In re T.T.

Filed 2/6/09 In re T.T. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kings County. George L. Orndoff, Judge.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Peter D. Moock, County Counsel, and Bryan Walters, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

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T.T. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26)^[1]to her two sons. She contends the juvenile court erred in reaching its decision because there was insufficient evidence of the boys adoptability. She also joins in arguments made by the boys father in his separate appeal, In re T.T., et.al. (F055689), in which he challenges the courts adoptability finding and contends termination would be detrimental to the boys because he has a beneficial parent/child relationship with them. We affirmed in fathers case, concluding the courts adoptability finding is supported by substantial evidence and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining the beneficial relationship exception to adoption did not apply. On review of mothers appeal, we will affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Summary of Prior Proceedings

Dependency proceedings in this case have been ongoing since December 2003 when the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over then four-year-old T. and four-month-old F. due in large part to their mothers drug use. Although the boys were placed in foster care, by October 2004 mother was sufficiently compliant with reunification services that she regained custody of the boys under a plan of family maintenance.

In February 2005, however, the Kings County Human Services Agency (agency) detained the boys and filed a supplemental petition alleging mother failed to comply with her court-ordered case plan requirements as she did not participate in mental health counseling and drug testing, did not take T. for a mental health assessment, and negligently failed to seek medical care for F., placing him at significant risk of harm. Neither mother nor father appeared at the April 2005 combined detention and jurisdiction hearing, at which the court found the allegations true. At the disposition hearing held the same month, the court removed the boys from their parents and denied further reunification services.

At the initial section 366.26 hearing held in August 2005, the juvenile court ordered a plan of adoption for the boys without terminating parental rights, and that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family within 180 days. In March 2006 the juvenile court ordered the boys into long-term foster care after the boys non-relative care-providers were no longer interested in adopting them and no other adoptive families were identified. On August 23, 2006, the boys were placed in a prospective adoptive home, where they remained throughout the remainder of the proceedings.

In May 2007, mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to place the children with her under family maintenance. A contested hearing was held over four separate court sessions that concluded in October 2007. At the first court session, held on August 23, 2007, the issue of whether T. would testify was addressed. T.s therapist, Debora Hughes McManus, testified she had been providing therapy for T. since November 2006, and had diagnosed him with generalized anxiety with depressed mood and oppositional conduct, and dysthymia with early onset. MacManus opined that requiring T. to testify would be damaging to him and amount to another trauma in his life; T. finally had settled into his new placement and was stabilized, and having him testify would be a major disruption. McManus explained that at that point in time, T. had control and enough structure where he felt capable, and if forced to testify, T.s sense of control would be affected because she thought T. has finally accepted that he is going to be living in foster care, that he is still going to have his family, but he has a foster family, and that idea is implanted in his brain and he has accepted that. And I think if you were even to introduce the idea that its possible for him to go home, his whole world is going to be turned over. McManus stated she had been approaching therapy from the presumption that T. was in a fost-adopt situation. The court found it was in T.s best interest not to testify and accepted the parties stipulation that if called to testify, T. would state he wanted to go home and live with his mother.

After testimony from mother, a social worker, T.s de facto parent, and mothers therapist, the court denied the section 388 petition. Mother appealed from the courts order, which we affirmed in an unpublished decision. (In re T.T., et al. (June 18, 2008, F054179) [nonpub. opn.].)

In February 2008, the juvenile court conducted a continued and contested post-permanency plan review hearing on the agencys request to set a section 366.26 hearing to change the boys permanent plan to adoption. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court followed the agencys recommendation and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother challenged the courts order by extraordinary writ petition, which this court denied in our case No. F054737 filed on May 23, 2008.

The Section 366.26 Hearing

The court eventually conducted the section 366.26 hearing in July 2008. In May 2008, Jenny Young-Cortez, an adoption specialist with the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), filed a 366.26 WIC Report assessing the boys adoptability. According to her report, it was likely that the boys would be adopted if parental rights were terminated. Young-Cortez evaluated each child as follows.

