In re S.F.

Filed 11/28/07 In re S.F. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maxine L.

John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jay L.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

INTRODUCTION

Appellants Maxine L. and Jay L. appeal from an order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]terminating their parental rights. We previously denied their petition (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 38.1 [now rule 8.452]) to set aside an order terminating reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. (Maxine L. v. Superior Court (Mar. 29, 2006, B188453) [nonpub. opn.].) They now contend the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights, in that the parental and sibling relationship exceptions to termination ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A), (E)) applied. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]

Maxine L. is the mother of the four children who are the subject of this dependency action: S.F., born in 1992; A.F., born in 1994; M.F., born in 1997; and Danny L., born in 1999. Jay L. is Danny L.s father.^[[3]]

The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in June 2004, when it was reported that Jay had sexually abused S.F., and that Jay and Maxine had abused all four children emotionally. The parents had a long-term history of domestic violence, and the children were afraid for their mothers life. The children reported that Jay would lock them out of the home after school until their mother returned home, denying them access to the bathroom. Additionally, S.F. reported that Jay touched her inappropriately on several occasions and tried to kiss her by force. M.F. stated that Jay touched her private part with a flashlight, but she was unable to recall much of the incident due to her age. Jay denied any sexual abuse. The Childrens Social Worker (CSW) assigned to the case resolved the matter pursuant to a voluntary family maintenance plan. Jay agreed to move out of the family home and Maxine agreed not to allow him to have contact with the three F. children.

When a child custody evaluator from the Family Law Court visited the mothers home in August 2004, she found Jay present, along with the F. children. When she told Jay he was not supposed to be there, Maxine said that she had asked him to be there for the meeting with her. The children reported that he ate dinner at the home and sometimes spent the night. The child custody evaluator discussed the matter with Maxine, who indicated that she did not believe S.F.s claim of sexual abuse. The child custody evaluator also spoke to S.F., who cried because her mother did not support her. The child custody evaluator reported the matter to DCFS.

The CSW visited the home of the F. childrens paternal grandmother, Rosalie R. The children confirmed that Maxine and their maternal grandmother allowed Jay into their home when they were there. They also reported that Jay physically abused Maxine in their presence. Additionally, he was mean to the three of them, while Danny received special treatment. He would lock them out of the house after school, while Danny would stay in the house with him. They had told their mother, but she had not stopped him from doing this.

S.F. reported three incidents of sexual abuse by Jay. In October 2003, while she was alone with Jay, he tried forcefully to kiss her on the mouth. She told him to stop, tried pushing and hitting him and ran away from him. Eventually, he apologized and said he would never do it again. He told her not to tell her mother, because she would file for divorce. Then in the beginning of 2004, she woke up at night when someone touched her. She felt a hand touching her inner thigh and moving toward her private area. She saw Jay standing over her; when he saw that she had awakened, he quickly left the room. Later in the year, Jay called her over to him when they were the only ones in the home. He again tried forcefully to kiss her on the mouth with his tongue out. She resisted and went to sit on the living room couch. He went into the living room, spread her legs apart and sat in front of her. He insisted that she give him a back massage while he rubbed her thighs. She pushed his hands away and asked him to leave her alone. S.F. told her maternal grandmother about the incidents. Her maternal grandmother told Maxine. Maxine told S.F. that she confronted Jay, who admitted the incidents. Maxine said that she would leave Jay, but instead she decided to work things out with him.

The CSW went to Maxines home, where the childrens maternal grandmother reported that Maxine and Jay were out of town. Although the maternal grandmother was supposed to be caring for Danny, she did not know where he was, only that he was at a neighbors home. When the CSW spoke to Danny, he confirmed that Jay lived with them.

After Maxine returned home, she spoke to the CSW. She denied allowing Jay contact with the F. children. When confronted with their statements, she claimed that she allowed him to eat at her home once, but she kept him away from the children. She equivocated as to whether she believed S.F.s claims of sexual abuse.^[[4]] She attempted to justify Jays actions in locking the F. children out of the house, explaining that the children went in and out of the house a lot and left the door open.

The CSW took all four children into protective custody on August 27, 2004. She placed them with Rosalie R., the F. childrens paternal grandmother, who was willing to care for all four children, although Danny was not related to her.

