Filed 7/13/17 In re R.V. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re R.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.


G053580

(Super. Ct. No. 16DL0239)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Arielle N. Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

THE COURT:*
R.V. appeals from a judgment declaring him a ward after the juvenile court found true one count of battery (Pen. Code, § 242; count 1) and one count of vandalism under $400 (§ 594 (a), (b)(2)(A); count 2). R.V. contends the juvenile court erred in calculating his maximum term of confinement because both counts were based upon a single objective. He also argues the probation condition requiring him to act peacefully with victims/witnesses should be reversed because it is vague. We determine R.V.’s maximum term of confinement properly included terms for counts 1 and 2. We agree the probation condition requiring R.V. to have “peaceful contact” with his victims/witnesses should be modified to give R.V. guidance as to the bounds of the proscribed behavior. With the modification, we affirm the judgment in all respects.
FACTS
R.V.’s mother took his phone away as punishment for being drunk. R.V. became upset, yelling and cursing. R.V. told his mother if she did not return his phone, he would try to hurt his stepfather, who was in another room. R.V.’s mother tried to keep him from reaching his stepfather, and he pushed her twice. Once R.V. reached the room where his stepfather was, he punched and damaged a closet door.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared R.V. a ward of the court and ordered 60 days of custody. The court also instituted probation with various conditions, including the requirement R.V. “have peaceful contact with the victims/witnesses of any offense alleged against you.”
DISCUSSION
R.V.’s Maximum Term of Confinement Properly Included Terms for Battery and Vandalism Offenses
R.V. argues his maximum term of confinement violated section 654 because it included sentences for his convictions for counts 1 and 2. He contends counts 1 and 2 were part of the same indivisible transaction and his correct maximum exposure should be for one count. We disagree.
Section 654 precludes separate punishment for “multiple statutory violations produced by the ‘same act or omission.’” [Citation.] (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) To determine whether conduct is indivisible under section 654, we look to R.V.’s “intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses.” (Ibid.) We review the factual question of whether R.V. had multiple criminal objectives under the substantial evidence standard. (People v. Nubla (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 719, 730.)
There was substantial evidence R.V. harbored two intents and objectives. The first was to push his mother, and the second was to break the closet door. R.V. became enraged with his mother when she took away his cell phone. He pushed her twice while attempting to assault his stepfather. It was only when his stepfather told R.V. he did not have his cell phone that R.V. formed a second objective of vandalizing property, destroying a closet door in the bedroom.
The crimes were not ancillary and one was not a means to accomplish the other. The juvenile court properly concluded counts 1 and 2 were separate for section 654 purposes.
The Probation Condition Requiring R.V. To Have Peaceful Contact With His Victims/Witnesses is Vague and Requires Modification
R.V. contends the juvenile court imposed overbroad probation conditions when it required him to have “peaceful contact” with victims/witnesses. The Attorney General agrees, and proposes a modification of the condition. We agree the probation condition should be modified.
We consider constitutional challenges to probation conditions under the de novo standard of review. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 878.) “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 890.) R.V.’s challenge to his probation condition as facially vague is a pure question of law, easily corrected on appeal by modification of the condition. (Id. at p. 888.)
R.V. complains the condition fails to clearly define what he is prohibited from doing, specifically how he is to have “peaceful contact” with his stepfather, with whom he resides. We agree, and conclude that the “peaceful contact” condition is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to put R.V. on notice of what constitutes a probation violation. We disagree with R.V., however, that the condition must be stricken. Modification of the condition resolves any possible confusion or ambiguity. We therefore modify R.V.’s probation condition to specify the conduct forbidden by it. The enumerated noncomplying conduct is sufficient to give guidance to R.V. and the juvenile court as to the parameters of the proscribed behavior.
DISPOSITION
We instruct the juvenile court to modify the May 18, 2016 minute order to delete the probation condition reading, “minor to have peaceful contact with the victims/witnesses of any offense alleged against you” and replace it with a probation condition reading, “minor shall only have peaceful contact with the victims, his mother and stepfather, which means not threatening, injuring, intimidating, attacking, battering, assaulting, stalking, destroying the personal property of, unlawfully distributing the personal property of, or blocking the movements of the victims.” In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.