Marriage of Avraham
Filed 7/17/12 Marriage of Avraham CA2/7
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
In re Marriage of MIRI and
NATAN AVRAHAM.
B234607
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. SD027039)
MIRI AVRAHAM,
Respondent,
v.
NATAN AVRAHAM,
Appellant.
APPEAL of a
judgment of the Superior Court
of
County. David J. Cowan,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Law Office
of John A. Tkach and John A. Tkach, for Appellant.
Law Offices
of Tobie B. Waxman and Tobie B. Waxman, for Respondent.
_____________________________
Natan
Avraham appeals from the denial of his motion to set aside the judgment entered
after the parties stipulated in open court to the resolution of his family law
dissolution action. Finding no basis for
relief has been stated, we affirm.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Miri and Natan Avraham
were the parties to a highly contested dissolution proceeding. On August
17, 2010, after participating in settlement proceedings, the
parties, each represented by counsel,
placed the terms of the settlement on the record in open court. The court inquired of each party to confirm
that he and she both understood and agreed to be bound to the stated terms and
settlement. The trial court found a
binding agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6,
and ordered Miri’s counsel to prepare a judgment consistent with the terms of
the agreement placed on the record.
Contested hearings followed with
respect to actions the parties were taking in contemplation of the final
judgment, all culminating in a hearing on October 5, 2010.
Natan, through counsel, had filed his written objections to the proposed
judgment prior to the hearing. After
hearing argument on the one remaining objection which the parties did not
resolve in a conference that preceded the hearing, the court entered the
judgment. On April 4, 2011, Natan moved
to set aside portions of the judgment under section 473, subdivision (b) and
Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e); he subsequently entered a written
stipulation to amend certain portions of the judgment. After a hearing the court denied the motion
to set aside. This timely appeal
followed.
We begin by noting that Natan
argues on appeal that a number of sections of the judgment contained provisions
that were not part of the oral agreement on the record. Of the 17 different provisions he cites, he
raised only six in his written objections prior to the entry of judgment by the
trial court. What he nowhere
acknowledges, however, is that the parties resolved all but one of the issues
raised in the written objections by agreement; only one was left for resolution
by the court, and we will address that provision.
With respect to the motion to set aside,
an additional nine provisions were raised.
Those will be discussed separately.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In hearing a section 664.6 motion,
the trial court may receive evidence, resolve issues, and determine what the
parties had previously agreed to in the disposition placed on the record before
it. (Weddington
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 (
they are supported by substantial evidence.
(Id. at p. 815;
1242, 1253 (Critzer);
561, 565.) We will resolve any
evidentiary conflicts, drawing all necessary inferences, to support the trial
court’s findings and order enforcing an agreement. (Osumi
v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
Objections to the
Judgment
Section 664.6 is a summary
procedure; it permits enforcement of a settlement agreement by the entry of
judgment. A settlement
is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material
settlement terms. (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104
Cal.App.4th 1421, 1430–1432 (Elyaoudayan);
Weddington Productions, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811-813.) The court ruling on the motion may consider
the parties’ declarations and
other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to, and the court’s
factual findings in this regard are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard. (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 911; Casa de
Valley View Owner’s Assn. v. Stevenson (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189–1190.) If the court determines that the parties
entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a
formal judgment.
Cal.App.3d 989, 995.) The statute
expressly provides for the court to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of
the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
664.6; Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182-1183.)
Of the 17 issues Natan raised on
appeal, he objected to only six prior to the entry of judgment: 3.1; 6.3; 6.4; 6.4.1; 6.4.2; and 13.1.2. At the hearing on October 5, 2010, the court
indicated that, following a conference with counsel, all of those issues but
one had been agreed to; counsel did not contradict the court’s understanding. Having failed to seek rulings on these
grounds, and indeed, having stipulated to the judgment as to those grounds,
Natan has waived any right to appeal.
(See, e.g., Critzer, supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1261-1262.) A party
may not expressly agree to an action in the trial court, and then attack it on
appeal. (Nevada County Office of Education v. Riles (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d
767, 779.)
As to the only remaining issue,
paragraph 13.1.2, the waiver of Watts
credits, Natan’s counsel presented argument.
The court, indicating that the settlement expressly covered issues that
would have implicated Watts credits,
overruled the objection.
Natan has not demonstrated that the
ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. Watts
credits concern reimbursement for the use of community assets after the date of
separation, here related to Miri’s use of the family residence. The parties were explicit, however, as to a
number of financial issues post-separation, and agreed to detailed provisions
concerning the division of expenses for themselves and the children, without
reserving any right for Natan to seek additional credits. Indeed, the court was careful, when the oral
agreement was placed on the record in August 2010, to ask the parties, through
counsel, whether any issues remained.
The parties identified only spousal support, custody, visitation and
child support issues, and placed on the record the agreement with respect to
those issues. Neither Natan nor his
counsel mentioned, nor sought to reserve, the Watts issue.
On appeal, Natan argues that the
waiver of Watts credits was a term
that had not been agreed to, but fails to discuss in any manner the court’s
reasoning or explain why its conclusion that it had been an implicit part of
the agreement was not supported by substantial evidence. This is insufficient to satisfy his burden on
appeal.
Merely stating a ruling was in
error is insufficient to present an issue for review. “This is no legal analysis at all. It is simply a conclusion, unsupported by any
explanation” of asserted error. (
410.) “Mere suggestions of error without
supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not
properly present grounds for appellate review.”
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
1066, 1078.)
Motion To Set Aside
Represented by new counsel, Natan
filed a post-judgment motion to set aside on April 4, 2011. On appeal, he challenges the ruling as to
nine provisions on which he sought relief in the trial court under section 473,
subdivision (b) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect) and
Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e) (mistake). He seeks relief grounded in those statutory
provisions in this court on a different basis, however, arguing not mistake,
but instead that the court imposed material terms to which the parties had not
agreed, in violation of section 664.6. He
sets forth no authority that the court improperly denied relief under those
statutory provisions; thus even if, contrary to our earlier discussion, we were
to agree that the court improperly denied relief under section 646.6, he has
stated no basis for relief.
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In the absence of citation to authority,
he has provided no basis for this court to reach the issue. “When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument
it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is
unnecessary. [Citations.]” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.) “[P]arties
are required
citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary
elements allows this court to treat appellant’s . . . issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.)
We note the finding
of the trial court that Natan seemed dissatisfied with the agreement, and that
his objections appeared to reflect an intent to renegotiate the terms. This is not the first time such an issue has
been raised; in Elyaoudayan, supra,
104 Cal.App.4th 1421, at page 1431, the court made clear that such objections
were not valid: “Having orally agreed to
settlement terms before the court, parties may not escape their obligations by
refusing to sign a written agreement that conforms to the oral terms. The oral settlement, like any agreement,
‘imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.’
[Citations].”
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover her costs on appeal.
ZELON,
J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P.
J.
JACKSON, J.
the parties share a last name, we shall refer to them by their first names for
clarity, and not out of disrespect.
Natan asserts he was not represented by counsel on this date, the record is to
the contrary.
