. To the contrary,
the wording of the instruction suggested the jury should give no weight at all
to the mutually delayed discovery. At
most, as we concluded in Saucedo, this
instruction “was merely a vehicle for credibility challenges that would have
been made even in the absence of the instruction.” (Id.
at p. 943.) Defense counsel did just
that in closing argument, making much of Cruz’s unexpected testimony on Ortega’s
behalf without focusing on the prosecutor’s failure to comply with pretrial
disclosure. For his part, the prosecutor
mentioned pretrial disclosure during closing argument only to state that
neither party had committed a discovery violation. Under these circumstances Aguirre cannot
establish prejudice from the use of the modified CALJIC No. 2.28.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
PERLUSS,
P. J.
We
concur:
WOODS,
J.
ZELON, J.
court sentenced Aguirre, who was on probation for a misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction at the time of the assault, to state prison for the lower
term of two years.
clerk indicated the attachment could not issue without Cruz’s date of birth and
other personal information. Defense
counsel said he did not have that information; the prosecutor said he had
provided the defense with Cruz’s name, date of birth and telephone number.
