In re R.M.
Filed 7/19/13 In re R.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.M., a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
E057757
(Super.Ct.No. J233244)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court of
Bernardino County.
Christopher B. Marshall and Cheryl C. Kersey, Judges. Affirmed.
Megan
Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene
Basle, County Counsel,
and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Mother, A.M., appeals from
the October 17, 2012, and December 11, 2012, orders denying mother’s modification petitions and
terminating her parental rights for
R.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.1.)
I.M., an infant was
diagnosed with biliary atresia, a congenital condition that could cause liver
failure and necessitate liver transplant.
While at the hospital, mother displayed mental health disorders. I.M. and R.M. were detained in separate
placements. After reunification services
were terminated, mother began domestic violence counseling and additional
therapy. The juvenile court denied her
section 388 petition. On the day of the
section 366.26 hearing, mother filed another section 388 petition, which was
again denied. I.M. was placed in
long-term foster care as a medically fragile child and parental rights were
terminated for R.M. so that she could be adopted by her caretaker. This appeal is from the denial of mother’s
two section 388 petitions and from the order terminating parental rights for
R.M.
Mother asserts the juvenile
court abused its discretion and erred in denying the section 388
petitions. Mother also argues the
beneficial relationship exception was established and the court erred by not
considering a legal guardianship instead of adoption. We conclude the record supports the orders of
the juvenile court. We affirm.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency History
Mother has five children,
with the youngest born during these proceedings. Her oldest child, A.M., born in 2001, is in
the custody of his father due to a child dependency proceeding from 2001 to
2002, which arose when mother was arrested for public intoxication. Mother was convicted of child endangerment
and incarcerated in 2004 and 2005. As a
condition of probation, mother was not allowed to have any children in her
custody. Her second child, M.M., was
born in 2003 and placed in a legal guardianship with the maternal grandparents.
B. Detention
The
original dependency petition was filed in June 2010 and alleged the parents’
failure to protect because of mother’s history of criminal endangerment,
substance abuse, mental health issues; no provision for support; and abuse of
sibling. (§ 300, subds. (b), (g), and
(j).) R.M., born in 2007, was two years
old and I.M., born in 2010, was five months old. The whereabouts of their fathers were unknown.
In May 2010, the San
Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received an immediate
response referral for severe medical neglect of I.M. from Loma Linda University Medical Center. When mother brought I.M. to Loma Linda for
congestion, he was diagnosed with signs of jaundice and possible liver
failure. I.M. needed to be tested for a
condition known as biliary atresia, a serious ailment which would require a
liver transplant. Mother resisted giving
approval for I.M.’s surgical liver biopsy.
Dr. Klooster, I.M.’s
attending pediatric gastroenterologist, expressed his opinion mother was not
capable of understanding I.M.’s condition.
Dr. Klooster believed a court order was necessary to obtain consent for
I.M. to have the necessary liver biopsy.
In telephone conversations, mother became aggressive and irrational,
showing signs of paranoia and no concept of reality. Removal of the children was necessary. R.M. was placed with a nonrelative extended
family member (NREFM) who had provided her with day care. At the June 2010 hearing, the court found a
prima facie case to detain the children.
Mother was granted monitored
visitation.
C. Jurisdiction and Disposition
After I.M. was discharged
from the hospital, he was placed in a medically fragile foster home with a
registered nurse. Test results from the
liver biopsy showed I.M. had biliary atresia and would need further evaluation
for a liver transplant. Mother may have
changed pediatricians causing a delay in treatment and preventing I.M. from
having a surgery to postpone the need for a liver transplant. Mother maintained there was a
misunderstanding and she knew I.M. had a serious medical condition and had
insisted he receive medical attention even when Kaiser emergency room had
assured her that I.M. was healthy.
Mother claimed she had taken I.M. to have a bilirubin test for jaundice
in February and March 2010 and the doctor had recommended waiting until I.M.
was four months old to run another bilirubin test.
Mother said she had switched
insurance providers in March 2010 so that I.M. could be evaluated by different
doctors and the change in providers took several weeks. The medical professionals confirmed mother
had provided I.M. with appropriate care except for the delay from February to
March 2010 in taking I.M. for the bilirubin test. Mother’s medical eligibility worker confirmed
that mother had frequent contacts with her and kept her updated as to I.M.’s
medical condition. However, the
eligibility worker also described mother as “very lost†in understanding I.M.’s
treatment plan. Mother would have
benefitted from an advocate to explain the medical procedures.
R.M. was a healthy, happy
child with no medical complications or developmental delays. R.M. had received regular medical care since
2007 and was up-to-date on all her immunizations and physical exams.
