Filed 12/21/18 Klatte, Budensiek & Young-Agriesti, LLP v. Knoot CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

Defendant and appellant Matthew Knoot (Knoot)[1] appeals from the trial court’s issuance of a Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8[2] restraining order requested by plaintiff and respondent law firm Klatte, Budensiek, Young-Agriesti, LLP (KBY), on behalf of its employee, attorney Yeun C. Yim (Yim). We affirm.

Background

KBY represented Knoot’s former employer in an arbitration proceeding initiated by Knoot in May 2017. Knoot represented himself in the proceeding. In December 2017, KBY filed a petition seeking a section 527.8 workplace violence restraining order against Knoot on behalf of Yim.

KBY’s petition was supported by declarations showing the following. In October 2017, Knoot sent Yim an e-mail describing himself as a “LIFE-LONG enemy” and threatening “things will be put in motion that can’t be stopped.” He also threatened that if Yim did not “do the smart thing here and end it all now,” she would “suffer[] for the next 40 years.”

In November 2017, Yim conducted the deposition of Knoot for the arbitration by video conference. During the course of the deposition, Knoot twice removed and unfolded a knife. Yim averred, “At times, Mr. Knoot would look directly at me while using the knife, he would gesture with the knife in his hand, he would pierce pieces of fruit with the knife, and he would keep the knife within my view for prolonged periods such that I felt that he was attempting to intimidate me.” When asked about symptoms of emotional distress as relevant to his damages claim, Knoot said he has “dreams about hurting people.” When Yim asked Knoot who he dreamed about hurting, he said “You.” He said he did not recall how many times he had dreamed of hurting Yim, not even whether it was more or less than ten times. Yim asked Knoot why he had dreams of hurting people, and Knoot responded, “Because I hate [sic] you’re a horrible person.” Yim also asked Knoot whether he “wish[ed]” to hurt “someone,” and Knoot responded, “I don’t recall at this time.”

On December 4, 2017, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing for December 27. On December 7, after KBY served the temporary restraining order, Knoot sent KBY an e-mail stating, “Let it be obvious that the accusation of me making ‘threats’, were not threats at all, just a foreshadowing of the actual events that were coming.”

The hearing was continued to January 12, 2018 on Knoot’s request. The trial court viewed video excerpts of Knoot’s arbitration deposition and observed that Knoot removed a knife and used it to cut an apple. The court observed, “It is not a pen knife, and it is not a small knife. It appears to be some sort of—I wouldn’t say a hunting knife, but a utility knife. It is not a Swiss Army knife. I believe it appears to be . . . approximately three to four inches, and it’s shaped like what we commonly consider a butcher knife.” With respect to the portion showing Knoot answering Yim’s question as to who he “dreamed of hurting,” the trial court observed, “So for the record, when she asked that question, he was looking down, he smirked and said, ‘You.’ ” Knoot admitted that he brought out a knife during the deposition and that he testified at the deposition that he had dreams of hurting Yim. He told the court he had a “dislike and distaste” for Yim and had “seen her do some very, very immoral, illegal, and otherwise shady things” which led to an “extreme dislike for this woman as any normal person who follows the law and is a just person would.”

After the hearing, the trial court issued a 3-year workplace violence restraining order against Knoot and in favor of Yim.

Discussion

Section 527.8 enables an “employer to seek an injunction to prevent violence or threatened violence against its employees.” (City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 536 (Garbett).)[3] Under section 527.8, subdivision (j), a trial court “order shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence” if it “finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence.” A “credible threat of violence” is “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) We review the trial court’s order under the “substantial evidence” standard of review. (Garbett, at pp. 537–538.) We “resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party, and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s findings.” (Id. at 538.)

Knoot challenges the sufficiency of the evidence he made a credible threat of violence towards Yim. However, his arguments are based on his own testimony and his own interpretations of the evidence before the trial court. We are required to defer to the trial court’s assessments of the evidence and credibility determinations, and the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding Knoot engaged in conduct towards Yim “that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) Knoot asserts that he lacked (and still lacks) any intent to inflict physical harm on Yim, but a finding of such subjective intent is unnecessary to support the issuance of an injunction under section 527.8. (Garbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 [“appellant’s subjective intent was not required for his conduct to be deemed a credible threat”]; id. at p. 539 [section 527.8 “requires only a statement made knowingly and willfully, which would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety”].)

Knoot argues his admission to having dreamed of harming Yim served a “legitimate purpose” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2)), because he was answering a question asked by Yim in the arbitration deposition. However, his smirking served no legitimate purpose, and his disingenuous answers that he did not recall whether he had such dreams more or less than ten times, or whether he wished to hurt someone, served no legitimate purpose and reasonably could have put Yim in concern for her safety. The circumstance that Knoot frequently answered questions in the deposition by saying he did not recall does not mean a reasonable person could not have been placed in fear by Knoot’s answers to those particular questions.

Knoot contends KBY misled the trial court in several respects. He argues the video of the arbitration deposition spliced together various incidents that were separated by a substantial period of time. But KBY’s counsel told the trial court he was showing “three clips.” Knoot argues KBY’s counsel mischaracterized the knife he used during the deposition by calling it an “assault-style knife.” But any mischaracterization was harmless, because the trial court viewed the video and came to its own conclusions about the nature of the knife. Knoot contends KBY misled the court because his October 2017 threat of “suffering for the next 40 years” was actually referring to a complaint he had filed or intended to file with the California Bar Association. He asserts the cover page of the complaint was attached to the e-mail, but he fails to provide a record citation supporting that assertion. In any event, the trial court could reasonably find Knoot’s extreme language in the e-mail (“LIFE-LONG enemy” and “40 years” of “suffering”) added to the credibility of Knoot’s subsequent threatening conduct.

Knoot contends he was not timely served with two documents, including “Petitioner’s Supplemental Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss” and “Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice.” However, he fails to cite to any portion of the record where he objected on the basis of untimely service and requested an opportunity to respond. In any event, any untimely service was harmless because Knoot fails to identify any evidence or argument he would have presented had he received the documents at any earlier time. Knoot also contends he “was not allowed enough time to prepare his defense” because he returned from a trip seven days before the January 2018 hearing. However, he cites no portion of the record where he requested a further continuance, and he identifies no evidence he could have presented had he had more time to prepare.

Knoot contends he was denied “proper opportunity to describe the previous events to show justification of Knoot’s feelings towards Ms. Yim, or the opportunity to show that any reasonable person would share the same feelings, and that Ms. Yim should be expecting Mr. Knoot to hate her based on Ms. Yim’s own actions.” Knoot has not shown error. A trial court has broad discretion to exclude evidence where the “probative value” of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 352.) In the present case, even assuming Knoot’s reasons for hating Yim were not completely irrelevant, the issue before the trial court was whether Knoot had made a “credible threat of violence.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) To the extent the trial court declined to hear evidence regarding the causes for Knoot’s feelings about Yim, it was not error. The trial court could reasonably conclude it did not need to hear a detailed explanation about the reasons for Knoot’s feelings because issuance of an injunction under section 527.8 was required if Knoot threatened violence, even if his feelings of hatred were justified by Yim’s actions (which we do not intend to suggest was the case).[4]

Finally, Knoot contends the trial court was biased against him. He fails to show the court abused its discretion in any of the cited evidentiary rulings and admonishments. And, even if he did demonstrate error, it would not be sufficient to show bias or appearance of bias on the part of the trial court judge below. (See People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112, overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151 [“a trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review”].)

Disposition

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

NEEDHAM, J.

BRUINIERS, J.*

(A153594)