In re T.W.
Filed 3/5/13 In re T.W. CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re T.W., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.T. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
T.W.,
Appellant.
D061960
(Super. Ct. No. J515074B)
APPEALS
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Richard D. Huffman, Judge.
(Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed in part and remanded with
directions.
L.T. and
Timothy W. (together the parents) appeal a juvenile court judgment removing
their minor daughter, T.W., from their custody following true findings made on
a Welfare and Institutions Code
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
section 387 supplemental petition. The
parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's
findings that the previous placement with L.T. was ineffective in protecting
T.W., and T.W.'s removal from parental custody was necessary to prevent
substantial danger to her. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order as to the section 387 supplemental petition.
T.W. also
appeals, contending the court erred by granting L.T. six more months of
reunification services because the services she already received exceeded the
statutory limit of section 361.5. We
conclude the time limits for services set forth in section 361.5 did not become
operable until T.W. was removed from the custody of both parents at a
disposition hearing on the section 387 petition. Because the parents have now used up some of
their entitlement to services under section 361.5, we remand the matter to have
the juvenile court determine whether to continue or terminate their services
under current circumstances.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August
2009, the San Diego County Health and
Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court under
section 300, subdivision (j), alleging four-year-old T.W. was at substantial
risk of harm because L.T. had subjected T.W.'s sister, Olivia J., to serious
physical harm and excessive discipline in T.W.'s presence. The court detained T.W. with Timothy. At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
October 2009, the court declared T.W. a dependent, removed her from L.T.'s
custody and placed her with Timothy. The
court ordered the parents to participate in services consistent with their case
plans.
During the
next 12 months, L.T. completed a parenting education program that was not court
approved, and 10 weeks of a 12-week anger management program. The court ordered six more months of services
for the parents, and amended L.T.'s case plan to include an assessment by a
substance abuse specialist because she had recently tested positive for
amphetamine and methamphetamine.
In July
2011, 15-year-old Olivia disclosed that Timothy, her stepfather, had molested
her when she was 11 years old and continued to molest her until she was 14
years old. Agency filed a section 342
subsequent petition, alleging T.W. was at risk of being sexually abused by
Timothy because he had sexually abused Olivia.
T.W. was detained first in foster care and then with her adult
sister. In October 2011, the court
sustained the allegations of the subsequent petition, placed T.W. with L.T. and
ordered supervised visits for Timothy.
Several
months later, social worker Angela Gaynor received information that Timothy was
living with L.T. and T.W. Gaynor
reminded L.T. that Timothy could not be in her home and L.T. could not
supervise visits between Timothy and T.W.
Timothy admitted he continued to go to L.T.'s home but denied staying
overnight. He refused to participate in
sexual abuse treatment as required by his case plan, saying he was "not a
predator" and the requirement was "stupid." Gaynor reported that L.T. continued to show
poor judgment and repeatedly placed T.W. at risk by allowing Timothy in her
home. Risk factors included T.W.'s young
age and vulnerability, Timothy's sexual abuse of Olivia when she was younger
and lived with L.T., Timothy's refusal to obtain treatment, and L.T.'s refusal
to participate in therapy. Consequently,
Agency filed a section 387 supplemental petition, alleging T.W.'s placement
with L.T. had not been effective in protecting T.W. The parents declined Agency's offer of
services to prevent T.W.'s removal from L.T.'s custody.
At a
detention hearing on March 6, 2012, the court made a prima facie finding on the
section 387 supplemental petition and found Agency had made reasonable efforts
to prevent or eliminate the need to remove T.W. from L.T.'s custody. The court detained T.W. in out-of-home care.
Gaynor
recommended six more months of services for L.T. to give her the opportunity to
recognize the signs and red flags of sexual abuse, and to understand the
dynamics of sexual abuse and the role she plays in protecting her
children. Gaynor said services would
enable L.T. to empathize with her children and discuss how she would prevent
further incidents of sexual abuse.
