In re R.P.
Filed 1/31/14 In re R.P. CA1/4
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re R.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
R.P.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
A139050
(Napa
County
Super. Ct. No. JV17285)
R.P. appeals from a
juvenile court order declaring him to be a ward of the court and placing him on
probation upon a finding that he committed a
aiding and abetting a burglary. He
argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding. After reviewing the record, as we must, in
the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s ruling, we disagree. Accordingly,
we affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural
Background
The burglary at the
center of this case involved a break-in of a car. On August 5, 2012,
the car’s owner drove his mother and children to a park in Napa. He parked, locked, and left the car, a Mazda. Some time later, he heard a car alarm and returned
to his car. He did not see anyone nearby,
so he disarmed the alarm, relocked the car, rearmed the alarm, and again left
the car where it was parked. He later heard
the alarm again and returned once more to his car to discover that a door was open
and cash was missing from inside.
A Napa police officer
responded to a report of a vehicle burglary and received a description of two
suspects. The officer soon located and
contacted R.P. and C.N., who matched the suspects’ descriptions. R.P. “appeared nervous,†and he and C.N. “would
kind of look at each other prior to answering the [officer’s] questions.†C.N. acknowledged hearing a car alarm but
denied being in or near a car or taking anything from the Mazda. R.P. also admitted hearing a car alarm, but he
likewise denied being in or near a car or taking anything out of one. R.P. told the officer that he had not seen C.N.
enter a car and did not know whether C.N. had stolen anything.
The officer found
$100 in cash in C.N.’s back pocket but found no “contraband†in R.P.’s
possession. C.N. and R.P. were placed
under arrest.
Three months later,
the Napa County District Attorney
filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602, subdivision (a) seeking to have R.P. declared a ward of
the court. The petition alleged one felony
count of second degree burglary of a vehicle with intent to commit
one misdemeanor count of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer.
At the May 2013 jurisdictional
hearing, a witness who lived across the street from where the Mazda was parked testified
about the burglary. The witness saw
three men, including R.P., walk by the Mazda.
they passed it to look inside, and was looking in the car. [The group] then continued down the
street.†About five minutes later, the
witness heard a car alarm. When he
looked outside, he did not see anyone near the Mazda and “thought it was a cat
or something that maybe bumped the car.â€
About 15 minutes
after that, the witness saw R.P. again.
R.P. was standing on the corner, about 250 feet from the witness’s
window, talking on a cell phone and “looking up and down the street.†The witness “[d]idn’t pay much attention to
him†and “thought he was waiting for a ride or something.†The
whom he had previously observed looking inside the Mazda reach through the car’s
window, unlock the door, and open it, setting off the alarm again. R.P. was still looking up and down the street,
and to the witness “it appear[ed] that [R.P.] was able to see his companion
reaching into the car and unlocking the door.â€
The witness saw the other man take something from inside the Mazda and
walk away “at a brisk pace.†The other man
met R.P. at the corner, and they continued on together.
C.N. and R.P.
testified for the defense. C.N. stated that
as he and R.P. were walking by the Mazda, C.N. “noticed that there was a window
down and money in the car. And so I was
[sic], quick as possible, opened the door and grabbed it. [R.P.] wasn’t around.†C.N. denied making any plans with R.P. before
the burglary, characterizing the crime as “get in and go.†C.N. pleaded guilty to the crime and was
placed on probation.
On
cross-examination, C.N. acknowledged that during his arrest he told several lies
to the police officer. He also admitted
that despite his testimony that R.P. “was not involved,†he did not speak up in
R.P.’s defense when they were arrested.
R.P. testified that
earlier on the day of the burglary, he had gone to C.N.’s house because he was
friends with C.N.’s younger brother, and the family was temporarily taking care
of R.P.’s dogs for him. A few hours after
arriving at the house, R.P. agreed to accompany C.N., whom he did not know as
well, to a 7-Eleven store.