Nine-year-old T. was in good medical and physical health. At his last physical examination in October 2007, T. was prescribed a nasal spray for allergies and two inhalers for asthma. His physicians notes indicated his asthma was controlled, as were his behavioral problems; no other problems were noted. T. was developmentally age-appropriate in most areas, and while he was working on improving his social skills, the prospective adoptive parent reported T. had a more positive, respectful attitude towards his peers compared to the last academic year, and she had no concerns that would warrant a referral for further assessment. T., who was in the third grade, was performing above grade-level. His behavior at school had improved substantially as he was able to stay focused, successfully complete his deskwork and homework, and encountered fewer fights with his peers during recess.

After a January 2007 psychological evaluation, T. was diagnosed as an emotionally disturbed child with the following disorders: severe disruptive behavior disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), moderate anxiety disorder NOS, and early onset dysthymic disorder. In January 2008, a psychiatrist diagnosed T. with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). T. was attending once weekly therapy with Debora McManus, and had been prescribed psychotropic medication since June 2007. According to his psychiatrist, T. did not have any side effects from the medication and her clinical impression of T.s behavior has been stable; T. had improved his judgment and his prognosis was good. T. had also received therapueutic behavioral services (TBS) in the placement home and sometimes at school, where a therapist provides the child and prospective adoptive parent intervention tools, therapeutic services, and behavior modification on a one-on-one basis. The prospective adoptive parents use of TBS had decreased over the last six months, which was a significant improvement in T.s behavior, and TBS services were terminated in April 2008.

Four-year-old F. was also in good health, although he had allergies and asthma, which was controlled by inhalers. In December 2007, F. began attending once-weekly speech therapy sessions through the school district because he required additional work with articulation of sounds and enunciation of certain letters. He continued to show large improvements with his speech. Other than his speech, F. appeared to be developmentally age-appropriate in all areas and was reported to be a bright and clever child who was academically on-target in his preschool program. F. began exhibiting challenging behaviors the year before, such as throwing extended tantrums, refusing to comply with or pretending not to hear directives, refusing to listen to the babysitter, being disruptive in the classroom and showing aggression and antagonism towards other children as well as his brother. To address these behaviors, F. began attending one-hour weekly therapy in November 2007. Since attending the therapy, F. had learned there are consequences for his actions and was more accountable for his behaviors.

The boys each had lived in eight placements over the course of their dependency. Although Young-Cortez did not discuss their placement history, authors of earlier reports did. When the boys initially were detained in August 2003, they were placed in foster care. Between their initial detention and their return to mothers custody a year later, T. lived in four placements while F. lived in two. By April 2004, they were living together with their maternal grandmother, where they remained until their return to mothers custody in August 2004. After the boys were removed once again from mothers custody in February 2005, they were placed together in a foster home. The foster parent at first considered adoption, but eventually decided not to adopt the boys due to T.s continual behavioral issues, which included failing to respond to authority figures, lying, stealing, being stubborn/oppositional/defiant and aggressive/assaultive, having tantrums, and poor sibling and peer relationships. The foster parent agreed to retain custody of the boys until a permanent home could be found. On January 6, 2006, the boys were placed with a second prospective adoptive family, who had been visiting with the boys since November 2005. By March 2006, however, the family had decided not to adopt after expressing concerns over T.s behavior at home and in school.

On August 23, 2006, the boys were placed in a third prospective adoptive home. The prospective adoptive mother said she was interested in adopting the boys. In January 2007, the prospective adoptive mother reported she had been working on T.s behaviors, which were manageable at home but had worsened at school and with the babysitter. Consequently, the prospective adoptive mother requested additional support and services. She stated that while she loved the boys, if T.s behavior did not improve with additional services, she would no longer support his continued placement in her home.

Young-Cortez reported that through therapy and the patience of the prospective adoptive parent, the boys behaviors had improved significantly, the placement had stabilized, and the prospective adoptive parent was prepared to proceed with adopting the boys. Young-Cortez explained the prospective adoptive parent had been approved for adoption since March 10, 2006, and requested placement of the boys with the goal of adoption in the future. The prospective adoptive parent had been the boys care-provider for one year and nine months, had developed a close, loving relationship with them, was prepared to move forward with a more permanent plan of adoption, and it appear[ed] likely [the boys] will be adopted by the prospective adoptive parent if parental rights were terminated.