Services for Timothy would help him identify his triggers for sexual
abuse, change his patterns of sexual behavior and develop a relapse prevention
plan. Gaynor could not recommend placing
T.W. with L.T. because she had violated the court's visitation order by
allowing Timothy to visit T.W. in her home and she only recently began
participating in services. Further,
Gaynor was concerned that L.T. would allow Timothy to live with her because he
was homeless.
The court
held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 4, 2012. Gaynor testified T.W. would be at risk if
returned to L.T.'s custody because L.T. had participated in only three therapy
sessions and refused to drug test twice, Timothy was still untreated for sexual
abuse, and L.T. did not fully understand the dynamics of sexual abuse. Also, the parents had violated the court's
visitation order on several occasions.
Gaynor identified two safety threats to T.W.: (1) L.T. had allowed Timothy access to T.W.
or had not protected her from the risk of sexual abuse; and (2) L.T. was likely
to flee with T.W.
T.W.'s
adult sister, L.C., testified she lived with L.T. and was asked to supervise
Timothy's visits with T.W. She knew Timothy
could not stay in L.T.'s home overnight and T.W. could not be left alone with
the parents. L.C. said she never left
T.W. alone with Timothy, and L.T. never supervised visits between T.W. and
Timothy. L.C. testified she supervised
eight visits between Timothy and T.W., four of which took place in L.T.'s
home. She denied being told visits could
not occur there.
The court
received in evidence the stipulated testimony of social worker Rafael Munoz,
who was assigned to T.W.'s case from December 2009 to July 2011 when T.W. was
placed with Timothy. Throughout that
time, the parents violated the court's orders for supervised visits with
T.W. Munoz did not believe that L.T. would
abide by the court's order prohibiting Timothy from being in her home or that
she could protect T.W. from Timothy.
After
considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court sustained the
allegations of the section 387 supplemental petition and found reasonable
efforts had been made to prevent T.W.'s removal from L.T.'s custody. The court removed T.W. from parental custody
and placed her with a relative. The
court found neither parent was entitled to an additional 12 months of services,
but under the exceptional circumstances of this case, it was in T.W.'s best
interests to order six more months of services for both parents.
DISCUSSION
The Parents' Appeals
I
The parents
contend the evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings on the
section 387 supplemental petition. They
assert there was no evidence Timothy was having unsupervised contact with T.W.
in L.T.'s home and, therefore, there was no showing T.W. was at risk of sexual
abuse by Timothy.
A
A section
387 supplemental petition is used to change the placement of a dependent child
from the physical custody of a parent to a more restrictive level of
court-ordered care. (§ 387; Cal.
Rules of Court,
title="">[2]
rule 5.560(c).) In the jurisdictional
phase of a section 387 proceeding, the court determines whether the factual
allegations of the supplemental petition are true and whether the previous
disposition has been ineffective in protecting the child. (§ 387, subd. (b); rule
5.565(e)(1).) If the court finds the
allegations are true, it conducts a dispositional hearing to determine whether
removing custody is appropriate. (Rule
5.565(e)(2); In re H.G. (2006) 146
Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) A section 387
petition need not allege any new jurisdictional facts, or urge different or
additional grounds for dependency because a basis for juvenile court
jurisdiction already exists. (In re
John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1211; In re Joel H. (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 1185, 1200.) The only fact
necessary to modify a previous placement is that the previous disposition has
not been effective in protecting the child.
(§ 387, subd. (b); In re Joel H., at p. 1200.)
