Miraflores v. City of Los Angeles
Filed 10/29/09 Miraflores v. City of Los Angeles CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MINERVA MIRAFLORES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. | B211966 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC350072) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mary Ann Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Kamal Antoine Bilal and Kamal Antoine Bilal for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Janet G. Bogigian, Assistant City Attorney, and Amy Jo Field, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________________
While standing on the sidewalk at the corner of a Los Angeles intersection, plaintiff Minerva Miraflores was struck by a car and suffered severe injuries. As a result, plaintiff sued the person driving the car, two other individuals and the City of Los Angeles (City). After plaintiffs fifth attempt to state a cause of action against the City, the trial court sustained the Citys demurrer without leave to amend, finding plaintiff could not state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff appealed.
It is undisputed that, as to her claims against the City, plaintiff was required to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act or Act). (Gov. Code, 900 et seq.) In addition to arguments made in the trial court, the City argues for the first time on appeal that plaintiff failed to comply with the Acts mandatory timeframe for filing suit. We agree with the City and conclude, as a matter of law, plaintiffs action against the City is untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Background
On April 5, 2004, as plaintiff stood on the sidewalk at the corner of Venice Boulevard and Union Avenue in Los Angeles, two cars collided in the intersection. The impact pushed one of the cars onto the sidewalk where the car struck and severely injured plaintiff.
On April 4, 2006, plaintiff filed a form complaint, suing three individuals and 30 Doe defendants. Plaintiff did not name the City as a defendant. She alleged two causes of action, both of which were based on the individual defendants alleged negligence in operating their cars.
On September 26, 2006, 29 months after the accident, Plaintiff filed a form first amended complaint, adding the City as a defendant. In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged a general negligence cause of action against the City, stating the intersection where the accident occurred was a dangerous condition and proximately caused her injuries. Plaintiff also checked boxes indicating she was required to comply with a claims statute and had complied with applicable claims statute. The City filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint.
In response, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. No longer using the form complaint, plaintiff set out her negligence causes of action against the three individual defendants and the City. She did not allege any facts indicating that she had complied with the Tort Claims Act. The City filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint, arguing the complaint failed to allege a dangerous condition. The City did not claim plaintiff had failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
Plaintiff tried three more times to state a cause of action against the City, filing a third, fourth and fifth amended complaint. In her fifth and final amended complaint, filed January 24, 2008, plaintiff specified two dangerous condition causes of action against the City (one under Government Code section 835, subdivision (a), and the other under subdivision (b)) and added a cause of action against the City for intentional creation of a dangerous condition. She also alleged she filed a Government Tort Claim for personal injuries . . . in compliance with Government Code section 910, et seq., which claim has been rejected. The City demurred to the fifth amended complaint, again arguing the complaint failed to allege a dangerous condition as well as arguing the City had no duty to install a left-turn signal or left-turn pocket at the accident intersection. The City did not argue plaintiffs complaint was untimely filed.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. After denying plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City on October 27, 2008. Plaintiff appealed.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard of review is clear: We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff. [Citations.] (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126 (Zelig).)
2. Issue raised for first time on appeal
Initially, we address whether we can consider the Citys argumentraised for the first time on appealthat plaintiffs lawsuit is barred by the Acts mandatory statute of limitations. As a general rule, we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, however. It is well settled that a litigant may raise for the first time on appeal a pure question of law which is presented by undisputed facts. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394. See also, e.g., Stone Street Capital, LLC v. CaliforniaState Lottery Commission (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 123, fn. 10; Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259.)
Here, the City argues plaintiffs lawsuit is barred as a matter of law because she did not sue the City within the statutorily mandated time for doing so. This raises a purely legal issue presented on undisputed facts. In addition, as the City indicates, were we to reverse the judgment without considering the statute of limitations issue, the City undoubtedly would raise the same issue before the trial court on remand. Thus, because the issue is purely legal, the relevant facts are undisputed, and judicial economy would be served, we consider the issue on its merits.
3. Failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act
In order to sue the City, plaintiff was required to comply with the Tort Claims Act. The intent of the Tort Claims Act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against governmental entities. Rather, the intent of the Act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1127; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 (Munoz).) Our Legislature has prescribed the time and manner of filing claims against the [government], and the conditions under which it may be sued. (Chase v. State of California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 808, 811 (Chase).) If a litigant fails to commence legal action against the government within the statutorily prescribed time, recovery will be denied. (Ibid.)
a. Presentation and filing deadlines under the Act
Before filing a complaint seeking money or damages against a governmental entity, the Tort Claims Act requires (i) the plaintiff to present the claim to the relevant governmental entity and (ii) that the entity reject the claim. (E.g., Gov. Code, 910, 911.2, 912.4, 912.6, 945.4.) The act creates a bond between the administrative claim and the judicial complaint. Each theory of recovery against the public entity must have been reflected in a timely claim. In addition, the factual circumstances set forth in the claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint. [Citation.] [] . . . [] Generally speaking, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board. . . . [] Under Government Code section 945.4, presentation of a timely claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of suit against a public entity. (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1776-1777.)