Maxine and Jay then met with the CSW. They blamed Rosalie R. for the childrens detention, claiming that she wanted to break up their relationship. Jay admitted being at Maxines house only once when the F. children were there. He also admitted domestic violence toward Maxine. He denied sexually abusing S.F., however. He demanded that Danny be placed with his relatives, claiming Danny was in danger at Rosalie R.s home, since he was not related to her.

DCFS filed a section 300 petition on September 1, 2004. It alleged the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to Jays sexual abuse of S.F. and physical abuse of S.F., A.F. and M.F, and the domestic violence between Jay and Maxine. (Id., subd. (a).) It further alleged the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the parents failure to protect the children, neglect of the children and substance abuse. (Id., subd. (b).) This was based on the sexual and physical abuse and domestic violence, as well as on Jays locking the F. children out of the house and his history of substance abuse. The petition also alleged sexual abuse, cruelty and abuse of a sibling. (Id., subds. (d), (i), (j).)

At the detention hearing on September 1, 2004, the juvenile court found a prima facie case had been made for detention. It ordered the children detained with Rosalie R. but gave DCFS discretion to place any of the children with other relatives. It ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services. It granted Maxine monitored visitation with the children, while Jay was given monitored visitation with Danny only.

In a report prepared for the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on October 5, 2004, the CSW reported that Danny had been moved to the home of his paternal great-aunt, Rose D. The CSW had re-interviewed Jay and Maxine. Jay continued to deny any sexual abuse. He claimed that twice when S.F. was crying, he had tried to hug and comfort her. S.F. must have misread his intentions. Jay denied any physical abuse of the F. children and told the CSW that Rosalie R. was putting ideas in their heads. Maxine stated that she did not know what to believe regarding the allegations of sexual abuse. She denied that any physical abuse had occurred.

The CSW also interviewed the F. children. They confirmed that Jay hit them and screamed at them. He never hit Danny or screamed at him, however. The children also saw Jay hit, choke and slap Maxine, pull her hair and hold a knife to her throat. Maxine denied that any of this occurred and suggested that the children said these things because they did not like Jay. Jay acknowledged that he had pushed, slapped and choked Maxine but claimed that the children were not in the same room at the time.

Jay acknowledged a past history of drug abuse and that he had used drugs the past June because [he] was stressed, but he claimed he no longer was using drugs. Maxine denied that he had used drugs since he met her.

The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was continued two times, to December 1, 2004. In an interim review report, the CSW noted that Maxine and Jay were attending the Child Sexual Abuse Program (CSAP). Maxine was attending parenting and domestic violence classes and was on several waiting lists for individual counseling. Jay was attending parenting and anger management classes and had enrolled in individual counseling.

At the hearing, the F. children testified in chambers, and Rosalie R. testified in open court. The court declared the children to be dependents of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (f). It ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to Maxine and Jay. It found that before there can be reunification, the parents will have to demonstrate the ability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the child[ren], and the ability to provide stable and appropriate housing. It further found that the extent of progress the parents have made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care has been minimal. The court granted Maxine monitored visitation with all four children. It granted Jay monitored visitation with Danny only. It ordered Maxine to participate in CSAP, individual counseling, and parenting and domestic abuse classes. It ordered Jay to participate in CSAP, individual counseling, drug counseling and random drug testing, and parenting and domestic abuse classes.^[[5]]

In an April 5, 2005 report prepared for the six month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (e)), the CSW reported that Maxine and Jay were attending CSAP, but the CSW was unable to verify their progress. Maxine was attending a domestic violence program. Maxine claimed to have completed parenting classes, but the CSW had not been able to verify completion. Maxine had not been participating in individual counseling due to financial difficulties, but with DCFSs assistance, she recently had started attending. Jay completed parenting classes. He was attending and making satisfactory progress in an anger management and substance abuse recovery program, and he had tested negative for drugs. He was attending domestic violence counseling. He also was attending individual counseling. His counselor reported that he was continuing to deny any sexual abuse and that S.F. misunderstood his intentions.

At the hearing on May 17, 2005, the court found it would be detrimental to return the children to their parents, but that it was likely the children could be returned by November 1, 2005. It found the extent of progress the parents have made in the last period of review toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care has been partial. It ordered DCFS to continue reunification services to the 12-month date. It gave Maxine unmonitored visitation with all children so long as Jay was not present. It ordered that Jay have as much monitored visitation with Danny as could be arranged.