We review
the court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings for substantial
evidence. (In re Henry V. (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529; In re A.O. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1054,
1061.) Evidence is "
'[s]ubstantial' " if it is " 'reasonable, credible, and of solid
value.' " (In re S.A. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140.) We do not
pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the
evidence or weigh the evidence. Instead,
we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record
favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if other
evidence supports a contrary finding. (In
re Casey D. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596,
610.) The appellant has the burden of
showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support
the findings or order. (In re L.Y.L.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Here, the
supplemental petition alleged the court's previous order placing T.W. with L.T.
had been ineffective in protecting her because L.T. had allowed Timothy to be
in T.W.'s home for extended periods after Timothy had sexually abused T.W.'s
sister in the family home, and he refused to participate in services for sexual
offenders. The evidence showed L.T. knew
Timothy had sexually abused Olivia but still allowed him to spend time with
T.W. in her home in violation of Agency's restrictions on supervision. The social worker admonished the parents on
several occasions that Timothy was prohibited from being in the home and L.T.
was prohibited from supervising his visits with T.W. However, Timothy, who was homeless, continued
to spend time there. In the social
worker's opinion, Timothy's presence in the home placed T.W. at risk of sexual
abuse because she was young and vulnerable, Timothy refused sexual abuse
treatment, and L.T. refused to participate in therapy and did not understand
the dynamics of sexual abuse or know how to protect T.W. (See § 300.2; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196 [dependency
statutes are designed to protect children at risk of harm and thus, the court
need not wait until a child is abused to assume jurisdiction].) The court expressly found the social worker's
testimony was credible and we defer to this finding because we have no power to
judge the effect, value or weight of the evidence, consider the credibility of
witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence.
(In re S.A., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) Substantial evidence supports the court's
jurisdictional findings on the section 387 supplemental petition.
II
The parents
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's order removing
T.W. from L.T.'s custody. They assert
there was no evidence of a substantial danger to T.W.'s health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being if she remained in the
home. They further assert Agency should
have considered less drastic alternatives to removal from L.T.'s custody.
A
When a
section 387 petition seeks to remove a minor from parental custody, the court
applies the procedures and protections of section 361. (In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th
996, 1001-1003.) Before a minor can be
removed from the parent's custody, the court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if
the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor's parent's . . . physical custody."
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
453, 462.)
A removal
order is proper if it is based on proof of:
(1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor; and (2)
potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94
Cal.App.3d 52, 60.) The parent need not
be dangerous and the minor need not have been harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is
on averting harm to the child. (In re
Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.)
B
The record
supports a finding L.T. was unable to provide proper care for T.W., and T.W.
would be at risk of harm if she remained in L.T.'s custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) L.T. allowed Timothy to have contact with
T.W. in her home, even though she knew he had sexually abused Olivia. She had been repeatedly told that Timothy
could not be in her home and she could not supervise visits. L.T. delayed starting therapy, and she did
not understand the risk Timothy posed to T.W.
Timothy continued to deny sexually abusing Olivia and refused to participate
in treatment for sex offenders.
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding its previous
disposition had not been effective in protecting T.W. from the risk of sexual
abuse by Timothy.
C
Substantial
evidence also supports a finding reasonable efforts were made to prevent or
eliminate the need for T.W.'s removal from L.T.'s custody. (§ 361, subd. (d).) T.W. became a dependent in 2009 and remained
in the custody of one or the other parent for three years under the juvenile
court's supervision. The parents
consistently ignored the restrictions on visitation, even after being reminded,
and did not participate in services as required by their case plans. When Agency filed the section 387
supplemental petition, the parents declined an offer of services to prevent
T.W.'s removal from L.T.'s custody. A
team decision meeting was held to determine whether T.W. could remain in L.T.'s
custody with a safety plan in place. The
social worker and her supervisors assessed the risk to T.W. and determined
there were no services or precautions available to ensure T.W.'s safety in the
home. Thus, Agency did consider less
drastic alternatives and used reasonable efforts to prevent T.W.'s removal from
L.T.'s custody.
I
T.W. contends the court erred by ordering six more months
of reunification services for L.T.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] She asserts that at the time of the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing on the section 387 supplemental petition,
L.T. had already received 31 months of services, which exceeded the section
361.5, subdivision (a), statutory limit.
T.W. calculates the length of services beginning with the detention
hearing in August 2009, claiming this is when the court originally removed her
from L.T.'s custody within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (a).
