Marriage of Alving and Katrekar

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 8/23/12  Marriage of Alving and Katrekar CA6

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SIXTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

 
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In re the Marriage of ANJALI ALVING and ASHISH KATREKAR.	H037399      (Santa Clara County       Super. Ct. No. FL136943)
ANJALI ALVING,   Appellant,   v.   ASHISH KATREKAR,   Respondent.

 

            Appellant
Anjali Alving appeals from an order awarding href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">physical custody of the parties’ two
children to respondent Ashish Katrekar, her former husband.  We find no error and affirm.

 

I.  Background

            Appellant
and respondent were married in 1995 and separated in October 2006.  They have two minor sons.  Pursuant to a href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">judgment of dissolution that was filed
in December 2007, the parties had joint legal and physical custody of the
children.

            After
appellant remarried, she accepted a position in the Boston
area in November 2009.  Appellant
then filed an order to show cause in which she requested that she be allowed to
move to the Boston area with the
children.  In December 2009, appellant
moved to the Boston area.  The children remained with respondent in California
and visited with appellant pursuant to a December 10, 2009 order.

            The matter
was referred to Family Court Services for an evaluation of physical custody,
visitation, and move-away issues. 
Patricia Coil prepared an evaluation report with recommendations.  After the evaluator interviewed appellant,
respondent, and both children, and observed the children with each party, she
recommended that the children, who were then 11 and seven years old, continue
to live with respondent and have visitation with appellant.

            After the
trial court held a hearing, it found that it was in the children’s best
interests to stay in California
with respondent and have visitation with appellant.

 

II.  Discussion

            Appellant
contends that there were significant errors in the evaluation report, and that
she was prevented from establishing these errors because the evaluator, who was
not subpoenaed by either party, did not appear at the hearing.  Appellant contends that since she was a
self-represented litigant the trial court erred by failing to advise her that
she could request that the hearing be continued to allow her to subpoena the
evaluator.

            Self-name="SR;1482">represented litigants are “held to the same
standards as attorneys.  [Citation.]” 
(Kobayashi v. Superior Court
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)  As the
California Supreme Court has stated, “[S]elf-representation is not a ground for
exceptionally lenient treatment.”  (>Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th
975, 984.)  The court explained that “[a]
doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who
represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be
unfair to the other parties to litigation.” 
(Id. at p. 985.)  Since self-representation alone is not a
ground for lenient treatment, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
failing to advise appellant that she could seek a continuance in order to
subpoena the evaluator. 

            Appellant
next contends that it “is the judiciary’s preference to resolve matters on
their merits rather than by procedural default.”  (Boldface omitted.)  We reject this contention.  It is well-settled that “[t]he court may
grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring a
continuance.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1332(c).)  This court reviews the trial
court’s determination under the abuse of discretion standard.  (Oliveros
v. County> of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
1389, 1395.)  Thus, even if appellant had
been aware that she could request a continuance, she could not establish good
cause for a continuance because she failed to subpoena the evaluator.

            Appellant also contends that the
trial court failed in its duties “to avoid a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">miscarriage of justice” and to ensure
that “ ‘verbal instructions given in
court and written notices are clear and understandable by a layperson,’ ” quoting Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.  (Boldface & italics omitted.)  She further contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing:  to
review her proposed visitation schedule; “to include a clause specifying that
she under circumstances of excusable absence would not be responsible for the
children during the scheduled visitation time;” and to include a provision that
allowed the children to visit each parent during the festival of Diwali.

            We presume
that the judgment is correct and the appellant has the burden of overcoming
this presumption by affirmatively showing error on an adequate record.  (Ketchum
v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.)  Here, we are unable to review appellant’s
contentions, since she has failed to provide a name="SR;3763">reporter’s transcript of the
hearing.  Accordingly, we reject these
contentions.

 




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III.  Disposition

            The order
is affirmed.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                        _______________________________

                                                                        Mihara,
J.

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

 

______________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.

 

 

 

 

 

______________________________

Duffy, J.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">*