Masters v. DMV
Filed 4/24/13 Masters v. DMV CA2/4
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
WILLIAM
A. MASTERS, II,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Defendant and Respondent.
B242522
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PC050467)
APPEAL from a
judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Randy Rhodes, Judge.
Affirmed.
William A.
Masters, II, in pro. per.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Alicia M. B. Fowler, Assistant Attorney General,
Michael E. Whitaker and Ernesto J. Fong, Deputy Attorneys General, Defendant
and Respondent.
__________________________________
William A. Masters, II filed a
complaint for money damages against
the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), an agency of the State of California.
The DMV moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity to the lawsuit
under various federal and state laws. The superior court granted summary judgment
in favor of the DMV. Finding no error,
we affirm.
In late 1996,
appellant moved from California to Virginia.
He never filed a change of address form with the DMV. Appellant obtained a Virginia driver’s license, and surrendered
his California driver’s license to the Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles. The Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles mailed the license back to the DMV. DMV records showed that on April
16, 1999,
appellant was involved in a traffic incident in San Bernardino County, California.
On July
19, 1999,
the DMV sent a notice to appellant’s last known California address, requesting that appellant
schedule and complete a medical reexamination by August 11,
1999, as the
DMV had information that he might have a medical condition that could affect
his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
On August 20, 1999, the DMV mailed a notice to
appellant’s last known California address, informing him that his
driver’s license would be suspended as of August 24, 1999, unless he completed a medical
examination. The written notice also
informed appellant that his vehicle could be impounded if he drove it while his
license was suspended. Appellant did not
submit evidence of the requested medical examination, and the suspension took
effect on August 24, 1999.
On January
6, 2000, the
DMV received a confidential “Morbidity Report†from the Department of Health
Services, indicating that appellant had a reportable medical condition that
could affect his driving.
On October 28,
2002, the DMV mailed another notice to appellant’s last known California
address, informing him that his driving privilege would be suspended as of
November 27, 2002, due to appellant’s failure to appear in court and pay an
outstanding traffic violation.
In May 2008,
appellant returned to California from Virginia.
While driving in Hollywood, he was pulled over for failing to
completely stop at a stop sign. The
officer impounded appellant’s car because appellant was driving with a
suspended California driver’s license. Appellant paid $155 to lift the 1999
suspension, and $960 to retrieve his vehicle.
He also provided the DMV with evidence that he had undergone a medical
examination. Both the 1999 and 2002
suspensions were lifted by May 24, 2008.
In June 2008,
appellant applied for a truck driving position with Swift Transportation. He obtained a new California driver’s license, but was not
hired. Appellant claimed Swift informed
him that it could not hire him because his driver’s license had been suspended
within the past 12 months. In November
2009, appellant attempted to obtain vehicle insurance, but was denied because
he was a “high risk†driver, as his driver’s license had been suspended for
nine years.
On March
30, 2009,
appellant filed a claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government
Claims Board (CVCGCB), seeking to recover the monies he paid to lift the
suspension and retrieve his impounded vehicle.
On April 22, 2009, the CVCGCB mailed a letter to appellant,
acknowledging receipt of his “late†claim.
On January 7, 2010, the CVCGCB denied the claim because
it was filed untimely. Although
appellant was informed he could appeal the denial through a petition for a writ
of mandate under Government Code section 945.4, he never filed a petition.
As of May
25, 2011,
appellant’s DMV driving record no longer reflected his 1999 driver’s license
suspension. As of August
2, 2011, his
driving record no longer reflected the 2002 license suspension.
On March
29, 2011,
appellant filed a complaint for damages against the DMV. The complaint sought $2 million in
compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages for (1) negligence and
(2) violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
appellant alleged that the DMV improperly failed to cancel his California driver’s license in 1996 and
thereafter suspended his license in 1999, without providing him with notice and
an opportunity to be heard. In the
complaint, appellant noted he had filed a complaint for damages in federal
court, but that a federal judge had “dismissed my request for financial damages
citing the State’s Eleventh Amendment protections against monetary suit in
federal courts, but allowed me to re-file for injunctive
relief. . . . Having my damages barred in [f]ederal
[c]ourt, I now proceed to the [s]tate [c]ourt.â€
Appellant did not seek injunctive relief; nor did he name any individual
defendant.
On May
20, 2011,
the DMV filed an answer, generally denying the allegations and asserting, as an
affirmative defense, immunity under Government Code section 815.