Young-Cortez had not observed any visits between mother, father and the boys, which visits were arranged and supervised by the agency. According to agency records, since long term foster care had been ordered in March 2006, father and mother had been allowed once-monthly supervised visits at the agency office. The boys two younger siblings, who were not dependent minors, as well as their maternal grandmother, were also present at a majority of the visits. The parents had been consistent in keeping their scheduled visits, having cancelled only two visits in June 2006 and August 2007, one due to pregnancy complications and the other due to difficulties traveling with the boys sibling. No problems or concerns were reported at the visits. The parents usually brought food, toys and clothing and interacted appropriately with the boys. The parents and maternal grandmother hug and kiss the boys, but the boys do not appear to reciprocate these feelings.

The agency assistant who supervised a majority of the visits since June 20, 2005, reported that T. did not appear to be very close to or affectionate with his parents, but T. was close to his maternal grandmother. F. did not appear to be very close to or affectionate with either his parents or his maternal grandmother, and he readily left to go home to the prospective adoptive parent, who was the only person F. was affectionate toward. The assistant believed both boys were securely attached to their prospective adoptive parent and considered her to be their primary care-provider. The assistant stated that the parents were generally appropriate towards the boys. The assistants impressions were that the boys had fun during visits, but when visits ended they readily left to go home to the prospective adoptive parent, who they viewed as a mother figure.

A preliminary adoption assessment of the identified prospective adoptive parent indicated she appeared suitable for adoption of the boys. The prospective adoptive parent had always wanted to adopt children and when presented with the boys special needs, she made a commitment to provide them a permanent home and be a responsible and loving parent. Since the boys were placed in her home, she has realized she cannot live without them and wishes to adopt them. The prospective adoptive parent was willing to provide a home for the boys despite being aware they presented with behavioral and emotional challenges. She followed through with medical, developmental, educational and therapeutic appointments as recommended, and had developed a better understanding of their special needs, striving to ensure she is able to find available resources to meet them. Young-Cortez reported the prospective adoptive parent appeared committed to the permanent care and support of the boys and had stated she was anxious to complete the adoptive placement and finalization process so they could become permanent members of her family.

F. was too young to communicate his opinion regarding the placement and prospective adoption. T. stated he enjoyed his placement and was fine and happy living with the prospective adoptive parent. T. called the prospective adoptive parent Mom and stated her daughter was a good sister to him. When informed his prospective adoptive parent was interested in adopting him, T. indicated he would like to continue to see his birth family once in awhile after his adoption. T. reported he was cool with being adopted and indicated he knew the best place for him was to remain with the prospective adoptive parent. T. did state he wished to return to his birth family when he turns 18 years old. T. understood his prospective adoptive parent wished to adopt him and F., and he reported he accepted the idea.

Young-Cortez reported that future visitation between father, mother and the boys would be at the prospective adoptive parents discretion. The prospective adoptive parent stated that she felt it was best for T. to have continued contact with his birth family once the adoptions are finalized. To that end, she would allow the boys to have face-to-face contact with their birth parents and maternal grandmother, but only during special events such as the boys birthdays and Christmas, and was willing to transport the boys for visits as long as the birth family was willing to reciprocate by traveling to her area to meet with the boys. She also would continue to welcome written correspondence, cards, telephone calls and photographs between the boys and their birth family.

Young-Cortez stated it would not be detrimental to terminate fathers and mothers parental rights in order to provide permanency for T. and F. through a plan of adoption. Although case records and discussions with the agency assistant indicated there was some bond and attachment between T[] and [his] birthparents, it is not a significant bond to warrant maintaining parental rights and keeping T[]in foster care until the age of majority. Those records and discussions also showed that F. did not appear to share a significant bond and attachment to anyone other than the prospective adoptive parent.

At the July 2008 hearing, county counsel, on the agencys behalf, submitted its case on Young-Cortezs report, an addendum report that listed additional findings requested of the juvenile court, and the case file, of which the court took judicial notice. The agency also called Young-Cortez as a witness. Young-Cortez testified she was an adoption specialist who had been employed with the CDSS for eight years. She also had worked as a social worker for four years with social services in Tulare, Madera and Fresno counties, and nine years with the CDSS.

