In re Wilson P.

Filed 2/28/08 In re Wilson P. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Benjamin Campos, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI,  21.) Affirmed as modified.

Nancy K. Undem, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Wilson P. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 entered after the juvenile court denied his suppression motion (id.,  700.1) and found true the allegation that he possessed a knife with a locking blade on school grounds (Pen. Code,  626.10, subd. (a)). Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion and imposed unconstitutionally vague probation requirements. We modify the probation requirements and affirm the order.

FACTS

On September 21, 2006, Dean Leonardo Casanas and a school safety officer conducted a random search of the boys gym lockers at Bell High School. In one of the lockers, Dean Casanas found a knife in the pocket of a pair of pants.

The locker was issued to two boys, and it contained two sets of clothing in it. Not wanting to arrest the wrong boy, Dean Casanas decided to approach each boy separately. He took appellant from his gym class, brought him to the locker room and told him to put on his clothes. Appellant put on the pants containing the knife. Dean Casanas asked appellant if he had anything in his possession that he should not have. Appellant said he did not. The safety officer then searched appellant and recovered the knife from his pants.

There are signs above the gym lockers stating that the lockers are school property and subject to search. Additionally, students are told at orientation that the school conducts random searches of students, their lockers and their personal possessions. Students are given paperwork that they and their parents sign acknowledging notification of this school policy.

DISCUSSION

A. Suppression Motion

In reviewing the juvenile courts ruling on a suppression motion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. (In re Cody S. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, 90.) We independently determine whether the evidence supports the ruling. (Ibid.)

Students in the public schools have the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures on campus. (In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 557.) This right is not necessarily coextensive with the right possessed by adults, however. (Id. at p. 558.)

While students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons and effects that they bring to school, that expectation of privacy must be balanced against the schools obligation to maintain discipline and to provide a safe environment for all students and staff. (In re Cody S., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 91, fn. omitted.) Under the California Constitution, students and staff of public schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful. (In re Latasha W. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1527.) The schools thus have an obligation to keep weapons off campuses. (Ibid.)

Courts have upheld special needs administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, . . . where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable. [Citations.] (In re Latasha W., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527.) In schools, the need to provide a safe environment is great. Additionally, requiring a suspicion-based standard for searches would be unworkable, in that the schools have no way of monitoring the students before they arrive on campus and thus no way of determining which students may be concealing weapons on their persons. By the time a weapon is displayed or brandished, providing the suspicion necessary for a search, it may be too late for the school to prevent its use. (Ibid.)

Where, as here, students are advised that lockers are subject to search, students do not have an expectation of privacy as to their lockers. (See In re Cody S., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 92-93.) The random locker search thus did not represent a major intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy.

In view of the schools need to maintain a safe campus and the students lack of expectation of privacy in their lockers, we conclude on balance that the search of appellants locker was constitutional. The juvenile court therefore did not err in denying appellants suppression motion.

B. Probation Conditions

Appellant challenges three of the probation conditions imposed by the juvenile court as unconstitutionally vague: (1) Do not associate with anyone disapproved of by parents [or your] probation officer (No. 15); (2) Do not . . . remain in the presence of any unlawfully armed person (No. 16); and (3) [S]tay away from places where [narcotics] users congregate (No. 21).

Such conditions are unconstitutionally vague unless they include a knowledge requirement, i.e., that they specify that appellant not associate with anyone he knows to be disapproved of by his parents or probation officer, that he not remain in the presence of anyone he knows to be unlawfully armed and that he stay away from places where he knows users congregate. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 891; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816.) Thus, modification to impose an explicit knowledge requirement is necessary to render the condition[s] constitutional. (In re Sheena K., supra, at p. 892; In re Justin S., supra, at p. 816.)

DISPOSITION

The order is modified to provide an explicit knowledge requirement as to probation conditions Nos. 15, 16 and 21, i.e., that appellant not associate with anyone he knows to be disapproved of by his parents or probation officer, that he not remain in the presence of anyone he knows to be unlawfully armed and that he stay away from places where he knows users congregate. As so modified, the order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

JACKSON, J.^*

We concur:

VOGEL, Acting P. J.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

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^* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.