CFS recommended the children
be removed from mother and mother receive family reunification services. Mother’s mental health remained a concern but
her behavior was appropriate. Mother
reported alcohol use in 2001 but denied current drug or alcohol use since
then. She had stable employment at Kmart
since 2008. Mother was also in a
relationship with her boyfriend, Adrian, who was employed, and had an
appropriate relationship with R.M.
Mother agreed to participate in all necessary services to regain custody
of her children.
Mother loved her children
and was highly motivated. She had
supervised visits, which were appropriate and loving. Upon mother’s departure, R.M. cried and
wanted to stay with mother. Mother was
highly resourceful. In the past, she had
found adequate child care services, provided the children with routine health
care, had stable employment, and effectively used public transportation.
In July 2010, mother was
arrested for assault with a deadly weapon
involving her boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend.
After mother was granted probation, CFS recommended she continue to
receive services.
In October 2010, mother
submitted to CFS’s recommendations and the court made jurisdictional findings
and disposition orders. The court
sustained the allegations concerning mother’s history of child endangerment,
substance abuse, and mental health issues.
The court declared the children to be dependent and ordered them removed
from mother. The court ordered mother to
receive family reunification services.
D. Six-Month Review Hearing
In April 2011, mother was
living with her boyfriend and relying upon him and public assistance as her
means of support. Mother could not
continue working because of demands of her case plan including counseling,
classes, and visitation. Her random drug
tests were negative. A psychological
evaluation concluded that mother had minimized her history but was also
cooperative and showed no signs of delusions, cognitive impairment, or thought
disorders. The psychologist recommended
a medical evaluation by a psychiatrist and continued supervised visitation.
Mother and R.M. appeared to
enjoy each other’s company and were bonded when they were together. R.M. was enrolled in a preschool ready
program and mother had signed her up for Head Start. I.M.’s health had slowly improved and he was
being evaluated regarding contact with R.M.
The court found that mother
had participated in her services, attended individual counseling, family
counseling, and a parenting class, and completed a psychological
evaluation. The court found mother had
been cooperative and proactive in her case plan, was open to guidance, had made
progress, and was attending therapy with R.M.
The court ordered mother to have unsupervised overnight visits, not to
exceed four overnights a week. CFS
recommended that family maintenance services be offered to mother and that R.M.
be allowed to return to mother’s home.
At the April 2011 hearing,
minor’s counsel objected to R.M. going home with mother. The court permitted increased visitation but
denied family maintenance and ordered mother to first have a psychiatric
evaluation. In an incident on April 27,
2011, mother became upset and yelled at CFS staff because she was unable to get
new gas cards for the month.
In May 2011, mother was
having difficulties arranging transportation, appointments, and care. Mother’s symptoms and inappropriate behaviors
were increasing under the demands of parenting R.M. four days a week. Although mother wanted to parent her
children, the social worker doubted her ability. It was reported that mother had yelled at
R.M. during visitation and R.M. had accused mother of hitting her with a
toy. R.M. had a mark on her upper arm
but she could not describe the toy or say how the incident happened. Mother felt misunderstood and believed R.M.
was mad because she did not go home with mother. Visitation was changed to supervised. CFS recommended R.M. remain in a concurrent
planning home but that mother continue to receive services because of the
likelihood of reunification.
At the hearing in May 2011,
CFS withdrew its recommendation for family maintenance and asked for visits to
revert back to being supervised. Over
mother’s objection, the court ordered supervised visits.
From May to July 2011, CFS
continued to recommend R.M. remain in the concurrent planning home and mother
receive services. Mother showed poor
judgment. During a July visit, mother
questioned R.M. about missing her and elicited uncomfortable, nervous
laughter. R.M. said she did not want to
return to mother’s care. Mother
continued to have difficulties communicating with others and to display
persecution anxiety. CFS expressed
ongoing concerns about mother’s mental health and ability to parent. Although mother had participated in services,
CFS still had concerns about mother’s long-term mental health stability.
At the six-month review
hearing in July 2011, the court authorized CFS to increase mother’s visitation
and for her to have some unsupervised visits and reunification services.
E. 12-Month Review Hearing
In October 2011, CFS
recommended that R.M. remain with the foster mother. Although mother had complied with her plan
and demonstrated improvements, CFS still questioned whether mother had gained
enough skills and judgment to make decisions in the best interest of her
children. R.M. called mother “mom†and
the foster mother “mommy.†R.M. appeared
to enjoy mother’s visits but was also happy to return to the foster
mother. The foster mother was interested
in adoption. R.M. and I.M. enjoyed
monthly sibling visits but I.M. remained placed separately due to his special
medical needs. The court found the
permanent plan of return to mother’s home was appropriate but that R.M.’s
placement remained necessary and mother’s progress was moderate.
