Filed 5/8/17 In re Jonathan U. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re JONATHAN U. et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
B277588
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. DK14400)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALEJANDRO U.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
2
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * *
After finding that Alejandro U. (father) had sexually
abused his 13-year-old stepdaughter and shown her younger
brother and half brothers adult pornography, the juvenile court
removed the children from father’s custody. Father appeals this
ruling. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Athena J. (mother) has five children—Cynthia V. (born
2002), Luke V. (born 2005), Jonathan U. (born 2008), Christopher
U. (born 2009), and Nickolas U. (born 2011).1
The three youngest
boys are father’s.
Between 2011 and 2015, father repeatedly touched
Cynthia’s clothed buttocks, fondled her clothed vagina, and
kissed her neck and back. In 2014, Cynthia reported the abuse to
mother, but she did nothing once father denied it. Father also
allowed his three boys—Jonathan, Christopher, and Nickolas—to
watch adult pornography on his cell phone.
After Cynthia first reported the sexual abuse to school
officials, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile
court to exert dependency jurisdiction over all five children
because (1) father’s sexual abuse of Cynthia, and mother’s failure
to protect her from that abuse, constituted “sexual abuse” and the
“failure . . . to adequately . . . protect” Cynthia, and also posed a

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal, nor are father’s
stepchildren, Cynthia and Luke.
3
“substantial risk” that she and her brothers “will suffer[] serious
physical harm or illness” (in violation of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j))2
; and (2) father’s
display of adult pornography, and mother’s failure to prevent it,
constituted a “failure . . . to adequately supervise or protect” all
four boys, and placed the boys at “substantial risk [of] suffer[ing]
serious physical harm or illness” (in violation of section 300,
subdivision (b)).
The juvenile court sustained these allegations. Mother and
father pled no contest to the allegation involving the display of
adult pornography, and the Department dismissed a number of
other allegations.
3
The matter proceeded to a contested hearing
on the allegation regarding Cynthia’s sexual abuse. The juvenile
court found Cynthia’s statements set forth in the various reports
to be “credible,” and that she had suffered sexual abuse and
remained at substantial risk of the same. The court also found
that Jonathan, Christopher, and Nickolas were at substantial
risk of abuse, noting that father had “inappropriate sexual
boundaries [with] . . . the kids” and that the risk to the boys,
while “slightly different” than the risk to Cynthia, was not “so

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
3 Specifically, the Department dismissed its allegations that
(1) father sexually abused Christopher and mother did not
intervene (in violation of section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and
(j)), (2) father sexually abused Nickolas and mother did not
intervene (in violation of the same provisions), and (3) father
sexually abused Jonathan and mother did not intervene (in
violation of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d)).
4
insubstantial as to prevent the court [from] taking steps to
protect” them.
The juvenile court removed the children from father. In so
ordering, the court noted the continued risk to the children and
rejected father’s argument that the risk was mitigated because
father had attended 77 group or individual counseling sessions,
finding that father’s attendance—while “commendable”—did not
result in “actual substantive progress in a way that would
minimize the risk that exists today.”
The juvenile court set a six-month progress report hearing,
and father immediately filed this timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Father argues that substantial evidence does not support
the juvenile court’s order removing from his custody his three
boys—Jonathan, Christopher, and Nickolas.
4
A juvenile court may remove a child from his parent’s
custody only if, among other things, it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were returned
home, and there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s]
physical health can be protected without removing the [child]
from the . . . parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
We review a juvenile court’s removal order for substantial
evidence by asking whether the record contains evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support that order.
(In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 811-812.) Although the

4 Father does not attack the juvenile court’s ruling exerting
dependency jurisdiction, and mother has not appealed at all.
5
courts are divided over whether appellate courts must apply the
clear and convincing evidence standard in undertaking this
review (compare In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1492-
1493 [higher standard disappears on appeal] with In re Noe F.
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 367 [higher standard must be “ke[pt]
in mind” on appeal]), we will assume that the standard still
applies in this case.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal
order with respect to father’s three boys. Father sexually abused
Cynthia for four years. That level of abuse posed a substantial
risk of harm to the three boys as well. In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766 (I.J.) is directly on point. There, as here, the father sexually
abused his daughter (or stepdaughter) and argued that such
abuse provided no basis to remove his sons from his custody. Our
Supreme Court rejected that argument, reasoning that a parent’s
sexually aberrant behavior toward a child of one sex posed a
substantial risk of similar behavior toward his remaining
children, regardless of their sex. (Id. at pp. 778-780.) Indeed, the
risk in this case is even greater than in I.J. There, the father had
never “sexually abused . . . the boys” (id. at p. 773); here, father
engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with his three boys
by showing them adult pornography.
Father raises two arguments in response. First, he
contends that his boys are not at risk unless he has previously
sexually abused them, and notes that the boys each indicated
that they felt safe with him. This argument ignores I.J. as well
as Christopher’s statement that he felt “weird” and “nasty” when
father bathed Christopher’s private parts. For support, father
cites In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58 and In re Steve W.
(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10. But In re James T. found insufficient
6
evidence to support a 16 year old’s removal from his mother due
to her “economic instability” (In re James T., at p. 65), and In re
Steve W. found insufficient evidence to support an infant’s
removal from his mother when it was the father who killed the
infant’s older sibling (In re Steve W., at pp. 12-13, 22). Neither
decision casts any doubt on the situation presented in this case,
or in I.J.
Second, father asserts that his voluntary efforts to sign up
for and attend 77 group and individual sex therapy sessions has
removed all risk of harm to his three boys. Yet there was no
evidence that father’s efforts, however commendable, have
resulted in any “substantive progress” in addressing the issues
that prompted the need for the Department’s intervention in the
first place. The provider of these services stated that father,
while “very receptive” and “very positive,” was just “becoming
aware of the dangers” the counseling is designed to address; the
provider did not indicate father had addressed, let alone fully
addressed, those dangers. (Cf. In re Jasmine G. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 282, 285-289 [parents who twice used corporal
punishment, but who had foresworn such punishment, expressed
remorse, undergone therapy, and attended parenting classes had
made sufficient progress to negate need for removal].) Father
cites In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996, 1005, but that case
held that removal was not warranted when a parent maintained
a “chronic[ally] mess[y]” home; this case is entirely different.
7
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
_________________________, J.*
GOODMAN

* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.