Juan
C. v. Super. Ct.
Filed
9/13/13 Juan C. v.
Super. Ct. CA4/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
JUAN C.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF ORANGE
COUNTY,
Respondent;
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES
AGENCY et. al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
G048507
(Super. Ct.
No. DP021497)
O P I N I O N
Original proceedings;
petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jacki C. Brown, Judge. Petition
denied.
Lawrence
A. Aufill for Petitioner.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County
Counsel, Karen L.
Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest
Orange County Social Services Agency.
Yana
Kennedy for Minor.
*
* *
Juan C. (father) seeks
order terminating reunification services for his son M.C. (born July 2011) and
setting a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 (all statutory references are to this code)
hearing for September 20, 2013. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.450.) Father
contends there is insufficient evidence
to support the juvenile court’s finding that returning M.C. to father’s physical
custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his physical or
emotional well-being. Father also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s conclusion
father was offered or received reasonable reunification services. Finding no error, we deny the petition.
I
Facts and Procedural Background
On July 24, 2011, Los Alamitos police received a report
of a woman acting erratically outside a homeless shelter. Officers observed N.L. (mother) swinging
newborn M.C. by the lower body, causing his head to flop dangerously back and
forth. Mother proclaimed she was “dancing
for the Gods and here is my sacrifice for the Gods.†Mother was unkempt, and appeared to be under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Mother dropped the infant to the ground and kicked him, causing him to
flip over. M.C. suffered serious injuries,
including internal brain bleeding, requiring hospitalization in a surgical
intensive care unit.
The officer arrested mother
for child endangerment and other
offenses. A social worker with the Orange
County Social Services Agency (SSA) interviewed mother later at the jail. Mother denied harming M.C., but acted
erratically during the interview, and threatened the social worker. Mother told the social worker M.C.’s “father
was in heaven†and the social worker “should ask Moses to send the father down
to pick up the child.â€
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The social worker located
father two days later. He and mother
were not married, but had been together for about 18 months, and he was with
mother shortly before the precipitating incident. Father revealed he suffered from depression
and had been hospitalized five times for mental health issues. Homeless and living a transient lifestyle, he declared
he could not currently care for an infant.
SSA filed a
mother intentionally inflicted serious physical harm to him, his parents failed
to protect him or provide him with adequate care, leaving him without support,
and his parents suffered from mental illness.
(§300, subds. (a), (b), (e) & (g).)
SSA placed M.C. in a
foster home upon his release from the hospital. The social worker discussed the allegations of
the petition with father in mid-August 2011.
Father stated he noticed a lump on the back of M.C.’s head about a week
before the incident. Mother claimed she
did not know how it occurred. Before the
incident, mother had been acting erratically and had refused to take her medication. On the day mother injured M.C., she struck father
during an argument. He took the baby
back to the shelter, but the manager “shut the door in†his face. He left M.C. with mother and returned to Santa
Monica.
About a year elapsed
between the detention hearing and the jurisdiction hearing. During this period, M.C. manifested significant
developmental, neurological, and cognitive deficits. He initially required phenobarbital because
of tremors, possibly caused by in utero drug exposure, and required hours of
physical and occupational therapy and other services weekly.
Father briefly relocated
to an Orange County
shelter, but soon returned to Los Angeles
County. Father recommended a paternal aunt in Florida
as a placement resource. The aunt
reported father “had a very difficult life since childhood.†Both of father’s parents had mental health
problems or substance abuse issues.
Father was left to “fend for himself on the streets at age 14.â€
SSA gave father bus
passes and arranged weekly monitored visitation, but father visited M.C. infrequently. During visits, he often demonstrated poor
parenting skills and appeared to “lack [] understanding of the child’s severe
developmental delays.†Despite
instruction from the monitors, father did not “engage with [M.C.], talk to him,
smile at him, etc.†He did not ask
questions about M.C.’s condition and it was “concerning . . . that he doesn’t
take more of an interest . . . .†At one
point father declared he was “not gonna go see [M.C.] ever again.†He enrolled in a parenting class, but did not
complete the course. Father received mental
health counseling through Los Angeles
County and assistance through a homeless
outreach center. Father acknowledged on
several occasions he could not care for M.C. because of his own mental health
issues and an unstable housing situation.