F. 18-Month Hearing
In December 2011, mother and
R.M. resumed overnight visits. R.M.
struggled with the transition but also stated she wanted to return to mother
“forever.†R.M. seemed to be enjoying
overnights with mother and I.M. On the
other hand, R.M. was recounting “outlandish tales†about events at her mother’s
home to avoid returning there “forever.â€
R.M. was receiving therapy.
Mother had combined her visits with both children and was successfully
managing appointments, obligations, and transportation. With continued support, mother could
stabilize her mental health. The January
2012 report recommended R.M. return to mother’s home with family maintenance
services.
On January 19, 2012, the
court authorized R.M.’s return to mother’s home with family maintenance
services. At the 18-month review hearing
on February 21, 2012, the court adopted the recommendations of the January 19,
2012, report. R.M. remained home with
mother with continued services. I.M. was
also placed with mother on an extended three-week visit.
G. Section 387 Petition
In April 2012, CFS filed a
petition under sections 342 and 387. The
petition alleged that, on April 13, 2012, mother was arrested under Penal Code
273.5 for a domestic violence incident with her boyfriend. Adrian told the social worker the fight had
begun when mother accused him of cheating and locked him out of the house. Mother was pregnant with their child and he
did not want to press charges.
The court ordered R.M.
detained from mother and returned her to the foster home of the NREFM, where
R.M. adjusted well because she had lived there for nearly two years. Mother’s visitation was changed back to being
supervised.
On May 8, 2012, mother
denied that she was the aggressor in the domestic incident. Mother claimed that the incident did not take
place in front of the children and had never happened before. Mother served 18 days in jail and was placed
on probation and ordered to complete a 52-week course. Mother had separated from Adrian but they
were still in contact because of the pregnancy.
CFS recommended that no
family reunification services be ordered for mother due to the lack of progress
after two years of services. CFS also
recommended the court order a section 366.26 hearing with the permanent plan of
adoption for R.M., with the foster mother as the prospective adoptive parent.
At the hearing in June 2012,
the court found clear and convincing evidence to remove R.M. from mother’s home
because mother had failed to complete her plan.
Reunification services ended and the court ordered a section 366.26 hearing
to consider the termination of parental rights.
The court granted mother weekly supervised visitation for one hour. The court denied mother’s counsel’s motion to
be relieved.
CFS requested decreasing
mother’s visitation to two times a month.
CFS was concerned that mother was blaming the foster mother and refusing
to cooperate in plans for a vacation and party for R.M. CFS asked to continue sibling visitation
because R.M. and I.M. enjoyed seeing each other. Over mother’s objection at a hearing on
September 12, 2012, the court ordered mother’s supervised visitation be reduced
to twice per month.
The
court denied a second motion for mother’s counsel to be relieved.
H. Section 388 and Section 366.26 hearing
In October 2012, mother
filed a petition under section 388 requesting reinstatement of reunification
services, documenting her attendance at counseling, therapy, anger management
and domestic violence classes. CFS
responded that, even though mother was enrolled in counseling and therapy, she
had not shown that she benefited from services in the past. Furthermore, another domestic disturbance had
been reported involving mother and her boyfriend on September 7, 2012.
Mother was absent at the
October 17, 2012, hearing because she had recently given birth to her fifth
child. The court denied a request for
continuance and also denied mother’s section 388 petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
The section 366.26 report
concluded that R.M. was a healthy five-year-old girl with no medical or
developmental problems. R.M. had been
placed in the prospective adoptive home since July 2010 and showed a strong
attachment to her prospective adoptive mother, who had provided day care for
R.M. before placement. R.M.’s caretaker
was committed to providing her with a permanent home. R.M. was strongly attached to her prospective
adoptive family and appeared happy and comfortable in their home. In contrast, mother had maintained visitation
with R.M. throughout the proceedings and their interactions were affectionate
and appropriate. Also, R.M. loved her
brother I.M. and enjoyed visitation with him.
On the day of the December
11, 2012, hearing, mother filed a second section 388 petition again requesting
reunification services. Although the
parties stipulated to the bond between mother and R.M., the court found there
was no change in circumstances and denied mother’s petition. The court found it was in the best interest
of the child to terminate parental rights for R.M. so that she could be freed
for the permanent plan of adoption. I.M.
remained in long-term foster care as the selected permanent plan.