For the 12-month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (f)), the CSW reported that Maxine had completed a parenting teens class. This class dealt with teenage behavior and was not a general parenting class.^[[6]] She had attended 10 of 19 sessions in her domestic violence program and had not completed the program. A progress report from the program stated that Maxine was still denying that Jay sexually abused S.F. and claiming that her children would therefore be returned to her. The CSW had not received a progress report from CSAP.

Jay had completed his drug program and parenting classes, although the CSW had not received a certificate of completion from the parenting program. Jay had attended individual counseling, and the counselor reported the Jay had made consistent progress in identifying and better dealing with stress and anger. Jay had attended 41 of 52 sessions in a domestic violence program. He had attended 11 of 15 CSAP programs. The program coordinator reported that Jay offered comments on others progress but was in denial as to his own problems and avoided dealing with them. The coordinator believed Jay presented a risk to children if allowed unmonitored or extended contact with them.

Maxines visitation with the F. children had been sporadic. Maxines and Jays visitation with Danny had been inconsistent.

The CSW spoke with Rosalie R. and the F. children about the possibility of adoption. Rosalie R. wanted to adopt the children. The children wanted Rosalie R. to adopt them. They did not believe they would be returned to Maxine due to Jay.

The CSW also spoke with Rose D. and Danny regarding adoption. Rose D. wanted to adopt Danny. Danny was too young to understand the concept of adoption but said he wanted to stay with Rose D. because he was happy there.

In a November 21, 2005 report, the CSW noted that she had received a report from the CSAP coordinator regarding Maxines participation in the program. The coordinator reported that Maxine had been attending therapy on a regular basis. During the past several weeks, she had been addressing her relationship with Jay, how issues from her past were currently affecting her and had been working on problem solving skills. She was honestly looking at the fact that her husband is denying the abuse. The coordinator hoped that as she addressed her own feelings, she would be able to empathize better with her childrens feelings. She understood that she needed to take responsibility for her childrens safety and well-being. The coordinator recommended that Maxine continue in group counseling and individual therapy, in that there still were areas she needed to address.

The hearing was continued until January 5, 2006. At the hearing, CSAP coordinator William Taylor (Taylor) testified that he had been coordinating the group sessions that Jay attended. While Jay initially was defensive and did not participate, he later started working with the group and becoming more active. Taylor reiterated that Jay had not accepted his part in the molestation, which created a good likelihood that he would participate in the same behaviors again. Taylor felt Jay would benefit by continuing his participation in the program, and it might help him accept responsibility for his behavior.

Taylor supervised the therapist working with Maxine. That therapist stated that Maxine would make progress and then regress, first accepting what S.F. said and then denying that any sexual abuse had occurred. Denial allowed her to avoid having to make a choice between her children and Jay. Maxine did understand the need to protect her children, in theory, but Taylor was not sure about her ability to protect them. As long as she was unable to talk with Jay about what happened, there was a probability she would be unable to protect the children.

Jay testified about the programs in which he participated. He said he had learned how to understand Maxine, how to deal with his anger, the cycle that triggers molestation and the feelings of a victim. He had learned how to be a better husband and parent, and how to communicate appropriately with his children.

Jay denied saying that he hit Maxine, although he admitted choking and pushing her. He also denied that he molested S.F. When asked how he could have a relationship with S.F. when he denied molesting her and she believed he had done so, Jay answered, Because it never happened. He was then asked how he could talk to her, and he said that he had no hate for anybody. Additional questions about S.F. brought out Jays explanation that she was molested by her uncle previously, and that was why she was afraid that he would molest her.

Laureen Novak (Novak), the current CSW, testified as to the programs Jay had participated in and completed. She testified that his visitation with Danny had been consistent. She was recommending termination of family reunification based on the progress report from CSAP, which did not recommend that Jay have unmonitored visitation with the children. Although she could surmise that Danny would be fine in unmonitored visitation with Jay, in that the allegations of molestation involved a female child, she relied on the CSAP report.

Maxine testified that she understood she was where she was because of a failure to protect her children. She had learned to be a better parent and to talk to her children more openly. She had learned to see red signs, hidden signs of molestation.

Maxine explained that she had been molested as a child. So to hear what happened with my daughter, its hard to see that, to accept it, but when I was told about my daughter and her uncle right after this came out, people started telling me. . . . I mean, I understand where my daughter is coming from, but thats something that I have to deal with myself. [] As far as my own molestation, Ive never been treated for it, but I do talk about it in my class, and thats where theyre helping me to understand my molestation so I can talk to my daughter more and to help her out with her, I guess, recovery. Maxine had not discussed with S.F. the molestation by Jay, stating, I always feel I cant discuss that with her.

