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MacKenzie v. Madden

MacKenzie v. Madden
04:29:2013





MacKenzie v




MacKenzie v. Madden





















Filed 4/25/13 MacKenzie v. Madden CA2/6









NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.











IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT



DIVISION SIX




>






R. BRUCE MacKENZIE et al.,



Plaintiffs,
Cross-defendants, and

Respondents,



v.



JOSEPH E. MADDEN et al.,



Defendants,
Cross-complainants, and

Appellants.




2d Civil No.
B234252

(Super. Ct. No.
1338982)

(Santa
Barbara County)








Respondents R. Bruce and
Louise MacKenzie and their neighbors, including appellants Joseph E. and
Christy Madden, all have a private road easement incident to the ownership of
their respective parcels. To protect against
flooding from an adjacent creek and provide privacy to their road, respondents
and a group of their neighbors placed a berm, rocks and hedges along the outer
edge of the parcel of property owned by appellants, who live on the other side
of the creek and reach their residence from a different road. Appellants did not approve of the changes and
litigation ensued. Following a three-day
bench trial that included a visit to the site, the trial court found the
improvements were a proper exercise of respondents' rights and duties under a
right-of-way easement and accordingly entered judgment in their favor. Appellants contend the court's ruling is
legally and factually erroneous. We
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

La Vuelta
Road (La Vuelta or the road) is a
"u"-shaped road in Montecito that begins and ends at two points along
North Jameson Lane, which
runs parallel to Highway 101. The road
was created in 1921 pursuant to a survey subdivision map of the "Hermosa
Vista Property," which includes part of the San Ysidro Creek (the creek).href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] The subdivision consists of 16 parcels, all
but one of which are bounded on one side by the centerline of La Vuelta. Thirteen of the parcels are entirely east of
the creek, while two of the remaining parcels begin west of the creek and
extend eastward over the creek to the centerline of La Vuelta.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] The owner of each parcel of property that
includes a portion of La Vuelta also owns a 30-foot wide easement (the La
Vuelta easement or the easement), which gives them "a right of way for all
of the uses and purposes of a private roadway."

Over the years, the
residents of the subdivision have treated La Vuelta as a private road and have
borne all responsibility for its maintenance and repair. "Private road" signs have been at
both ends of the road for the past several decades.

For the last 25 years,
respondents have lived on the parcel of property that runs east from the
centerline of La Vuelta at its western entrance. In 1995, appellants purchased the
southernmost parcel of property that begins east of the creek and extends
eastward to the centerline of La Vuelta.
Their residence is east of the creek and is reached by a different road.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] The property is roughly the shape of an
"upside-down" right triangle.
The southernmost point of the property, which is wedged between the
creek and the western edge of La Vuelta, is approximately 81 feet long. The portion of appellants' property in this
area that is not part of the La Vuelta roadway easement, which the trial court
accurately characterized as "icicle"-shaped, is approximately four
feet at its widest and gradually narrows to a width of about one inch until it
ends to the west of respondents' driveway.


Although appellants
cannot access their property from La Vuelta by vehicle, Joseph Madden often
parks vehicles along the road and during dry times often hikes through the
creek bed to reach the bus stop on Jameson.
Christy Madden has also been known to traverse the creek bed to reach
the home of her parents, who live on La Vuelta.


In recent years, heavy
rains have caused the creek to swell and flood La Vuelta from the southernmost
area of appellants' property and a small triangular-shaped property to its
south that is owned by a third party.
After Jameson Lane was widened in 2007, respondents and their neighbors
noticed an increase in motorists attempting to use La Vuelta as an alternate
route only to discover that it ends on Jameson, very near their starting
point. Motorists were also cutting
across the triangular-shaped property to obtain access to La Vuelta.

