In re
Filed 8/14/13 In re Stanley C. CA4/1
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re STANLEY
C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D063697
(Super. Ct.
No. J518144D)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Cynthia A. Bashant, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B.
Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas E.
Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and
Erica R. Cortez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
L.R., the
half-sister of Stanley C., appeals a judgment terminating the father's parental
rights over Stanley and selecting adoption
as his preferred plan. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.26.)
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] The sole issue on appeal is whether
court's finding the sibling relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) is inapplicable. We
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stanley
was born in 2004. His mother died in
2009. She had three older children,
including L.R., who was born in 1997. Stanley's
presumed father, Stanley C. III (Stanley III), has a lengthy history of drug
abuse, psychological problems and criminal conduct.
This
2010 in Los Angeles County,
when all the children were living with Stanley III. He was incarcerated without making any
arrangements for them, and because of his drug use, the children feared him and
did not want to continue living with him.
Further, the whereabouts of the half-siblings' father were then
unknown. The
(the Department) filed a petition on Stanley's
behalf under section 300, subdivision (b).
Stanley III
was provided with reunification services for a lengthy period. During that time, Stanley
had numerous placements. At times he and
L.R. were placed together, and at other times they lived apart but enjoyed
consistent visits. The siblings attended
conjoint therapy to address grief over their mother's death and "feelings
of rejection associated with the multiple placements."
In January
2011 Stanley joined L.R. at the
home of a nonrelative extended family member, Tiffany C. Tiffany lived in San
Diego, and in July 2011 Stanley's
case was transferred here, under the aegis of the
Agency (the Agency).
After
several continuances, the 18-month review hearing was held in
January 2012. The court found
Stanley III had not made substantial progress in his case plan. Among other problems, he had tested positive
for drugs once and failed to show up for 10 other random tests. The court terminated reunification services,
scheduled a section 366.26 hearing, and continued Stanley
in Tiffany's care.
The Agency
assessed Stanley as adoptable
because he is "an articulate, inquisitive and intelligent boy"
without "any major medical, developmental or emotional issues." The Agency nonetheless recommended a
guardianship. Stanley
and L.R. had a "significant relationship," and Tiffany was committed
to caring for them under a guardianship.
She was not then able to adopt because of financial issues.
In June
2012, however, Stanley petitioned
the court under section 388 for a change of placement. He advised that he wanted to live with
nonrelative extended family members and "mentors" Mike J. and Lisa J.
(the J.'s) in Los Angeles. The petition alleged Tiffany was not meeting
his daily needs and her home was filthy.
It further alleged: "It is
in Stanley's best interest to be in
a placement where he feels loved, cared for, and has a sense of belonging. He is extremely bonded to Mike and Lisa and
wishes to live with them. Mike and Lisa
are willing to care for Stanley,
love him like their own son, and will not only provide him with basic needs but
also provide him with a better quality of life than he is [currently]
receiving."
An
investigator with minor's counsel's office submitted a declaration pertaining
to her interviews with Stanley and
L.R. Stanley
wanted to live with his father, but if that was not possible he wanted to live
with the J.'s. He understood that if he
moved to their home he would be "far from his sisters," but he
believed he could call and visit them.
L.R. wanted Stanley to live
with the J.'s "because they take better care of him and he is happier with
them." L.R. said she and Stanley
had just returned from a weekend visit with the J.'s, and he cried because he
did not want to leave them.
The social
worker reported that Stanley liked
visiting the J.'s on the weekends. The
social worker asked him how he felt about the possibility of living away from
his siblings, and he said "bad" and began to cry. He persisted, however, in stating he wanted
the J.'s to adopt him. He said he
"would 'miss' his siblings if he was unable to see them again," but
"he 'talks to them all of the time' and he 'really wanted to be adopted.'
" He wanted to take the J.'s last
name and he referred to them as his "new family."
Additionally,
Lisa provided a statement. She and
Michael met all four children several years earlier when the children attended
an after school program she and Michael ran.
When their mother died, the J.'s "became committed to all four of
the children" and "stayed closely connected with them through all of
their placements." The J.'s
believed the siblings' needs were being met at Tiffany's, but Stanley's
were not. They wanted to provide him
with a secure and permanent home through adoption.
The social
worker found the allegations against Tiffany were unfounded. Tiffany, however, acquiesced in Stanley's
move to the J.'s home because she did not want him to have to choose between
homes. Tiffany said she would
"always have a door open for him."
The court
gave the Agency the discretion to change Stanley's placement, and in July 2012
it moved him to the J.'s home. L.R.
wished to remain with Tiffany, and the Agency abided by her wish. The court continued the section 366.26
hearing to complete an adoption assessment.
The Agency
changed its recommendation to a permanent plan of adoption. Its report describes Stanley as "cute,
social, [and] intelligent," with "some emotional issues (grief and
loss)." Further, he is healthy, has
no developmental problems, and is "an excellent student," receiving
"highest marks in every subject."
He is "specifically adoptable" because the J.'s want to adopt
him. Stanley calls the J.'s
"mom" and "dad," and consistently said he wants to be their
son. Additionally, there were 14
families in San Diego County and dozens of out-of-county families willing to
adopt a child with Stanley's characteristics.