Maxine later testified, I was told from the beginning of the case not to discuss the whole anything about the case with [S.F.], so I havent. And she did try to talk to me about it, and I would tell her, I cant talk to you in regard to that. If you want to talk to me, have your counselor present at the time because I dont want to go and jeopardize the case more than it is.

Maxine also explained that when S.F. told her about the molestation, I was shocked, and I was mad, but I had just started a new job. And I know thats where I messed up. I should have got her and went straight to the police, which I didnt. In the future, however, she would go to the police if one of her children came to her with a claim of molestation.

When asked, Maxine stated that she did not believe Jay molested S.F. He was not capable of molesting any of the children, in that he was their father figure. She believed someone molested S.F., but she did not know who.

Maxine also was asked to explain why she let Jay back in the house after she had agreed not to let him back. She explained that the detectives rejected the case, so she thought Jay could come back home. The CSW told her he could not come home, but Maxine had said, Well, you guys told me if its a dead case, he can come back home. We can still see each other. So she let Jay come over. The children already were in bed when he left, so they thought he spent the night, but he had not.

The court reviewed the sexual and physical abuse and domestic violence that occurred in this case. In spite of all those kinds of abuse, mother stuck by [Jay] and failed to protect these children. The Department got involved, substantiated allegations, and made a deal with mother that they would not file on condition she kept [Jay] away from the children and mother didnt. Interestingly enough, despite mothers testimony today, the information in the past report is she was well aware [Jay] was not supposed to be around the children and did it anyway.

The court was concerned that despite Maxine having been molested as a child, she allowed S.F. to be molested and did nothing to protect her. Although Maxine was the person S.F. should trust most in the world, Maxine had chosen someone else over her. Since the beginning of the case, the court hoped the services received would change Maxine. It certainly has not 14 months later, and mother continues to cho[o]se [Jay] over her children. Thats fine. Mother can choose anybody she wants. . . . [] I wish you the best of luck, but youll do it without your children.

There isother than completion of court ordered programs, there is no indication [of] any progress anywhere, as far as Im concerned. There seems to be no awareness on either of these parents part the seriousness that brought this case in front of the court, that they were both perpetrators of physical abuse and emotional and sexual on these children, and theyre clearly not aware of that today. [] And while I find that there is paper compliance, I do not find any substantial progress in all the services here.

The court found that returning the children to Maxine and Jays custody would create a substantial risk to the childrens safety and physical and emotional well-being. Maxine and Jay had made minimal progress towards alleviating the problems that caused the childrens removal. There was no substantial probability that the children could be returned to Maxine and Jays custody by the 18-month date, in that Maxine and Jay had not demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete objectives of the treatment plan or to provide for the childrens safety, protection, physical and emotional health and special needs. DCFS had made reasonable efforts to return the children to Maxine and Jay. The court therefore terminated reunification services and set the case for a permanent plan hearing ( 366.26). (Maxine L. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 2-11.)

Maxine and Jay filed a petition for extraordinary writ, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that return of Danny to their custody created a substantial risk of detriment to him. Maxine additionally contended that the evidence was insufficient to support termination of reunification services, thus the juvenile court abused its discretion in not ordering additional reunification services.

We found substantial evidence of risk if Danny were to be returned to Maxine and Jay. We explained that that sexual abuse of a sibling may support a finding of substantial risk to the remaining siblings, even if they are of different genders (In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90-91; In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 197-198). (Maxine L. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 13.) We observed that the CSAP coordinator, Taylor, indicated that although Jay had made progress in the program, he was in denial as to his molestation, was unwilling to address core issues and presented a risk to minors if allowed extended contact with them. Taylor believed that as long as Jay did not accept his part in the molestation, there was a good likelihood that he would participate in the same behaviors again. Taylor did not limit the risk to female children but testified that Jay presented a risk to his own child as well. (Maxine L. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 13-14.)

We also observed that Maxine testified not only that she did not believe Jay molested S.F. but also that she believed he was not capable of molesting his own children. If she was unwilling to believe that Jay could molest Danny, then she would be unable to protect Danny from such molestation, notwithstanding her testimony that if one of her children came to her claiming sexual abuse she would go to the police.