To address these
concerns, respondents and a majority of their neighbors decided to place
electronic gates at both entrances to La Vuelta. They also undertook to place a berm, rocks,
and hedges within the La Vuelta easement along the edge of the road where the
flooding occurs, which includes a portion of the narrow southernmost strip of
appellants' property. Appellants were
included in all of the discussions, and initially did not contest the changes. After respondents obtained permits and began installing
the gate columns, however, appellants complained to the County of Santa Barbara
(the County) that one of the columns was on their property. The County took no action because neither of
the columns were on appellants' property and did not interfere with the
County's property rights.

Appellants also
challenged the placement of the berm, rocks, and hedges on their property. After appellants stated their intent to
remove the improvements and replace them with a chain link fence and gate,
respondents filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Following the sustaining of a demurrer,
respondents filed an amended complaint to which a demurrer was overruled.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] Appellants filed a cross-complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for trespass.

Following a bifurcated
trial on the equitable claims, the court found in favor of respondents. In its statement of decision, the court
indicated that "the foundation" for its ruling was the language in
appellants' own deed describing the easement at issue as "a right of way
for all of the uses and purposes of a private roadway." Based on this language, the court found
"that the berm, boulders and hedge are all appropriate additions to the
land, as they add true and necessary protection to the roadway for the common
good in the prevention of flooding, and which do very little if anything at all
to interfere with [appellants'] permissible use of the easement area for
parking. It is obvious that Mr. Madden
won't be able to walk from the creek bed through the hedge to get to the bus
stop, but he still has a clear pathway from the creek bed up to Jamison Road [>sic] on the north side of the
hedge." The court further found
that "the improvements pose the least burdensome interference with
[appellants'] use of their property, consistent with their obligations under
the easement. The Court is impressed
with the creativity and restraint shown by the builder. The improvements were carefully placed within
[appellants'] land over which the easement runs. No part of the improvements encroaches on the
unencumbered parts of their property."


The court also found
that appellants' proposed construction of a chain-link fence along the easement
was inconsistent with respondents' rights under the easement, and accordingly
ruled that appellants "have lost the right to erect a fence, gate, or
bridge on their property within the area of the easement." The court noted that it "did not engage
further in a weighing process, balancing hardship against benefit, as it is not
necessary to do so where the evidence is so compelling as to prompt a
determination that there is virtually no interference with [appellants']
historical use of this tiny 'icicle' of land which has always been subject to
the easement."

In its judgment, the
court declared that respondents had the right to maintain the subject
improvements and that appellants were prohibited from removing them or erecting
a fence within the area of the easement.
The judgment further gives respondents the right to complete the gate
project subject to the County's approval.href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] The court declined respondents' request that
it issue a further declaration "that they have the right, at some future
unspecified time, to add to any of the improvements which are the subject of
this suit. Such relief is speculative
and beyond the scope of this proceeding."
Appellants timely appealed following the denial of their href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">motion for a new trial.

DISCUSSION

Appellants claim (1) the
berm, rocks, and hedge respondents placed within the La Vuelta right-of-way
easement on appellants' property are unlawful because La Vuelta is a public
road; (2) the court erred in finding the road is private based solely on
language included in the deed to appellants' property; and (3) the improvements
in any event go beyond the scope of respondents' easement. None of these claims has merit.

In its ruling, the court
found that whether La Vuelta was offered or accepted for dedication as a public
road is essentially irrelevant to the issue whether respondents had the right
to maintain the road pursuant to the grant of a private easement. The law is in accord. Over 100 years ago, our Supreme Court
stated: "It is a thoroughly
established proposition in this state that when one lays out a tract of land
into lots and streets and sells the lots by reference to a map which exhibits
the lots and streets as they lie with relation to each other, the purchasers of
such lots have a private easement in the streets opposite their respective
lots, for ingress and egress and for any use proper to a private way, and that
this private easement is entirely independent of the fact of dedication to
public use . . . ." (>Danielson v. Sykes (1910) 157 Cal. 686,
689 (Danielson).) For this reason, it is also irrelevant
whether deeds to some of the parcels did not include express references to this
type of easement.