R.P. described how
he became aware that C.N. was planning to steal something from the Mazda: “Like when I seen him go back [toward the
car], and . . . he told me, and I was oh, I’m going to keep straight. And he said okay. And he did what he did, and I was riding [my]
skateboard down the street.†R.P. wanted
“to get away from [C.N.] while he was doing it, so I wouldn’t get in
trouble. . . . [M]y dad teaches me don’t hang out with people
who steal.†R.P. admitted that he had
lied to the police officer, but he denied that he acted as a lookout or
otherwise helped C.N. commit the crime.
The juvenile court
sustained the petition’s allegations, and it then granted the defense’s motion under
Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b) to reduce the burglary charge to a
misdemeanor. At the dispositional
hearing, the court declared R.P. to be a ward of the court and placed him on
probation. R.P. timely appealed.
II.
Discussion
We review the juvenile
court’s finding that R.P. committed second degree burglary for substantial
evidence, which requires us to “ ‘ “review[] the entire record in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a
rational trier of fact could find [the elements of the crime] beyond a
reasonable doubt.†’ †(
620, 630-631.) “Whether a person has
aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is a question of fact, and on
appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are
resolved in favor of the judgment.†(
1, 5.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of
the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ †’ †(George
T., at p. 631.)
of Liability for Aiding and Abetting a Crime.
To establish a
defendant’s liability as an aider and abettor, the People must first establish that
a crime was committed. (
1227.) Then, they must prove the
defendant’s (1) “ ‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent,’ â€
(2) “ ‘intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends,’ †and
(3) “ ‘conduct . . . that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.’ †(
1069; see also Pen. Code, § 31.) The
requisite intent is the “ ‘intent to encourage and bring about conduct that
is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense.’
†(People
v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1044.)
“[I]t is elemental that one who keeps watch during the commission of [a]
crime to facilitate the escape of the criminal is guilty as a principal.†(People
v. Hill (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 287, 294 (Hill); see, e.g., People v.
Silva (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 162, 169; People
v. Jaggers (1932) 120 Cal.App. 733, 735.)
R.P. concedes that C.N. committed burglary and that he knew of C.N.’s unlawful
intentions, but he argues that the last two elements of liability were not
proven because there was insufficient evidence that he intended to aid or
performed an act that aided the commission of the crime.
1. Sufficient
evidence supports the finding that R.P. acted to aid the burglary.
Whether a defendant acted as an
aider and abettor is “determine[d] from the totality of the circumstances
proved.†(People v. Morga (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 200, 207.) “Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not
sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting, nor is the failure to take action
to prevent a crime.†(
518, 529-530.) In addition, a
defendant’s presence in the offender’s company before or after the crime does not
establish liability as an aider and abettor.
(See Hill,
292-294.) These circumstances, however,
are “factors†that may properly be considered when determining whether the
defendant is guilty as a principal. (
1087, 1094-1095.)
Here, the testimony that R.P. was
looking up and down the street during the burglary was direct evidence of an
overt act aiding the crime’s commission.
R.P. was standing at a four-way intersection, and we agree with the
Attorney General that he was in a position to signal to C.N. if he saw officers
(or others) approach the scene. Looking
up and down a street may be “innocuous†in and of itself, but it is less so
when coupled with the understanding that an acquaintance is nearby committing a
crime. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1129.) R.P.’s activity was sufficient to permit the
juvenile court to infer that R.P. was acting as a lookout to aid in a crime he
knew was in progress.
R.P.’s knowledge of C.N.’s crime distinguishes
this case from the two upon which he primarily relies. In Hill,
supra, 77 Cal.App.2d 287, one of the
defendants, Ingram, drove the other defendants to a bar and stayed in the car
while they went inside and robbed it. (
plans. (Id. at pp. 288, 290-291.)