Agency
contends the period for reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision
(a), began to run only when T.W. was removed from the custody of both parents
at the disposition hearing on the section 387 supplemental petition and not
when T.W. was detained or initially removed from L.T.'s custody and placed with
Timothy. L.T. joins in this
contention. Timothy filed a supplemental
appellant's brief, claiming he, like L.T., is entitled to reunification
services ending 12 months after the date T.W. was removed from both parents'
custody.
A
The issue
of whether the services the parents received exceeded the statutory limit
requires us to consider the interplay between two statutes governing the
provision of reunification services:
sections 361.2 and 361.5. Because
this issue is one of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of
review. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 849 [issues
of law and statutory construction are reviewed de novo]; In re Alanna A.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 562 [where facts are not disputed, the effect or
legal significance of those facts is a question of law to be reviewed de novo].)
B
Sections
361.2 and 361.5 were enacted in 1986 as parts of a single legislative
scheme. (In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 475.) Section 361.5 contains general rules for
providing family reunification services to parents of minor children removed
from parental custody. (
"[F]amily reunification services are activities designed to provide
time-limited foster care services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse or
exploitation, when the child cannot safely remain at home, and needs temporary
foster care, while services are provided to reunite the family." (§ 16501, subd. (h); see
145.) The goal of section 361.5 is to promote
the return of the child to parental custody.
(In re Ericka W., at p.
478.) Reunification services under this
statute are mandatory except in certain specified circumstances. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b)(1)-(15);
Section
361.5 includes time limitations on the provision of family reunification
services. When the child is over the age
of three, "court-ordered services shall be provided beginning with the
dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child entered
foster care . . . ."
(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
A child is "deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of
the date of the jurisdictional hearing . . . or the date that is 60 days after
the date on which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of
his or her parent . . . ."
(§ 361.49.) Notwithstanding
the presumptive 12-month limitation, services can be extended up to 18 months
"after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of
his or her parent . . . ."
(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)
Under the
plain language of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A), the period for
mandatory reunification services begins at the time of disposition and
continues while the child is in foster care or until the child is returned to
the home of the parent. The statute does
not apply if, at the disposition hearing, a child does not enter foster care,
but is placed with a parent. (
12, 19.) Thus, the
" 'clock' " for services under section 361.5, subdivision
(a), does not start to run unless and until the child is removed from the
physical custody of the parents and the court determines whether they are
entitled to reunification services according to the lengthy analysis set forth
in that statute. (In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 650 (A.C.); In re Pedro Z., at
p. 21.)
Section
361.2 also pertains to the provision of reunification services but, unlike
section 361.5, applies only when the minor is removed from the physical custody
of one parent under section 361 and placed in the custody of the noncustodial
parent under the supervision of the juvenile court. (§ 361.2, subds. (a) & (b);
expressly contemplates that reunification services will be offered only for the
purpose of facilitating permanent parental custody of the child by one or the
other parent." (
49, 60 [reunification often involves one, but not both, parents].) Thus, a different set of rules regarding
reunification services applies in cases where custody of a minor is shifted
from one parent to another parent. (
361.2, the court may: (1) order
reunification services for the parent "from whom the child is being
removed"; (2) order services "solely to the parent who is assuming
physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without
court supervision"; or (3) order services for both parents, followed by
review hearings under section 366 to determine which parent, if either, should
have custody of the child.
(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).)
Services
ordered under section 361.2 are discretionary and not expressly time-limited
because the minor remains in the custody of a parent and the goal of placing a
child in parental custody has been met.
(In re Erika W.,
also In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 644, 651.) Nevertheless, the
juvenile court may "structure the provision of reunification services
around the ultimate goal of providing a stable permanent parental home for the
child." (In re Erika W., at p. 476.)