Although, in both her first amended complaint and her operative fifth amended complaint, plaintiff alleged she had complied with the applicable claims statute, she gave no details as to when she presented a claim or when the City rejected her claim. In the fifth amended complaint, plaintiff states only that she filed a Government Tort Claim for personal injuries as alleged herein in compliance with Government Code section 910, et seq., which claim has been rejected. Despite the lack of details, however, based on the undisputed facts, we can calculate both the latest date on which plaintiff could have presented a claim to the City and, from that, the latest date she could have filed her lawsuit against the City.
Under the Tort Claims Act, plaintiff was required to present her claim to the City within six months of the accrual of her cause of action. (Gov. Code, 911.2, subd. (a) [A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person . . . shall be presented as provided in Article 2 . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.].) Plaintiffs cause of action accrued on April 5, 2004the date she was injured. Thus, she was required to present her claim to the City no later than October 5, 2004.
Once plaintiffs claim was presented, the City had 45 days to act on it. (Gov. Code, 912.4, subd. (a).) If the City failed or refused to act on the claim, the claim is deemed rejected as of the last day the City could have acted on it. (Gov. Code, 912.4, subd. (c).) Thus, assuming plaintiff presented her claim on the last possible day (October 5, 2004), the City rejected plaintiffs claim (either directly or by failing to take action on it) no later than November 19, 2004.
Once the City rejected her claim, plaintiff was authorized to sue the City based on the circumstances alleged in her claim. (Gov. Code, 945.4.) However, the Tort Claims Act mandates strict deadlines for filing suit. The prescribed statutes of limitations for suing a public entity are mandatory. (Chase, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 812.) The Tort Claims Act manifests a purpose that the time within which an action may be commenced under it is absolute, and will not be extended for any reason. (Ibid.)
If the City issued a written notice of rejection of plaintiffs claim, plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit against the City within six months after the City sent or personally delivered the written rejection notice. (Gov. Code, 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, assuming the City issued a written notice of rejection on the last possible day (November 19, 2004), plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit against the City no later than May 19, 2005.
Alternatively, if plaintiffs claim was deemed rejected because the City failed to act on it and no written notice of rejection was issued, plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit against the City within two years of the accrual of her action. (Gov. Code, 945.6, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, assuming the City did not issue a written notice of rejection of plaintiffs claim, plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit against the City no later than April 5, 2006 (i.e., two years after her cause of action accrued).
Although plaintiff filed her initial complaint on April 4, 2006, she did not name the City as a defendant at that time. She first named the City as a defendant when she filed her first amended complaint on September 26, 2006more than five months after the last day she could have filed suit against the City.
b. Relation-back doctrine
Assuming plaintiff had the longer two-year timeframe in which to sue the City, her lawsuit against the City could be saved if the first amended complaintin which plaintiff named the City as a defendant for the first timerelates back to the date plaintiff filed her original complaint. If a plaintiff is ignorant of a defendants name, Code of Civil Procedure section 474 permits the plaintiff to sue the unknown defendant under a fictitious name (such as Doe). (Code Civ. Proc., 474 [When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .].) It is a well established rule that when a complaint sets forth a cause of action against a defendant designated by a fictitious name and his true name is thereafter discovered and substituted by amendment, he is considered a party to the action from its commencement so that the statute of limitations stops running as of the date the original complaint was filed. (Olden v. Hatchell (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1035 (Olden).)
As the City correctly explains, however, the first amended complaint here cannot relate back to the original filing date because plaintiff was not ignorant of the name of a defendant (the City) when she first filed her lawsuit. Because plaintiff states she complied with the Tort Claims Act (under which she would have had to present a claim to the City no later than October 2004), she must have known the identity of the City at the time she filed her initial complaint in April 2006. Accordingly, the relation-back doctrine does not apply and plaintiffs first amended complaintin which she names the City for the first timeis untimely. (Chase, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 808; Olden, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036.) This defect cannot be cured by further amendment.
Because plaintiff failed to file her lawsuit against the City within the required time, her action against the City is barred as a matter of law. In light of this conclusion, we need not and do not address plaintiffs remaining arguments.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
JOHNSON, J.
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