When the others returned, Ingram was asleep and the car was not
running. (Id. at pp. 288-291.) They
woke him up and asked him to drive away, but they did not tell him what they
had done. (Id. at pp. 289-292.) Although
Ingram had aided the commission of the crime in the sense that his actions
helped the other defendants escape, his conviction was reversed because there
was no evidence that he knew about the robbery or that he intended to aid its
commission. (Id. at pp. 288, 293-294.) Unlike
Ingram in Hill, who was unaware of his acquaintances’ criminal activity, R.P. knew
of C.N.’s plans and was aware of the crime while it was occurring. This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference
that R.P. was acting as a lookout.
In the other case upon which R.P.
relies, the defendant was in bed when two other men brought a woman to his home
and raped and assaulted her. (
284, 286.) The defendant learned of the
crime several hours later, but “[t]here [was] no evidence that he in any way
assisted the other defendants or encouraged them,†that he knew of the other
defendants’ plans beforehand, or that he did anything to the victim. (Id.
at pp. 287-288.) The appellate court
granted a writ of prohibition after concluding that probable cause was lacking
to permit the defendant to be prosecuted as an aider and abettor. (Id.
at pp. 285, 289.) In
it happened or knowingly aided or encouraged it.
R.P. argues that his actions did not
actually “facilitate the crime†because he would have been unable to effectively
“keep[] watch against intrusion†since C.N. was in plain view, he was standing
too far away from C.N., and the burglary was over in seconds. But R.P. cites no authority precluding a
judgment of guilt because an act facilitating a crime could have been
aid or encouragement rendered plays little role in the crime’s commission. (See People
v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 184-185, fn. 11 [“ ‘[l]iability attaches to
anyone “concerned,†however slight such concern may be’ â€].)
2. Sufficient
evidence supports the finding that R.P. intended to aid the burglary.
We also conclude there was
sufficient evidence to infer that R.P. intended
to aid the commission of the crime based on the evidence supporting the finding
that he acted as a lookout and on his concession that he was aware of C.N.’s
criminal purpose. (See
558-559.) Although R.P. contends that
upon learning of C.N.’s plan, “he immediately voiced his disapproval and took
steps to remove himself from that activity,†the juvenile court reasonably could
have found that this testimony was not credible. The witness who lived across the street from
the parked car testified that he saw R.P. and two others walk by the parked
car, heard a car alarm five minutes later, and heard another car alarm 15
minutes after that while R.P. was standing on the corner looking up and down
the street. And R.P. does not dispute
that he waited until C.N. was done stealing and then continued on with
him. (See In re Lynette G., supra,
54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1095.) This evidence
provided the juvenile court with a basis to reasonably conclude that R.P.
intended to aid in the commission of the burglary. While it is true, as R.P. points out, that his
false statements to the police officer do not compel a finding of guilt because they could “indicate[] nothing
more than a reluctance to involve himself†or C.N. (Pinell v. Superior Court, supra,
232 Cal.App.2d at p. 288), the fact that R.P. lied during his arrest makes it
all the more reasonable for the court to have discounted R.P.’s story that he
disapproved of the burglary and immediately took steps to separate himself from
it. The court “was not obligated to
believe†R.P.’s testimony that he was not involved, and on appeal we must
accept the court’s credibility determinations.
(In re Juan G.,
We acknowledge that the evidence
that R.P. acted as a lookout to aid the burglary is less than overwhelming and may
have permitted the conclusion that he was innocent. But it is the factfinder, “not the appellate
court[,] that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.†(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357-358.) As a result, on
appeal “[t]he test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not
whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.†(People
v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.)
We conclude that substantial evidence permitted the juvenile court to
reasonably conclude that R.P. aided and abetted the commission of the burglary.
III.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Humes,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Reardon, Acting
P.J.
_________________________
Rivera, J.
misdemeanor charge was brought under Penal Code section 148, subdivision
(a)(1). Because the latter charge is not
at issue in this appeal, we do not discuss the evidence primarily relevant only
to it.