In June 2012, father
appeared mentally stable and had been living in an apartment for two months. But by late July, he was again living on the
streets after an altercation with a roommate.
He asked to have his case transferred to Los
Angeles, where he was searching for employment and
housing, explaining it was too difficult to travel to Orange
County to visit M.C. and complete
his court-ordered services.
In July 2012, father
pleaded no contest to the allegations of the petition as amended. The juvenile court found the allegations to
be true.
Father continued to have
difficulty embracing his parental responsibilities while visiting M.C. In September 2012, father did not attempt to
correct M.C.’s errant behavior or “verbally engage in any communication with
the child. He . . . just stands or sits
around the child.†When M.C. tried to
put his finger in a light socket, father did not move to protect or redirect
him, and the monitor had to remove the child from the area.
Father had obtained
employment, but he continued to live on the streets. He explained he could not “live in any type
of shelter, or housing . . . where he is told he must follow certain rules and
conditions.†He stopped seeing his
therapist and psychiatrist, and stopped taking his prescribed medication, asserting
he no longer needed it. He had not
completed any of his case plan requirements and did not visit M.C. The social worker informed father he must secure
housing, maintain employment, and seek childcare for M.C. to have the child
returned to his care. Father complained “this
appeared to be too much.â€
The social worker
reported in late October 2012 that 15-month old M.C. continued to have
significant developmental delays and was “still exhibiting some Autistic
characteristics.†He also had become “very
aggressive, throw[ing] things, pull[ing] hair†and “hitting people
unexpectedly.†She recommended adding
behavioral therapy to the child’s treatment regimen. Father reported feeling under stress at his
job, returned to his psychiatrist and asked to resume medication for bipolar
and depressive disorders. Father also enrolled
in a 10-week parenting class, and received a recommendation for individual counseling. The social worker also recommended
psychotherapy so father can share “feelings of frustration, anxiety,
irritability†and to find “healthy ways to cope . . . with his mental health
issues.â€
At the disposition
hearing in December 2012, the juvenile court ordered reunification services for
father, and approved the case plan contained in the October 18, 2011 social services report. The court set an 18-month review hearing for January 24, 2013.
The social worker’s
initial report for the review hearing recommended terminating father’s reunification
services. Father had completed a parent
education class, but had not started individual
counseling. He stopped taking
medication for his mental illness, missed an appointment with his psychiatrist,
and visited his mental health clinic infrequently. His mental health counselor in Los
Angeles explained mental illness is chronic, and
patients need ongoing therapy to function appropriately and safely. She could not say whether father was able to
safely and appropriately care for M.C. at the current time.
Father had moved into an
apartment in Santa Monica, but
ignored the social worker’s attempts to verify the residence. He continued to work full time at a restaurant.
He refused to sign the case plan, and
his visits with M.C. remained inconsistent.
Authorized to have monitored visits two times a week, father visited M.C.
about once a month. He often cancelled
or failed to show up for scheduled visits, and other times arrived late, tired
from a long commute, and left early. The
visits were “unproductive, distant, and cold†and father did not “display any
affection, nurturance, or express any words of endearment.†He did not appear “to have learned any parenting
skills or expectations from his parenting classes.†Nor did he appear emotionally attached to M.C. He did not hug, kiss, or talk to his
son. Father did not set boundaries,
redirect M.C.’s aggressive behavior, or “prevent the child from possible injury
during†visits.
In February 2013, the
social worker reported father ignored M.C.’s caregiver during a January 30
visit and gave M.C. apple slices with skin, causing M.C. to gag because he did
not know how to chew some foods. The
caregiver reported father failed to take into account M.C.’s severe
developmental delays and was unwilling to listen or learn. Father left the visit 30 minutes early and did
not show up or call to cancel a February 6 visit. He also missed visits on February 13 and
February 19.