Section 815 provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by statute,†“[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether
such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee or any other person.â€
On March
7, 2012, the
DMV filed a motion for summary judgment.
In the motion, the DMV argued that it was immune from liability for
money damages under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as expressly provided
in sections 815 and 818.4, and under the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The DMV also argued
(1) that the due process claim was deficient as a matter of law because the DMV
is not a “person†under Title 42 United States Code section 1983, (2) that
a negligent act is not a “deprivation†under the federal Due Process Clause of
the federal Constitution , (3) that appellant failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing a timely claim with the CVCGCB before filing
his lawsuit, as required by section 945.4, and (4) that appellant failed to
exhaust his judicial remedies by failing to file a petition under section
946.6, requesting excusal from the requirements of section 945.4.
In a
declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment, John F. Maguire, a
DMV employee in the licensing operations division, stated that much of the
records related to appellant’s driving records in 1996 and 1999 had been purged
from the computer system, as part of the DMV’s document policy. Based upon a review of documents available on
microfilm, Maguire stated there was no record that appellant had filed a change
of address with the DMV. Maguire further
stated the DMV’s records indicated that appellant might have a medical
condition characterized by lapses of consciousness. Accordingly, on July 19,
1999, DMV
sent a written notice to appellant’s last known California address, advising him that his
driver’s license would be suspended unless he completed a reexamination before
August 1999. When appellant failed to do
so, his license was suspended. Finally,
Maguire asserted that “[a] holder of a California driver’s license is always
subject to California vehicle laws when driving in the State of California[,]
including any suspensions to his/her driver’s license[,] notwithstanding
possession of driver’s licenses from other states. If an individual surrenders his California driver’s license to another state,
doing so does not cancel or eliminate his/her California driving privilege.â€
On March
28, 2012,
appellant filed an opposition. He
contended that California waived its immunity by enacting
section 815.6, which provides that a public entity is liable for an injury
caused by a failure to discharge a mandatory duty. He also contended that the DMV could not
claim immunity for not being a “person†under Title 42 United States Code section
1983, because that statute addressed only federal lawsuits by black and mulatto
citizens against members of the Ku Klux Klan for violations of their
constitutional rights. He further
contended that his due process claim alleged intentional wrongdoing. He also asserted that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies by filing a timely claim, as under section 911.2,
subdivision (a), he had 12 months to file a claim with the CVCGCB because he
was not seeking compensation for an injury to his person or personal
property. Finally, he asserted that the
requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act, sections 810 et seq., were
unconstitutional, as they deprived him of equal access to the courts.
On May 16,
2012, the DMV filed a reply, contending (1) that the Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution barred the instant lawsuit, (2) that appellant’s
complaint did not allege any deliberate or intentional governmental decisions
or actions, (3) that section 818.4 expressly immunized the DMV from damages
claims relating to the suspension or revocation of licenses,
section 815.6 implicated in this case, and (5) that the requirements of the
Government Claims Act were constitutional.
On June
26, 2012, the
superior court granted the motion for summary judgment. In its written order, the superior court
determined that the DMV was not subject to liability on either the negligence
cause of action or the due process cause of action. With respect to the negligence cause of
action, the court found (1) that the DMV was not subject to liability,
based on the immunities under sections 815 and 818.4; (2) that appellant failed
to file a timely government claim, in violation of section 911.2; and (3) that
appellant failed to seek judicial review of the denial of his government claim,
in violation of section 946.6. With
respect to the due process cause of action, the court found (1) that the DMV
could not be sued under Title 42 United States Code section 1983 because it is
not a “personâ€; (2) that negligent acts were insufficient to establish
liability; and (3) that appellant could not sue the DMV for monetary damages
for a claimed violation of procedural due
process rights. Appellant timely
appealed.
Appellant
contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“A
defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the record establishes as a matter
of law that none of the plaintiff’s asserted causes of action can prevail.
[Citation.]†(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) Generally, “the party moving for summary
judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of
the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his
burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of
the existence of a triable issue of material fact.†(Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In moving for summary judgment, “all that the
defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one
element of the cause of action -- for example, that the plaintiff cannot prove
element X.†(Id.
at p. 853.)
“‘Review of a
summary judgment motion by an appellate court involves application of the same
three-step process required of the trial court.
[Citation.]’†(Bostrom v. County
of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662.) The three steps are (1) identifying the
issues framed by the complaint, (2) determining whether the moving party has
made an adequate showing that negates the opponent’s claim, and (3) determining
whether the opposing party has raised a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.)