When both parents potentially are appropriate permanent placements, the
court may provide services to both parents, with permanent custody to be
determined at a later review hearing. (
C
A
comparison of sections 361.5 and 361.2 suggests there are two separate
statutory tracks for services: one when
a child is placed with a noncustodial parent (§ 361.2), and another when a
child is placed with someone other than a parent (§ 361.5). (In re
Erika W., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at
p. 475.) Here, the juvenile court
followed the procedure of section 361.2 when, at a jurisdiction and disposition
hearing held in October 2009, it declared T.W. a dependent, ordered her removed
from L.T.'s physical custody and placed her with Timothy subject to the court's
supervision. (§ 361.2, subds. (a)
& (b)(3).) The court exercised its
discretion under section 361.2 by ordering services for both parents.
of both parents at the October 2009 disposition hearing and she did not enter
foster care at that time, section 361.5 was not implicated. (A.C.,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.
649.) Similarly, with respect to the
section 342 subsequent petition, the time-limited services of section 361.5 did
not apply at either the detention hearing in July 2011 or the disposition
hearing in October 2011 because T.W. had not yet been removed from the custody
of both parents.
title="">[6]
Contrary to
T.W.'s argument, the timeline for services under section 361.5 did not begin to
run when T.W. was detained in out-of-home care, either in August 2009 or July
2011. Section 361.5 applies only when a
child is "removed" from parental custody, not "detained"
out of the home. Before the court holds
a hearing where jurisdiction is established, it lacks authority to remove a
child from a parent's custody. A child
may be taken into temporary custody by a peace officer or social worker (§§ 305
& 306), and at the detention hearing, the court is empowered to determine,
based on a prima facie showing, whether the minor shall be "further
detained." (§§ 315 &
319.) Only after the jurisdiction
hearing may the court consider whether it should "limit the control to be
exercised over the dependent child" at the disposition phase. (§ 361, subd. (a).) A court is not authorized to conduct a
disposition hearing unless and until it has conducted a jurisdiction hearing on
the dependency petition and found the child comes within one of the statutory
definitions of a dependent child. (§
300.) Before the court can remove a
child from parental custody and make its placement decision, it must make
findings based on clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) The high standard of proof by which a removal
decision is made "is an essential aspect of the presumptive,
constitutional right of parents to care for their children." (In re
Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) Because "removal" from parental
custody is a milestone in juvenile court proceedings, the distinction between
removal and detention is crucial. (
T.W. relies
on In re N.M. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
845, 853-854 (N.M.) to support her
argument the section 361.5 limited time for services begins running at the time
of detention. However, in
version of section 361.5 that stated services "shall not exceed six [or
12] months from the date the child entered foster care," but made no
mention of when those services begin. (
applicable here, "court-ordered services shall be provided
and ending six or 12 months after the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A) & (B),
italics added.) We disagree with the
court in N.M., at pages 854-855, to
the extent it holds the limited time for reunification services under section
361.5 starts to run at detention. (See
removal from parent's physical custody between initial detention and
disposition hearing, section 361.5 is inapplicable in the absence of a
disposition order placing child with someone other than a parent].)
Moreover,
despite some ambiguities in the record before us, it is reasonable to infer
that the review hearings on the original section 300, subdivision (j), petition
were not conducted to determine whether T.W. could be returned to parental
custody because she was already placed with a parent. There were no six-month, 12-month or 18-month
findings made at these hearings as there would have been had the court placed
T.W. in foster care. Instead, the
hearings were meant to monitor T.W.'s placements with a parent—first with
Timothy and then with L.T.—and to determine whether court supervision was still
necessary. (See In re Joel T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 263, 267; In re Gabriel L., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 650 [when a
dependent child is safely in custody of one parent, "the court is not
concerned with reunification, but with determining whether continued
supervision is necessary in the family home"].) The court's goal at that time was to provide
a stable, permanent parental home for T.W. through services under section
361.2, with the possibility of eventually giving permanent custody of T.W. to
one or the other parent. (§ 361.2,
subd. (b)(3); see In re Erika W.,
When the
family's circumstances necessitated the filing of a supplemental petition, the
court was required to conduct a hearing to decide whether to remove T.W. from
parental custody and provide services.
