In re T.M.
Filed 12/5/13 In re T.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
T.M.,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E057528
(Super.Ct.No.
J238944)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior
Court of
Bernardino County.
Cheryl C. Kersey, Judge.
Affirmed.
Grace Clark, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County
Counsel, and Regina
A. Coleman, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant T.M. (father) appeals from a juvenile court’s order denying
his request to transfer the dependency case regarding his son, T.M. (the
child), from San Bernardino County to Riverside County. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2011,
the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a Welfare
and Institutions Code
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
section 300 petition on behalf of the child, who was seven months old at the
time. The petition alleged that the
child came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious
physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (e) (severe physical abuse of a
child under five). The petition alleged
that father and the child’s mother (mother)
engaged in domestic violence in the
presence of the child, that father physically abused the child, and that the
abuse resulted in injuries such as bruising, a torn frenulum, a skull fracture,
and a broken femur. The petition also
alleged that mother used marijuana throughout her pregnancy, that father knew
or reasonably should have known that she had a problem with substance abuse,
and that father also had a history of substance abuse.
The social worker reported that mother had a history of domestic abuse
and had previously gone to jail. Father obtained
a protection order against mother in February 2011, and she had no contact with
him or the child since then. Father
stated that he had been the primary caretaker of the child since February 25, 2011.
On May 18, 2011, a
juvenile court detained the child in confidential foster care.
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on June 6, 2011, and recommended that the
child be removed and placed in out-of-home care, and that reunification
services not be provided to either parent. The child was assessed by Dr. Amy Young at the
Children’s Assessment Center.
Dr. Young reported that the child had a
skull fracture, a bruise on his left chest area, a femur fracture, and a torn
frenulum (the flap of skin beneath his upper lip). The torn frenulum was consistent with blunt
force. The social worker reported that
father was not married to mother, and his name was not on the child’s birth
certificate, but he claimed to be the father. He told the social worker that he believed the
child’s injuries were sustained when the child was in mother’s care. Father insisted that the spots that appeared
to be bruises on the child were actually Mongolian spots. The social worker spoke with mother as well,
and she said she had not had contact with the child since February 2011. She said that the child did not have Mongolian
spots on his chest, but he did have one on his back.
The social worker concluded that the child had non-accidental
injuries, and that father and mother (the parents) were unable to provide a
plausible explanation for the injuries. Due to the age of the child, his
vulnerability, and his dependence on others to meet his needs, the social
worker opined that his safety and well-being would be jeopardized if he
remained in the parents’ care.
In an addendum report dated June
20, 2011, the social worker changed her recommendation to providing
the parents with reunification services. A CT scan of the child’s skull did not provide
clear findings of a fracture, and a bone survey indicated that “it [was] less
likely that there [were] fractures.†The
social worker also noted that, on several occasions, father accused CFS staff,
doctors, and other caregivers of abusing the child, but he had never
acknowledged the concerns that brought the child to CFS’s attention while in
his care.
At a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 6, 2011, the court found
that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), declared the
child a dependent of the court, declared father the presumed father of the
child, and ordered the parents to participate in reunification services.
On March 1, 2012, the
social worker informed the court that mother and father were back together as a
couple.
The social worker filed a six-month status review report on May 29, 2012, and requested that
reunification services be continued. The
parents had completed objectives in their case plans, in addition to completing
16 sessions of anger management.
Nonetheless, they had not been able to demonstrate that they had
benefitted from any of the services. The
social worker opined that their relationship appeared to be “toxic and not
healthy for them or the child.†On March 20, 2012, they had a domestic
violence incident. Furthermore, the
social worker noted that the court had ordered father to undergo a
psychological examination on May 5,
2012, but he had not made himself available to schedule an
appointment. The social worker reported
that father continued to blame everyone for the removal of the child except
himself. He had been angry, rude,
disrespectful, and resistant to any help CFS offered him. At a contested six-month review hearing on August 8, 2012, the court continued
reunification services.
On November 1, 2012,
father filed a motion to have the case transferred to Riverside,
since he and mother had moved there.
Father alleged that, since the six-month review hearing, a new social
worker had taken over the case, and he informed his counsel that he was having
problems with the new social worker.