Mother filed a notice of
appeal from the court orders on October 17, 2012, and December 11, 2012,
denying her section 388 petitions and terminating her parental rights for R.M.
III
SECTION 388 PETITIONS
A. Standard of Review
The appropriate standard of
review for a denial of a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion combined
with substantial evidence. (In re
Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1065-1067.) Abuse of discretion means the trial court’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd and results in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. (
166, 179-180; In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 319.) Substantial
evidence is evidence that is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid
value. (In re Lynna B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 682.) Viewing both standards together, the
reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision unless, seeing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, no judge
could reasonably have so ruled. (
Under section 388, a parent
petitioning to reestablish reunification services needs to show a change of
circumstances or new evidence, and establish that modification is in the best
interests of the child. (§ 388, subd.
(c)(1)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1) and (h); In re Andrew L. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 178, 190.) The court has two choices: (1) summarily deny the petition or (2) hold a
hearing. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) To avoid summary denial, the petitioner must
make a “prima facie†showing of “facts which will sustain a favorable decision
if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is
credited.†(In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) Otherwise, the court may deny the
application. (In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450.) On the other hand, if “a hearing would
promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the
hearing.†(In re Heather P. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886, 891,
904, 912.)
B. Denial of Request to Continue the October
2012 Hearing and Due Process
The hearing on October 17,
2012, took place on a Wednesday morning.
Mother had given birth sometime on Monday and was hospitalized from
October 15, 2012, to October 18, 2012. The
court denied mother’s petition without any testimony because she was absent
although the court was aware she had recently given birth.
On appeal, mother argues the
court abused its discretion, denied her due process, and misapplied the
applicable standard set forth in In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, by not continuing the matter to a
new hearing date to allow her to appear, testify, and cross-examine
witnesses. Mother argues the court’s
error persisted when it summarily denied the second 388 petition in December
2012.
In determining whether a
child’s best interests are served by a continuance, the juvenile court
considers three factors: the need for
prompt resolution and a stable environment and the damage of a prolonged
temporary placement. (§ 352;
195, 199.) Here R.M.’s best interest
would not be served by a continuance.
R.M. was in the dependency system for nearly two and one-half years from
June 2010 to October 2012. Mother was
not making progress toward reunification.
After the April 2012 episode of domestic violence, mother’s services had
been terminated. The statutory time
limits had expired. Mother may have
recently given birth but that did not offer a reason to continue the section
388 hearing when the court had already announced it would deny the petition. R.M. could only be damaged—not benefited—by a
continuance in the hearings on sections 388 and 366.26.
In addition, mother contends
she was deprived of her due process right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, such as the caseworker and persons whose hearsay statements are
contained in the reports. (
at pp. 913, 915; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(2)(B)(i).) In this regard, however, due process only
operates if there are material conflicts in the evidence or material issues of
credibility. (In re Clifton V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404-1405.) Those considerations do not apply here. It is undisputed that mother continued to
participate in various programs and therapy, as she alleges in both her section
388 petitions. But it is also undisputed
that mother continued to be involved in domestic violence with her boyfriend in
April and September 2012 and she could no longer qualify for services because
of statutory limits. Thus, mother was
not denied due process when the court refused to continue the October 17, 2012,
hearing. The same analysis applies to
mother’s arguments about the court’s denial of the second 388 petition in
December 2012. It was not an abuse of
discretion to deny either petition.
C. Changed Circumstances and Best Interests
As to the merits of her
section 388 petitions, mother contends modification would have been in the best
interest of R.M. because mother had maintained regular visitation, complied
with all of her services, and had shown changed circumstances. Mother consistently visited and completed
requested services: “Visitation and
compliance with the reunification plan should be indicia of progress toward
family preservation.†(
1774, 1790.) Due to her efforts to
comply with the court orders and take additional classes on her own initiative,
mother asserts her circumstances were changed and were not merely changing. (See In
re Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1799.)
In considering changed
circumstances, the court should evaluate:
(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency; (2) the
strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parents and
caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or
ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (In re
Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532; In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447.) Mother contends that her petitions met all of
the Kimberly F. factors.
As to the first and third
prongs, mother maintains there was a reasonable basis to conclude that mother
was recognizing and addressing the problems which caused the dependency and the
ongoing issues. Mother had reunited with
both her children before the April 2012 incident. In September 2012, she had completed 32 hours
of anger management and obtained domestic violence counseling. Mother was also enrolled in a domestic
violence/anger management program.
“Dependency proceedings are not simply a conveyor belt leading to the
termination of parental rights.†(
666, 676.) If the evidence suggests that
despite a parent’s substantial history of misconduct, there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that the relationship with the current child could be saved,
the court should always attempt to do so, as “the primary focus of the trial
court must be to save troubled
families, . . .†(Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464;
207, 218.)
