In re Y.W.
Filed 5/21/13 In re Y.W. CA2/7
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
In re Y.W., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B243901
(Los Angeles
County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Y.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct.
No. CK94568)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Philip L. Soto,
Judge. Affirmed.
David A. Hamilton, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John F. Krattli, County Counsel,
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Y.W.
(“Motherâ€), the mother of dependent child Y.W., appeals from one jurisdictional
finding of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
and she also contends that her rights were violated by errors made by the court
at the adjudication. We need not address
Mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional finding in light of the uncontested
other bases for jurisdiction; and although the court erred in failing to give
the required advisements and take proper waivers at the adjudication, the error
was harmless under any standard.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Newborn infant Y.W. came to the attention of the
in June 2012 based on a report from the drug and alcohol treatment program in which
Mother was participating. The reporting
party told DCFS that there were concerns about Mother’s mental health; that she
had threatened her roommates; that she ignored the child’s cries while she was
chanting; that she left him unattended while she showered; and that she did not
handle him properly.
DCFS spoke with an Oregon social worker who had
worked with Mother prior to Y.W.’s birth.
That social worker reported that Mother and the father of Y.W. and his
siblings had engaged in domestic violence for many years and that they were
aggressive in front of the children.
Mother had chronically neglected her other children, failing to feed
them to the point of malnourishment; and she failed to send them to school. Mother was dependent on social services in Oregon, demonstrated poor money
management skills, ran through money and food stamps quickly, and angrily
demanded food of her choice from office staff.
She had post-traumatic stress disorder, paranoia, and attached personality
disorder; the social worker believed that her aggression, dependency, inability
to parent, poor money management skills, and poor living skills indicated that
she may have further mental health issues, possibly schizophrenia. Her psychiatrist believed she required more
intensive services than Oregon could provide. Mother had been observed to be abusive,
aggressive, and withdrawn, with hallucinations and delusions. Mother also had an IQ of 74. The Oregon social worker urged DCFS to
detain newborn Y.W.
Y.W.’s four older siblings had been placed with a
paternal aunt in California in 2011, and Oregon had sent Mother to California as well so that the
maternal grandmother could assist Mother in receiving services. Mother was enrolled in a residential program
designed for women who were recovering from domestic violence and substance
abuse. Mother’s case manager told DCFS
that Mother had been diagnosed with alcohol dependency and her former case
manager reported that she had entered the program due to alcohol abuse. Mother’s therapist told DCFS that Mother
entered the program due to her marijuana use.
The assistant director of Mother’s program told DCFS that in ten years
of working there, she had never seen anyone as bizarre as Mother. She displayed serious mental health issues that
interfered with her ability to succeed in the program.
DCFS spoke to multiple people at the treatment program
about Y.W.’s situation. The assistant
director of Mother’s program reported that Mother prayed for long periods of
time, during which she chanted and did not attend to the baby. She did not believe, however, that the baby
was in immediate danger or needed to be removed. The vice president of the program agreed that
the baby was presently all right but questioned whether Mother would be able to
cope with him as he grew. Mother’s
social worker strongly urged DCFS not to detain the baby, stating that Mother
was doing her best to take care of the child and that there was no basis for
detention. Mother’s therapist did not
believe that the report made to DCFS was accurate or that there was any basis
for detaining the baby. She believed
Mother was taking good care of Y.W.
DCFS requested that Mother participate in a Voluntary
Family Maintenance Case due to her mental health history and her open
dependency case in Oregon. Mother
refused. DCFS then filed a
fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code
title="">[1]
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).
DCFS did not remove Y.W. from Mother’s care and asked that he stay in
Mother’s home. The court detained Y.W.
from his incarcerated father and ordered that he remain with Mother as long as
she remained in her residential program.
On July 30, 2012, Mother’s program reported that
Mother had argued that day with another patient and that Mother had scissors in
her hand, was very loud, and threatened the other patient. Staff had to intervene and take the scissors
from Mother. At some point Mother was
holding Y.W. while being verbally aggressive with others. Staff tried to make Mother aware that she was
frightening her child, but she refused to listen. As a result of the incident, Mother was being
discharged from the program. DCFS then
detained Y.W. and placed him in foster care.