Additionally, Maxine and Jay continued to make excuses for their behavior. They continued to attempt to place the blame for everything that happened on others. Maxine continued to give every indication that she would continue to place a higher priority on her relationship with Jay than on protecting her children. (Maxine L. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 14.)

We also found substantial evidence supporting the trial courts denial of additional reunification services on the ground there was no substantial probability that the children could be returned to Maxine and Jays custody by the 18-month date ( 361.5, subd. (a)(3)). (Maxine L. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 16.) This was based on Maxine and Jays inability and unwillingness to address the issue of sexual molestation so that Jay would not re-offend and Maxine would be able to protect the children from such abuse in the future. (Id. at p. 15.)

For the May 4, 2006 hearing, the CSW reported that S.F. and M.F. were still attending counseling, while A.F. was on a waiting list to get a therapist to deal with anger issues. They had been visiting with Maxine about twice a month. They had been living with Rosalie R. for almost two years and wanted her to adopt them.

Danny had been living with his paternal great aunt, Rosie D., and her family since September 2004. He was happy with her and wanted her to adopt him. Maxine and Jay visited Danny weekly.

At the May 4 hearing, the F. childrens attorney reported that Rosalie R. was willing to facilitate their post-adoption visitation with Danny. The court continued the hearing to July 6, and then to September 12, 2006 for a contested hearing. The court ordered DCFS to facilitate sibling visitation. The hearing subsequently was continued several times to February 22, 2007.

At the hearing, S.F. testified that she enjoyed her visits with Maxine and wanted to continue to see her, but she wanted to stay with Rosalie R. She also enjoyed visiting with Danny and wanted to see him more.

A.F. testified that it seemed like he and his siblings had been living with Rosalie R. their whole lives. He enjoyed visiting with Maxine and wanted to continue the visits. He also enjoyed visiting with Danny and wanted to see him more.

Maxine testified that she visited the F. children once or twice a week. She visited Danny more often and participated in his school activities. She believed that she had a bond with her children.

Rosie D. testified as to Maxines and Jays visits with Danny. She said Maxine played an important role in Dannys life, and there was a strong bond between Danny and Jay. She agreed that if parental rights were terminated, she would allow Danny to continue to visit with his half-siblings. Rosalie R. also agreed that if parental rights were terminated, she would allow the F. children to visit with Danny.

Jay testified that he visited Danny twice a week; they also talked on the telephone. He coached Dannys baseball team, helped him with his homework and attended open house at school. He believed he shared a strong bond with Danny.

The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were adoptable. It found no indication that the children over 12 did not want to be adopted; they all testified they wanted to remain where they were. It also found that it would be detrimental to the children to return them to their parents.

The court noted the case had been pending approximately two and a half years. The court has seen, for the record, no differences in the last year except that the children continue to reside and bond in the homes that they are placed in . . . .

The reason there was no difference was that theres been no further support from the mother in regards to [S.F.s] allegations over the last three years, and over the number of services that have been provided in this case. [] The kind of mother that [S.F.] wants and deserves to be with doesnt exist in this case because the mother has continued to choose [Jay] over [S.F.] and her children from day one in this matter.

Maxine had denied the domestic violence, even though Jay admitted it, and she had denied the sexual abuse. Its two-and-a-half years later, [S.F.] has never backed off of those allegations, and yet mother continues to not believe her. [] Both mother and father went through extensive sexual abuse training. None of that mattered then; it doesnt matter now. [] Mother continued to indicate even at the [section 366].21(f) [hearing] she didnt believe that it ever happened and he was no risk to anybody. [] The [CSAP] therapist indicated that mother would make progress and then [re]gress, first accepting what [S.F.] said, and then denying that any sexual abuse had occurred. [] I thought it was an interesting statement, the therapist said that denial allowed her to avoid having to make a choice between her children and Jay. Maxine did understand the need to protect her children, in theory, but . . . the therapist was not sure . . . about her ability to protect them. And unfortunately mother has made that choice over and over again, including the fact that they share a residence today.

The court also noted that although Jay had been in sexual abuse therapy, his therapist indicated that he had not accepted his part in the molestation, creating a likelihood that he would re-offend. Similarly, Jay had participated in domestic violence counseling but had made no progress.