Young-Cortez testified the boys were in very good physical condition and health, and there was no concern their physical condition would preclude them from adoption. F. was emotionally delayed and functioning at a two-year old level, while T. was diagnosed as emotionally disturbed. In Young-Cortezs opinion, these emotional conditions would not preclude the boys from adoption. When asked if it was likely the boys were to be adopted in this case, she responded, In this family, yes. When asked if she had an adopted family in mind, she responded, Yes, I do. Young-Cortez had been involved in this case from three to five years, had been familiar with the boys for awhile, and reported the boys were doing very well in their placement and had made significant progress since placed there in August 2006.

Young-Cortezs initial assessment of the boys when they were placed into long-term foster care found them not adoptable due to their emotional problems. Young-Cortez explained the current foster mother was always committed to adoption, but she wanted to stabilize them due to their emotional problems. Young-Cortez agreed that the agency had reported the birth parents interaction with the boys generally had been favorable and therefore she did not have any reason to believe there would be a problem between the birth parents and the boys. At the beginning she considered whether it would be in the boys best interests to return them to their birth parents, but she had not reconsidered that option. She had considered placement with the maternal grandmother, but determined it was not in the boys best interests and would be detrimental to them.

There was no question in Young-Cortezs mind that the current adoptive family would go through with the adoption. Young-Cortez believed the boys referred to their birth parents as mom and dad, thereby appearing to recognize them in a parental role. While T. was a nine-year-old emotionally disturbed child, in Young-Cortezs opinion he was still an adoptable child, as she would be able to locate a family for him even if his current caregiver did not want to adopt him. While four-year-old F. was functioning emotionally at a two-year-old level, Young-Cortez opined he would still be an adoptable child even if his current caregiver did not want to adopt him and she would be able to find an adoptive family for him because he was making improvements.

Although Young-Cortez believed there was a relationship between the boys and their birth parents, she did not believe there was a significant attachment. She characterized the relationship as someone the boys come to see once a month, and they play with, and they get to go home. When it is time to go home, the boys are not upset or disturbed by leaving. From April 2006 to the time of the hearing, father had not missed a visit. Young-Cortez discussed with the prospective adoptive parent the idea of the birth parents having continued contact with the boys after the adoption and she was open to it, although she was not willing to enter into a post-adoptive contract. Young-Cortez did not discuss legal guardianship with the prospective adoptive parent because she had completed an adoption home study with the intent to adopt, and went through the entire adoption program and training with the adoption agency.

Young-Cortez had discussed with T. what would happen when he is adopted, but did not tell him he might not see his birth parents ever again because the prospective adoptive parent had entertained a thought of keeping contact open. Young-Cortez agreed T. had [a] history with his birth parents and knows them, and that F. knows his birth parents are people that love him. Young-Cortez spoke with the prospective adoptive parent about discussing the adoption with the boys and asked her to discuss with T. the possibility he would see his parents after the adoption, and they are a very important part of his life. Young-Cortez asked T. questions about how he feels about his birth parents, and T. says he does miss them.

Mother testified she was opposed to termination of her parental rights because she didnt think the agency gave she and father the chance to get the boys back the right way and did not try to let father get them. Mother believed she had done everything she had been asked to do and complied with her case plan. Mother felt it was in the boys best interests to be returned to either her or father because they are their kids, she loves them, and she can take care of them.

Father testified he visited the boys once a month for an hour and had never missed a visit. There was a time when his visits were more frequent. During his once-a-month visits, which are supervised, father and the boys played baseball, ate sweets and had conversations about school and types of stuff. The boys call him Dad and mother Mom. When visits are over, T. cries a little, while F. just leaves because he is young still he didnt really know. Father did not think the boys wanted their visits to end because they have so much fun at the visit, but they know when it is time to go. Father testified the boys used to cry when visits ended, but they now were comfortable with the routine and used to it.

The last time father lived with the boys was for four months when they were under family maintenance, but he didnt remember what year that was. During that time, father was the man of the house and did things like help T. with his homework. Father did not talk to the boys about the adoption, but he knew T. didnt want to be adopted and claimed [t]hey are putting it in his head. When asked how he knew T. didnt want to be adopted, father responded [b]ecause I know he loves his parents more than anybody in this world so I already know. Father said both T. and F. give both he and mother hugs and kisses during visits, although sometimes F. is stubborn and doesnt want to do it. Father did not want the boys to be adopted because he loves them and if they are adopted, theres no telling what I am going to be at in this world. Father wanted to continue to have contact with the boys if they were adopted.

