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In re S.B.

In re S.B.
02:02:2014




In re S




In re S.B.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 5/21/13  In re S.B. CA1/3











>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
THREE

 

 
>










In re S.B.,
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.


 


THE PEOPLE,

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.B.,

            Defendant and Appellant.

 


 

 

 

            A135649

 

            (San Francisco
County

              Super. Ct.
No. JW086350)

 


 

            S.B.
(hereafter the minor) appeals from a juvenile court order denying his motion,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782,href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
seeking to set aside findings and dismiss a delinquency
petition
filed against him in 2008. 
We agree with the minor that the record does not show the juvenile court
exercised its discretion when it denied the motion.  Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand
the matter for further proceedings.

>FACTShref="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]

            On May 23, 2008, the juvenile court
found that the minor came within the meaning of section 602 after he admitted
that on or about May 9, 2008,
when he was 15 years old, he committed a second-degree
robbery
(Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)).  In return for the minor’s admission, the
district attorney dismissed a weapon sentencing enhancement related to the
robbery, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, “a BB gun and/or a
knife”.  The juvenile court declared the
minor a ward of the court and placed him under the supervision of the probation
department.  On June 10, 2009, the juvenile court declared the
minor “has successfully completed probation,” and his wardship was terminated.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] 

            Three years
later, on April 9, 2012, the
now 19-year-old minor filed this motion, pursuant to section 782, seeking to
set aside the findings and dismiss the petition on the grounds that he had been
rehabilitated and a dismissal would permit him to enlist in the Air Force.  In opposing the motion, the district attorney
argued the juvenile court had no authority to dismiss the petition because
section 782 only applied to “open” cases and California Rules of Court, rule
5.790, only allowed the juvenile court to dismiss a petition at a dispositional
hearing.  It was alternatively argued
that even if section 782 allowed dismissal, the court should not grant the
motion because the minor’s rehabilitation was insufficient to justify
dismissal.  According to the district
attorney, “[i]f the Court were to accept the [m]inor’s position,” then all
juveniles would be entitled to an order sealing their records as long as they
successfully completed probation even if they sustained an offense for which
their records could not be sealed. 

            At a
hearing on May 1, 2012, the
juvenile court and counsel discussed the court’s authority to dismiss a
petition under section 782 if the minor was not entitled to an order sealing
his records under section 781.  The court
continued the matter to allow both parties to look into the legislative history
pertaining to section 782.  On May 16, 2012, the district attorney
filed a second opposition.  In pertinent
part, the district attorney renewed the argument that the juvenile court should
not dismiss the petition because the minor was not entitled to an order sealing
his juvenile record.  Alternatively, it
was again argued that even if section 782 allowed dismissal, the court should
not grant the motion because dismissal would not be in the interests of justice
or the welfare of the minor. 

            At the
reconvened hearing on May 17, 2012, the juvenile court and the parties again
discussed the court’s authority to dismiss under section 782, as well as the
merits of the minor’s entitlement to relief under section 782.  During the course of argument, the juvenile
court appeared to express concern that there was no appellate case law
addressing a section 782 motion made after termination of the wardship, and
asked counsel how often juvenile courts granted motions under section 782.  In response to the latter query, the
prosecutor asserted that as far as she knew a section 782 motion had never been
made in the juvenile court in that county. 
The minor’s counsel replied that section 782 motions had been filed in
San Mateo County, but counsel did not know “the rate at which [the motions]
were granted.”  At the conclusion of
argument, the juvenile court denied the motion to dismiss without comment.  The minor filed a timely notice of appeal.

>DISCUSSION

            Since the hearings held in this
matter, our Supreme Court has addressed the parameters of a juvenile court’s discretionary
authority to dismiss a petition under section 782.  (In re
Greg F
. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 416-419.) 
Consequently, the parties no longer dispute, and we concur, that
although the minor’s wardship was terminated, the juvenile court retained “discretionary
. . . power” under section 782 to set aside its findings and dismiss
the petition if the court found that the interests of justice and the welfare
of the minor required dismissal.  (>In re Greg F., supra, p. 419.)  In reviewing an order either granting or
denying a section 782 motion, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion
standard of review.  (>In re Greg F., supra, at
p. 413.)  The juvenile court is not
obliged to state its reasons for denying a section 782 motion; it is only when
the juvenile court chooses to exercise its discretion to dismiss that its
decision “must be supported by a statement of ‘specific reasons’ in a minute
order.”  (In re Greg F., supra, at p. 413.)  Thus, ordinarily, in the absence of any
showing to the contrary, we would presume the juvenile court knew and applied
“the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official duties”
when it denied the section 782 motion.  (>People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d
1026, 1032; see Evid. Code, § 664.) 
However, in this case we cannot be confident that the juvenile court’s
denial represents an exercise of its discretion in light of its expressed
concerns directed to its authority to grant the requested relief.  Therefore, we conclude the order should be
reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile court for a reconsideration of
the minor’s motion.  Our decision should
not be read and we express no opinion on how the juvenile court should exercise
its discretion in deciding the motion.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]

>DISPOSITION

            The order is reversed
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 

 

 

                                                                                    _________________________

                                                                                    Jenkins,
J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

_________________________

Pollak,
Acting P. J.

 

 

_________________________

Siggins,
J.





id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]           All further unspecified statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.  Section 782 states: “A judge of the juvenile
court in which a petition was filed, at any time before the minor reaches the
age of 21 years, may dismiss the petition or may set aside the findings and
dismiss the petition if the court finds that the interests of justice and the
welfare of the minor require such dismissal, or if it finds that the minor is
not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. 
The court shall have jurisdiction to order such dismissal or setting
aside of the findings and dismissal regardless of whether the minor is, at the
time of such order, a ward or dependent child of the court.” 

id=ftn2>

href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="">[2]           We set forth only those facts
necessary to resolve this appeal.

id=ftn3>

href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="">[3]           Despite the successful termination of
the wardship, there are collateral consequences to the minor’s sustained
juvenile adjudication for robbery, including a prohibition against the sealing
of his juvenile records (§§ 707, subd. (b)(3), 781), and a prohibition against
his possession of a firearm until the age of 30 (Pen. Code, § 29820,
subds. (a)(1), (2), (b)).

id=ftn4>

href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="">[4]           In light of our determination, we do
not need to address the minor’s other arguments. 









Description S.B. (hereafter the minor) appeals from a juvenile court order denying his motion, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782,[1] seeking to set aside findings and dismiss a delinquency petition filed against him in 2008. We agree with the minor that the record does not show the juvenile court exercised its discretion when it denied the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
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