Marriage of Dardashti



Filed 4/22/11 Marriage of Dardashti CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Marriage of PARISA and ROBERT DARDASHTI.	B222131 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD441539)
PARISA DARDASHTI, Respondent, v. ROBERT DARDASHTI, Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard Montes, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Dardashti, in pro. per.; and Mac E. Nehoray for Appellant.
Paul Kujawsky for Respondent.


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INTRODUCTION
Robert Dardashti appeals from a judgment of the superior court (1) granting spousal and child support, and (2) holding Parisa Dardashti (respondent) harmless on any obligations arising out of $240,000 that he received as part of a refinance loan. He contends (1) that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of net monthly disposable income used to determine the amount of spousal and child support, and (2) that the trial court erred in charging appellant with receiving $240,000 of community funds while holding respondent harmless on the loan. Finding no error, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties, who have three minor children, were married on January 30, 1995, and separated on March 2, 2006. On November 5, 2008, the parties stipulated to a consolidated trial on respondent’s order to show cause re contempt for appellant’s alleged failure to pay spousal and child support and on appellant’s order to show cause for modification of child support, visitation and spousal support. After a six-day trial, appellant was found in contempt of five prior court orders. The parties then filed pleadings that, among other matters, discussed proposed spousal and child support payments and the proposed disposition of a refinance loan on a property in Oxnard, California.
In her pleading, respondent requested that the court find appellant’s average monthly gross cash flow was no less than $27,492 for the year ending December 31, 2008. She attached an exhibit showing how this amount was calculated: she took 35 percent of the annual gross receipts for appellant’s chiropractic business, added $127,685 for unjustified annual payments to two of his employees, and divided that sum by 12.
With respect to the refinance loan on the Oxnard property, respondent requested the trial court find (1) that the Oxnard property was community property, (2) that appellant fraudulently obtained a $780,000 refinance loan with his sister by claiming that he was a single man when he was married to respondent at the time, (3) that approximately $480,000 of the $780,000 refinance loan was cashed out and made payable to appellant and to his sister, and (4) that appellant received one-half of that amount, or $240,000.
On May 29, 2009, the trial court issued an order (1) granting spousal and child support based upon a determination that appellant’s net monthly disposable income was not less than $27,492, (2) imposing a constructive trust on the Oxnard property, and (3) holding that “the monies that [appellant] has withdrawn are in the nature of a loan for which he will be responsible and for which he will hold [respondent] harmless.” With respect to the credibility of witnesses, the court found appellant “evasive,” lacking in “sincerity,” and “not entirely forthcoming” as to the financial issues in the case. The court further found that “many of [appellant’s] contentions” regarding the financial arrangements of his chiropractic business did “not ring true.”
The trial court agreed with respondent and made all of the findings that she requested. On the issue of appellant’s net monthly disposable income, the trial court determined (1) that the figures on appellant’s tax returns were unreliable, (2) that the gross receipts of his chiropractic business were $577,775 in 2008, (3) that the salaries paid to two of his employees, Maz Jazbi and George Zahedi, should be added to appellant’s cash flow because there was insufficient evidence to show that they earned those salaries, and (4) that appellant had an average monthly cash flow of no less than $27,492. With respect to the refinance loan on the Oxnard property, the trial court found (1) that the property originally belonged to appellant’s sister, (2) that the property was transferred to the sister and to appellant, as “a single man,” although appellant was not a single man at the time, and (3) that appellant and his sister took out a $780,000 refinance loan on the house, of which appellant received $240,000 in cash, which constituted community funds. The trial court determined that appellant’s actions of “acquiring property in his name only and refinancing the property are violations of section 1101 of the Family Code,” and that the refinance loan “constitutes a violation of the fiduciary duty that [appellant] owed to [respondent].”
A judgment of dissolution was entered, and on February 1, 2010, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On October 7, 2010, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for an extension of time. On November 4, 2010, this court summarily denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion (1) by failing to properly calculate his average monthly cash flow, and (2) by ordering appellant to hold respondent harmless on the $240,000 he received from the loan. We address each contention in turn.^[1]
In order to determine the proper amount of child support, the trial court must calculate the parties’ net monthly disposable income. (See Fam. Code, §§ 4055, subd. (b)(1)(E) [formula for statewide uniform guideline for child support includes total net monthly disposable income of both parties], 4059 [total net monthly income is determined by taking gross monthly income and subtracting pro-rata federal and state tax liability].)^[2] Appellant contends that the trial court improperly calculated his net monthly disposable income because (1) it made a mistake in its addition of incomes and (2) it failed to consider his federal and state income tax liability. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court found that his annual income was $33,000, that the annual payment to Jazbi was $71,240, and the annual payment to Zahedi was $60,000. Adding these figures together and dividing by 12 would result in a monthly disposable income of $13,687, not the $27,492 figure determined by the trial court. Moreover, this calculation did not include a deduction for state and federal tax liability. Appellant thus argues that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly calculating his net monthly disposable income to determine his child and spousal support payments. After reviewing the entire record, we reject the premise of appellant’s argument and find no abuse of discretion.^[3]
First, the trial court did not find appellant’s annual income to be $33,000. Rather, it found that appellant was not credible in his testimony regarding his financial matters. The trial court adopted the formula proposed by respondent in determining that appellant’s annual income was approximately 35 percent of the gross receipts of his chiropractic business, or $202,221. The court further found that because there was insufficient evidence to justify the payments made to Jazbi and Zahedi, those amounts should be added back into appellant’s cash flow. Doing so and dividing by 12 yielded the court’s determination of appellant’s net monthly disposable income.^[4] On appeal, appellant challenges neither the 35 percent figure nor the amounts added to it. As for appellant’s claim that the court failed to consider his federal and state tax liability, he fails to acknowledge the court’s finding that the figures on appellant’s tax returns were unreliable. He does not, however, challenge that finding on appeal. As appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred either in its mathematical calculation of his monthly disposable income or in declining to use the unreliable figures of tax liability provided by appellant, he has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Similarly, the trial court did not err in requiring that appellant hold respondent harmless on the “monies that [appellant] has withdrawn.” Appellant contends that the trial court should wait to determine the amount chargeable to appellant until after the property is sold or the loan is repaid. According to appellant, “once the property is sold, then the court can determine the amount of community funds which has to be charged to the Appellant. [¶] If the court charges Appellant with receiving $240,000 in community funds, then the court has to make allowances once Appellant pays back said loan which results in gain of $0 to the Appellant.” Under appellant’s theory, if the price on the Oxnard property dropped precipitously, appellant might be charged with receiving less than $240,000 in community funds. We reject appellant’s contention. Here, the trial court found that appellant had received $240,000 in community funds. Appellant does not challenge this finding. Thus, appellant is liable for receiving at least $240,000 in community funds. Accordingly, even if he repays the loan or sells the property, he is indebted to respondent for at least $120,000.
Appellant also contends that by ordering him to “pay, assume and hold Respondent harmless from [the refinance] loan,” “[i]n essence, Appellant is being charged $480,000 and not $240,000.” We disagree. The trial court held that “the monies that [appellant] has withdrawn are in the nature of a loan for which he will be responsible and for which he will hold [respondent] harmless.” Nowhere does the trial court state that respondent withdrew more than $240,000. Rather, the trial court specifically found that appellant received $240,000 in community funds. Thus, we reject appellant’s claim of error.^[5],
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent Parisa Dardashti.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.




MANELLA, J.

We concur:


EPSTEIN, P. J.


SUZUKAWA, J.

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