In re Steven S.





















Filed 4/18/13
In re Steven S. CA5











NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


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In re STEVEN S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN S., Defendant and Appellant.	F065790 (Super. Ct. No. JJD064578) >OPINION

THE COURThref="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">^*

APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Tulare
County. Juliet L. Boccone, Judge.

Allan
Junker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-



The court
readjudged appellant, Steven S., a ward of the court after it sustained
allegations in a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) charging him with href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">receiving stolen property (count 1/Pen.
Code, § 496, subd. (a)),href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">^[1] petty theft (count 3/§ 484, subd. (a)), and
resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (count 4/§ 148, subd.
(a)(1)).

On August
30, 2012, the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of the court and
placed him in his mother’s custody. On
appeal, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
adjudication for resisting, delaying or
obstructing a peace officer. We
affirm.

FACTS

On February 11, 2012, at
approximately 12:05 a.m., Porterville Police Officer Michael Gray was on patrol
in a marked police car when he received a dispatch that three subjects were
carrying items and traveling westbound on Eastridge Circle. Gray responded to A Street on the west side
of a large, open field that is situated directly west of where Eastridge Circle
comes to a dead-end.

The field did not have any lights
and was dark. It had a couple of dirt
and paved roads and vehicle access on its west, north, and east sides. Gray drove onto the field eastbound from A Street
towards Eastridge with the lights on his patrol car off, but he turned them on
after traveling a few feet into the field.
Gray was then able to see the three subjects, later identified as
appellant and two other minors, walking toward him approximately 100 yards away
in the middle of the field. Appellant
was approximately six feet behind the other two minors and was carrying some
items. The other two minors were
carrying a large speaker box.

As Gray drove up to the three
minors, they stopped and stood still until he was approximately 15 feet away
then they suddenly dropped everything and ran eastbound. Two of the minors then ran north and Gray
followed them approximately 100 yards before he was able to take them into
custody. Porterville Police Officer
Anthony White eventually detained appellant in the parking lot of a restaurant
350 to 400 yards from the field and returned him to the location where Officer
Gray had seen the three minors drop the items they were carrying. At that location, the officers found a
speaker box, an amplifier, an electric drill, a book of CDs and a package of
stickers, which were later determined to have been stolen.

Officer Gray did not turn on his
emergency lights or order the three minors to do anything before they ran from
him.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his adjudication for delaying or obstructing a peace
officer because it is mere speculation that he knew or reasonably should have
known that the vehicle that approached him and the two other minors in the
field was a police vehicle. We disagree.

In determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile court proceeding, the
reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to the sufficiency and
substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal convictions
generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Those principles include the following: “In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] The appellate court
presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (>People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053.)


Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part, “[e]very
person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any ... peace officer ... in
the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or
employment, when no other punishment is prescribed ...” is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Thus, “‘[t]he legal
elements of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a) are as follows: (1) the defendant willfully resisted,
delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties.
[Citation.]’” (>In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
1325, 1329.) Flight from an officer
attempting to effect a lawful detention can constitute “delay[ing ] ... a peace
officer” (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), provided
the person fleeing knows the officer wishes to detain him. (In re
Gregory S. (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 764, 777-778; People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985-987 (>Allen).)

In Allen,
supra, 109 Cal.App.3d 981, two police
officers in a marked patrol car saw the defendant, Allen, in a group of people
standing near the open trunk of a parked car, which appeared to contain a pile
of jackets. One of the subjects was
holding what appeared to be a new jacket extended on his arm and placed it in
the trunk when he saw the patrol car.
The officer “was in the process of stopping his police car when
[Allen],” upon seeing the police car, slammed the trunk lid closed and began
walking away “‘in a hurry’ and ‘continuous[ly] looking over his shoulder’” at
the officers. (Id. at pp. 983-984.) “At
that point, ... the officers began to go after [Allen] in their police
car.” (Id. at p. 984.) “Finally, as
the officers closed in, [Allen] broke into a run and eventually attempted to
hide from the officers,” who apprehended him and arrested him for violating
section 148. (Id. at p. 987.) In appealing
his conviction of receiving stolen property, Allen “argue[d] ... that the
arrest for violation of … section 148 was unauthorized and that the subsequent
events produced poisoned fruit of an illegal arrest.” (Id.
at p. 985.)

In rejecting this argument, this
court stated, “appellant apparently contends that the officer must advise the
individual that he is under arrest or that the officer wants to detain
him. However, there is no reason to
believe that appellant would have heeded a verbal warning with any more
alacrity than he heeded the clear knowledge that the officer wanted to detain
and talk with him.” (>Allen, supra, 109 Cal.App. 3d at p. 987.)
We concluded, “Since appellant knew he was going to be detained, and
since the detention would clearly have been lawful, it was the officers’ duty
to cause the detention to be made. The
actions of appellant (running and hiding) caused a delay in the performance of
[the officer’s] duty. As [the officer]
personally perceived these events, he had probable cause to arrest for
violation of … section 148, a misdemeanor.”
(Ibid.) In Allen,
we also concluded, “Since the officer had the legal right, indeed duty,
[citation] to detain appellant, appellant, if he was aware of the officer’s
desire, had the concomitant duty to permit himself to be detained.” (Id.
at p. 985.)

Here, upon driving onto the field
in his marked patrol car, Officer Gray turned on his headlights as appellant
and the two other minors were approximately 100 yards away in the middle of the
field carrying a large speaker box and other stolen items. As Officer Gray approached the trio in his patrol
car, appellant and his cohorts stood still until Gray was approximately 15 feet
away from them when they dropped the stolen property they were carrying and ran
away from the officer. It was undisputed
in the juvenile court that Officer Gray had the right to detain the three
minors to investigate what they were doing in the dark, open field late at
night carrying the above-noted property.
Further, the court could reasonably conclude from the above circumstances
that the minors did not recognize the approaching vehicle as a police car until
it was 15 yards away from them and at that point they dropped the stolen
property and fled because they knew Gray was going to detain them and they
wanted to avoid apprehension. Moreover,
since Officer Gray had a legal right to detain the minors and the record
supports the court’s implicit finding that appellant was aware of Gray’s desire
to do so, appellant had a duty to permit himself to be detained. Therefore, by fleeing appellant violated
section 148, subdivision (a)(1) because he delayed and obstructed Officer Gray
in the performance of his duties.

Appellant contends that there is no
evidence Officer Gray activated his emergency lights or called out to him and
his cohorts or that the officer did anything other than approach them in a
dark, unlit field with the car’s headlights aimed directly in their eyes. Appellant further contends that it was just
as likely that an aggrieved owner of the stolen property or a neighbor was
looking for them or that another vehicle was simply cruising in the unlit field
for a malign purpose. Thus, according to
appellant, the evidence is insufficient to support his adjudication for
violating section 148 because the record does not contain substantial evidence
that he knew or reasonably should have known that the vehicle that approached
him and his cohorts was a police car. We
disagree.

Allowing the car to approach them
to a distance of 15 feet would have greatly facilitated the occupants of an
unknown vehicle to assault or apprehend them if that was their intent. Thus, had appellant and the other minors
thought that the vehicle was occupied by the owner of the stolen property, a
neighbor, or someone with a malign purpose, it is unlikely they would have
allowed the vehicle to approach so close before fleeing. That they did indicates that appellant and
the other minors did not consider anyone in the vehicle a threat until the
vehicle got close enough that they realized it was a police car and that was
what caused them to flee. Accordingly,
we conclude that the record contains substantial
evidence that supports appellant’s adjudication for resisting, delaying, or
obstructing a police officer.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.