The only issue remaining
for our review is whether the court erred in finding that the subject
improvements were within the scope of the easement. To the extent the existence or scope of an
easement hinges on findings of fact, we review the trial court's findings for href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">substantial evidence. (See Warsaw
v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc.
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570.)

As we have noted,
respondents are entitled to use the La Vuelta easement "for ingress and
egress and for any use proper to a private way . . . ." (Danielson,
supra
, 157 Cal. at p. 689.) It has
long been settled that the right to use property for road purposes includes
"a right to make necessary and reasonable improvements for the purpose for
which it was intended to be used."
(Zimmerman v. Young (1946) 74
Cal.App.2d 623, 628; see also Healy v.
Onstott
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 612, 617; 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real
Estate (3d ed. 2006) Easements, § 15:67, pp. 15-223 & 15-224.) Substantial evidence supports the court's
finding that the subject improvements were reasonable and necessary to prevent
the creek from flooding La Vuelta and provide privacy and security from drivers
who were attempting the access the road through that area. Substantial evidence also supports the
finding that the improvements were minimally intrusive and placed the least
possible burden on appellants' property.

Appellants' reliance on >Herzog v. Grosso (1953) 41 Cal.2d 219 (Herzog),
is unavailing. In Herzog, the owners of a servient tenement were sued for interfering
with the dominant tenement owners' use of an easement, consisting of a private
road near Universal Studios that had been provided to them by a prior
owner. The trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs that required the defendants to, among
other things, remove a gate and fence they had erected at the entrance to the
road. (Id. at p. 224.) In
affirming, the Supreme Court adopted the trial court's findings "that the
fence and gates interfered with plaintiffs' free use and enjoyment of the
easement. Plaintiffs' home is located in
a large city and the road should be kept unobstructed for adequate access by
the fire department, police department, and other public agencies. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) The opinion goes on to state: "Defendants suggest that they should be
allowed to maintain the gates and fence to prevent motorists from mistaking the
road for a public road and entering defendants' property. Plaintiffs concede that defendants are 'free
to put up any sign deemed necessary as would not unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs'
use of the easement.' It would appear
that defendants could thus be adequately protected." (Id. at
p. 225.)

As relevant to the
instant case, the court in Herzog also
affirmed the judgment to the extent it gave the plaintiffs the right to
construct and maintain a wooden guard rail along one side of the easement. In rejecting the defendants' claim that this
aspect of the judgment unduly burdened the servient tenement, the court
reasoned: "By the grant of the
easement, however, plaintiffs acquired the right to do such things as are reasonably
necessary to their use thereof.
[Citations.] Since the road
adjoins a steep embankment, guardrails are reasonably necessary and would not
unduly burden the servient tenement."
(Herzog, supra, 41 Cal.2d at
p. 225.) As we have explained, the particular
facts of this case support the court's finding that respondents' improvements,
including the columns and gate, were reasonably necessary to their use and
enjoyment of La Vuelta and did not unduly burden appellants' use of their
property.

Appellants also rely on >Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 697 (Scruby), for the
proposition that "[t]he conveyance of an easement limited to roadway use
grants a right of ingress and egress and a right to unobstructed passage to the
holder of the easement. A roadway
easement does not include the right to use the easement for any other
purpose." (Id. at p. 703.) The easement
in Scruby, however, was merely
"for road and utility purposes."
(Ibid.) Respondents' easement is not so limited. (Danielson,
supra
, 157 Cal. at p. 689.)
Moreover, the primary issue in Scruby
was whether a winery's placement of grapevines within the dominant tenement
owner's 52-foot wide roadway easement unreasonably interfered with the use of
said easement. (Scruby, at p. 700.) The
trial court's affirmative finding on that issue was supported by substantial
evidence and was thus upheld on appeal.
(Id. at p. 705.) The trial court's finding that the dominant
tenement holder's pavement of a portion of the easement "was not incident
to the reasonable repair and maintenance of the easement" was similarly
upheld. (Id. at p. 707.)href="#_ftn6"
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6] Substantial evidence also supports the
contrary findings at issue in this case.href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="">[7]

DISPOSITION

The judgment is
affirmed. Respondents shall recover
their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.