Specifically, father stated that the new social worker “continued to
display the same attitudes previously reported by him.†Father described the new social worker as
“threatening, unprofessional and totally disrespectful during his contact with
her.†He reported that he made numerous
complaints and recently submitted two messages to the social worker’s
supervisor. Father also stated that he
met with a psychologist for his evaluation and had a confrontation that led him
to “believe that he could not get a fair and independent assessment.†Father concluded that he had ongoing problems
with the agency in San Bernardino, and since he was currently living in
Riverside, it was in his best interest that the case be transferred there so he
could receive “an independent evaluation of his progress†and ability to parent
his child.
The social worker filed a 12-month status review report on November 5, 2012, and recommended
that the court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing. The parents were living
together as a couple and stated that they intended to raise the child together.
The social worker was concerned, given
their volatile history and the recent domestic violence incident in March 2012.
The social worker was further concerned
because father still did not take responsibility for the injuries to the child
that occurred in his care. Father also
remained uncooperative with completing the court-ordered psychological
evaluation. The social worker concluded
that father and mother had still failed to demonstrate any benefit from the services
they had completed, and that returning the child to them was not in the child’s
best interest.
At the 12-month review hearing on November 13, 2012, the court heard father’s motion to
have the matter transferred. The court
stated that it did not see any reason for father wanting the matter transferred
to Riverside, except that he did not get along with CFS. Father’s counsel added that the parents now
lived in Riverside, and confirmed that father had problems with the
psychologist and the previous social worker, and that there was an ongoing
conflict with the current social worker.
Thus, father wanted “a fresh look from a fresh department so [he could]
get a fair assessment of the case.†The
court declared that it was not transferring the case to Riverside. The court stated, “We’re not going to start
over somewhere else,†and concluded that it was not in the best interest of the
child. The court then continued the
matter to December 12, 2012, for a contested review hearing. Father filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
The Court Properly Denied Father’s Request to
Transfer the Case to Riverside County
Father argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied his
request to transfer the case to Riverside County. He asserts that the question was whether it
was in the child’s best interest for the case to be transferred. He contends that the transfer would benefit
the child since the case was at the stage where the focus was on reunification,
Riverside was the county of residence of the child’s parents, a transfer would
provide father a fresh start with a new social worker and “be in a better position
to achieve reunification,†and the transfer would not create unnecessary delay.
We conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion.
Section 375 provides that “whenever, subsequent to the filing of a
petition in the juvenile court of the county where that minor resides, the
residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of the
minor were it not for the existence of a court order issued pursuant to this
chapter is changed to another county, the entire case may be transferred to the
juvenile court of the county where that person then resides . . . .†“[S]ection 375 permits, but does not require,
a court to transfer a juvenile case to the county where the parent
resides.†(In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 992 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two],
italics omitted.) The juvenile court
must consider the best interest of the child when deciding whether to transfer
the matter. (Id. at pp. 992-993.) “Matters such as placement of the minor and
transfer of the proceedings to another jurisdiction are committed to the sound
discretion of the juvenile court.
[Citations.]†(
Cal.App.4th 1469, 1478.)
We initially note the timing of father’s request to transfer the
case. At the time of his request, father
had nearly 11 months of reunification services.
CFS had provided him with monthly in-person contacts, referrals,
consultation with service providers, and monthly assistance with transportation
to services and visits. Although father
had completed some of his services, he had not demonstrated that he had
benefitted from the services. He
continued to blame everyone for the removal of the child except himself. Consequently, by the time the court considered
father’s motion to transfer, the social worker was recommending that
reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set.
Furthermore, father’s request to transfer the case to Riverside
appeared to be based on his own best interest.
As the court noted, the main reason father wanted the matter transferred
was that he was having problems with his social workers and the psychologist. His request was clearly not based on the best
interest of the child. Moreover, in
light of CFS’s recommendation to set a section 366.26 hearing to terminate
parental rights and establish a permanent plan of adoption, father’s county of
residence had very little bearing on the court’s decision about which venue
would serve the child’s best interest. (
We conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in
denying father’s request to transfer the case.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting
P. J.
We concur:
KING
J.
MILLER
J.
further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
unless otherwise noted.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