“Although we
independently review the grant of summary judgment [citation], our inquiry is
subject to two constraints. First, we
assess the propriety of summary judgment in light of the contentions raised in
[appellant’s] opening brief.
[Citation.] Second, to determine
whether there is a triable issue, we review the evidence submitted in connection
with summary judgment, with the exception of evidence to which objections have
been appropriately sustained.
[Citations.]†(
USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124.)
B. Appellant’s Complaint
As discussed previously, appellant
sought money damages for alleged negligence and violation of his due process
rights by the DMV. The DMV sought
summary judgment, asserting that as a matter of law, appellant could not
prevail on his causes of action because the DMV was immune under various
federal and state laws. We agree.
The United States Supreme Court has
held as a matter of federal constitutional law that sovereign immunity and the
constitution bar private suits against a state in federal courts or state courts,
unless the state waives its immunity or Congress expressly abrogates that
immunity. (Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706, 729, 745-746.) Here, the State of California has expressly
not waived its immunity to lawsuits for money damages arising from the
suspension of driver’s licenses. Section
815 of the Government Claims Act states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute,†“[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or
any other person.â€
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]
Section 818.4 specifically provides that “[a] public entity is not
liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation
of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license . . . .â€
Thus, appellant cannot demonstrate that the DMV has waived its immunity
to his lawsuit.
Nor has appellant shown that Congress
expressly abrogated the DMV’s immunity to lawsuits for money damages arising
from the suspension of his driver’s license.
The mere fact that one of appellant’s causes of action is a claim for a
violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is insufficient to show
that the DMV’s immunity has been abrogated by Congress. That cause of action was brought under Title
42 United States Code section 1983.
Supreme Court has held that by enacting Title 42 United States Code section
1983, Congress did not intend to “overturn the constitutionally guaranteed
immunity of the several States.†(
342.) Accordingly, sovereign immunity
bars appellant’s claims against the DMV.
Moreover, even were the DMV not
immune to lawsuits based upon an injury arising out of a suspension of a
driver’s license, appellant cannot prevail on his causes of action for
additional and independent reasons. With
respect to the cause of action for negligence, the superior court had no
jurisdiction over the claim, because appellant did not exhaust his
administrative and judicial remedies under the Government Claims Act by timely
presenting a claim to the CVCGCB and requesting relief with the superior
court. (See §§ 911.2 & 945.4; see
also Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist.
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 208 [“Before suing a public entity, the plaintiff must
present a timely written claim for damages to the entity.â€].)
Appellant contends for the first time
on appeal that the filing requirements of the Government Claims Act have been
abrogated or preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.
Even were we to find this argument had not been forfeited, the superior
court did not err in granting summary judgment.
The negligence cause of action is based upon state common law, not upon
a federal right. Appellant’s reliance on
Smith v. Cremins (9th Cir. 1962) 308
F.2d 187 (Smith),
F.2d 702 (Willis), and
F.2d 738 (Donovan) is misplaced. Those cases addressed only the applicability
of the filing requirements of the Government Claims Act to a cause of action
based upon a federal right.
under Title 42 United States Code section 1983 are subject to the three-year
limitations period in Code of Civil Procedure section 338. (Smith,
supra, at p. 190.)
and held that the Government Claims Act could not impose timely filing
requirements that restricted the limitations period. (Willis,
supra, at p. 704;
appellant cannot prevail on his negligence cause of action for the additional
and independent ground that he failed to meet the jurisdictional filing
requirements of the Government Claims Act.
With respect to his due process cause
of action, appellant cannot prevail for the additional reason that the DMV is
not a proper party to a suit under Title 42 United States Code section
1983. That statute provides in pertinent
part that: “Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or
Territory, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law. . . .†(42 U.S.C. §
1983.) The United States Supreme Court
has held that a state and its agencies are not considered “person[s]†for
purposes of a Title 42 United States Code section 1983 damages action. (Will
v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71.) Thus, a cause of action seeking money damages
for a violation of federal due process cannot be brought against the DMV under
Title 42 United States Code section 1983.
In short, the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of the DMV.
name="_ftnref9" title="">[9]
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
MANELLA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Code, unless stated otherwise.
945.4 provides that a claim must be presented to the CVCGCB before a plaintiff
can file a lawsuit against the DMV.
Section 911.2, subdivision (a) provides that a claim relating to
“injury to [a] person or to personal property†must be presented within six
months after accrual of the action.