Unfortunately, the record
also shows that mother and her boyfriend were involved in domestic violence
again in September 2012 and also on other occasions that had not been disclosed
to CFS. Therefore, in spite of mother’s
ongoing participation in programs lasting for more than two years, she was not
successful in remediating her problems.
Although the court did not reach the issue of the parent-child bond, it
is not disputed that mother and R.M. were close. But, based on that alone and in view of
mother’s other failures, mother did not establish changed circumstances.
Furthermore, the record does
not support it would be in R.M.’s best interests to grant the section 388
petitions. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317, 320.) R.M. was removed when she was two years
old. By December 2012, she had been out
of mother’s home for almost 30 months.
She was happy and “fully integrated†with her foster family. R.M.’s need for continuity and stability made
it in her best interest to deny mother’s petitions and move forward with a
permanent plan.
IV
PARENTAL BENEFIT EXCEPTION
Mother
argues that, based on the beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), the
court should not have terminated her parental rights. Mother asserts R.M. would benefit from a
continued relationship with mother through legal guardianship instead of
adoption. We disagree.
Adoption is the preferred
permanent plan because it is more secure and permanent than legal guardianship
and long-term foster care. (
184, 206-207.) At the section 366.26
hearing, if the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that
the child is likely to be adopted, the court is statutorily required to
terminate parental rights unless there is a compelling reason for finding that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental under one of the six
exceptions enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). (In re
Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 291.)
The burden of establishing
an exception to termination rests with the party claiming the exception
applies. (In re Daisy D., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) One of those circumstances is section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), where a parent maintained regular visitation and
contact, and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship to such a
degree that the child would be greatly harmed by termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i);
53; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
289, 297.) Courts examine the beneficial
relationship exception on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many
variables which affect a parent-child bond.
“The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables
which logically affect a parent-child bond.â€
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) A juvenile court
must balance the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship
in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging, a new
family would confer. If severing the
natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
preference for adoption is overcome. (
Courts apply a composite standard of review
that incorporates both the substantial evidence and the abuse of discretion
standards of review when reviewing a juvenile court’s determination regarding
the applicability of a statutory exception to termination of parental
rights. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1314;
621-622.) The Bailey J. court observed that the juvenile court’s decision whether
an adoption exception applies involves two component determinations: a factual and a discretionary one. The first determination, because of its
factual nature involving the existence of a beneficial parental relationship,
is properly reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Bailey J., at p. 1314.) The
second determination calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance
of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can
be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the
child of adoption. That determination is
appropriately reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Id.
at p. 1315.)
It is not disputed that
mother maintained regular visitation and contact with R.M. The issue is whether the benefit to R.M. is
greater than the value of a stable permanent home. If a juvenile court determines that a parent
has “‘maintained regular visitation and contact’†and there is a “‘substantial,
positive emotional attachment’†between child and parent benefitting the child,
and that the benefit from continuing that parent-child relationship in a
tenuous placement “‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to
outweigh’†the benefit that child would gain from the stability and permanency
of adoption, then the parent-child relationship exception is established. (In re
C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 129.)
The second determination in
the exception analysis is whether the existence of that relationship or other
specified statutory circumstance constitutes “a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.†(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) In In
re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 614, the juvenile court found that the bond
between mother and K.P. was not “strong enough†to rise to the level meriting
the application of the parental relationship exception to the termination of
parental rights because it did not constitute the type of parental bond
necessary that the child would benefit from continuing this relationship as
compared to the advantages of adoption.
(Id. at p. 623;
545.)
Here R.M. had a close
relationship with mother but she was most content and secure in her placement
with her foster mother. The existence of
a parent-child relationship is not a compelling enough reason against terminating
parental rights because mother is demonstrably incapable of parenting R.M. in a
sustained, responsible way. Mother has
five children and she is a parent to none of them. Over several years, mother had worked to
improve her parenting skills and the ability to care for her children. But, in April and September 2012, mother was
still struggling with the issue of domestic violence that had appeared in July
2010. It was not an abuse of discretion
to terminate parental rights. For the
same reasons, we do not agree a legal guardianship would be the better
alternative to adoption. (
1530, 1533-1534, 1536-1538.)
V
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion or otherwise err in denying the section 388 petitions. No beneficial relationship exception was
established. Adoption, not a legal
guardianship, is the preferred plan. We
affirm the orders of the juvenile court denying mother’s section 388 petitions
and terminating her parental rights.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
HOLLENHORST
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