As to the
sibling bond, the Agency's report states the J.'s were committed to all of the
children even before the dependency
proceedings began, and they intended to foster the sibling
relationship. Further, it states: "In balancing
the . . . sibling relationship against the benefits of adoption,
it appears to be in Stanley's best interest to be adopted. Prior to dependency, Stanley lived in a
chaotic household compounded by the trauma of discovering his mother
deceased. Upon removal, to exacerbate
the trauma, Stanley experienced 7 placements in two years and has not had the
opportunity to develop a sense of stability. . . . [O]ne can infer that in the event that
parental rights are not terminated and dependency is continued for an
additional 10 to 13 years . . . , it would further foster
his concept of having 'temporary homes' and also place him in a vulnerable
position of having additional placements in the future. [¶]
Overall, children deserve the most permanent plan available and Stanley
is in desperate need of stability and permanency."
At the
February 2013 hearing, the social worker testified: "[Stanley's] progressing in [the J.'s]
care. And he deserves permanency. He deserves stability. I mean, this is the first stable family he's
had. He's demonstrating claiming
behaviors by calling them mom and dad. I
mean, he's doing wonderfully." The
social worker believed adoption would not be detrimental to the sibling
relationship because the J.'s intended to foster it through consistent contact
and they were willing to have visits in their home.
Lisa
testified she intended to adopt Stanley and to "maintain as much contact
with [his siblings] as possible."
The J.'s told Stanley he could call his siblings whenever he wanted,
"let us know and we'll call them."
The siblings were welcome to visit Stanley in the J.'s home and stay
overnight. She had driven him to San Diego
to visit them, although they are teenagers with busy schedules and at times
they are difficult to reach. She
conceded Stanley and L.R. had not visited since the preceding July.
Stanley III
opposed the severance of his parental rights.
He testified he wanted his son to know he loved him, and "I just
did not give up." He also wanted
Stanley to keep his last name and to preserve the legal relationship between
Stanley and L.R. He believed Stanley was
happy with the J.'s., and he wanted his son to remain with them under a
guardianship.
The court
found by clear and convincing evidence
that it is likely Stanley will be adopted and none of the exceptions to the
adoption preference applies. It
terminated parental rights, selected adoption as the preferred permanent plan,
and designated the J.'s as prospective adoptive parents.
In
addressing the sibling relationship exception, the court explained: "[Stanley] wants to be adopted. He was even asked about his siblings. And he said he will really miss his siblings
if he couldn't have contact with them, but he still really wants to be
adopted. He's made it very clear. And given his history, and the number of
placements he's had and the instability he's had, I'm not surprised by that
desire to just be guaranteed I am never leaving this home again. And I think adoption is the only plan that
gives him that assurance you never have to leave us again."
DISCUSSION
I
"
'Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the
Legislature.' [Citation.] . . .
If the court finds a minor is likely to be adopted if parental rights
are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor under one of
the specified exceptions." (
247, 251.) "The statutory
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which
remains adoption." (
53.) The party raising an exception has
the burden of proving its applicability.
(In re Megan S., supra, at p.
251.)
"One
of the . . . statutory justifications for refraining from
terminating parental rights and placing adoptable children in adoptive homes is
the 'sibling relationship exception.' "
(In re Hector A. (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 783, 791; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) This exception applies when "[t]here
would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking
into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but
not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home,
whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close
and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's
best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared
to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
"To
show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent [or
sibling] must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the
severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each
other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently
significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial
interference with that relationship."
(In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 942, 952, fn. omitted (L.Y.L.).)
This court
has recognized "the application of this exception will be rare,
particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a
competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re
Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014, citing L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.) "[E]ven if a sibling relationship exists
that is so strong that its severance would cause the child detriment, the court
then weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship
against the benefit to the child adoption would provide." (L.Y.L.,
supra, at pp. 952-953.)
II
L.R.
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the
sibling relationship exception is inapplicable.
"The issue of sufficiency of the evidence in dependency cases is
governed by the same rules that apply to other appeals. If there is substantial evidence to support
the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. [Citation.]
We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts.
Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings,
consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm
the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports
a contrary conclusion." (
We conclude
the evidence amply supports the court's ruling.
Stanley and L.R. undoubtedly love each other and have a close relationship. They lived together for a substantial portion
of his life, and they shared common experiences, including the trauma of losing
their mother. We cannot fault the court,
however, for finding any potential detriment was outweighed by the benefits of
adoption, particularly given Stanley's young age and the lengthy period of
instability in his placements.
L.R.
emphasizes a notation in an Agency report that when considering moving away
from his sisters, Stanley said he felt bad and began to cry. L.R. concedes, however, that he nonetheless
wanted the J.'s to adopt him. Further,
L.R. told the social worker that after a weekend visit with the J.'s Stanley
cried because he did not want to leave them.
In L.Y.L., supra, 101
Cal.App.4th at p. 952, we held that, standing alone, evidence a child
"would be sad" if separated from a sibling was insufficient to show
the court erred by finding the exception inapplicable. We come to the same conclusion here.
L.R.
asserts the court should have selected guardianship because the J.'s were
willing to care for Stanley permanently whether it selected adoption or
guardianship, and Tiffany was willing to enter into a guardianship. We disagree.
"Unlike adoption, other permanency options are not equivalent to
the security of a permanent home."
(In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 231.) " 'A
guardianship is 'not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and
permanent placement intended by the Legislature." [Citation.]' " (In re
Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1156.)
"Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in
that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an
individual who will assume the role of a parent." (In re
Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.) Stanley is entitled to the security and
permanence of an adoptive home with parents devoted to raising him to majority.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL,
P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
HUFFMAN, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Further statutory references are also to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The Department also filed petitions on behalf of the other
children, but their cases are not at issue on appeal.