PERREN,
J.

We concur:







GILBERT, P. J.







YEGAN, J.

>

Denise de Bellefeuille, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________



Law Office of John C.
Lauritsen, John C. Lauritsen; Law Office of Mark D. Jamison and Mark D. Jamison
for Appellants.

Richardson, Fair &
Cohen, Manuel Dominguez; Law Offices of Bruce MacKenzie and Bruce MacKenzie for
Respondents.





id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="">[1] When the map was created, Jameson Lane was
part of Pacific Coast Highway.



id=ftn2>

href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The last parcel, which is depicted in the
northwest corner of the subdivision map, lies west of the creek and does not
include any portion of La Vuelta.



id=ftn3>

href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="">[3] Appellants' property and the other two Hermosa
Vista parcels west of La Vuelta are accessed by Tiburon Bay Road and bear
addresses for that road.

id=ftn4>

href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="">[4] The amended complaint also named Charles Crail
as a defendant. Crail owns the parcel of
property west of appellants' property.
Crail's property is not part of the Hermosa Vista subdivision. He was sued after respondents discovered he
was planning to give appellants an easement that would have allowed them to
build a bridge over the creek, with the theoretical purpose of obtaining
vehicle access to their property from La Vuelta. Crail was dismissed from the case pursuant to
a settlement in which he agreed to refrain from offering any easement to
appellants.

id=ftn5>

href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="">[5] Appellants will be given a key to open the
gate once it is installed. According to
respondents' representation, pedestrians will still be able to access the road
through a pedestrian gate at the southwest end.


id=ftn6>

href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="">[6] The trial court's finding was based on
evidence that before the dominant tenement holder (Scruby) paved a strip of
property near the entrance to the easement from the highway, he had been
informed that the winery's use permit required that the entrance be moved
farther south along the highway to allow a proper turning radius from the
highway to the winery property. After
viewing the scene, the trial court also found "'that for safety reasons a
single entrance to the winery property is essential.'" (Scruby,
supra
, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.)



id=ftn7>

href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title="">[7] For the first time in their reply brief,
appellants refer us to Buechner v. Jonas (1964)
228 Cal.App.2d 127. The only relevant
similarity between Buechner and the
instant case is that both involved a dominant tenement holder's placement of a
hedge in a roadway easement. In >Buechner, the primary issue was whether
the dominant tenement holder had either extinguished or limited her right to
use the easement by planting the hedge.
(Id. at p. 130.) Moreover, the dominant tenement holder never
claimed any right to maintain the hedge, which the trial court found "was
purely ornamental and temporary." (>Id. at pp. 129-130.) The facts and issues in this case are plainly
dissimilar. Cottonwood Duplexes v. Barlow (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1501, which
was issued after appellants filed their reply brief, is also inapposite. In that case, the court framed the issue as
"whether a court can partially extinguish a granted easement if the
evidence shows that the owner of the dominant tenement does not reasonably
need, either now or in the future, the entirety of the easement . . .
." (Id. at p. 1508.) The court's
ruling in this case neither expressly nor implicitly extinguished any portion
of either party's easement.








Description Respondents R. Bruce and Louise MacKenzie and their neighbors, including appellants Joseph E. and Christy Madden, all have a private road easement incident to the ownership of their respective parcels. To protect against flooding from an adjacent creek and provide privacy to their road, respondents and a group of their neighbors placed a berm, rocks and hedges along the outer edge of the parcel of property owned by appellants, who live on the other side of the creek and reach their residence from a different road. Appellants did not approve of the changes and litigation ensued. Following a three-day bench trial that included a visit to the site, the trial court found the improvements were a proper exercise of respondents' rights and duties under a right-of-way easement and accordingly entered judgment in their favor. Appellants contend the court's ruling is legally and factually erroneous. We affirm.
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