During closing arguments, the agencys counsel requested the court terminate parental rights with the goal of adoption. Agency counsel asserted the agency had met its burden of showing the boys were likely to be adopted, as they were relatively young and in good physical condition, and the boys emotional problems were improving, especially since being placed with the current prospective adoptive parent who was willing and committed to adopting them. The childrens counsel asked the court to follow the agencys recommendation. Mothers counsel argued the evidence was clear that this was not a guaranteed adoption, as the boys previously had been found to be non-adoptable and although they were placed in a household that was able to deal with their special needs, that household had asked for an extension of time so the boys could be stabilized. Mothers counsel also argued that because the adoption was not guaranteed to occur, it was not in the boys best interests to terminate parental rights since the boys had a relationship with their birth parents. Mothers counsel asked the court to not terminate parental rights and to continue the boys in foster care until it could be determined whether the adoption would really occur. Fathers counsel joined in mothers counsels argument, agreeing that the adoption was not certain to go through, and argued that guardianship should be discussed first with the prospective adoptive parent. Fathers counsel also argued there was a close bond between the parents and the boys which would be detrimental to sever, and urged the court to order either guardianship or long-term foster care.

Upon submission, the court found the boys were likely to be adopted and made the requisite findings to terminate parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding the boys are adoptable. Relying on the boys medical, psychological, and placement histories, as well as their special needs, mother contends they were not generally adoptable. According to mother, any analysis of the likelihood of the boys adoption depended solely on the prospective adoptive mothers desire to adopt them. Under these circumstances, mother further claims the children were only specifically adoptable, therefore the court was required to inquire into the prospective adoptive mothers ability to meet the boys needs and whether a legal impediment to adoption existed. Mother asserts there is insufficient evidence to support such findings, arguing a legal impediment to adoption may exist, the prospective adoptive mother may not be able to meet the boys specific needs, and is not actually capable of meeting their needs. Mother concludes, therefore, that she is entitled to reversal.

Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The adoptability issue at a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the dependent child, e.g., whether his or her age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649 (Sarah M.).) It is not necessary that the child already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent waiting in the wings. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223, fn. 11.) [] Conversely, the existence of a prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a dependent child, constitutes evidence that the childs age, physical condition, mental state, and other relevant factors are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the child. In other words, a prospective adoptive parents willingness to adopt generally indicates the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family. (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650.) (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1311-1312 (A.A.).)

Having reviewed the record as summarized above, we find no support for mothers claims. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the boys were healthy and doing well in their adoptive home. T. was developmentally age-appropriate in most areas and his social skills were improving. Although T. had been diagnosed as emotionally disturbed and with ADHD, his behavior at home and school, as well as his judgment, had improved as a result of ongoing therapy and medication, and his prognosis was good. While F. was functioning emotionally at a two-year-old level, he was in therapy and had made improvements. F. was in speech therapy to address problems he was having with his expressive language skills, which were improving. Both boys were doing well academically; T., who was described as a smart child and a quick learner was performing above grade-level and F., who was described as a bright and clever child, was on-target at his preschool.

The prospective adoptive parent was well aware of the boys educational and therapeutic needs and was actively engaged in meeting them. Although five months after the boys were placed with her the prospective adoptive parent stated that unless she received additional services for T. she could not support his continued placement in her home, over the next 16 months additional services were provided, T.s behavior improved and stabilized, and the prospective adoptive parent, who realized she could not live without the boys, was committed to providing them with a permanent home.

Given the boys positive attributes, the progress they were making in overcoming their behavioral and emotional problems, along with the prospective adoptive parents willingness to adopt them, the court properly could find it was likely the boys would be adopted. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) While mother approaches the question of the boys adoptability by picking and choosing evidence from the record to support her argument, this is not an approach we may follow on review. As we recently explained in A.A., [t]he power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citation.] All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the decision, if possible. We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.)