In late February 2013,
father’s lawyer declared a conflict and the court appointed a new lawyer. The court continued the 18-month review to
March 21.
In the report prepared
for the March 21 hearing, the social worker noted father had not contacted the
social worker or the caregiver, or visited M.C., since the last report. The foster mother reported father had angrily “accused
her of writing lies in [the prior] report.†In May, the social worker reported that father
resumed visiting M.C., but the foster mother described the visits as “poor
quality†and noted father left the visits 40 minutes early.
The review hearing
commenced May 7, 2013. The current and former social workers
testified, as did father. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found M.C.’s return to father
would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety and physical or
emotional well-being, and father’s progress toward alleviating the causes
necessitating placement had been minimal.
Finding it was “futile†to provide father with further reunification
services, the court scheduled a hearing to implement a permanent plan for M.C.
II
Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the
Juvenile Court’s Finding that Returning M.C. to His Father Poses a Substantial Risk
of Harm
permanency hearing shall be held no later than 12 months after the date the
child entered foster care . . . .â€
the permanency hearing, the court settles on a permanent plan for the child,
which includes a determination of whether the child will be returned to the
child’s home within the time limits of section 361.5, subdivision (a). “[T]he
court shall order the return of the child to the [parent’s] physical custody .
. . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return
of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of
establishing that detriment. . . . The
court shall also determine whether reasonable services that were designed to
aid the parent or legal guardian to overcome the problems that led to the
initial removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or offered
to the parent or legal guardian. . . .
to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered
treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be
detrimental.†(§ 366.21, subd. (f),
italics added.)
argues there is no evidence he “has ever abused or neglected the child. The father completed two parenting
classes. Father is now fully employed,
with an appropriate home for the minor.
The father spoke with his psychiatrist about going off his medications,
because it made working extremely difficult.
Father was aware, that without a job, the child would not be returned to
his care. The evidence presented to the
juvenile court shows father thriving.
Father . . . has held a job for over seven months; has maintained an
apartment for approximately six months; has $800 in savings; travels six hours,
by bus, to visit his child; attends individual counseling. These are not the actions of a debilitated
parent suffering mental health issues.
The fact that father has mental health issues is not substantial
evidence of substantial risk of detriment to the child.â€
A reviewing court must
uphold a juvenile court’s findings and orders if they are supported by
Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) Credibility
determinations and resolving conflicts in the evidence are reserved for the
trier of fact. (In re Tanis H. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) “[W]e
must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the
juvenile court [citation], and we must also ‘. . . view the record in the light
most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.’†(In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d
112, 114.) The appellant bears the
burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98
Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Byczkowski, the social worker since February
8, 2013, testified he believed
returning M.C. to his father would create a substantial risk of detriment to
the child. Byczkowski explained he grew
concerned when father informed him he no longer took his psychotropic
medications, and claimed his psychiatrist told him he did not need to take the
medications if he felt better. But father
could not remember the psychiatrist’s name or contact information. Byczkowski felt father’s statements were “gravely
concerning as they tend not to be consistent with information, training, or
experiences that I have based on individuals with mental histories.†The social worker noted that father did not
“appear to be able to provide†his plan concerning child care. Byczkowski also emphasized father visited
M.C. sporadically, and when he did visit, father failed to “appropriately or
adequately parent the child†and “does not take direction or guidance offered
by the caretaker or other individuals . . . .â€
Barbara Flores, father’s
former social worker, testified she spoke with father’s psychiatrist in January
2013. The psychiatrist stated she
prescribed medication for father, but was unsure whether he was taking it because
he missed his December 2012 appointment. Father explained he stopped taking the
medication because it made him sleepy and hard for him to work. Flores noted father’s
mental health provider reported father was “not consistent in his mental health
counseling.†Flores
also had “concerns about [father’s] parenting ability,†and believed he could
not adequately supervise or protect M.C.