The court then turned to the question whether any of the exceptions to termination of parental rights existed. Parents are claiming that a [section 366.26, subdivision] (c)(1)(A) exception exists. [] And the children do meet the point that . . . they have maintained regular and consistent visits, which leads the court to look at whether or not the benefit to the children of their continuing relationships with their biological parents outweighs the benefits to the children of permanence.

The court had looked at the length of time they have lived with the parents; looked at the visitation since then. But this court is a very firm believer that children are entitled to permanence . . . in a home that actually loves them, protects them, and places them first. And that is what this court finds they have in their current placements. The benefit to the children of having a stable, permanent home far outweighs [the] little benefit the children get from a continuing relationship with their biological parents.

The court praised Jay for his participation in Dannys life. It noted, however, that his participation did not compare to that of the people who were there for him day in and day out, caring for him, helping him, feeding and clothing him.

As to the sibling relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), the court pointed out that both caretakers have testified that they are more than willing to continue visitation. The children want visitations; there is no indication that visitations will stop. The court added that it was Jay who demanded that Danny be removed from the home where the other three children were placed because that caretaker was not a relative to Danny, because of the different father, and then uses that argument at a [section 366].26 [hearing] to keep that child from going to permanence. Its just amazing to me. [] . . . []

So the court does not find thatwhile the children have a relationship theres no indication that that relationship will be terminated in any fashion. And therefore the court does not find that the [section 366.26, subdivision] (c)(1)(E) exception exists either.

The juvenile court therefore terminated Maxines and Jays parental rights over the four children. It ordered DCFS to take steps necessary to allow the children to be adopted.

DISCUSSION

On appeal from an order pursuant to section 366.26 terminating parental rights, the question is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in deciding to terminate parental rights. (In re Jessie G. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1, 9; In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1801.) The courts decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; Jones T. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 240, 250.)

Once the proceedings reach a selection and implementation hearing, the legislative preference for adoption over legal guardianship or long-term foster care must be heeded unless, under one of the enumerated statutory exceptions, termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. ( 366.26, subds. (c)(1), (c)(4).) The first exception arises when the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)

At this point in the proceedings, . . . the goal of the proceedings changes from reunifying the family to locating a permanent home for the child apart from the parent. [Citation.] The permanency planning hearing aims to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker. [Citation.] The abiding principle at the permanency planning hearing is the welfare and best interests of the child. [Citation.] (In re Jason E. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548.)

As a consequence, regular visitation alone does not meet the requirements of the parental relationship exception to the preference for adoption. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; accord, In re Jason E., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1548-1549.) The parent must show that severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed . . . . (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.) Among the factors the court examines in determining whether the exception applies are [t]he age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs. (Autumn H., supra, at pp. 575-576.)

Maxine points out that the children lived with her most of their lives, and she had a strong bond with them. She had participated in all the programs ordered by the court and maintained regular visitation with them after they were detained.

Maxine also points to a section of S.F.s testimony as demonstrating the existence of the parental relationship exception:

Q Now would you like to continue to stay with your grandparents?

A Yeah, I would.

Q Okay. Would you like to have an opportunity to possibly stay with your mom in the future?

The Court: The record should reflect theres been an awfully long pause. [] Is that a hard question for you to answer [S.F.]?

[Mothers Counsel]: Ill withdraw the question and ask a different question. . . . Would you like to continue to see your mom?

A Yes.

The Court: The record should reflect that [S.F.] is crying and she did answer yes.

Maxine argues that from S.F.s testimony, it could not be determined clearly that S.F. wanted to be adopted by her grandparents. As discussed above, however, the presumption was that adoption was the best permanent plan for the children. ( 366.26, subds. (c)(1), (c)(4).) It was Maxines burden to show that the subdivision (c)(1)(A) parental relationship exception existed. S.F.s testimony does not establish that S.F. wanted to maintain her relationship with Maxine over being adopted by her grandparents.

It is clear from the record that the trial court considered all of the relevant factors in making its decision to terminate parental rights. It considered the length of time the children had lived with Maxine and her consistent visitation with them. It also considered her inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the domestic violence and sexual abuse that led to the childrens removal from her custody and to take the steps necessary to put their welfare above her own. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding permanence outweighed maintenance of the childrens relationships with Maxine. (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; Jones T. v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 250.)

Jay asserts that the juvenile courts decision is not supported by the evidence, in that he had maintained a relationship with Danny and occupied a parental role in his life. It was not necessary that Jay care for Danny on a day-to-day basis.