Mother claims that a legal impediment to adoption by the prospective adoptive mother may exist and the evidence shows the prospective adoptive mother may not be able to meet the boys specific needs because she might refuse to adopt them if they decompensate, she might not continue to take them for services they require, and she is not able to meet T.s need for continued visitation with his birth parents after the adoption. This argument is not only factually incorrect, but is based on a legally faulty premise. Ignoring the boys positive attributes and their progress in addressing their emotional and behavioral problems, mother claims the boys could only be considered adoptable because a particular family is willing to adopt. Mother contends the boys are only specifically adoptable, not generally adoptable, and under the decision in In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062 (Carl R.), the prospective adoptive mothers suitability to adopt is therefore at issue here.

With respect to a legal impediment to adoption, mother asserts that because it was stated in the adoption assessment that the prospective adoptive mother has been married once, she may still be legally married and therefore unable to adopt without her spouses permission. (See Fam. Code. 8603 [A married person, not lawfully separated from the persons spouse, may not adopt a child without the consent of the spouse, provided that the spouse is capable of giving that consent.].) Based on the fact that this statement is in the past tense, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that the prospective adoptive mother is no longer legally married. Moreover, the adoption assessment states that a preliminary assessment was conducted pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(D), which requires a preliminary assessment of the prospective adoptive mothers eligibility, and the assessment states she is suitable to adopt the boys. This evidence further supports a finding that there is no legal impediment to adoption. Significantly, mother did not object to this aspect of the report in the juvenile court or attempt to introduce any evidence of a legal impediment.

With respect to the prospective adoptive mothers ability to meet the boys needs, it was stated in the adoption assessment that the prospective adoptive mother appeared to be capable of meeting their emotional, developmental, social and physical needs, as: (1) she had provided a home for the boys for one year, nine months; (2) she was willing to provide a home for them despite being aware before their placement with her that they had behavioral and emotional challenges; (3) she had followed through with medical, developmental, educational and therapeutic appointments as recommended; (4) she had developed a better understanding of the boys special needs and strove to ensure she was able to find available resources to meet those needs; and (5) the boys appeared to be well-cared for, healthy, content and happy. Moreover, the adoption specialist reported in the adoption assessment that the prospective adoptive mother felt it was best for T. to continue to have contact with his birth family and would allow face-to-face contact on special occasions, which was in-line with T.s expressed desire to see his birth family once in awhile after his adoption. From all of this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that the prospective adoptive parent was able to meet the boys needs, including providing specialized services and ensuring the boys received visitation with their birth parents.

Mother argues, however, that because the prospective adoptive mother expressed reservations about adopting the boys five months into their placement with her, it is more than likely she will not adopt the boys if they decompensate. She also asserts that the prospective adoptive mother might not continue to take the boys for services without a social workers assistance or allow the boys to have continued visitation with their birth parents despite T.s need for on-going contact with them. These arguments are based entirely on speculation and amount to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence. We will neither speculate nor supplant the juvenile courts role as trier of fact. (See In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.)

As for mothers argument over generally adoptable versus specifically adoptable children, we frankly do not see the point. The law does not compel a greater showing if a child is adoptable solely because a particular individual wishes to adopt him or her. (A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1315-1316.) The case mother relies on for this assertion, Carl R., is so factually distinguishable from the instant case as to be of little factual or legal significance.

In Carl R., the minor, who was approximately eight years old but had the emotional maturity of an eight-month-old infant, suffered severe disabilities that would always require total care and had lived most of his life in a convalescent hospital. (Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) At trial, the court confronted competing claims over whether he should be freed for adoption by a family who would home school him. The appellate issue was very narrow what is the proper scope of the inquiry by the juvenile court in determining the adoptability of a child who will require intensive care for life? (Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) In resolving the issue, the appellate court observed that, where such a child is deemed adoptable based solely on the fact that a particular family is willing to adopt him or her, the trial court must consider whether the family can meet the childs particular needs. (Ibid.) The court concluded the juvenile court sufficiently assessed the prospective adoptive parents ability to meet the childs educational needs, therefore an inquiry into their specific educational plan was unwarranted. (Carl R., supra, at pp. 1063-1065.) In contrast here, while the boys do have special needs, medically, emotionally and developmentally speaking, they will not require intensive care for life. Accordingly, Carl R. does not compel a different result.

In sum, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts adoptability finding. This record demonstrates that the prospective adoptive mother could meet the boys needs.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile courts orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

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Gomes, J.

WE CONCUR:

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Cornell, Acting P.J.

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Hill, J.

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^[1]All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.