DCFS filed an amended dependency petition, alleging
that the parents’ history of violence presented a risk of physical harm to
Y.W.; that this violence also endangered Y.W.’s physical health and safety and
placed him at risk of physical harm, damage, and danger; that Mother abused
alcohol and marijuana, rendering her unable to provide care to Y.W. and
endangering him; that his father had a history of substance abuse rendering him
unable to care for the child and endangering him; and that Mother had mental
and emotional problems including aggressive and violent behavior, endangering
Y.W.
The court found true all the
allegations as amended and sustained all counts of the amended petition and
declared Y.W. a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivisions
(a) and (b). Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency
of the Evidence to Support Alcohol and Drug Allegations
Mother does not contest the
court’s jurisdiction over Y.W., but she contends that the record lacks
substantial evidence to support the allegation under section 300, subdivision
(b) that her alcohol and drug issues endanger Y.W.’s physical health and safety
and place him at risk of physical harm, damage, and danger. Y.W., however, was also found to be a
dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (a) and three
other counts under section 300, subdivision (b), and those findings have not
been challenged on appeal. Because the
juvenile court’s other uncontested findings offer an independent basis for
affirming the exercise of jurisdiction over the child, we need not consider
Mother’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support one
allegation under section 300, subdivision (b).
(In re Dirk S. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1037, 1045 [single basis for jurisdiction is sufficient to uphold
juvenile court’s order]; In re Jonathan B.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [when one jurisdictional finding is supported by
substantial evidence, appellate court need not consider sufficiency of evidence
to support other findings].)
II. Alleged
Violations of Mother’s Rights
Mother claims that the juvenile court erred by
adjudicating the dependency petition when only a pretrial resolution conference
had been scheduled for that date. The
record shows, however, that on July 13, 2012, the court advised Mother that
August 21, 2012, would be the date for a pretrial resolution conference and
adjudication. On August 21, the matter
was continued until September 4 to permit time for the incarcerated father to
respond to his newly appointed attorney.
Mother chose not to attend that hearing and her whereabouts were
unknown, but her counsel was there and was instructed to advise her of the new
date. On September 4, Mother appeared
for the new date for the pretrial resolution conference and adjudication. Neither she nor her counsel objected to the
adjudication being held that day or made any statement of being surprised by
the proceedings. The record does not
support Mother’s argument that she was ambushed by the adjudication of the
dependency petition on September 4, 2012.
Next, Mother complains that the court did not use
Judicial Council from JV-190. She
acknowledges that California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(e) notes that a parent
and counsel may complete this form and submit it to the court, but notes that
the form itself specifies that the form is for “mandatory use.†She contends that the “best practice†would
be to require the use of the form whenever a parent submits on the report, but
she does not claim that the court erred.
Mother has not established any basis for reversal with this argument.
Finally, Mother argues, and
County Counsel concedes, that the juvenile court erred when it failed to advise
her of, and make findings that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived, her rights to a contested hearing; to assert the privilege against
self-incrimination; to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and to compel the
attendance of witnesses. (Cal. Rules of
Court, Rules 5.534(k) & 5.682(b), (f).)
A juvenile court’s failure to advise on the record is subject to
harmless error analysis. (
1372, 1378.) Mother has not established
prejudice here. She has not identified
any respect in which she would have proceeded differently had the required
advisements been made, or any manner in which the outcome might have been or
would have been different had she been properly advised and waivers taken on
the record. She describes being unhappy
about the dependency proceedings, refusing to cooperate at various points in
the proceedings, and resisting jurisdiction, but Mother’s opposition to
jurisdiction does not show that she was prejudiced in any way or that the
outcome would have been different had the advisements been given. She claims to have been “unable to avail
herself of her due process rights,†but she does not describe what rights she
would have availed herself of if the advisement and waiver process had been
properly followed, or how the result would have been different. Regardless of the harmless error standard
applied here, Mother has not established prejudice from the advisement and
waiver errors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
ZELON,
J.
We
concur:
PERLUSS, P. J. WOODS,
J.
otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