We agree that the juvenile courts decision not to apply the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) cannot be based solely on Jays failure to care for Danny on a day-to-day basis. As explained in In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 at page 51, the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the general rule that adoption should be ordered when the child is likely to be adopted is a relationship characteristically arising from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. Day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship. A strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, particularly in the case of an older child, despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction.

The evidence is clear that there was a relationship and bond between Jay and Danny. Jay kept in contact with Danny and involved himself, as far as he was able, in Dannys life. This does not resolve the matter, however.

As noted in In re Casey D., supra, it is the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist, one of those exceptional circumstances being the existence of such a strong and beneficial parent-child relationship that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child and outweighs the childs need for a stable and permanent home that would come with adoption. (70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) Thus, Jay was required to demonstrate that his relationship with Danny was both strong and so beneficial to Danny that maintaining the relationship outweighed Dannys need for a permanent and stable home. Stated otherwise, Jay was required to show that severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive [Danny] of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [Danny] would be greatly harmed if Jays parental rights were terminated and Danny were freed for adoption. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; accord, In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.)

When asked why maintaining his relationship with Danny would be more beneficial to Danny than allowing him to be adopted by Rosie D., Jay testified: Because he needs his real father in his life, you know, not just, you know, twice a week. You know he needshe needs me there, you know, all the time to teach him whats right and whats wrong. And to help him with his school, homework, and with his sportssports activities, and just to be, you know, a role model.

Nothing in this testimony supports a finding that Dannys relationship with Jay was so strong and beneficial that maintaining it outweighed providing Danny with a stable and permanent home. If Danny needed to be taught right from wrong, helped with his homework and sports, a role model, these things could be provided by Rosie D. and her extended family with whom Danny lived or had contact. It is telling that Danny himself, though he may have enjoyed his time with Jay, wanted to be adopted by Rosie D.

There is always some incidental benefit to a child from the existence of interaction between natural parent and child. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342; In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.) However, this incidental benefit is insufficient to meet the requirements of the exception to termination of parental rights provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). (In re Lorenzo C., supra, at p. 1342.) Jay failed to demonstrate anything more than an incidental benefit to Danny in maintaining their relationship. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), exception to adoption did not apply. (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; Jones T. v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 250.)

Maxine and Jay also contend the trial court erred in finding the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)) did not apply, based on its conclusion that both caretakers have testified that they are more than willing to continue visitation. The children want visitations; there is no indication that visitations will stop. We disagree.

Subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 provides an exception to termination of parental rights when [t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.

At the section 366.26 hearing, Rosalie R. and Rosie D. testified that they intended to continue visitation between the F. children and Danny if the children were adopted. There was no evidence they would not do as they said. This provides substantial evidence that termination of Maxines and Jays parental rights would not be detrimental to the childrens relationships with one another. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1019; see also In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254; In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952, fn. 5.)

This case is distinguishable from In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, where the juvenile court had some doubts about [the potential adoptive parents] intentions, and of her appreciation of the importance of [the childs] sibling relationships. On that basis, the court had reason to question whether, if adoption were ordered, visitation would be allowed to continue to the extent [the child] needs. (Id. at p. 824.) Here, the juvenile court, having listened to Rosalie R. and Rosie D., had no doubts about their intent to permit visitation to continue. As in In re Naomi P., [w]e will not interfere with the courts conclusion in this regard. (Ibid.)[7]

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

JACKSON, J.*

We concur:

VOGEL, Acting P. J.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

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[1] All future section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] To the extent relevant, we take our facts from our previous opinion.

[3] A.F., Sr., father of S.F., A.F. and M.F., had joint custody with Maxine L. of their children pursuant an order of the family law court. He is not a party to the instant proceedings.

[4] When Maxine spoke to the police in response to a report they received about the sexual abuse, she claimed that Rosalie R.s son had abused S.F.

[5] Jay filed a notice of appeal from the courts order, claiming on his notice of appeal that he did not commit the alleged charges.

[6] At this time, S.F. was 13. A.F. was 11, M.F. was 8 and Danny was 5.

[7] For this reason, we need not address the trial courts statement that because Jay was responsible for Danny being placed in a different home than the F. children, he should not be allowed to use the sibling relationship exception to preclude termination of parental rights.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.