(§ 387; rules 5.565(e), 5.565(e)(2) & 5.695(a).) At the disposition hearing in May 2012, the
court removed T.W. from both parents' custody for the first time, triggering
the time limits of section 361.5. Thus,
the services the parents previously received under section 361.2 did not
preclude them from receiving reunification services under section 361.5.
Our
conclusion is consistent with the court's holding in A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at page 639: "Section 361.5 time limits for
reunification services start to run when a child is removed from all parental
custody at the disposition hearing," and not when the child is placed with
the noncustodial parent under section 361.2.
As the A.C. court explained,
section 361.5 is "inapplicable in the absence of a disposition ordering a
placement with someone other than a parent." (A.C.,
at p. 650.) The court saw no distinction
between a section 361.2 placement with a previously noncustodial parent and a
section 362 placement with a custodial parent.
(A.C., at p. 649, citing
from the physical custody of a custodial parent and that parent receives
services under section 362, the section 361.5 clock does not start to run
unless and until an amended petition results in removal at disposition].) In either case, the time limits for services
set forth in section 361.5 do not apply if the child is not removed from the
custody of both parents at the disposition hearing.
at p. 649.)
As the
makes sense. Children who are placed
with at least one of their parents from the beginning of the dependency are
differently situated than those who immediately enter foster care. Such a child, in most cases, is not suffering
from the same level of disruption and need for prompt permanency adjudication
as he or she might otherwise experience in a foster care placement. Moreover, a custodial parent who has lost
custody to a (previously) noncustodial parent following a dependency petition
is not similarly situated to one who loses custody of the child to an
alternative placement. This parent does
not have the same section 361.5 right to attempt reunification during the
dependency proceeding if the court decides to maintain custody with the
previously noncustodial parent." (
Termination of parental rights is not at issue for that parent because
the child remains in the custody of the other parent. (Rule 5.725(a)(2)
[Court ordinarily "may not terminate rights of only one parent under
section 366.26 . . . ."].) Until
T.W. was removed from the custody of both parents at the disposition hearing on
the section 387 supplemental petition, the parents did not face ultimate
termination of their parental rights, even had one or the other parent been
unable to reunify within the statutory period.
(See In re A.L.,
fn. 7 [because minor was placed with mother, father was not at risk of having
parental rights terminated even though he did not receive reunification
services].)
D
After the
court sustained the allegations of the section 387 supplemental petition,
removed T.W. from the custody of both parents and placed her in foster care,
the time limits for reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision
(a)(1)(A), were triggered. Although the
court ordered six months of reunification services for the parents, it did not
do so under a section 361.5 analysis,
and thus, the case must be remanded to the juvenile court with directions to
determine whether services should continue for each parent based on current
circumstances, including the parents' reunification efforts and T.W.'s
permanent placement needs. (See
at p. 60 [because reunification services are a benefit, not a constitutional
entitlement, the juvenile court has discretion to terminate those services at
any time, depending on the circumstances presented]; In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1241-1242 [father's
abysmal efforts at reunification supported court's decision to terminate
services before expiration of six-month period]; see also In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1259 [appellate courts
cannot, in dependency cases, mechanistically make determinations without regard
to passage of time and intervening events in child's life], disapproved on
another ground in In re Zeth S. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.)
II
T.W.
contends the court abused its discretion by ordering six more months of
reunification services for L.T. because there were no exceptional circumstances
justifying further services, given L.T.'s minimal participation in services she
received. However, because we have
concluded the statutory time limitation on services did not begin until T.W.
was removed from both parents' custody at disposition, which necessitates a
remand to determine whether the parents' services should be continued, we need
not address this issue.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment declaring T.W. a dependent and removing her from parental custody is
affirmed. The matter is remanded to the
juvenile court to determine whether to continue or terminate the parents'
services under current circumstances.
McDONALD,
Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