She concluded father had not benefitted from the parenting program based
on “his inability to redirect the child, engage in conversation, engage in some
kind of involvement with the child during his visits.†She cited his passivity and failure to parent
his child appropriately, including giving M.C. apples that caused him to choke,
and not supervising M.C. when he ran out of the room to an elevator. Based on his “lack of compliance in completing
his service plan [psychotherapy apart from his mental health program counseling,
and continued medication regimen] and his parenting skills and inability to
supervise correctly, the child, and the content of the visit,†the social
workers recommended terminating reunification services.
As related in detail above,
the record contains substantial evidence
that supports the trial court’s detriment finding. Father’s decision to skip psychiatric
appointments and discontinue his prescribed medication demonstrated the child
remained at risk in father’s care because he did not appreciate the nature of
his mental illness. Father’s inconsistent
visitation, and especially his passive care and supervision of M.C. during visits,
also showed the child remained at risk in father’s care. As the social worker reported, father
demonstrated a lack of understanding of M.C.’s severe developmental delays and
often demonstrated poor parenting skills, notwithstanding his completion of a
parenting class. Father did not set
boundaries, redirect M.C.’s aggressive behavior, or “prevent the child from
possible injury during†visits. Notably,
father never progressed beyond monitored visitation. Father’s failure to hug, kiss or talk to his
son showed he lacked an emotional attachment; at the least it showed M.C.
received no emotional and loving support.
As mentioned above, father acknowledged on several occasions he could
not safely care for M.C. because of his own and M.C.’s issues. Nor could father’s mental health counselor in
Los Angeles say whether father was
able to safely and appropriately care for M.C.
It is laudable that
father completed a parenting program, and by May 2013, appeared to have
established stable employment and housing.
But given father’s long history of mental illness and transience, his
failure to protect M.C. shortly after the birth, father’s decision to
self-treat his mental illness, the extra care and supervision necessitated by
M.C.’s special developmental and cognitive needs, and father’s manifest failure
to grasp basic parenting concepts notwithstanding the parenting class, the
court did not err in concluding return of M.C. to father in May 2013 would
create a substantial risk of detriment to M.C.’s safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being.
B. Substantial
Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding Reasonable Services Were Offered
or Provided to Father
provides, “Except as [otherwise] provided . . ., whenever a child is removed
from a parent’s . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker
to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s†parent. Where the child is under three years of age “on
the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his parent,
court-ordered services shall be provided for a period of six months from the
dispositional hearing as provided in subdivision (e) of Section 366.21,
but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care as
provided in Section 361.49 unless the child is returned to the home of the
parent or guardian.†(§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(B); § 361.49 [child enters foster care at the earlier of the jurisdictional
hearing or 60 days after the date he or she is initially removed from the
physical custody of his or her parent or guardian.)
Father contends the
juvenile court erred when it found reasonable services had been offered or
provided. “Family preservation is the
priority when dependency proceedings commence. [Citation.] ‘Reunification services implement “the law’s
strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Therefore, reasonable
reunification services must usually be offered to a parent. [Citation.] SSA must make a ‘“‘good faith effort’â€â€™ to
provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family. [Citation.] ‘[T]he plan must be specifically tailored to
fit the circumstances of each family [citation], and must be designed to
eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding. . . .’ The adequacy of SSA’s
efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances
of the particular case. [Citation.]†(Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1501.)
We are mindful, however,
“[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been
provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services
provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether
the services were reasonable under the circumstances.†(In re
Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
“It is the job of SSA to assist parents with inadequate parenting skills
in remedying the sources of the problem, not to eradicate the problem itself.†(In re
Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable services for
substantial evidence. (Angela S. v.
Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)
Father complains the
social workers did not do enough to “get father into individual counseling.†He marshals a list of alleged SSA omissions,
including a failure to follow up on referrals provided to father or determine
whether father was still on a waiting list for counseling. He also emphasizes SSA did not refer father
to an additional parenting class, did not refer him to a parent-mentor program,
never informed father he should attend domestic violence counseling, failed to
contact father’s mental health providers to ascertain his mental health status,
did not provide a referral packet for Los Angeles County services, and did not give
him bus passes after he informed social workers he had transportation problems.
He argues the juvenile court should have
continued the case under section 352 to provide him with “six months of family
reunification services.†(See
Cal.App.4th 996, 1017.)
The operative case plan
required father to cooperate with recommendations of the treating psychiatrist
and follow through on any medication regime, and “take medications as
prescribed, on a consistent basis,†and “meet with the attending psychiatrist,
before terminating any medications.†The
case plan also required father to participate in individual, conjoint, family
and/or group therapy with an SSA-approved therapist “to address issues of . . .
child abuse, inappropriate/poor parenting skills, parental responsibilities
& expectations, protective measures, age appropriate discipline,
abandonment/separation issues, anger management, low self-esteem, childhood
trauma as it relates to adult dysfunction, substance abuse, mental illness,
cycle of domestic violence, co-dependency, and dynamics and consequences of
dysfunctional relationships. Counseling
is to continue until such time as the assigned social worker determines in
consultation with the therapist that the goals of therapy have been
accomplished and therapy is no longer necessary. Frequency of counseling is to be determined
by the assigned social worker in consultation with the therapist.â€
The case plan required
SSA to facilitate weekly supervised visitation, review the case plan with
father and “provide referrals to appropriate resources to facilitate the
[father’s] compliance with the case plan,†“provide in & out of county
transportation passes/tickets for†father “as needed to facilitate the case
plan requirements, and visitation,†and “monitor [father’s] cooperation and
compliance with the Court-approved case plan by contacting the parents’
service-providing agencies to obtain service progress information.â€
As noted, father contends
the social workers did not do enough to “get [him] into individual counseling.â€
Father testified Flores provided him
with referrals in Santa Monica for parenting classes, counseling, and drug
testing. In January 2013, he was on a
waiting list for individual counseling with Santa Monica Family Services, referred
by Flores. The provider told him he
would have to wait for a call, but father decided to find “his own place†and
started counseling in February 2013 with Alexis Litvak through Daniel’s Place,
which had been suggested by his caseworker, Chris Richardson, at Ocean Park
Community Center. He still was receiving
weekly counseling at the time of the May 2013 hearing. He and Litvak “talk[ed] about pretty much
everything, basically, how am I gonna deal with my son, what’s my future . . .
. She asks me questions.†They also dealt with issues related to his
mental health, including his anxiety.
According to her
reports, in June 2012 Flores advised Chris Richardson, father’s
community center case manager, that father needed to participate “with his case
plan components†including “long term individual counseling.†As noted, father conceded at the hearing Flores
referred him to appropriate counseling in Santa Monica. But as of October 2012 father stated he had
“not participated in any case plan activities, and cannot do so because of
work.†Flores
encouraged him to “return to the location he initially was attending for parent
education, or to return to,†Richardson
“for referrals to parent education, and individual counseling.†Flores also urged him
to return to therapist Amy Byrne, who was willing to provide additional
referrals for separate psychotherapy with a clinician outside the county’s
mental health agency. Flores
also advised father’s psychiatrist, Dr. Fine, that she wanted father to attend
psychotherapy to help him deal with “intimate relationships, peer
relationships, substance abuse, co-dependency, unresolved childhood trauma,
and/or poor parenting skills, responsibilities and expectations.†Fine agreed to provide father with a list of
psychotherapists. Flores
stated she would explore resources for father to help pay for these services,
but that “he must take the initiative to enroll, and demonstrate his commitment
to staying involved and participating consistently.†In November 2012, father’s parenting
instructor, Angelie McCord, encouraged father to enroll in individual
counseling as well. In January, Flores
again advised father “he needed to attend individual counseling with a
different therapist [other than Byrne] to discuss other critical issues that do
not involve his mental health.â€
The record reflects social
workers did review case plan responsibilities with father, referred him to resources
near his residence, and also worked through father’s longstanding mental health
providers and case workers to refer him to appropriate psychotherapy. As noted, father ultimately obtained counseling
with Alexis Litvak, who was suggested by Richardson. SSA’s efforts concerning individual counseling
were not unreasonable.
