In re M.W.
Filed 8/26/13 In re M.W. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(San
Joaquin)
----
In re M.W., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C071349
(Super. Ct. No. 68026)
Minor M.W.
appeals from the juvenile court’s order to pay $2,528 in victim
restitution. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 730.6 (§ 730.6).) Minor claims he
was denied due process at the restitution hearing because the
inadmissible hearsay evidence to find he caused the damage for which he was ordered
to pay restitution. We conclude the
evidence was admissible and thus minor was not denied
due process. We
affirm the order of the juvenile court.
In
September 2010, minor was adjudged a ward, placed on probation, and released to
his parents. On July 28, 2011, a violation of probation petition
(VOP) was filed alleging the minor impersonated a police officer on May 26, 2011, and vandalized a golf
course on August 12, 2011. Minor denied these allegations.
On August 15, 2011, the People filed a
new delinquency petition alleging minor impersonated an officer (Pen. Code, §
146a, subd. (b)). Appellant admitted
this charge, and the VOP was dismissed on the People’s motion. Minor was continued as a ward and reinstated
on probation with additional conditions.
The
juvenile court later held a restitution
hearing to determine whether minor damaged the golf course and the amount
of such damages. Over a hearsay
objection, the People introduced a police report to show that minor drove
“donuts†on the golf course, damaging it.
The report included statements from witnesses that minor drank alcohol
that night, then drove a vehicle on the golf course, causing the damage, and
the minor’s admission to having done so.
At the
restitution hearing, minor denied admitting damaging the golf course, and
denied drinking that night. His father
testified and corroborated that the minor had not made admissions to the
police.
The
juvenile court ordered minor to pay $2,528 restitution to the owners of the
golf course. This appeal followed.
Minor’s
sole contention is that the juvenile court wrongly considered the police report
at the restitution hearing. Minor argues
that this admission rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair, in denial of
his right to due process.
Minor
acknowledges we have twice ruled that hearsay evidence is admissible at the
dispositional phase of a juvenile delinquency
case (In re Vincent G. (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 238, 244 (Vincent G.);
In re T.C. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 837, 848 (T.C.))
but attempts to distinguish those cases, arguing that in those cases there was
some relationship between the dismissed counts and the underlying conviction,
thus whether the minor actually committed an uncharged count was not being
established solely through hearsay
evidence. Here, minor argues, there was
no relationship between the uncharged count and the admitted count. Accordingly, he contends that when the People
and trial court relied on the police report to establish causation, they
violated his right to due process because they relied on only hearsay evidence
to prove he had committed the criminal act for which he was now being ordered
to pay restitution.
We have
previously held that: “section 730.6 specifies when restitution
730) states when restitution may be
imposed as a condition of probation. In
other words, . . . section 730.6
‘serve[s] as a floor, not a ceiling, for juvenile probation
conditions.’†(T.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 845.) Accordingly, the People were not required to
prove causation under section 730.6 before the juvenile court could order the
minor to pay restitution as a condition of probation.
According
to section 730: “The court may impose
and require any and all reasonable [probation] conditions that it may determine
fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the [minor] enhanced.â€
(§ 730, subd. (b); see also In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.) Thus, in determining whether and how much
restitution a minor should pay as a condition of probation, the juvenile court
is setting a condition of probation it has deemed appropriate under the
circumstances to reform and rehabilitate the minor. The juvenile court is not determining the
minor’s criminal liability, as such.
Moreover,
in setting the conditions of probation, it is well-established that juvenile
courts “should consider the broadest range of information,†including uncharged
criminal acts. (T.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 845-846.) Thus the juvenile court’s consideration of a
police report in setting the minor’s probation conditions, including
restitution, was not a violation of his right to due process. (See
T.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 848-849; In re Jeanette V. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 [due process is a flexible concept].)
DISPOSITION
The order
of the juvenile court is affirmed.
DUARTE , J.
We concur:
NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.
MURRAY , J.