Father also complains
SSA did not refer father to an additional parenting class or parent mentoring. Flores referred father
to parenting education in Santa Monica. Father testified he attended nine of ten
parenting classes before dropping out, and then re-enrolled and completed
another 10-week parenting class. Father
believed the second course “was pretty much a waste of time because†it largely
duplicated the earlier class. Nothing
suggests the course referred did not contain the appropriate components of an
effective parenting education program, or that another class or mentoring would
have helped. Father simply appeared
unable to grasp the concepts taught.
SSA’s efforts concerning parenting education were not unreasonable.
Father complains SSA did
not refer him to a domestic violence or personal empowerment program. Flores testified she
“believed†she referred father at some point to a program in Orange
County, but apparently did not
refer him to a Los Angeles County
program. Flores
also testified father’s failure to participate in an empowerment program (PEP) was
not the reason for her recommendation against M.C.’s return. Although Byczkowski testified it would have
been “beneficial for father to participate in that type of service,†domestic
violence between the parents was not at the heart of this case. Any failure to refer or follow up with father
concerning a PEP program did not deny father the reasonable services he needed
to regain custody of M.C.
Father also contends the
social workers failed to contact father’s mental health providers to ascertain
his mental health status. Flores
testified she did speak with Dr. Fine, who informed her about father medication’s
status. Fine did not have much specific
information about father. Neither she nor
father’s former county mental health counselor, Amy Byrne, appeared very
forthcoming with information, perhaps because of confidentiality concerns. It is unclear whether or when father advised
the social workers about his counseling with Litvak to allow SSA to solicit
input. In any event, while it would have
desirable to have assessments from father’s mental health providers, nothing
suggests the providers had information favorable to father’s position. SSA’s failure to obtain further details of
his condition did not deny father reasonable services.
Father also asserts
social workers did not give him bus passes.
In her December 2011 report, Flores noted SSA was
supplying out of county bus passes and asked the court “to correct the wording
on the minute order†to allow father to continue to receive out of county passes. Father testified at the hearing in May 2013
he continued to make the three-hour trek from Santa Monica
to Orange on the bus and train, but
did not testify SSA failed to supply him with bus passes. Although he missed visits for work-related
and other reasons, nothing suggests he did not have access to
transportation.
Finally, we reject
father’s suggestion that “unofficial services†offered to him during the
17-month predisposition period cannot be considered because they were
“voluntary†rather than court-ordered.
Here, at the detention hearing in July 2011, the court ordered SSA to
provide “reunification services as soon as possible.†Because of time limits on out of custody
placement, especially with young children, it is necessary to start
reunification efforts immediately. It
would frustrate the statutory purpose to speedily resolve dependency issues if
those efforts could not be considered in determining whether SSA provided
reasonable services.
III
Disposition
The petition from the
order terminating reunification services is denied, as is the request for a
stay of the section 366.26 hearing set for September 20, 2013.
ARONSON,
J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
FYBEL, J.
mother pleaded guilty in a collaborative court proceeding to assault by means
of force likely to cause great bodily injury, corporal injury on a child, child
abuse and endangerment, and battery on a police officer. The court placed her on probation in the “Whatever
It Takes†program for mentally ill and homeless persons. The juvenile court declined to offer mother
reunification services. She is not a
party to this writ proceeding.
ultimately failed to complete the requirements for foster placement. Father also suggested temporary placement
with the maternal grandfather in Texas, but the grandfather lived with a
parolee daughter (not mother) and refused to “kick her out on the street when
she is doing so well.â€
